CHARLES H. ROBINSON JR. VS. BOARD OF REVIEW (BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR) ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2428-18T2
CHARLES H. ROBINSON JR.,1
Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF REVIEW,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
and ACCOUNTING
PRINCIPALS, INC. (FL),
Respondents.
____________________________
Submitted December 18, 2019 – Decided January 7, 2020
Before Judges Haas and Enright.
On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of
Labor, Docket No. 162,956.
Charles H. Robinson, Jr., appellant pro se.
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent Board of Review (Donna Arons, Assistant
Attorney General, of counsel; Andy Jong, Deputy
Attorney General, on the brief).
1
Appellant is referenced in the record also as Charles Henry Robinson, Jr.
Respondent Accounting Principals, Inc. (FL) has not
filed a brief.
PER CURIAM
Claimant Charles H. Robinson, Jr. appeals from the December 20, 2018
final decision of the Board of Review (Board). We affirm.
Robinson worked for Accounting Principals, Inc. (API) from March 26,
2018 until August 24, 2018, when he was terminated from employment. He
filed for benefits on September 2, 2018. A Deputy of the Division of
Unemployment and Disability Insurance determined Robinson's unemployment
claim was valid and that he was entitled to a weekly benefit rate of $536 and a
maximum benefit amount of $6432. Robinson appealed from this determination
to the Appeals Tribunal, which issued a decision in November 2018 affirming
the Deputy's decision. Robinson then appealed to the Board, which upheld the
Appeal Tribunal's decision. This appeal followed.
Robinson argues his benefit was not properly calculated and that the
entirety of his earnings from API should have been considered to calculate his
benefit. We disagree.
A-2428-18T2
2
N.J.S.A. 43:21-19(c)(1) defines the term base year to mean "the first four
of the last five completed calendar quarters immediately preceding an
individual's benefit year."2 Further, the statute provides:
With respect to a benefit year commencing on or after
July 1, 1995, if an individual does not have sufficient
qualifying weeks or wages in his [or her] base year to
qualify for benefits, the individual shall have the option
of designating that [the] base year shall be the
"alternative base year," which means the last four
completed calendar quarters immediately preceding the
individual's benefit year; except that, with respect to a
benefit year after October 1, 1995, if the individual also
does not have sufficient qualifying weeks or wages in
the last four completed calendar quarters immediately
preceding his [or her] benefit year to qualify for
benefits, "alternative base year" means the last three
completed calendar quarters immediately preceding
[the individual's] benefit year and, of the calendar
quarter in which the benefit year commences, the
portion of the quarter which occurs before the
commencing of the benefit.
[Ibid.]
Preceding his claim for unemployment benefits, Robinson earned the
following income:
2
"Benefit year," under N.J.S.A. 43:21-19(d), is defined as "the 364 consecutive
calendar days beginning with the day on, or as of, which [an individual] first
files a valid claim for benefits, and thereafter, beginning with the day on, or as
of, which the individual next files a valid claim for benefits after the termination
of his last preceding benefit year."
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Second calendar quarter of 2017: zero wages; zero base
weeks in employment;
Third calendar quarter of 2017: zero wages; zero base
weeks in employment;
Fourth calendar quarter of 2017: zero wages; zero base
weeks in employment;
First calendar quarter of 2018: zero wages; zero base
weeks in employment;
Second calendar quarter of 2018: $10,725.37 in wages;
twelve base weeks in employment;
Third calendar quarter of 2018 through September 1,
2018: $8157.19 in wages; nine base weeks in
employment.
Robinson's regular base year was April 1, 2017 through March 31, 2018
(the first four of the last five completed calendar quarters before the claim was
filed). However, he was not employed during this period, so his regular base
year did not result in a valid claim. Accordingly, the Appeals Tribunal
considered his first alternate base year, July 1, 2017 through June 30, 2018. The
first alternate base year resulted in a valid claim.
Importantly, N.J.S.A. 43:21-19(c) and N.J.A.C. 12:17-5.2 only allow for
consideration of a second alternate base year if the first alternate base year does
not result in a valid claim. In this case, Robinson's first alternate base year
resulted in a valid claim. Therefore, any earnings which fell outside of his first
alternate base year, specifically the $8157.19 Robinson earned in the third
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quarter of 2018 through September 1, 2018, were properly excluded in the
calculation of his benefit.
Our review of an administrative agency decision is limited. Brady v. Bd.
of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997). "If the Board's factual findings are
supported 'by sufficient credible evidence, [we] are obliged to accept them.'"
Ibid. (quoting Self v. Bd. of Review, 91 N.J. 453, 459 (1982)). We also accord
substantial deference to the agency's interpretation of the statute it is charged
with enforcing. Bd. of Educ. of Neptune v. Neptune Twp. Educ. Ass'n., 144
N.J. 16, 31 (1996).
"[I]n reviewing the factual findings made in an unemployment
compensation proceeding, the test is not whether [we] would come to the same
conclusion if the original determination was [ours] to make, but rather whether
the factfinder could reasonably so conclude upon the proofs." Brady, 152 N.J.
at 210 (quoting Charatan v. Bd. of Review, 200 N.J. Super. 74, 79 (App Div.
1985)). "Unless . . . the agency's action was arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable, the agency's ruling should not be disturbed." Ibid. Given our
deferential standard of review, there is no basis to disturb the Board's affirmance
of the Appeal Tribunal's determination.
Affirmed.
A-2428-18T2
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