DCPP v. S.G. AND K.A.G., IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF K.K.G.-G. (FG-09-0110-21, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2022 )


Menu:
  •                                       RECORD IMPOUNDED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-2956-20
    NEW JERSEY DIVISION
    OF CHILD PROTECTION
    AND PERMANENCY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    S.G.,
    Defendant,
    and
    K.A.G.,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ____________________________
    IN THE MATTER OF THE
    GUARDIANSHIP OF K.K.G.-G.,
    a minor.
    _____________________________
    Argued September 29, 2022 – Decided October 5, 2022
    Before Judges Haas and Mitterhoff.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County,
    Docket No. FG-09-0110-21.
    Catherine Wilkes, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
    argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora,
    Public Defender, attorney; Catherine Wilkes, of
    counsel and on the briefs).
    Wesley Hanna, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
    cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Acting
    Attorney General, attorney; Donna Arons, Assistant
    Attorney General, of counsel; Wesley Hanna, on the
    brief).
    Melissa R. Vance, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
    argued the cause for minor K.K.G.-G. (Joseph E.
    Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney;
    Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy Public Defender, of
    counsel; Melissa R. Vance, of counsel and on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant K.A.G. 1 is the biological father of K.K.G.-G.          Defendant
    appeals from the June 2, 2021 judgment of guardianship terminating his parental
    rights to the child. Defendant contends the Division of Child Protection and
    Permanency (Division) failed to prove each prong of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) by
    clear and convincing evidence. The Law Guardian supports the termination on
    appeal as it did before the trial court.
    1
    We refer to defendant and the child by initials to protect their privacy. R.
    1:38-3(d)(12).
    A-2956-20
    2
    Based on our review of the record and applicable law, we are satisfied that
    the evidence in favor of the guardianship petition overwhelmingly supports the
    decision to terminate defendant's parental rights.      Accordingly, we affirm
    substantially for the reasons set forth by Judge Bernadette N. DeCastro in her
    thorough written decision rendered on June 2, 2021.
    We will not recite in detail the history of the Division's interactions with
    defendant and K.K.G.-G.      Instead, we incorporate by reference the factual
    findings and legal conclusions contained in Judge DeCastro's decision. We add
    the following brief comments.
    The guardianship petition was tried before Judge DeCastro over the course
    of two days. The Division presented overwhelming evidence of defendant's
    parental unfitness and established, by clear and convincing evidence, all four
    statutory prongs outlined in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). In her thoughtful opinion,
    Judge DeCastro concluded that termination of defendant's parental rights was in
    the child's best interests, and fully explained the basis for each of her
    determinations. In this appeal, our review of the judge's decision is limited. We
    defer to her expertise as a Family Court judge, Cesare v. Cesare, 
    154 N.J. 394
    ,
    413 (1998), and we are bound by her factual findings so long as they are
    A-2956-20
    3
    supported by sufficient credible evidence. N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v.
    M.M., 
    189 N.J. 261
    , 279 (2007).
    Applying these principles, we conclude that Judge DeCastro's factual
    findings are fully supported by the record and, in light of those facts, her legal
    conclusions are unassailable. Children are entitled to a permanent, safe and
    secure home. We acknowledge "the need for permanency of placements by
    placing limits on the time for a birth parent to correct conditions in anticipation
    of reuniting with the child." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. C.S., 
    367 N.J. Super. 76
    , 111 (App. Div. 2004). As public policy increasingly focuses on a
    child's need for permanency, the emphasis has "shifted from protracted efforts
    for reunification with a birth parent to an expeditious, permanent placement to
    promote the child's well-being." 
    Ibid.
     That is because "[a] child cannot be held
    prisoner of the rights of others, even those of his or her parents. Children have
    their own rights, including the right to a permanent, safe and stable placement."
    
    Ibid.
    The question then is "whether the parent can become fit in time to meet
    the needs of the children." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. F.M., 
    375 N.J. Super. 235
    , 263 (App. Div. 2005); see also N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v.
    P.P., 
    180 N.J. 494
    , 512 (2004) (indicating that even if a parent is trying to
    A-2956-20
    4
    change, a child cannot wait indefinitely).    After carefully considering the
    evidence, Judge DeCastro reasonably determined that defendant was unable to
    parent K.K.G.-G. and would not be able to do so for the foreseeable future.
    Under those circumstances, we agree with the judge that any further delay of
    permanent placement would not be in the child's best interests.
    Affirmed.
    A-2956-20
    5