DAVID HOOK VS. BOHDAN SENYSZYN (L-0296-04, SUSSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )


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  •                              NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-1359-19T4
    DAVID HOOK and MODERN
    METHOD DEVELOPMENT,
    INC.,
    Plaintiffs-Respondents,
    v.
    BOHDAN SENYSZYN,
    Defendant-Appellant,
    and
    KELLY SENYSZYN, MODERN
    METHOD TRUST, and MODERN
    METHOD LEASING INC.,
    Defendants.
    ______________________________
    Submitted on December 16, 2020 - Decided February 3, 2021
    Before Judges Sumners and Geiger.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Sussex County, Docket No. L-0296-04.
    Bohdan Senyszyn, appellant pro se.
    Coughlin Duffy, LLP, attorneys for respondents (Jason
    A. Meisner, of counsel and on the brief; Joseph P.
    Fiteni, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant Bohdan Senyszyn appeals the trial court's October 25, 2019
    order denying reconsideration of a September 13, 2019 order denying his motion
    to reinstate to the trial calendar his counterclaims1 against plaintiffs David Hook
    and Modern Method Development. We dismiss the appeal.
    The parties' dispute began some seventeen years ago. Because of their
    familiarity with the details of their litigation, we only set forth a brief summary
    of the procedural history that is relevant to this opinion.
    In 2003, Senyszyn, who had assumed responsibility over real estate
    developer Hook's financials affairs, offered to lend Hook money for Hook's plan
    to purchase land in Hardyston Township. Senyszyn advised Hook that he
    purportedly lacked sufficient funds to purchase the property on his own. A year
    later, plaintiffs sued Senyszyn, his wife, Kelly, Modern Method Trust, and
    Modern Method Leasing, Inc., alleging fraud, rescission, conversion, forgery,
    and unjust enrichment. Counterclaims were filed in response.
    1
    The record does not include Senyszyn's answer and counterclaims to plaintiffs'
    complaint, nor does it indicate what relief he seeks.
    A-1359-19T4
    2
    In 2005, Senyszyn was charged with federal crimes of tax fraud and
    related offenses stemming from his embezzlement of plaintiffs' funds. In the
    meantime, the civil litigation continued, resulting in a partial settlement
    agreement in March 2006. A March 5, 2007 consent order followed in which
    the parties agreed to binding arbitration of their outstanding disputes. However,
    Senyszyn's guilty plea in September 2007, resulted in a thirty-four-month prison
    term and delayed the civil litigation.
    In September 2010, after the litigation was reactivated, another consent
    order was entered, in which the parties again agreed to arbitration. For reasons
    that are unclear in the record, arbitration did not occur, and in October 2017,
    plaintiffs sought to enforce the consent order to compel arbitration.       In a
    November 17, 2017 order, the trial court compelled arbitration in accordance
    with the 2006 settlement agreement and the 2010 consent order.
    Senyszyn subsequently became dissatisfied with arbitration and filed a
    motion to reinstate his counterclaims and have the litigation placed back on the
    trial list. The court's September 13, 2019 order and oral decision denied the
    motion.2 Senyszyn sought reconsideration of the order.
    2
    The record does not include a transcript of the decision.
    A-1359-19T4
    3
    On October 25, 2019, the court entered an order and oral decision denying
    Senyszyn's motion for reconsideration. Applying the well-settled standard set
    forth in D'Atria v. D'Atria, 
    242 N.J. Super. 392
    , 401 (1990), the court stated:
    A litigant should not [move for] reconsideration
    merely because of dissatisfaction with a decision of
    the[c]ourt. Reconsideration should only be utilized for
    those cases which fall into that narrow corridor in
    which either the [c]ourt has expressed its decision
    based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis or
    it’s obvious that the Court either does not consider, or
    failed to appreciate the significance of probative,
    competent evidence.
    And it indicates that motion practice must come
    to an end at some point and if repetitive bites at the
    apple are allowed, the core will swiftly sour. The
    [c]ourt must be sensitive and scrupulous in its analysis
    of the issues in a motion for reconsideration.
    The court determined Senyszyn was not acting in the spirit of the settlement
    agreement and consent orders requiring that the parties' dispute be resolved by
    arbitration.
    Senyszyn agreed verbally before the court and signed the October 25 order
    stating he would not make any additional Superior Court filings until after the
    arbitrator's final decision. The order provided:
    By consent, the parties agree as follows: Mr. Senyszyn
    agrees to not file any claim, application, motion,
    complaint or other proceeding related to David Hook,
    Modern Method Development or the "Farmland Parcel"
    A-1359-19T4
    4
    in any division or part of the Superior Court until after
    the issuance of a final decision in the arbitration
    proceeding pending before Robert Margulies, Esq.
    In this appeal, Senyszyn argues the trial court erred by not conducting a
    full and fair trial on the issues he raised; namely, the motion to reconsider and,
    by extension, "the [p]redicate [m]otion," apparently referring to the underlying
    motion to reinstate his counterclaims and reinstate the matter to the trial
    calendar.3 Senyszyn argues the court's decision ignored his legal arguments and
    lacked thoroughness.    We need not address the merits of these arguments
    because the appeal is procedurally deficient.
    First, the October 25 order provided that the parties agreed not to file any
    claim or motion "in any division or part of the Superior Court until after the
    issuance of a final decision" by the arbitrator. Senyszyn's appeal violates this
    order. Second, the underlying September 13 order and the October 25 order
    3
    Senyszyn's notice of appeal seeks review only of the court's October 25, 2019
    order denying his motion for reconsideration, not the September 13, 2019
    motion to reinstate his claims. We could, therefore, limit our review to that
    order alone. See W.H. Indus., Inc. v. Fundicao Balancins, Ltda, 
    397 N.J. Super. 455
    , 458 (App. Div. 2008); Fusco v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Newark, 
    349 N.J. Super. 455
    , 461-62 (App. Div. 2002). Given Senyszyn's failure to provide a
    transcript of the court's September 13 decision, we are unable to fully examine
    the rationale of the decision. Nonetheless, the transcript of the October 25
    decision sheds some light on the court's reasoning for its September 13 order.
    A-1359-19T4
    5
    denying reconsideration were interlocutory–final judgment had not been entered
    because arbitration was still pending. Hence, Senyszyn was required to seek
    leave to appeal with our court within twenty days of the latter order.
    4 R. 2
    :2-
    3(b). This was not done. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
    Nonetheless, even considering the merits of Senyszyn's appeal, we discern
    no reason to disturb the October 25 order. The court did not abuse its discretion
    in denying reconsideration. See D'Atria, 
    242 N.J. Super. at 401
    . There is no
    showing the court's decision was "palpably incorrect or irrational" or "that the
    [c]ourt either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of
    probative, competent evidence." 
    Ibid.
    To the extent that any arguments raised by defendant have not been
    explicitly addressed in this opinion, it is because we are satisfied they lack
    sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
    Appeal dismissed.
    4
    According to the plantiffs' merits brief, a final arbitration award was issued in
    favor of plaintiffs on June 10, 2020. A motion to confirm the award is pending
    before the trial court.
    A-1359-19T4
    6