STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JULIO MARCELO (11-03-0367, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0729-19T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JULIO MARCELO,
a/k/a JUAN MARTINEZ,
and JULIO MORCELO,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Submitted December 15, 2020 – Decided January 05, 2021
Before Judges Mawla and Natali.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Hudson County, Indictment No. 11-03-0367.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Steven M. Gilson, Designated Counsel, on
the brief).
Esther Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney for
respondent (Stephanie Davis Elson, Assistant
Prosecutor, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Julio Marcelo appeals from an August 6, 2019 order denying
his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. We
affirm.
In 2011, defendant was indicted on three counts of first-degree robbery,
N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (counts one, two, and three); second-degree possession of a
weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (count four); second-
degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (count five); and
second-degree certain persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b) (count
six). In 2012, a jury convicted defendant of counts one through four, acquitted
him of count five, and the State dismissed count six. The trial judge sentenced
defendant to an extended term of twenty-five years subject to the No Early
Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, on count two; merged count four into
counts one and three, and imposed a concurrent twenty-year sentence subject to
NERA on counts one and three.
The parties are familiar with the underlying facts, which we recounted in
two prior appeals addressing defendant's challenges to his convictions and
sentence. State v. Marcelo, No. A-4573-13 (App. Div. Oct. 25, 2016) (Marcelo
I) and State v. Marcelo, No. A-4573-13 (App. Div. Sept. 7, 2017) (Marcelo II).
A-0729-19T4
2
Pertinent to the issues raised on this appeal, in Marcelo I, defendant
challenged the jury instruction on the robbery counts and challenged his
sentence as excessive and punitive. Marcelo I, slip op. at 2-3. Regarding the
jury instruction, we stated: "Defendant . . . contends his conviction should be
reversed because the record is devoid of jury instructions directing the jury to
begin deliberations anew after a deliberating juror was replaced by an alte rnate
juror." Id. at 12. Because the record was inadequate to enable us to resolve the
issue, we remanded the matter to the trial judge to reconstruct the record in
accordance with our instructions, and retained jurisdiction pending the
proceedings. Id. at 14-15, 18.
However, we rejected defendant's arguments regarding his sentence,
which contested the trial judge's application of certain mitigating factors. Id. at
15-16. At the outset, we stated: "Significantly, defendant does not dispute he
was subject to an extended term based on his status as a persistent offender." Id.
at 15. Although we concluded the sentence neither violated the sentencing
guidelines nor shocked the judicial conscience, we remanded "for the court to
amplify the record by explaining the basis for its finding" regarding an
aggravating factor which did "not appear to be supported by the record." Id. at
A-0729-19T4
3
17. We concluded defendant's remaining arguments concerning his sentence
lacked merit. Id. at 18.
In Marcelo II, we noted the jury instruction issue was moot because the
missing transcript, which caused us to direct the trial judge to reconstruct the
record, was located following the remand. Marcelo II, slip op. at 2. We also
affirmed the sentence, concluding defendant's trial counsel did not object to the
application of the pertinent aggravating factor and the court's application of the
factor was not plain error leading to an unjust result. Id. at 8.
The Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for certification. State v.
Marcelo, 232 N.J. 290 (2018). In 2018, defendant filed a pro se PCR petition,
containing a certification alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel stating:
I met with my trial attorney two times in preparation for
a trial. Both of those meeting[s] lasted about ten
minutes. Our discussions about the case were limited
and not productive. I felt that the attorney had no time
for me or interest in the case.
I do not recall ever discussing with my trial attorney the
issue of an extended term. I did not know what the term
meant and may well have decided not to go to trial if I
had understood the effect of an extended term at
sentencing. I do not feel that I received adequate or
effective representation.
A-0729-19T4
4
Although it is not part of the appellate record, we glean from the transcript of
the PCR petition that defendant was assigned PCR counsel who filed a brief,
which raised an additional issue relating to the robbery jury charge.
In a written opinion, Judge Sheila A. Venable denied the petition and
summarized defendant's arguments as follows:
[Defendant] argues that defense counsel was
ineffective for failing to meet with [defendant]
sufficiently in order to develop a strategy for trial, in
addition to failing to explain the consequences of a plea
agreement in which [defendant] was exposed to an
extended term of imprisonment. Nor did counsel make
any objection to the jury charge for first-degree
robbery.
The judge concluded defendant's claim he was never informed of his
eligibility for an extended sentence was belied by his own pretrial memorandum,
which defendant had
initialed on each page and ultimately signed[,] . . . [and
did] in fact discuss the possibility of an extended term.
The answers to several questions on the form show that
there was some awareness that [defendant] qualified for
an extended term, both discretionary and mandatory in
nature, and that he faced a sentence of up to life
pursuant to NERA. . . . Moreover, the [m]emorandum
also discusses the plea agreement initially offered,
consisting of the State recommending a fifteen-year
term of imprisonment coupled with eighty-five percent
parole ineligibility.
A-0729-19T4
5
. . . Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that
[defendant] did not know precisely what an extended
term entailed, he nonetheless appears to have been
aware of the consequences of conviction at trial
[versus] consequences of a plea deal.
The judge further noted
[defendant] does not discuss what exactly he did not
understand about the possibility of an extended term,
nor does he elaborate as to how this omission by
counsel affected his decision to go to trial. Nor has
[defendant] provided any transcript of the court
proceedings from which this [c]ourt can determine
whether [his] contentions have merit. Therefore,
without more, [defendant's] assertion in this regard is
merely bare and conclusory in nature, and fails to
establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance.
Addressing the ineffective assistance claim relating to defendant's
meetings with trial counsel, the judge stated:
[Defendant] asserts that he only met twice with counsel
prior to trial, and that the lack of meaningful
communication with counsel ultimately caused a
breakdown in communication. . . . However, this
appears to be the extent of [defendant]'s discussion of
inadequate trial preparation, and he does not specify the
manner in which this prejudiced him. With the
exception of the alleged failure to explain the extended
term, and the failure to object to the ["]and/or["]
language in the robbery jury charge, [defendant]
provides no specific examples of inadequate
performance by trial counsel, nor does he discuss how
any such consequences arose from inadequate
preparation by and consultation with trial counsel.
A-0729-19T4
6
Regarding the jury charge, the judge stated:
Finally, with regard to [defendant's] claims of the
use of the phrase "and/or" in the instruction to the jury
with regard to the robbery charge, it has been held that
the "repeated use of 'and/or' wrung from the charge any
clarity it might have otherwise possessed." State v.
Gonzalez, 444 N.J. Super. 62, 77 (App. Div.[ 2016]).
However, as discussed above, it is not entirely clear
how many times "and/or" was used in the jury charge
in the instant matter, as [defendant] has provided no
transcription of the trial or jury charge. Moreover, this
particular issue appears to have been raised by
[defendant] on direct appeal. . . . However, the
Appellate Division concluded that this argument,
among others, was "without sufficient merit to warrant
further discussion." . . . Therefore, this argument . . .
has been foreclosed on direct review.
On appeal, defendant raises the following point:
THIS MATTER MUST BE REMANDED FOR AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARING BECAUSE
DEFENDANT ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE
CASE OF TRIAL COUNSEL'S INEFFECTIVENESS
DUE TO INADEQUATE CONSULTATION.
We review a judge's denial of PCR without an evidentiary hearing de
novo. State v. Jackson, 454 N.J. Super. 284, 291 (App. Div. 2018). "Post-
conviction relief is neither a substitute for direct appeal, R. 3:22-3, nor an
opportunity to relitigate cases already decided on the merits, R. 3:22-5." State
v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992). A defendant raises a cognizable PCR
claim if it is based upon a "[s]ubstantial denial in the conviction proceedings of
A-0729-19T4
7
defendant's rights under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution
or laws of the State of New Jersey." R. 3:22-2(a). Because all criminal
defendants have the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel in their
defense, defendants may bring a PCR claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.
U.S. Const. amend. VI; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 10.
To reverse a conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must demonstrate that both: (1) "counsel's performance was deficient"
and (2) counsel's "errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair
trial." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see State v. Fritz,
105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987) (adopting the Strickland two-part test). Under the first
prong, counsel's representation must be objectively unreasonable. State v.
Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 578 (2015). Under the second prong, a "reasonable
probability [must exist] that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 583 (quoting Strickland,
466 U.S. at 694).
Initially, we note defendant's appellate brief raises arguments relating to
trial counsel's limited meetings with him and the extended sentence issue.
Therefore, we do not address the alleged inadequacy of the jury instruction
because "[a]n issue not briefed on appeal is deemed waived." Sklodowsky v.
A-0729-19T4
8
Lushis, 417 N.J. Super. 648, 657 (App. Div. 2011). Regardless, it would be
procedurally barred pursuant to Rule 3:22-4(a) and Rule 3:22-5.
The PCR court has discretion to determine whether a hearing is necessary
to aid in its analysis. State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997). If the court
decides a defendant's allegations "are too vague, conclusory, or speculative to
warrant an evidentiary hearing . . . then an evidentiary hearing need not be
granted." Ibid. (citing Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462-64). This is because there is a
strong presumption trial counsel "rendered adequate assistance and made all
significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Further, because prejudice is not presumed, Fritz,
105 N.J. at 52, a defendant must demonstrate "how specific errors of counsel
undermined the reliability" of the proceeding. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S.
648, 659 n.26 (1984).
As we noted within the context of a defendant's claim trial counsel failed
to investigate his case, "a petitioner must do more than make bald assertions that
he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. He must allege facts sufficient
to demonstrate counsel's alleged substandard performance . . . [and] assert the
facts that an investigation would have revealed[.]" State v. Cummings, 321 N.J.
Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999).
A-0729-19T4
9
Here, defendant's certification alleged trial counsel met with him twice ,
described the length of the meetings, and characterized the meetings as "limited
and not productive." However, more was required because defendant's
certification failed to explain how the length of meetings or their substance
prejudiced the outcome of the case. He did not describe how longer or more
frequent meetings would have constituted effective assistance of counsel or what
should have been discussed during these meetings that would have rendered
them productive. Defendant's certification offered no facts to support the
assertion that trial counsel was disinterested in his case.
We reach a similar conclusion regarding defendant's claim trial counsel
failed to advise him of his exposure to an extended term. We have held "an
attorney's gross misadvice of sentencing exposure that prevents [a] defendant
from making a fair evaluation of a plea offer and induces him to reject a plea
agreement he otherwise would likely have accepted constitutes remediable
ineffective assistance." State v. Rountree, 388 N.J. Super. 190, 214 (App. Div.
2006) (quoting State v. Taccetta, 351 N.J. Super. 196, 200 (App. Div. 2002)).
As Judge Venable explained, the record lacks any evidence of "gross
misadvice" to defendant regarding his sentencing exposure. The objective
evidence in the record shows defendant was aware he could receive an extended
A-0729-19T4
10
term and his PCR certification to the contrary was a bald assertion unsupported
by the record or any other facts to support the allegation.
Affirmed.
A-0729-19T4
11