ROBERT CURRIER VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD(NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD) ( 2017 )


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  •                         NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-3519-13T3
    ROBERT CURRIER,
    Appellant,
    v.
    NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE
    BOARD,
    Respondent.
    _______________________________
    Submitted January 31, 2017 – Decided October 26, 2017
    Before Judges Suter and Guadagno.
    On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole
    Board.
    Tucker Law Group, attorneys for appellant
    (Ricardo R. Jefferson, of counsel; Mr.
    Jefferson and Ian S. Clement, on the
    briefs).
    Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
    attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi,
    Assistant Attorney General, of counsel;
    Christopher C. Josephson, Deputy Attorney
    General, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Robert Currier appeals from the final agency decision of
    the New Jersey State Parole Board (Board) concurring with the
    decision of a board panel revoking his parole and establishing a
    twelve-month future eligibility term (FET).     We affirm.
    Tried to a jury in 1988, Currier was convicted of first-
    degree robbery and third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon.
    Initially sentenced to life imprisonment as a persistent
    offender, Currier was resentenced in 1991 after a remand by the
    Supreme Court, 
    126 N.J. 388
    , to an extended term of fifty years
    with a mandatory minimum term of seventeen years.
    In January 2012, Currier became eligible for parole for the
    fourth time.1   He was released with a maximum parole date of
    January 24, 2019.   In April 2012, Currier tested positive for
    cocaine, valium, and hydrocodone.     A decision on revocation was
    deferred to allow Currier to enroll in an intensive outpatient
    or in-patient treatment program.     In September 2012, Currier was
    arrested in Naples, Florida and charged with driving under the
    influence of alcohol (DUI).   Currier was convicted on the DUI
    charge and sentenced to probation.    A parole violation warrant
    was issued and Currier was arrested and extradited to New
    Jersey.
    1
    Currier was paroled in 2006, and revoked in 2009. He was
    paroled later in 2009, but revoked again later that year.
    2                           A-3519-13T3
    In March 2013, Currier waived a probable cause hearing and
    proceeded to a final revocation hearing.    Hearing Officer Carla
    Shabazz heard testimony from Florida parole officer Peter Arvin,
    and Currier's wife, Evelyn Currier.    Currier admitted to four of
    the five violations of conditions and special conditions
    including testing positive for cocaine, failing to report to his
    parole officer, and the DUI conviction, but contested the charge
    that he failed to participate in a substance abuse program.
    Peter Arvin testified that he provided Currier with sign-in
    sheets to verify his attendance at NA/AA meetings but Currier
    failed to return the sheets.   Currier testified that he attended
    NA/AA meetings six days a week from January through March 2012
    but did not obtain sign-in sheets because he believed he was not
    under an obligation to attend.
    Evelyn Currier testified that her husband completed a
    twenty-eight-day drug and alcohol program in July 2012 and was
    "diligent" in attending AA meetings.
    Shabazz sustained the violation that Currier failed to
    participate in a substance abuse program, noting "he appeared
    familiar with the group vernacular" and failed to provide proof
    of attendance.   She found that clear and convincing evidence
    established Currier committed the violations, which she deemed
    "serious and persistent."   She noted that, while Currier
    3                          A-3519-13T3
    was on parole supervision for approximately
    nine months and he had several violations of
    supervision, specifically and most serious is
    subject's use of alcohol despite opportunities
    in treatment programs and a new conviction for
    [DUI].   It appears based on subject's non-
    compliance that he is unwilling or unable to
    comply with parole supervision.
    Shabazz's recommendation that Currier's parole be revoked
    was reviewed and adopted by a two-member Board panel.      Currier
    appealed to the full Board.   On February 26, 2014, the Board
    affirmed the Board panels' decision.
    On April 10, 2014, Currier's counsel filed a notice of
    appeal, but the appeal was dismissed on October 29, 2015 for
    failure to prosecute.   We reinstated the appeal on March 4,
    2016.   Currier now raises one point on appeal:
    POINT I
    THE COURT MUST REVERSE THE REVOCATION OF MR.
    CURRIER'S PAROLE BECAUSE THE BOARD'S
    DECISION WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AS IT
    DID NOT CONSIDER ALL OF THE EVIDENCE BEFORE
    IT.
    Our scope of review here is limited and subject to the same
    standard as other administrative reviews. Trantino v. N.J. State
    Parole Bd., 
    166 N.J. 113
    , 173 (2001) (Trantino VI).     We must
    affirm the administrative action unless it was "arbitrary,
    capricious or unreasonable, or not supported by substantial
    credible evidence in the record as a whole." Warren Hosp. v.
    4                            A-3519-13T3
    N.J. Dep't of Human Servs., Div. of Mental Health Servs., 
    407 N.J. Super. 598
    , 610 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting SSI Med. Servs.,
    Inc. v. State, Dep't of Human Servs., Div. of Med. Assistance
    and Health Servs., 
    146 N.J. 614
    , 620 (1996)).   "The burden of
    demonstrating arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable action rests
    upon the party challenging the administrative action." 
    Ibid.
    (citing McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 
    347 N.J. Super. 544
    ,
    563 (App. Div. 2002)).   We accord a "strong presumption of
    reasonableness" to the agency's exercise of its statutorily-
    delegated responsibilities. Newark v. Natural Res. Council Dep't
    Envtl. Prot., 
    82 N.J. 530
    , 539, cert. denied, 
    449 U.S. 983
    , 
    101 S. Ct. 400
    , 
    66 L. Ed. 2d 245
     (1980).
    Currier contends that the Board "rubber stamped" the
    hearing officer's recommendation without independently
    considering the evidence.   We disagree.
    The Board's decision first identified the five violations
    Currier was charged with:
    1. Failure to obey all laws and ordinances;
    2. Failure to report as instructed;
    3. Failure to refrain from the use or possession of
    controlled dangerous substances;
    4. Failure to participate in a substance abuse self
    help program with community sponsor; and
    5                          A-3519-13T3
    5. Failure to refrain from alcohol usage.
    The Board then noted that Currier admitted to all of the
    violations with the exception of the requirement that he
    participate in a substance abuse treatment program.   The Board
    rejected Currier's claim that the hearing officer refused to
    accept evidence that he had attended various drug and alcohol
    recovery programs, noting the record indicates that there was
    "substantial and significant testimony given concerning Mr.
    Currier's recovery program attendance."
    Currier claims that the Board failed to consider his
    automobile accident and that his relapse was caused in part by
    his inability to obtain prescribed narcotics.   The Board's
    decision indicated that the Board panel considered Currier's
    statements in mitigation of the violations.
    Based upon our review of the record and legal arguments, we
    are satisfied that the Board had ample factual and legal basis
    to conclude that clear and convincing evidence was presented to
    demonstrate that Currier violated the conditions of his parole
    and revocation was appropriate.
    Affirmed.
    6                        A-3519-13T3