DCPP VS. Y.O.-E. AND R.E., IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF JC.E. (FG-20-0013-19, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2020 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1658-19T2
NEW JERSEY DIVISION
OF CHILD PROTECTION
AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Y.O.-E.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
R.E.,
Defendant.
__________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE
GUARDIANSHIP OF JC.E.,
a minor.
__________________________
Argued November 18, 2020 – Decided December 16, 2020
Before Judges Whipple, Rose, and Firko.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Union County, Docket
No. FG-20-0013-19.
Clara S. Licata, Designated Counsel, argued the cause
for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender,
attorney; Clara S. Licata, on the briefs).
Jane C. Schuster, Assistant Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney
General, attorney; Jane C. Schuster, of counsel; Julie B.
Colonna, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
Louise M. Cho, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for minor (Joseph E. Krakora, Public
Defender, Law Guardian, attorney; Meredith Alexis
Pollock, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; Louise
M. Cho, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Y.O.-E. (Yolanda) appeals from a December 16, 2019
judgment of guardianship terminating her parental rights to her biological child,
JC.E. (Jonathan).1
On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred in finding the Division
of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) had met its burden by clear and
convincing evidence for each Title-30 prong. Defendant asserts the Division
1
For the sake of anonymity and ease of reference, we utilize the pseudonyms
from defendant's brief to protect the parties and the child. See R. 1:38-3(d)(13).
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neglected its duties to her while she herself was in Division custody.
Additionally, defendant contends that the Division should have provided further
support for her during her time trying to improve her situation so she could
parent Jonathan.
Defendant raises the following issues on appeal:
POINT I.
NO DEFERENCE IS OWED TO TRIAL COURT
LEGAL CONCLUSIONS OR FACT FINDINGS
UNSUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE THAT IS
SUBSTANTIAL AND CREDIBLE AND THAT IS
ALSO CLEAR AND CONVINCING.
POINT II.
[DIVISION]'S FAILURE TO ASSIST [YOLANDA]
IN BECOMING DOCUMENTED WHILE AN
UNDOCUMENTED CHILD IN [DIVISION]'S
CUSTODY IN THE 1990'S AND EARLY 2000'S,
WHICH LED TO INSTABILITY IN HER MENTAL
HEALTH TREATMENT, EMPLOYMENT, AND
RESIDENCE, SHOULD BAR [DIVISION] AND A
COURT FROM RELYING ON SUCH
CIRCUMSTANCES TO TERMINATE HER
PARENTAL RIGHTS TO [JONATHAN]. (Not Raised
Below).
POINT III.
[DIVISION] DID NOT PROVE THAT
[JONATHAN]'S SAFETY HAS BEEN OR WILL BE
ENDANGERED BY CONTINUING THE
PARENTAL RELATIONSHIP WHEN THERE WAS
NO PROOF THAT [JONATHAN] HAS BEEN
HARMED OR EXPOSED TO RISK OF HARM IN
A-1658-19T2
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THE THREE MONTHS HE WAS IN [YOLANDA]'S
CARE.
POINT IV.
[DIVISION] DID NOT PROVE BY CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT [YOLANDA]
WAS UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO ELIMINATE
THE ALLEGED RISK OF HARM TO [JONATHAN],
OR THAT THE DELAY IN PERMANENT
PLACEMENT WOULD ADD TO THE HARM WHEN
[YOLANDA]'S EFFORTS TO WORK, AND TO
ATTEND THERAPY, MEDICATION
MANAGEMENT AND VISITATION WERE
THWARTED BY TRANSPORTATION AND
SCHEDULING CONFLICTS [DIVISION] REFUSED
TO ADDRESS AND WHEN HER IMMIGRATION
STATUS MADE IT DIFFICULT TO PAY FOR
SERVICES.
POINT V.
[DIVISION] DID NOT PROVE THAT IT MADE
REASONABLE EFFORTS TO PROVIDE SERVICES
TO REMEDIATE THE CONDITIONS THAT LED TO
[JONATHAN]'S REMOVAL FROM [YOLANDA]'S
HOME WHEN IT FAILED TO ASSIST HER WITH
THE FINANCIAL, TRANSPORTATION, AND
SCHEDULING PROBLEMS THAT INTERFERED
WITH CONSISTENT ATTENDANCE AT
THERAPY.
POINT VI.
EXPERT OPINION THAT SEVERING
[JONATHAN]'S BOND WITH HIS FOSTER
PARENTS WOULD CAUSE SERIOUS
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM AND
THAT HE HAS A NEED FOR PERMANENCY IS
INSUFFICIENT WHEN [YOLANDA] HAS NEVER
HAD THE ABILITY TO TIMELY COMPLY WITH
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[DIVISION]'S REQUIREMENTS AND WHEN
[DIVISION] AND THE COURT HAVE USED HER
IMMIGRATION STATUS AGAINST HER.
Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm primarily for the reasons
expressed in the thorough written opinion of Judge Marc R. Brown issued with
the judgment, wherein he found the Division had established by clear and
convincing evidence all four prongs of the best-interests test, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-
15.1(a), which, in the best interest of the child, permits termination of parental
rights. In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 347-48 (1999).
Our review of the judge's decision is limited. We defer to his expertise as
a Family Part judge, Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-13 (1998), and we are
bound by his factual findings so long as they are supported by sufficient ,
credible, evidence, N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261,
279 (2007) (citing In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super. 172, 188 (App.
Div. 1993)).
Defendant came to this country at a young age as an undocumented
immigrant, was abused by her extended and immediate family, and was
ultimately placed in Division custody. Defendant suffers from severe mental
illness and has struggled to maintain employment, housing and treatment.
Defendant contends that because the Division failed to assist her in achieving
A-1658-19T2
5
documented immigration status while she was in its custody, she has been
continuously unable to secure housing, and she was recently held in an
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention facility. Defendant
asserts the Division's failure to seek documented status precluded her from using
the "social safety net" to seek medical and financial assistance. Moreover, the
Division's failure to seek documented status for her, resulting in her being in
ICE custody, further removed her from Jonathan's life.
Our review of the record reveals a more complicated picture, which
includes defendant's history of substance abuse, criminal behavior and
domestically violent relationships and includes the fact that defendant no longer
has custody of her five other children. After a thirteen-day guardianship trial
was held with three expert witnesses, two Division employees, and defendant's
immigration attorney, the court found defendant's mental health issues
permeated her life to the point that she was not a fit parent. She was not
compliant with therapy or pharmacological treatment. Defendant had not shown
she could be self-sufficient, was prone to returning to abusive relationships,
struggled to manage her mental health and sacrificed the opportunity to see
Jonathan because of criminal activity, immigration detention and psychological
episodes.
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Focusing on the third and fourth prongs, the court found that the Division
had made reasonable efforts to provide care, and Jonathan was in the best
alternative placement possible — with resource parents who wanted to adopt
him. Accordingly, the judge held that even though evidence was presented from
both sides, Jonathan saw his resource parents as his psychological parents; he
would not suffer harm from terminating defendant's rights to him, but rather, he
would suffer harm from terminating his relationship with his resource parents.
This appeal followed.
With leave granted to supplement the record, defendant has added for our
consideration that she has been released from ICE detention, now has
authorization to work, and can more readily access the help she needs through
government assistance. She is also currently living in an apartment. This
development certainly evidences a commendable change in circumstance, and
defendant contends that such a shift militates against the trial court's foundation
for terminating her rights. We disagree.
While the court understandably had to discuss, and consider, the issues
that may arise from defendant being in ICE detention, unable to access
employment, housing and medical assistance, we do not consider this change of
circumstances determinative. The trial judge was careful to discuss defendant's
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problematic conditions before detention and regardless of detention. As
unfortunate and troubling as defendant's life experience has been, it is not in
Jonathan's best interest to delay permanency while his mother's condition
remains fluid.
Affirmed.
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