STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. G.E.P. (11-02-0138, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2021 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0112-20T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
G.E.P.,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Argued January 13, 2021 – Decided February 2, 2021
Before Judges Accurso and Vernoia.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Morris County, Indictment No. 11-02-0138.
Anne M. Collart argued the cause for appellant
(Gibbons P.C., attorneys; Lawrence S. Lustberg and
Anne M. Collart, on the briefs).
Paula Jordao, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting
Chief Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for
respondent (Robert J. Carroll, Acting Morris County
Prosecutor, attorney; John McNamara, Jr., of counsel
and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant G.E.P. appeals from an order denying his Rule 3:21-10(b)(2)
motion to amend the aggregate thirty-year prison sentence imposed for his
convictions for six counts of first-degree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A.
2C:14-2(a)(1), and seven counts of second-degree aggravated sexual assault,
N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b).1 Defendant requested an amendment of his sentence—
release from custody—because prison presents a heightened risk for contracting
the COVID-19 virus, and because his medical conditions—including cardiac
issues and other ailments—present an increased "risk of serious illness or death"
if he contracts the virus.2 In a thorough and well-reasoned written decision,
Judge Stephen J. Taylor denied defendant's motion. We affirm.
1
We use initials to preserve the confidentiality of these proceedings. See R.
1:38-3(c)(9) and (12).
2
We describe the relief sought in defendant's motion based on the court's
decision and the briefs on appeal. The record on appeal does not include th e
notice of motion filed with the court, and neither the briefs on appeal nor
defendant's appendix identify the precise record that was presented to the motion
court. We note that the court's written decision denying defendant's motion
refers to "voluminous 'Inmate Progress Notes Reports'" and a "supplemental
filing" by the State detailing steps taken by the New Jersey Department of
Corrections to control the spread of the COVID-19 virus, but none of these
documents is included in the record on appeal. See generally R. 2:6-1(a)(1)(B)
and (I) (requiring that the record on appeal include "all docket entries in the
proceedings" before the trial court and "such other parts of the record . . . as are
essential to the proper consideration of the issues").
A-0112-20T4
2
Following his July 2015 convictions, the court remanded defendant to
custody and sentenced him to an aggregate thirty-year custodial term. 3 Four
years later, we reversed defendant's conviction and remanded for a new trial,
State v. G.E.P., 458 N.J. Super. 436, 465 (App. Div. 2019), and defendant was
released on bail. The following year, the Supreme Court reinstated defendant's
convictions and sentence, State v. G.E.P., 243 N.J. 362, 393 (2020), and
defendant was ordered to return to custody.
Prior to his return to custody, defendant moved under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2)
to amend his sentence to permit his release from the remaining custodial portion
of his sentence. He also claimed the court had the inherent authority
independent of the Rule to modify his sentence to allow for home confinement
with restrictions. Defendant asserted the requested relief was warranted because
he had aortic valve replacement surgery prior to his 2015 trial; he has a
permanent pacemaker; and he suffers from a mild thoracic aneurysm,
hypertension, hyperlipidemia, and carotid stenosis. He claimed that due to his
medical conditions and age—sixty-three—and the heightened risk of exposure
3
Defendant is not subject to the requirements of the No Early Release Act,
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. He was convicted of crimes committed prior to the statute's
enactment in 1997. See L. 1997, c. 117.
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to the COVID-19 virus under the conditions in prison, his incarceration "could
prove life-threatening."
After hearing argument, Judge Taylor entered an order denying the motion
and, in a comprehensive written opinion, made detailed findings of fact and
conclusions of law supporting his decision. The court ordered that defendant
return to custody on August 28, 2020, and it subsequently denied defendant's
motion for a stay of the order. We denied defendant's application to file an
emergent motion challenging the denial of the stay. This appeal from the order
denying defendant's motion for an amendment of his sentence followed.
Defendant presents the following arguments for our consideration:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT FUNDAMENTALLY
MISUNDERSTOOD AND MISAPPLIED THE
SUPREME COURT'S DECISION [IN THE MATTER
OF THE] REQUEST TO MODIFY PRISON
SENTENCES, 242 N.J. 357 (2020), AS WELL AS
OTHER GOVERNING PRECEDENT, IN DENYING
[DEFENDANT'S] RULE 3:21-10[(b)](2) MOTION.
A. The trial court ignored the "amplified" risk
presented by the novel coronavirus to individuals with
underlying conditions in the prison setting that
underpins Request to Modify Prison Sentences.
B. The trial court failed to meaningfully consider all of
the Priester factors and ignored the requirement in
Wright to examine whether continued confinement
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would exacerbate or hasten the progression of his
disease.
C. The trial court's dismissal of [defendant's] proffered
evidence of rehabilitation contravenes the legal
requirement that such post-offense conduct be taken
into consideration when evaluating a defendant's
sentence.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT WAS INCORRECT IN
HOLDING THAT IT LACKED THE AUTHORITY
TO POSTPONE [DEFENDANT'S] SURRENDER IN
ORDER TO ASSURE HIS SAFETY.
Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) provides for the grant of "extraordinary relief"—
release from "a custodial sentence . . . because of illness or infirmity of the
defendant." In the Matter of the Request to Modify Prison Sentences, 242 N.J.
357, 378 (2020) (first quoting State v. Priester, 99 N.J. 123, 135 (1985); and
then quoting Rule 3:21-10(b)(2)). A motion for relief under the Rule "is
committed to the sound discretion of the court." Priester, 99 N.J. at 135.
"The predicate for relief under the Rule is proof of the serious nature of
the defendant's illness and the deleterious effect of incarceration on the
prisoner's health." Ibid. A defendant seeking relief under the Rule must also
establish the medical services that are "unavailable at the prison would be not
only beneficial[,] . . . but are essential to prevent further deterioration in [the
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defendant's] health." Ibid. A defendant must further demonstrate "changed
circumstances in his [or her] health . . . since the time of the original sentence."
Id. at 136.
In deciding a motion under the Rule, a court must consider and balance
the factors established by the Court in Priester and reaffirmed in Request to
Modify Prison Sentences, 242 N.J. at 378-79, including the "nature and severity
of the crime, the severity of the sentence, the criminal record of the defendant,
the risk to the public if the defendant is released, and the defendant 's role in
bringing about his [or her] current state of health," Priester, 99 N.J. at 137. We
will not reverse a decision denying relief under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) unless it is
shown to be a mistaken exercise of discretion. Ibid.We discern no abuse of discretion in Judge Taylor's consideration and
weighing of the Priester factors, and we affirm substantially for the reasons set
forth in his detailed written decision. In the first instance, the judge recognized
the COVID-19 pandemic constitutes a change in circumstances permitting an
inmate with serious medical issues to apply for relief under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2).
See Request to Modify Prison Sentences, 242 N.J. at 379 (explaining the
COVID-19 pandemic "amounts to a change in circumstances under" Rule 3:21-
10(b)(2)).
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Judge Taylor also made findings concerning the illness and infirmity
defendant relied on to support his request for relief. The court found defendant
"has a 'past medical history of an aortic valve replacement that appears to be
degenerating,'" and defendant has "a mild thoracic aneurysm, [a] permanent
pacemaker for heart block, HTN, hyperlipidemia, and carotid stenosis."4 Judge
Taylor noted, however, that the doctor who reported defendant suffered from
those conditions also stated defendant was "asymptomatic." Based on a report
from a second doctor who had seen defendant on one occasion eleven months
prior to the filing of the motion, Judge Taylor also found it was necessary to
check defendant's pacemaker—which was implanted in 2017—every thirteen
weeks unless there was a problem, but that defendant "has not presented such a
problem."
The court found defendant did not present any evidence his incarceration
prior to his release in 2019 had a deleterious effect on his health. The court also
found defendant's doctors did not report any problems with the pacemaker and
that there was no evidence the New Jersey Department of Corrections was
incapable of providing the medical services necessary to monitor the operation
4
"HTN" is not described or defined in the doctor's letter or report or in the
court's opinion.
A-0112-20T4
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of the pacemaker. Judge Taylor rejected defendant's claim that his "serious and
deteriorating heart condition requires intensive medical supervision," noting the
doctors' reports submitted in support of the motion did not support the claim.
Judge Taylor explained that although the evidence established defendant
required medical care, the record lacked any evidence "that immediate
intervention is necessary or that medical services at the prison, or outside
hospitals contracted with the Department of Corrections, are unable to
sufficiently address" defendant's medical issues. The court found defendant
failed to demonstrate that his "heart condition alone" warranted the requested
amendment of his sentence—release from custody.
On appeal, defendant argues the court erred by analyzing defendant's
medical conditions under the Priester factors because it failed to properly
consider the amplified risk COVID-19 presents to individuals with underlying
conditions. The argument ignores that defendant argued before the motion court
that his various medical conditions alone were so dire that he was entitled to
relief under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2). Thus, the court's opinion properly addressed
that specific claim without regard to the increased risks presented by the
pandemic because defendant argued, at least in part, that his medical conditions
alone, without regard to COVID-19, required an amendment of his sentence
A-0112-20T4
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permitting his release from custody. Defendant does not challenge the court's
rejection of that claim, and we need not address it further. See Jefferson Loan
Co. v. Session, 397 N.J. Super. 520, 525 n.4 (App. Div. 2008) (noting that an
issue not briefed on appeal is deemed waived).
Defendant argues the court failed to address the risks to his health posed
by his incarceration during the pandemic. He contends Judge Taylor did not
consider the amplified risks COVID-19 poses to inmates in a prison setting, and
that the judge incorrectly analyzed defendant's medical conditions in isolation.
See Request to Modify Prison Sentences, 242 N.J. at 370 (noting "the risks
COVID-19 poses . . . are amplified in jail settings"). The argument finds no
support in the record.
Judge Taylor found that a report submitted by one of defendant's doctors,
and the guidelines from the Center for Disease Control, support defendant's
argument that "his serious heart condition renders him more susceptible to
serious complications should he contract COVID-19." The court, however,
rejected defendant's claim that it was "extremely likely" he would contract the
virus in prison, noting defendant's doctor reported that defendant "is not at an
increased risk of contracting COVID-19" due to his existing medical issues. In
addition, the court detailed the Department of Corrections' implementation of
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"significant mitigation tactics and universal testing of staff and inmates to
control the spread of COVID-19 in State prisons."5
Contrary to defendant's contention, Judge Taylor did not ignore the
amplified risks of complications defendant faces as a result of COVID-19 in a
prison setting. As required by the Court in Request to Modify Prison Sentences,
242 N.J. at 378-79, Judge Taylor applied and weighed the Priester factors, and
he determined the amplified risks posed by COVID-19 in a prison setting are in
part outweighed by the actions taken by the Department of Corrections to
mitigate each inmate's risk of contracting the virus. The court found the
evidence undermined defendant's claim his medical conditions made him more
susceptible to contracting COVID-19, and that defendant's "generalized fear of
contracting an illness [was] not enough" to warrant relief under Rule 3:21-
10(b)(2). Id. at 379. We find no error in the court's weighing of the amplified
risk of complications presented by the virus against the Department of
Corrections' actions to mitigate those risks in our State prisons. The court's
findings are supported by the evidence.
5
At oral argument on the appeal, defendant's counsel explained that it is
anticipated defendant will receive the COVID-19 vaccine within a few weeks as
part of the State's COVID-19 mitigation plan. That fact was not before the
motion court and we do not consider it in our determination of defendant's
appeal.
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Moreover, the court's analysis of the Priester factors did not end with its
findings concerning the risks posed by COVID-19 and the Department of
Corrections' substantial efforts to mitigate those risks. As required by the Court
in Request to Modify Prison Sentences, 242 N.J. at 378-79, Judge Taylor further
considered and balanced the other Priester factors, including "the nature and
severity of the crime, the severity of the sentence, the criminal record of the
defendant, the risk to the public if the defendant is released, and the defendant's
role in bringing about his current state of health," Priester, 99 N.J. at 137.
The court made detailed findings concerning those factors and concluded
that even if defendant satisfied the Priester standard of establishing he suffered
from a serious illness and that continued incarceration would have a deleterious
effect on his health, the remaining factors weighed against his request for a
release from custody. More particularly, the court explained that defendant was
convicted of numerous counts of first-degree aggravated sexual assault and
second-degree sexual assault on the victim. The assaults began when the victim
was eight years old, continued over a significant period until she was fifteen or
sixteen, and occurred while defendant served as a guardian to the victim.
In addition to the heinousness and severity of defendant's long-term
victimization of the child, the court further noted the severity of the sentence
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weighed heavily against his release. Defendant received an aggregate thirty-
year custodial term that included consecutive sentences, but he had served on ly
three years and eight months prior to the filing of his Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) motion
for release from custody. Judge Taylor also noted defendant was three years
away from his first eligibility for parole.
The court considered the risk to the public if defendant is released , and
also that defendant had been released on bail for about a year following the
reversal of his conviction. Judge Taylor rejected defendant's claim he did not
pose a risk to the public because his crimes had been committed many years
earlier.
The court noted that during a recorded 2009 telephone call with the victim,
defendant said he still "revel[ed]" in his sexual interactions with her. Defendant
told the victim, "It's awful how much I miss it"; "I look at it with a joy"; "I look
at it as one of the best things in my life"; and "I really do feel like it was an
amazing gift." Defendant also told the victim that his sexual experiences with
her, which began when she was eight years old, were "like the best chocolate ice
cream in the world, and you'll never find another flavor quite like that, you
know? That's how I feel about it."
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Judge Taylor found that the statements "were made in 2009, significantly
after the underlying incidents" of sexual assault, and that they did not
demonstrate any remorse or regret. The court also observed that defendant had
not received any sex offender specific therapy as recommended by the Adult
Diagnostic and Treatment Center (ADTC) when he was sentenced. 6 The court
concluded that although defendant had no other criminal record, the nature of
his offenses, his joy and revel in the crimes, and his lack of recommended sex
offender specific therapy rendered defendant a significant risk to the safety of
the community if his custodial sentence was amended to permit his release.
6
We reject defendant's claim the court did not consider his efforts at
rehabilitation when it considered the Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) motion. Judge Taylor
directly addressed the issue of defendant's rehabilitation by finding defendant
failed to participate in sex offender specific training as recommended by the
ADTC. Defendant asserts the court failed to consider that he did not commit
offenses while released on bail following the reversal of his conviction and that
he attended religious classes while incarcerated. He claims those facts
evidenced his rehabilitation. The evidence in the record concerning the religious
classes consists only of a list of seven "religious" workshops and study
"sessions" defendant attended during almost four years of incarceration. There
is no evidence concerning the content of the sessions or whether his participation
in those sessions may have aided his purported rehabilitation. Additionally, in
his weighing of the Priester factors, Judge Taylor did consider that defendant
had no other criminal record and that he had not committed any offenses while
on bail. As noted, however, the court determined that a weighing of the Priester
factors did not permit an amendment of defendant's sentence to permit his
release from custody.
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We find no error in the court's determination. Defendant committed very
serious sexual offenses over a long period of time against a young child over
whom he served as a guardian. His statements to the victim, long after the
crimes were committed, demonstrate that defendant fails to recognize or
understand that what he perceives as a "joy" and a "gift," and what he views "as
one of the best things in [his] life," actually constituted a long and unrelenting
course of aggravated sexual assault on a young child.
Judge Taylor placed great weight on defendant's threat to the community
in his balancing of the Priester factors. The court's findings concerning the
severity of defendant's crimes and sentence, and the risk defendant poses to the
safety of the community if released, are supported by the evidence. The findings
also support Judge Taylor's well-reasoned balancing of the Priester factors. The
court provided a rational explanation for its findings and determination, did not
depart from any established policies or legal principles, and did not rest its
decision on an impermissible basis. See United States v. Scurry, 193 N.J. 492,
504 (2008) (finding a court abuses its discretion when its "decision [is] made
without a rational explanation, inexplicably depart[s] from established policies,
or rest[s] on an impermissible basis" (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor,
171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002))). We find no basis to conclude Judge Taylor abused
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his discretion in denying defendant's motion to amend his sentence under Rule
3:21-10(b)(2).
Defendant also contends the court erred by finding that, independent of
Rule 3:21-10(b)(2), it lacked the inherent authority to fashion a remedy, such as
a modification of defendant's sentence to permit home confinement or a medical
furlough, based on the circumstances presented. We need not explore the extent
of a court's authority to fashion a remedy for an inmate who suffers from an
illness or infirmity because defendant's argument is founded on a
misinterpretation of the court's opinion.
The court's statement that it lacked the authority to delay continuation of
defendant's custodial sentence was made in the context of its finding that
defendant's motion sought what was tantamount to the medical furlough granted
by the court in State v. Boone, 262 N.J. Super. 220, 222-24 (Law Div. 1992).
Judge Taylor simply found he lacked the authority to grant the type of medical
furlough awarded in Boone under the circumstances presented by defendant's
application because, unlike the defendant in Boone, defendant is not suffering
from a life threatening illness the treatment for which is available only in an out-
of-state medical facility. Cf. id. at 222. As Judge Taylor correctly observed,
the Court in Request to Modify Prison Sentences explained that Boone "does
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not afford a basis for a broad-based judicial furlough process." 242 N.J. at 378.
We agree with Judge Taylor that defendant's application does not present
circumstances similar to those presented by the defendant in Boone, and, for the
reasons set forth in the court's written opinion, defendant is not entitled to the
extraordinary relief he requests. See Boone, 262 N.J. Super. at 223-24
(explaining the grant of a "judicial furlough" as an exercise of a court's "inherent
authority to act to preserve life" is a "power [that] should be sparingly utilized
in the very rarest of cases").
Defendant's remaining arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
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