STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. CLARENCE WILLIAMS (12-03-0728, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5597-18T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CLARENCE WILLIAMS,
a/k/a CLARENCE EDWARD
WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________
Submitted January 12, 2021 – Decided January 29, 2021
Before Judges Haas and Natali.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 12-03-0728.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Kisha M. Hebbon, Designated Counsel, on
the brief).
Theodore N. Stephens, II, Acting Essex County
Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Hannah F. Kurt,
Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals from a June 3, 2019 order denying his petition for post-
conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
I.
To provide context for our decision, we briefly recount the relevant facts
and procedural history as detailed in our opinion affirming defendant's sentence:
At approximately 5:30 p.m. on June 24, 2011, the
victim, Mr. Vasquez, was at a gas station putting air
into the rear, driver's side tire of his Infiniti G-35
automobile. It was a clear, sunny day. The car was
running and its windows were down. The driver's door
was "slightly cracked" open. Vasquez's cell phone and
other personal items were in the car.
Suddenly, Vasquez heard the driver's door close,
and he stood up to see what was happening. The car
"accelerated" away from Vasquez, but then "spun right
in front of [him, and began] coming straight in [his]
direction, coming quick." Because the car was coming
at him, Vasquez testified that he "got a good look" at
the driver . . . .
As the car approached him, Vasquez stuck his
hand in the driver's side window and held onto the car.
The car continued to accelerate. Vasquez attempted to
grab the man's face in order to take control of the
car . . . . However, he testified that, after he grabbed
hold of the car, he "was most focused on the cars
coming [his] way at like [sixty, seventy] miles an hour."
Vasquez estimated that his car was going eighty
miles an hour. His right leg was in the air, while his
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left leg dragged on the ground. Vasquez stated that he
"was dragged about [forty, forty-five] yards onto the
street." Once he saw traffic coming at him, Vasquez
stated that he "decided to jump off the vehicle."
....
At trial, Vasquez . . . identified defendant as his
assailant in court before the jury. In addition to
Vasquez's identification, the State presented DNA
evidence linking defendant to the offense. On June 29,
2011, the police located Vasquez's car on the side of a
road, approximately two miles from defendant's house.
It had no tires or rims, and Vasquez's phone and
personal effects were missing.
The police searched the car and found, among
other things, a soda bottle and a partially-smoked
cigarette. The police contacted Vasquez, who
confirmed that these items did not belong to him. The
police took DNA samples from the two items and sent
them to the State Police DNA lab. The lab reported that
the samples taken from the soda bottle and cigarette
matched a known DNA sample from defendant that was
already in the State's DNA database. Based upon this
"investigative lead," a detective put together the photo
array which was shown to Vasquez at his home by a
second detective who was not involved in the
investigation.
After Vasquez identified defendant, the police
arrested him. In June 2012, a detective took a buccal
swab from defendant during a court appearance in order
to collect his DNA. The State Police DNA lab
concluded that the DNA from defendant's buccal swab
matched the DNA found on the soda bottle and the
cigarette.
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Defendant did not testify at trial and did not call
any witnesses.
[State v. Williams, No. A-5725-13 (App. Div. Apr. 1,
2016) (slip op. 3-9).]
The jury convicted defendant of first-degree carjacking, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-
2. Defendant was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison with an 85% period
of parole ineligibility under the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. On
direct appeal, defendant argued the in- and out-of-court identifications of
defendant were unreliable and that his sentence was excessive. We rejected
these arguments and the Supreme Court denied certification. State v. Williams,
227 N.J. 133 (2016).
Defendant filed a timely PCR petition and brief in which he alleged,
among other things, that the trial court should have, sua sponte, given a cross-
racial identification jury charge and that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to "present . . . [his] material witness," or argue unspecified mitigating
factors that the victim did not suffer life threatening injuries. Appointed counsel
filed an amended petition and brief alleging "trial counsel failed to conduct an
adequate investigation" or "file[] a motion to suppress the DNA evidence" and
appellate counsel "fail[ed] to argue that the evidence was insufficient to convict
defendant of car[]jacking."
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Judge Michael L. Ravin issued a June 3, 2019 order and corresponding
opinion in which he concluded that defendant failed to establish a prima facie
case that either his trial or appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective.
The judge accordingly denied defendant's petition without an evidentiary
hearing.
Judge Ravin concluded the trial evidence supported the carjacking
conviction as the victim's leg injuries "w[ere] sufficient for the jury to find that
[defendant] inflicted bodily injury or used force on the victim, or knowingly put
the victim in fear of immediate bodily injury while [defendant] was taking the
vehicle." Additionally, the judge explained any potential issue with the in-court
identification was already addressed by the trial court at defendant's
unsuccessful Wade hearing.1
Judge Ravin also noted, contrary to defendant's contentions, that the trial
court issued a cross-racial identification jury instruction. In addition, the judge
explained that trial counsel argued for mitigating factor two, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-
1(b)(2) ("The defendant did not contemplate that the defendant’s conduct would
1
A Wade hearing is conducted for the purpose of determining whether an out-
of-court identification was made in unduly suggestive circumstances and, if so,
whether or not any ensuing in-court identification procedure would be fatally
tainted thereby. State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 238 (2011); see United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
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cause or threaten serious harm . . . ."). Further, Judge Ravin found defendant
"d[id] not specify what investigatory steps he believe[d] trial counsel should
have taken" or "who [the favorable] witness is, or what the witness would have
testified to." Finally, the judge concluded defendant "failed to articulate any
basis" upon which trial counsel could have challenged the admissibility of the
DNA evidence.
Judge Ravin characterized defendant's claim that his appellate counsel's
performance was constitutionally deficient as "meritless" because "there was
sufficient evidence in the record to show that [defendant] stole the victim's car
and caused him injury while doing so and also knowingly put the victim in fear
of immediate bodily injury."
Before us, defendant raises the following points for our consideration:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF WITHOUT AFFORDING
HIM AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO
DETERMINE THE MERITS OF HIS CONTENTION
THAT HE WAS DENIED THE RIGHT TO THE
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL AND
APPELLATE COUNSEL.
A. [THE PEVAILING LEGAL PRINCIPLES
REGARDING CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, EVIDENTIARY
HEARINGS AND PETITIONS FOR POST
CONVICTION RELIEF.
A-5597-18T4
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B. TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE
LEGAL REPRESENTATION BY VIRTUE OF
HIS FAILURE TO THOROUGHLY
INVESTIGATE ALL POSSIBLE DEFENSES
AND TO ADEQUATELY PREPARE FOR
TRIAL.
C. APPELLATE COUNSEL RENDERED
INEFFECTIVE LEGAL REPRESENTATION
BY VIRTUE OF HIS FAILURE TO ARGUE
THAT THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT
TO CONVICT DEFENDANT OF
CARJACKING.
D. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLTED TO A REMAND
TO THE TRIAL COURT TO AFFORD HIM AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO DETERMINE
THE MERITS OF HIS CONTENTION THAT
HE WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL AND APPELLATE
COUNSEL.]
We disagree with defendant's arguments and affirm substantially for the
reasons stated by Judge Ravin in his written decision. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We offer
the following additional comments.
II.
"[W]here the [PCR] court does not hold an evidentiary hearing, we may
exercise de novo review over the factual inferences the trial court has drawn
from the documentary record." State v. O'Donnell, 435 N.J. Super. 351, 373
(App. Div. 2014) (citation omitted). We review a PCR court's legal conclusions
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de novo. State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 415-16 (2004) (citing Toll Bros., Inc. v.
Twp. of W. Windsor, 173 N.J. 502, 549 (2002)).
"Post-conviction relief is neither a substitute for direct appeal, R. 3:22-3,
nor an opportunity to relitigate cases already decided on the merits, R. 3:22-5."
State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992) (citations omitted). A defendant
raises a cognizable PCR claim if it is based upon a "[s]ubstantial d enial in the
conviction proceedings of defendant's rights under the Constitution of the
United States or the [c]onstitution or laws of the State of New Jersey." R. 3:22-
2(a). Because all criminal defendants have the constitutional right to the
assistance of counsel in their defense, defendants may bring a PCR claim for
ineffective assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; N.J. Const. art. I, para.
10.
A claim for ineffective assistance of counsel must satisfy the two-part test
pronounced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and State v. Fritz,
105 N.J. 42 (1987), by demonstrating that "counsel's performance was
deficient," that is, "that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58. This test extends to appellate
counsel as well. State v. Loftin, 191 N.J. 172, 197-98 (2007).
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The first prong requires a showing that "counsel's representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. A
defendant, however, must overcome a strong presumption that counsel rendered
reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689. "The test is not whether defense
counsel could have done better, but whether he met the constitutional threshold
for effectiveness." State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 543 (2013). Further, the failure
to raise unsuccessful legal arguments does not constitute ineffective assistance
of counsel. State v. Worlock, 117 N.J. 596, 625 (1990); Strickland, 466 U.S. at
688.
Under the second prong, a defendant must demonstrate that his counsel's
errors prejudiced the defense such as to deprive defendant of a fair and reliable
outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To prove this element, a defendant must
demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694.
Moreover, a defendant is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary
hearing by simply raising a PCR claim. State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super.
154, 170 (App. Div. 1999) (citing Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462). An evidentiary
hearing is required only when: 1) a defendant establishes a prima facie case in
support of PCR, 2) the court determines there are disputed issues of material
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fact that cannot be resolved by review of the existing record, and 3) the court
determines that an evidentiary hearing is required to resolve the claims asserted.
State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354 (2013) (citing R. 3:22-10).
"A prima facie case is established when a defendant demonstrates 'a
reasonable likelihood that his or her claim, viewing the facts alleged in the light
most favorable to the defendant, will ultimately succeed on the merits.'" Id. at
355 (quoting R. 3:22-10(b)). In other words, there are "material issues of
disputed fact which cannot be resolved by reference to the existing record."
State v. Pyatt, 316 N.J. Super. 46, 51 (App. Div. 1998). Mere bald assertions
are insufficient. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170; see also State v. Marshall,
148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997) (holding "an evidentiary hearing need not be granted"
if "the defendant's allegations are too vague, conclusory, or speculative"
(citations omitted)).
Defendant argues that he established a prima facie claim that his trial and
appellate counsels' performance were constitutionally ineffective because trial
counsel "failed to conduct an adequate investigation and failed to file a motion
to suppress the DNA evidence" and because appellate counsel "fail[ed] to argue
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that the evidence was insufficient to convict defendant of carjacking." 2 We
disagree as defendant's arguments are factually unsupported by the record and
legally meritless.
Here, defendant has failed to establish that either his trial or appellate
counsels' performance was constitutionally defective, or that he suffered any
resulting prejudice. In bare and conclusory fashion, defendant contends a more
"thorough investigation" from trial counsel would have resulted in him being
"acquitted at trial." As Judge Ravin correctly explained, defendant failed to
identify what a more thorough investigation would have uncovered or what
specifically any "potential witnesses" would testify about. Similarly, defendant
offers no support for his conclusory assertion that trial counsel should have
"file[d] a motion to suppress the DNA evidence." He fails to detail the factual
or legal basis for any challenge and how the failure to file such a motion
prejudiced him. See State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 619 (2007) ("It is not
2
On appeal, defendant does not challenge the following arguments addressed
by the PCR court: 1) that the trial court should have sua sponte provided a cross-
racial identification jury charge and 2) that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to argue unspecified mitigating factors that the victim did not suffer life
threatening injuries. As defendant has failed to brief these issues, they are
deemed waived. See Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 417 N.J. Super. 648, 657 (App.
Div. 2011) (citations omitted). We have nevertheless considered the substance
of these contentions and conclude they are without merit for the reasons
expressed by Judge Ravin.
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ineffective assistance of counsel for defense counsel not to file a meritless
motion.").
As the judge noted, the record before the jury was sufficient to convict
defendant on carjacking as the victim identified defendant in court as the
perpetrator who stole his car, defendant's DNA was found in the car, and the
victim suffered leg injuries. See N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a)(1) (stating a person is
guilty of carjacking "if in the course of committing an unlawful taking of a motor
vehicle . . . he . . . inflicts bodily injury or uses force upon an occupant or person
in possession or control of a motor vehicle"). There was therefore no basis to
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the carjacking conviction
on appeal and in this regard appellate counsel is not required to "advance any
grounds insisted upon by defendant." State v. Gaither, 396 N.J. Super. 508, 515
(App. Div. 2007) (quoting R. 3:22-6(d)); see also Worlock, 117 N.J. at 625.
Because we agree with Judge Ravin that defendant did not establish a
prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel, we likewise conclude he
did not abuse his discretion in denying defendant's request for an evidentiary
hearing. See Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462. To the extent we have not addressed
any of defendant's arguments it is because we have concluded that they are
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without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-
3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
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