A.M. VS. T.A. (FD-09-0460-14, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2020 )


Menu:
  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-2725-18T3
    A.M.,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    T.A.,
    Defendant-Respondent.
    ______________________________
    Submitted April 30, 2020 – Decided May 27, 2020
    Before Judges Suter and DeAlmeida.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County,
    Docket No. FD-09-0460-14.
    A.M., appellant pro se.
    Thomas L. Curcio, attorney for respondent.
    PER CURIAM
    Plaintiff A.M.1 appeals from the December 14, 2018 order of the Family
    Part denying her motion to compel two of her children, who are in the custody
    of their paternal grandmother, defendant T.A., to undergo a psychiatric
    examination. We affirm.
    I.
    The following facts are derived from the record. A.M. is serving a forty-
    year sentence for the 2010 murder of the children's father. The children, then
    seven years old, were present in the home at the time of the killing, heard
    gunshots, and entered the bedroom to see their father dying. After the murder,
    the children were placed with T.A., to whom the trial court later awarded
    custody and guardianship. A third child placed with T.A. has since reached
    adulthood.
    During the proceedings that ultimately resulted in T.A. obtaining custody
    of the children, the court ordered their evaluation by a psychologist the parties
    jointly selected. At the evaluation, the children expressed no desire to see A.M.
    Notably, the children had been undergoing therapy for trauma resulting from the
    murder. In a 2014 report, the expert concluded visitation with A.M. would be
    1
    We identify the parties by initials to protect the confidentiality of court records
    relating to child custody. R. 1:38-3(d)(13).
    A-2725-18T3
    2
    harmful for the children. Based on the expert's opinion, the court ordered contact
    between A.M. and the children be limited to written letters, which would be
    reviewed by the children's therapist to determine if they would be shown to the
    children. In addition, the court directed T.A. to send A.M. photographs and
    copies of the children's report cards periodically.
    In 2018, A.M. filed a motion to compel the children to undergo a
    psychiatric evaluation for the purpose of having the court consider increasing
    her contact with the children. In her moving papers, A.M. requested oral
    argument. T.A. opposed the motion.
    The court denied A.M.'s motion, finding "there was no showing why it is in
    [the children's] best interests to be evaluated mindful of their ongoing therapy for
    many years after their father's murder." In addition, the court determined A.M. had
    not alleged a change in circumstances warranting modification of the court's prior
    orders that established limited contact between A.M. and the children. The court
    noted A.M.'s motion was "decided on the pleadings [without] objection."
    This appeal followed.      A.M. raises the following arguments for our
    consideration:
    POINT ONE
    THE COURT'S DECISION WAS AN ABUSE OF
    DISCRETION AND FAILED TO GIVE SUFFICIENT
    A-2725-18T3
    3
    WEIGHT TO PLAINTIFF'S STATUS AS MOTHER
    OF THE CHILDREN.
    POINT TWO
    THE MOTION COURT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH
    PROPER PROCEDURE BY FAILING TO MAKE
    FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
    LAW, REQUIRING A REMAND.
    POINT THREE
    THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW APPELLANT'S
    CLAIMS   USING   A  HARMLESS    ERROR
    STANDARD OF REVIEW AND NOT APPLY THE
    PLAIN ERROR STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR THE
    REASONS STATED BELOW.
    II.
    Our review of a Family Part order is limited. Cesare v. Cesare, 
    154 N.J. 394
    , 411 (1998). "[W]e do not overturn those determinations unless the court
    abused its discretion, failed to consider controlling legal principles or made
    findings inconsistent with or unsupported by competent evidence." Storey v.
    Storey, 
    373 N.J. Super. 464
    , 479 (App. Div. 2004). We must accord substantial
    deference to the findings of the Family Part due to that court's "special
    jurisdiction and expertise in family matters . . . ." Cesare, 
    154 N.J. at 413
    .
    We defer to the judge's factual determinations, so long as they are
    supported by substantial credible evidence in the record. Rova Farms Resort,
    A-2725-18T3
    4
    Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co. of Am., 
    65 N.J. 474
    , 483-84 (1974).           This court's
    "[a]ppellate review does not consist of weighing evidence anew and making
    independent factual findings; rather, [this court's] function is to determine
    whether there is adequate evidence to support the judgment rendered at trial."
    Cannuscio v. Claridge Hotel & Casino, 
    319 N.J. Super. 342
    , 347 (App. Div.
    1999) (citing State v. Johnson, 
    42 N.J. 146
    , 161 (1964)). We review de novo
    the court's legal conclusions. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm., 
    140 N.J. 366
    , 378 (1995).
    A.M.'s request for the appointment of an expert must be viewed in light
    of the well-established standard for modifying orders that establish custody and
    parenting rights. Custody orders are subject to revision based on the changed
    circumstances standard. Eaton v. Grau, 
    368 N.J. Super. 215
    , 222 (App. Div.
    2004). As we explained in Costa v. Costa, 
    440 N.J. Super. 1
    , 4 (App. Div. 2015):
    [m]odification of an existing child custody order is a
    "'two-step process.'" R.K. v. F.K., 
    437 N.J. Super. 58
    ,
    62 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting Crews v. Crews, 
    164 N.J. 11
    , 28 (2000)). First, a party must show "a change of
    circumstances warranting modification" of custodial
    arrangements. 
    Id. at 63
     (quoting Beck v. Beck, 
    86 N.J. 480
    , 496 n.8 (1981)). If the party makes that showing,
    the party is "'entitled to a plenary hearing as to disputed
    material facts regarding the child's best interests, and
    whether those best interests are served by modification
    of the existing custody order.'" Id. at 62-63 (citation
    omitted).
    A-2725-18T3
    5
    The changed circumstances standard also applies to modifications of parenting
    time, which may be granted if in the best interests of the child. Finamore v.
    Aronson, 
    382 N.J. Super. 514
    , 522 (App. Div. 2006). Rule 5:3-3(a) provides
    that when
    the court, in its discretion, concludes that disposition of
    an issue will be assisted by expert opinion . . . the court
    may order any person under its jurisdiction to be
    examined by a[n] [expert] designated by it . . . .
    Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude the trial court properly
    exercised its discretion when it denied A.M.'s motion.         The children were
    examined by an independent expert, jointly selected by the parties, in 2014. The
    court adopted the expert's opinion that it was in the children's best interests to
    limit their contact with A.M., given the trauma they suffered as a result of her
    having murdered their father. A.M. alleged no facts suggesting a change in
    circumstances warranting modification of that arrangement. Her request for the
    appointment of another expert to examine the children, who will become adults
    in August 2020, is based only on her dissatisfaction with the court's prior order.2
    2
    We also note that we granted T.A.'s motion to remand this matter for the
    limited purpose of allowing the trial court to decide her motion to remove the
    children to Florida. The trial court granted the motion on August 23, 2019.
    A-2725-18T3
    6
    To the extent we have not specifically addressed any of A.M.'s remaining
    claims, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written
    opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
    Affirmed.
    A-2725-18T3
    7