IN THE MATTER OF REGISTRANT J.G. IN THE MATTER OF REGISTRANT C.C. (ML-17-13-0023 AND ML-18-04-0057, MONMOUTH AND CAMDEN COUNTIES AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) (CONSOLIDATED) ( 2020 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NOS. A-4807-17T1
A-5512-18T1
IN THE MATTER OF
REGISTRANT J.G. APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
___________________
April 13, 2020
IN THE MATTER OF APPELLATE DIVISION
REGISTRANT C.C.
___________________
Argued January 22, 2020 – Decided April 13, 2020
Before Judges Accurso, Gilson and Rose.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. ML-17-13-
0023 and Camden County, Docket No. ML-18-04-
0057.
Glenn D. Kassman, Designated Counsel, argued the
cause for appellant J.G. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public
Defender, attorney; Glenn D. Kassman, of counsel and
on the brief).
Ellyn Rebecca Rajfer, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the
cause for respondent State of New Jersey in A-4807-17
(Christopher Gramiccioni, Monmouth County
Prosector, attorney; Ellyn Rebecca Rajfer, of counsel
and on the brief).
Jesse M. De Brosse, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Office
of the Public Defender in A-4807-17 (Joseph E.
Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Jesse M. DeBrosse
on the brief).
Jesse M. De Brosse, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for appellant C.C. (Joseph E. Krakora,
Public Defender, attorney; Jesse M. De Brosse, of
counsel and on the brief).
Matthew Thomas Spence, Special Deputy Attorney
General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause
for respondent State of New Jersey in A-5512-18 (Jill
S. Mayer, Acting Camden County Prosecutor, attorney;
Matthew Thomas Spence, of counsel on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GILSON, J.A.D.
These two appeals raise challenges to the use of the Registrant Risk
Assessment Scale (RRAS) to determine the risk of re-offense by persons who
have been convicted of possessing or distributing child pornography.
Defendants both pled guilty to second-degree endangering the welfare of a
child by distributing child pornography in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24 -
4(b)(5)(a)(iii). Following the completion of their custodial sentences, they
were both found to pose a moderate risk of re-offense and were designated as
Tier Two registrants under the Registration and Community Notification Laws,
N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23, commonly known as Megan's Law.
A-4807-17T1
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Defendants appeal from the orders imposing that level of classification,
contending that, as applied to them, the use of the RRAS was improper. They
also argue that the use of the RRAS in tiering sex offenders who have been
convicted of one offense related to possessing or distributing child pornography
gives a skewed tiering result. Thus, defendants argue that the RRAS should be
modified, replaced, or not used in tiering one-time child pornography offenders.
We conclude that neither defendant created the record to support his
arguments. Accordingly, we affirm and issue this consolidated opinion to
address the common arguments presented by defendants.
I.
To put defendants' challenges in context, we summarize the facts giving
rise to their convictions. We also summarize the procedural history concerning
their Megan's Law classifications.
Defendant J.G.
In 2015, law enforcement personnel obtained and executed a warrant to
search for an electronic device used to share a video of child pornography. J.G.'s
computer was seized. He later admitted that he had downloaded child
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pornography images and videos to his computer and had shared at least one
video depicting child pornography on an internet video chat site.
A forensic examination of J.G.'s computer revealed that it contained at
least six images and twenty-three videos of child pornography. J.G.'s computer
also contained another seventeen videos with names suggesting they depicted
child pornography. Some of the child pornography had been stored on J.G.'s
computer for approximately three years.
J.G. was charged with two counts of possessing child pornography and
one count of distributing child pornography. In January 2016, he pled guilty to
second-degree endangering the welfare of a child by distributing child
pornography. In accordance with his plea agreement, J.G. was sentenced in the
third-degree range to three years in prison. He was also sentenced to the
registration and reporting requirements under Megan's Law.
After J.G. was released from prison, the State determined that he posed a
moderate risk of re-offense based on a score of forty-six points on the RRAS.
Thus, the State notified J.G. that he would be classified as a Tier Two offender,
which required community and internet notification. J.G. objected, and the trial
court conducted a hearing.
A-4807-17T1
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At J.G.'s classification hearing, the State submitted the RRAS and
supporting information. J.G. disputed certain of the scores, and in particular,
the scores on factors three (age of victim), four (victim selection), and five
(number of offenses or victims). To support his position, J.G. called Dr. Philip
Witt, a psychologist, as an expert witness.
Dr. Witt was qualified as an expert in the evaluation, treatment, and risk
assessment of sex offenders. He explained that he met with and evaluated J.G.
using the Child Pornography Offender Risk Tool (CPORT) and the Sexual
Violence Risk-20 (SVR-20). He opined that J.G. posed a low risk of re-
offending because he had only one conviction of distributing child pornography
and did not have a history of anti-social behavior or convictions involving
physical contact with victims.
To put his opinions in context, Dr. Witt explained that he had served on
the Attorney General's task force that developed the RRAS. Dr. Witt testified
that when the RRAS was developed in 1995, child pornography had not been
considered. Focusing on factors three, four, and five of the RRAS, Dr. Witt
opined that those factors were inaccurate in assessing the risk of one-time child
pornography offenders. Thus, he offered three options: (1) not use the RRAS
A-4807-17T1
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for such offenders and use a different instrument; (2) use the RRAS, but not
score factors three, four, and five; or (3) use the RRAS, but create an exception
allowing courts to classify one-time child pornography offenders as Tier One
offenders.
On cross examination, Dr. Witt acknowledged the CPORT had not been
validated as an instrument for assessing the risk of re-offense and that the study
underlying CPORT had limits. In that regard, Dr. Witt acknowledged that none
of the eighty men involved in the CPORT study had prior child pornography
convictions and, therefore, the study was biased towards lower-risk offenders.
After hearing the testimony of Dr. Witt, and considering the submissions
and arguments of counsel, the trial court found the State had presented clear and
convincing evidence that J.G. posed a moderate risk of re-offense. The court
read its findings of fact and conclusions of law into the record on June 20, 2018.
The court first considered J.G.'s specific objections to the scoring of
factors three, four, five, and six of the RRAS. The court rejected Dr. Witt's
opinion that J.G. posed a low risk of re-offending because the court found that
Dr. Witt had not thoroughly checked J.G.'s self-reporting and the state had
shown that J.G. misreported and minimized his behavior. Accordingly, the court
A-4807-17T1
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accepted the State's score of forty-six on the RRAS and ruled that it was
appropriate to put J.G. in Tier Two, warranting community notification.
The court also considered, but rejected, Dr. Witt's opinion that factors
three, four, and five of the RRAS should not be used in scoring one-time child
pornography offenders. The court also found that CPORT was not an
appropriate alternative tool since it had not been validated as an actuarial
instrument. In addition, the court rejected Dr. Witt's argument that because child
pornography was not considered in developing the RRAS, that scale was not
appropriate for child pornography offenders.
Defendant C.C.
C.C. was identified as someone downloading and distributing child
pornography through a peer-to-peer network. Such networks allow users to
download content from other users' collections. In 2016, a number of electronic
devices were seized from C.C.'s home in accordance with a warrant. An
examination of those devices revealed that they contained approximately 40,000
images and videos of child pornography. The children depicted in those images
and videos ranged in age from nine to fifteen years old. Some of those images
had been downloaded in 2000, more than fifteen years earlier.
A-4807-17T1
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C.C. admitted he used peer-to-peer programs and had used his laptop
computer to download pornography. He was charged with four counts of
endangering the welfare of children by possessing and distributing child
pornography. In 2017, C.C. pled guilty to one count of second-degree
endangering the welfare of a child by distributing child pornography. He was
sentenced to five years in prison, parole supervision for life, and registration and
reporting requirements under Megan's Law.
Following his parole in May 2018, the State determined that C.C. posed a
moderate risk of re-offense based on a score of fifty-nine points on the RRAS.
Accordingly, the State notified C.C. that he would be classified as a Tier Two
offender, which required community and internet notification.
C.C. objected, and the trial court conducted a classification hearing on
April 4, 2019. At the hearing, the State presented the RRAS and supporting
information. The State and C.C. agreed to lower the scoring on factors seven
(length of time since last offense) and thirteen (employment stability). They
disputed the scoring of factors three, four, and five. The State sought high risk
scores on each of those factors. In contrast, C.C. argued for low risk scores, that
A-4807-17T1
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is, a zero on each of those factors. To support his position, C.C. called Dr. Witt
as an expert.
Dr. Witt testified that he met with C.C. and conducted evaluations using
CPORT and SVR-20. Dr. Witt explained that he had served on the Attorney
General's task force that developed the RRAS and a 2005 task force that
developed the Juvenile Risk Assessment Scale (JRAS), the juvenile counterpart
to the RRAS. Dr. Witt again testified that when the RRAS was developed, child
pornography had not been considered. He contended the JRAS considered child
pornography but did not score victim characteristics in pornography-only cases
if the offender had not committed a physical offense against the children
depicted in the images. Dr. Witt then recommended that the rules for scoring
factors three, four, and five on the JRAS should also apply to the RRAS.
The trial court did not accept Dr. Witt's opinions. The court declined to
apply the JRAS in scoring factors under the RRAS, reasoning that juveniles are
treated differently from adults for good reason. The court went on to accept the
high risk scoring on factors three, four, and five as submitted by the State under
the RRAS. The court found there was clear and convincing evidence that certain
victims were below the age of thirteen, the victims were strangers to C.C., and
A-4807-17T1
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there were over 40,000 victims. Consequently, on April 4, 2019, the court
entered an order classifying C.C. as a Tier Two registrant under Megan's Law.
C.C. filed a motion for reconsideration. As part of that motion, C.C.
submitted certifications from Dr. Jackson T. Bosley and Dr. Sean Hiscox, two
psychologists who also served on the committee for the JRAS. On July 11,
2019, the court entered an order denying C.C.'s motion for reconsideration.
II.
On these appeals, J.G. and C.C. both challenge the use of the RRAS in
determining their risk of re-offending under Megan's Law. They contend that
offenders, such as themselves, who have been convicted of only one offense of
possessing or distributing child pornography, should be scored differently from
sex offenders with a history of physical contact with their victims. Accordingly,
defendants argue that factors three, four, and five of the RRAS should be scored
as low risk or should be replaced with the JRAS scoring guidelines.
Alternatively, defendants argue that a new scale should be developed because
child pornography was not considered when the RRAS was developed and
factors three, four, and five of the RRAS systematically overstate the risk of re-
offense.
A-4807-17T1
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The primary issue presented by these appeals is whether the RRAS is an
appropriate tool to help assess the risk of re-offense for sex offenders who are
convicted of one offense for possession or distribution of child pornography.
We hold that it is. To put that issue in context, we first summarize the history
of Megan's Law and the cases evaluating Megan's Law. Next, we analyze
whether defendants have presented records that support a re-evaluation of the
RRAS scale.
A. Megan's Law
Megan's Law was enacted "to protect the community from the dangers of
recidivism by sexual offenders." In re C.A., 146 N.J. 71, 80 (1996) (citing Doe
v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 12-20 (1995)); N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(a). The statute requires
certain sex offenders to register with law enforcement agencies. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-
2 to -4. Law enforcement agencies are then required "to release relevant and
necessary information regarding sex offenders to the public when the release of
the information is necessary for public protection." N.J.S.A. 2C:7-5(a); In re
N.B., 222 N.J. 87, 95 (2015).
Megan's Law identifies three levels of community notification depending
upon the degree of the risk of re-offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8(a). If the risk of re-
A-4807-17T1
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offense is low, law enforcement agencies likely to encounter the registrant are
notified. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8(c)(1). If the risk of re-offense is moderate,
organizations in the community are also notified. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8(c)(2). If the
risk of re-offense is high, notification is also given to members of the public
who are likely to encounter the registrant. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8(c)(3); In re N.B.,
222 N.J. at 95.1
In Megan's Law, the Legislature required the Attorney General, in
consultation with an advisory council, to "promulgate guidelines and procedures
for the notification required" by the Act. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8(a). The guidelines
were required to identify factors relevant to the risk of re-offense and the
Legislature instructed the Attorney General to consider at least eight factors and,
if appropriate, to develop other factors. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8(b).
As instructed, the Attorney General "convened a committee composed of
mental health experts[,] as well as members of the Law Enforcement Committee,
which drafted the [RRAS] and the accompanying Registrant Risk Assessment
1
Following a 2000 constitutional amendment, Megan's Law was amended in
2001 to make information in the State's registry about certain sex offenders
publicly available on the internet. L. 2001, c. 167 (codified as N.J.S.A. 2C:7-
13).
A-4807-17T1
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Manual (RRA Manual), which explains the [RRAS]." In re C.A., 146 N.J. at
82. The RRAS identified thirteen factors and assigned them to four categories:
seriousness of offense, offense history, characteristics of offender, and
community support. Ibid. The RRAS gives greater weight to the first two
categories. Registrants are assigned scores for each factor and the factors are
then adjusted by multipliers. If the score is thirty-six or below, the registrant is
assigned to Tier One. If the score is between thirty-seven and seventy-three, the
registrant is assigned to Tier Two. And if the score is seventy-four or above
(the maximum score is 111), the registrant is assigned to Tier Three. Ibid.; In
re V.L., 441 N.J. Super. 425, 428-29 (App. Div. 2015).
The Supreme Court has held that the registration and community
notification components of Megan's Law are constitutional and enforceable.
Doe, 142 N.J. at 28; In re M.F., 169 N.J. 45, 52-53 (2001). The Court also has
upheld the use of the RRAS in classifying registrants. In re C.A., 146 N.J. at
108-09. Moreover, the Court has repeatedly ruled that the RRAS is entitled to
deference. Ibid.; In re G.B., 147 N.J. 62, 81-83 (1996); In re N.B., 222 N.J. at
95 n.3.
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The RRAS, however, is not immune to specific challenges as applied to a
particular registrant. In re G.B., 147 N.J. at 83-84. To protect the registrant's
liberty and privacy interests, the Court has held that a registrant is entitled, if
requested, to a judicial hearing to challenge his or her tiering. Doe, 142 N.J. at
30; In re G.B., 147 N.J. at 79. At that hearing, the State has the initial burden
of proof and can rely on the RRAS. In that regard, our Supreme Court has
explained that the RRAS is a "tool." In re G.B., 147 N.J. at 78. Accordingly,
the RRAS is "a useful guide to determine the amount of notification [the]
community should receive." Id. at 69. Nevertheless, "[t]he responsibility for
ultimately determining the proper scope of notification is left to the trial court
after a hearing on the matter." Ibid. (citing In re C.A., 146 N.J. at 83).
Furthermore, the judicial determination regarding the tiering classification and
community notification "must be [made] by clear and convincing evidence." In
re A.A., 461 N.J. Super. 385, 401 (App. Div. 2019) (alteration in original)
(quoting G.H. v. Twp. of Galloway, 401 N.J. Super. 392, 403 (App. Div. 2008)).
In explaining the use of the RRAS, our Supreme Court has stated:
Even though "the [RRAS] provides a useful guide for
the prosecutors and court to evaluate risk of re-
offense," the court must still make "a value judgment"
in determining the proper tier classification and scope
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of community notification. Thus, courts are not "to
blindly follow the numerical calculation provided by
the [RRAS], but rather to enter the appropriate tier
classification" based on all of the evidence available to
them. The determination of tier classification and
scope of notification "are best made on a case-by-case
basis within the discretion of the court."
[In re G.B., 147 N.J. at 78-79 (citations omitted)
(quoting In re C.A., 146 N.J. at 108-09).]
In challenging a tier determination, a registrant may argue that (1) the
RRAS score was erroneously calculated, (2) the case falls outside the
"heartland" of Megan's Law cases, or (3) the extent of community notification
required is excessive due to "unique" aspects of the registrant's case. In re T.T.,
188 N.J. 321, 330 (2006) (quoting In re G.B., 147 N.J. at 85). The Court has
also ruled that in limited circumstances, a registrant can call an expert to
"establish the existence of unique aspects of a registrant's offense or character
that render the [RRAS] score suspect." In re G.B., 147 N.J. at 69. Accordingly,
our Supreme Court has explained that if the expert testimony is believed, "such
evidence would lead to the conclusions that the [RRAS] does not adequately
represent the risk of recidivism for that particular registrant and that, therefore,
in such circumstances the scope of notification should be more limited than that
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indicated by the registrant's [RRAS] score and attendant tier classification."
Ibid. The Court noted that such challenges will be rare. Id. at 82.
The Court has also made clear, however, that registrants cannot argue
that the RRAS as a scale is unreliable. Ibid. Instead, the Court has repeatedly
held that the RRAS "is presumptively reliable." Ibid.; In re N.B., 222 N.J. at
95 n.3. Thus, the Court has explained:
[The RRAS] is presumptively accurate and is to be
afforded substantial weight – indeed it will even have
binding effect – unless and until a registrant "presents
subjective criteria that would support a court not
relying on the tier classification recommended by the
[RRAS]."
....
Challenges to the [RRAS] itself, or challenges to the
weight afforded to any of the individual factors that
comprise the [RRAS], are not permitted. Instead, all
challenges must relate to the characteristics of the
individual registrant and the shortcomings of the
[RRAS] in his particular case.
[In re G.B., 147 N.J. at 81, 85 (quoting In re C.A., 146
N.J. at 109).]
B. The evidence presented by J.G. and C.C.
Under existing case law, a registrant can challenge his or her individual
classification, but cannot challenge the RRAS itself. Id. at 85. Nevertheless,
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we do not read In re G.B. or its progeny as forever precluding a challenge to the
RRAS provided the challenge is based on empirical studies or data developed
since 1996. Moreover, the studies or data would need to be sufficiently reliable
such that others within the community of professionals evaluating, treating, and
assessing the risk of re-offense by sex offenders would rely on those studies or
data. In re Accutane Litigation, 234 N.J. 340, 399-400 (2018).
Accordingly, we analyze the challenges presented by J.G. and C.C. on two
levels: (1) the RRAS as applied to them; and (2) the RRAS itself. Neither J.G.
nor C.C. presented credible evidence to show that the RRAS as applied to them
was improper. They also both failed to present any studies or data that call into
question the continued validity of the RRAS as applied to one-time child
pornography offenders.
1. The As-Applied Challenges
As already summarized, both J.G. and C.C. rely on the testimony of Dr.
Witt in presenting their as-applied challenges. Dr. Witt evaluated both J.G. and
C.C., reviewed materials related to both offenders, and opined that they
presented a low risk of re-offending. In offering that opinion, Dr. Witt relied
primarily on the self-reports provided by J.G. and C.C. Both trial courts found
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that J.G.'s and C.C.'s self-reporting was incomplete and minimized their past
behavior. Moreover, both trial courts rejected as unreliable Dr. Witt's testimony
and opinions concerning the low risk presented by J.G. and C.C.
The trial courts' findings in that regard are supported by evidence in the
record and we discern no basis for disturbing those factual findings. See In re
A.R., 234 N.J. 82, 104 (2018) (holding that there is no abuse of discretion when
a trial court's factual findings are supported by "sufficient credible evidence in
the record"); In re A.I., 303 N.J. Super. 105, 114 (App. Div. 1997) (holding that
appellate courts review tiering determinations for abuse of discretion). Without
Dr. Witt's testimony, neither J.G. nor C.C. has established a factual basis to
challenge the scoring of the RRAS as applied to them.
Just as importantly, the trial courts found that there was clear and
convincing evidence that J.G. and C.C. posed moderate risks of sexual re-
offending. J.G. had possessed at least six images and twenty-three videos of
child pornography. Moreover, he possessed some of that child pornography for
more than three years. C.C. had possessed approximately 40,000 images and
videos of child pornography, and he possessed some of that material for more
than fifteen years. Consequently, there was clear and convincing evidence that
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both J.G. and C.C. victimized children under the ages of thirteen, those children
were strangers, and there were numerous victims. Indeed, both J.G. and C.C.
distributed child pornography thereby continuing the revictimization of the
children depicted in those videos. See In re Cohen, 220 N.J. 7, 12 (2014) (noting
that "[c]hild pornography, in particular, revictimizes the children involved with
each viewing of the same image or video").
2. The RRAS Itself
J.G. and C.C. again rely on Dr. Witt to challenge the RRAS itself. Dr.
Witt pointed out that the committee that developed the RRAS did not expressly
consider child pornography, and in particular the effects of the internet on child
pornography. Accordingly, Dr. Witt offered three options: (1) not use the RRAS
for one-time child pornography offenders and use a different "instrument"; (2)
use the RRAS but not score factors three, four, and five; or (3) use the RRAS
but create an exception that allows trial courts to classify child pornography-
only offenders as Tier One offenders. Moreover, C.C. argues that factors three,
four, and five of the RRAS should be scored as low risk (that is, zero) "as a
matter of law."
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The flaw in these arguments is that neither J.G. nor C.C. presented any
new, validated empirical studies or data supporting their positions. Dr. Witt
suggested either using CPORT in place of the RRAS or using the JRAS as a
modification to the RRAS. Dr. Witt acknowledged, however, that CPORT had
not been validated as an instrument for assessing the risk of re-offense and that
the study underlying CPORT had limits. Dr. Witt also acknowledged that the
JRAS was developed for juveniles. Data and studies demonstrate that juveniles
behave differently, and in particular, more impulsively, than adults. See In Re
C.K., 233 N.J. 44, 51 (2018) (holding that juvenile sex offenders "are more
likely to act impulsively" than adult sex offenders). Indeed, our Supreme Court
has recognized that juveniles act differently from adults and therefore, in
appropriate circumstances, warrant different treatment. See State v. Zuber, 227
N.J. 422, 445-46 (2017) (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 480 (2012))
(recognizing "children are different, and . . . those differences counsel against
irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison"). We agree with both trial
courts that Dr. Witt did not present sufficient studies or data to support
modifying or replacing the RRAS with CPORT or the JRAS.
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Without an alternative instrument, or new study or empirical data, J.G.
and C.C. rely on the assertion that child pornography was not expressly
considered when the RRAS was developed. That argument is an insufficient
basis for rejecting the use of the RRAS.
The RRAS was developed in 1995 by the Attorney General with the
assistance of mental health experts. Child pornography clearly existed in 1995.
As developed, the scale was to be applied to various sex offenders. Even if
every type of offender were not expressly considered, that omission does not
mean that the RRAS is automatically inapplicable to a particular type of
offender, such as a one-time child pornography offender. In other words,
although the developers of the RRAS did not expressly consider child
pornography, that omission is not evidence that the RRAS should not be applied
to a registrant convicted of a child pornography offense. Instead, there must be
evidence that experts in the area of assessing the risk of re-offense of sex
offenders generally agree that one-time child pornography offenders are
different, and should be evaluated differently, from other sex offenders. Neither
J.G. nor C.C. presented such evidence. Moreover, neither J.G. nor C.C.
presented evidence demonstrating that the Attorney General has been requested
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to reevaluate the efficacy of the RRAS for tiering child pornography offenders
under Megan's Law.
In summary, we discern no basis to reject the trial courts' findings that
J.G. and C.C. both failed to present evidence demonstrating that as applied to
them the use of the RRAS was improper. We also hold that neither J.G. nor
C.C. presented evidence that warranted a rejection of, or modification to, the
RRAS when applied to one-time child pornography offenders. Finally, we do
not preclude the possibility that a registrant could develop the record to
challenge the RRAS when it is applied to a one-time child pornography offender.
That record, however, was not presented by either J.G. or C.C.
Affirmed.
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