RANDY JOHNSON VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS ( 2020 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-1045-18T2
    RANDY JOHNSON,
    Appellant,
    v.
    NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT
    OF CORRECTIONS,
    Defendant.
    ___________________________
    Submitted January 29, 2020 – Decided February 6, 2020
    Before Judges Haas and Enright.
    On appeal from the New Jersey Department of
    Corrections.
    Randy Johnson, appellant pro se.
    Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
    respondent (Donna Sue Arons, Assistant Attorney
    General, of counsel; Nicholas A. Falcone, Deputy
    Attorney General, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Appellant Randy Johnson appeals from the October 10, 2018 final agency
    decision of the New Jersey Department of Corrections (DOC) that he committed
    prohibited act *.203, possession or introduction of any prohibited substances
    such as drugs, intoxicants, or related paraphernalia not prescribed for the inmate
    by the medical or dental staff. N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a). We affirm.
    DOC developed the following facts at appellant's disciplinary hearing.
    On May 22, 2017, while incarcerated at Northern State Prison, corrections
    officers found him in a shower in his underwear. Appellant was slurring his
    speech, disoriented, and unable to stand on his own. Medical staff provided
    emergency medical treatment to appellant and administered a Narcan shot.
    Corrections officers searched the shower where appellant was found and
    discovered a pair of pants. In the right pocket of the pants, they discovered four
    folded pieces of thick paper, which contained suspected heroin. Corrections
    officers also found glasses and a radio in the shower area that belonged to
    appellant. No other inmate was in the shower area at the time. The suspected
    contraband was logged and photographed. Subsequent testing confirmed the
    suspected contraband was fentanyl.
    Appellant's hearing on his disciplinary charge was postponed three times
    in order to secure lab results of the substance recovered during the incident, to
    A-1045-18T2
    2
    clarify the identification of appellant's pants and to allow him to confront and
    question the corrections officer involved in the incident.
    The hearing proceeded in June 2018. Appellant pled not guilty and was
    afforded the assistance of counsel substitute. During the hearing, the corrections
    officer who discovered appellant in the shower on the date of the incident
    testified that appellant was found in his underwear, his pants were nearby,
    nobody else was in the shower area at that time, and inmates are not permitted
    to walk to the shower from their cells wearing only their underwear.
    The hearing officer found appellant guilty of prohibited act *.203 and
    imposed the following penalties: permanent loss of contact visits; 365 days'
    urine monitoring; 125 days' administrative segregation; 125 days' loss of
    commutation time; 20 days' loss of recreation privileges; and 10 days' loss of
    telephone privileges. Appellant administratively appealed this decision and the
    DOC upheld the hearing officer's decision, triggering the instant appeal.
    Appellant argues there was no proof that the items found in the shower on
    the day of the incident belonged to him, that the investigation process was
    flawed, that he was not permitted to view the physical evidence pertinent to the
    investigation and that his counsel substitute was ineffective.
    A-1045-18T2
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    Having considered appellant's arguments in light of the record and
    controlling law, we find them to be without sufficient merit to warrant
    discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add only the following
    brief remarks.
    Our scope of review of an agency decision is limited. In re Stallworth,
    
    208 N.J. 182
    , 194 (2011); Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 
    414 N.J. Super. 186
    ,
    190 (App. Div. 2010).        Reviewing courts presume the validity of the
    "administrative agency's exercise of its statutorily delegated responsibilities."
    Lavezzi v. State, 
    219 N.J. 163
    , 171 (2014). "We defer to an agency decision
    and do not reverse unless it is arbitrary, capricious[,] or unreasonable or not
    supported by substantial credible evidence in the record." Jenkins v. N.J. Dep't
    of Corr., 
    412 N.J. Super. 243
    , 259 (App. Div. 2010).           But, an agency's
    "interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established
    facts are not entitled to any special deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp.
    Comm. of Manalapan, 
    140 N.J. 366
    , 378 (1995). Here, the DOC's decision is
    supported by sufficient credible evidence on the record as a whole, Rule 2:11-
    3(e)(1)(D), and is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Henry v. Rahway
    State Prison, 
    81 N.J. 571
    , 580 (1980).
    A-1045-18T2
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    Further, appellant was afforded the process due an inmate in disciplinary
    proceedings. See McDonald v. Pinchak, 
    139 N.J. 188
    , 195 (1995); Avant v.
    Clifford, 
    67 N.J. 496
    , 522-33 (1975). His claim that he was denied due process
    because his counsel substitute failed to provide adequate assistance is
    particularly unavailing. Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.12(a), "[w]hen an inmate
    has been charged with an asterisk offense, the inmate shall be afforded the right
    to request representation by a counsel substitute." Our Supreme Court has held
    that requiring inmates to be represented by attorneys "would be wholly
    incompatible with New Jersey institutional needs and capacities and . . .
    unessential to protection of the inmate's rights." 
    Avant, 67 N.J. at 537
    . Rather,
    the prison need only "choose a sufficiently competent staff member or inmate to
    provide assistance" or allow the inmate to choose "a consenting staff member or
    inmate." 
    Id. at 529.
    Inmate paralegals are not attorneys and receive limited
    training. To hold counsel substitutes to the standards of legally educated,
    licensed, and practicing attorneys would be unrealistic. Moreover, appellant has
    not demonstrated his counsel substitute was incompetent or failed to fulfill his
    limited role.
    Affirmed.
    A-1045-18T2
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