SARINA M. FERNICOLA VS. ROBERT C. FERNICOLA (FM-15-0587-17, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-0523-19T1
    SARINA M. FERNICOLA,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    ROBERT C. FERNICOLA,
    Defendant-Respondent.
    ________________________
    Argued October 19, 2020 – Decided January 11, 2021
    Before Judges Hoffman and Suter.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Chancery Division, Family Part, Ocean County, Docket
    No. FM-15-0587-17.
    Kevin E. Young argued the cause for appellant
    (Herlihy, Young & Niemiec, attorneys; Kevin E.
    Young, on the brief).
    Abigale M. Stolfe argued the cause for respondent
    (Stolfe & Zeigler attorneys; Abigale M. Stolfe and
    Heather N. Capp, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Plaintiff Sarina M. Fernicola appeals the August 23, 2019 Family Part
    order granting defendant Robert C. Fernicola's motion for reconsideration and
    finding the Nationwide Financial IRA (the Nationwide account) consisted solely
    of premarital funds and was not subject to equitable distribution under the
    parties' Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA). We affirm the August 23, 2019
    order.
    After ten years of marriage, plaintiff filed for divorce on November 14,
    2016, citing irreconcilable differences. Defendant filed a counterclaim citing
    the same grounds. A lengthy "collaboration process" was unsuccessful but the
    parties reached a settlement in mediation. The MSA was incorporated into their
    May 25, 2017 Final Judgment of Divorce.
    The MSA is a comprehensive document. We mention only the sections
    that are necessary for our opinion.
    Section 1.17 of the MSA provides that the parties have "conducted limited
    discovery but wish to proceed with the information exchanged during
    mediation."       They "waive[d] the right to complete formal discovery
    proceedings." Section 1.15 provides that the MSA is the entire agreement
    between the parties.
    A-0523-19T1
    2
    Article V of the MSA addresses the division of their property. Section 5.1
    lists certain assets defendant retains "free and clear of any interest" by plaintiff.
    Among other things, this includes two accounts identified by name and number,
    but does not include the Nationwide account. Section 5.2 lists the assets plaintiff
    retains "free and clear of any interest" of defendant. This includes plaintiff's
    teacher's pension. In section 5.3, the parties agree to execute the documents that
    are needed to transfer title in these assets. Section 5.4 lists an account the parties
    agree to share equally "along with any passive increase or decrease in value
    accumulated as of" the date the asset is distributed.
    The Nationwide account is addressed in section 5.5. Under that section,
    [t]he parties shall share the marital portion (the value
    of the asset as of the date of marriage, July 22, 2006
    and agreed upon date of dissolution, June 30, 2015) of
    the following assets:
    A. [account A] . . .
    B. Nationwide IRA . . .
    C. [account C] . . .
    D. [account D] . . .
    The parties will exchange the necessary documentation
    to each other within [thirty] days of this agreement so
    that each party's portion of these assets can be properly
    titled in their own name. Should a Qualified Domestic
    Relations Order [QDRO] be required for the transfer of
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    3
    any asset described above, the parties will share the cost
    of preparing the QDRO through Troyan and Associates.
    Any tax or liability associated with the transfer of these
    funds shall be paid by the party receiving the
    distribution that incurred the tax.
    The parties do not agree what portion of the Nationwide account, if any, is
    subject to equitable distribution.
    On August 22, 2018, defendant filed a motion to enforce litigant's rights
    requesting that plaintiff abide by paragraph 5.5 of the MSA. Defendant certified
    that the Nationwide account was "entirely pre-marital," making it exempt from
    distribution.     He certified these funds were "never commingled during the
    marriage." He requested counsel fees for making the motion.
    Plaintiff also requested the enforcement of litigant's rights to require
    defendant to complete the QDRO in accord with the MSA and requested an
    award of attorney's fees.
    The Family Part judge granted plaintiff's cross-motion. The December
    14, 2018 order provided that the parties were to cooperate in facilitating the
    completion of the QDRO's in accordance with their MSA, including the
    Nationwide IRA. The court denied the parties' requests for attorney's fees.
    Defendant requested reconsideration, arguing the term "marital portion"
    used in the MSA was not defined and that the full value of the account is not the
    A-0523-19T1
    4
    "marital portion."     Plaintiff filed opposition and a cross-motion to enforce
    litigant's rights. She argued that defendant's motion did not satisfy the standard
    for reconsideration.
    On February 22, 2019, the trial court ordered discovery and a plenary
    hearing. The plenary hearing was to determine the source of the funds for the
    Nationwide account.
    At the hearing, defendant testified that he is an attorney. Prior to his
    marriage, he worked as an associate in the firm of Schibell & Mennie. The firm
    funded a 401K with a cash deferred contribution. When he left the firm to start
    his own, the 401K account remained dormant. In his new firm, he established
    an IRA with Smith Barney as a retirement account.
    The parties consulted with a financial planner in 2010 because defendant
    wanted to invest money in "income-generating vehicles." New accounts were
    created and monies from existing accounts were rolled into the new ones.
    Defendant testified that through the divorce process, "[i]t was always
    understood . . . what was premarital was premarital. What was during the
    marriage, was during the marriage." This meant that "[w]hat we brought into
    the marriage prior to the marriage was not to be part of the marital component
    A-0523-19T1
    5
    and what would be divided up between is with regard to the assets during the
    marriage."
    Defendant claimed that when the MSA was prepared, they did not have
    all the documentation for the accounts "to determine what the amount of the
    premarital component was." The values listed in section 5.5 were approximate
    values. He thought the 401K from the Schibell & Mennie firm was rolled over
    into account C, but he was mistaken. Because they did not know what portion
    of the accounts in section 5.5 were premarital or marital, defendant testified that
    they were to submit all of their documentation to Troyan to prepare the QDRO.
    After the divorce, he assembled documents for Troyan as requested, but the
    401K from Schibell & Mennie and an IRA from Smith Barney were pre-marital.
    There was no premarital component to account C. Defendant advised plaintiff's
    attorney, but she would not agree to any exemption of the assets.
    Plaintiff testified that some of the financial statements about their
    investments were being sent directly to defendant's law firm, giving him
    knowledge of those accounts. This included the Nationwide account. Plaintiff
    claimed she had premarital funds in account A.
    Plaintiff testified that they met with the financial planner in 2010. Each
    had to bring documentation of their accounts. She did not have access to
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    6
    defendant's accounts. Plaintiff testified that because the Nationwide account
    was "opened essentially in the duration of the marriage, [she assumed] that it
    was part of the marital property." She understood the Nationwide account was
    to be divided evenly between them. In mediation, they were asked to discuss
    the premarital portions of any retirement accounts. She thought the premarital
    portion was already taken out of all the accounts in section 5.5 lettered A, B, C
    and D and that those values were then to be added and divided evenly.
    On August 23, 2019, the court found that the Nationwide account "was
    funded with and consists of solely premarital funds" and that it was "exempt
    from distribution in accordance with the plain language of [the MSA]." In the
    court's oral decision, the court found that "[t]he parties were in agreement
    coming out of the collaborative process, that [what] was premarital would be
    kept premarital, meaning that, the property of whatever party was premarital
    would not be subject to equitable . . . distribution." The court found it "was
    unclear at the time that the parties negotiated [the MSA]" what portion of the
    Nationwide account was marital and what was premarital.
    The court found the parties were not certain where certain premarital
    accounts had gone to in connection with their retirement planning. At issue was
    defendant's 401K from the Schibell & Mennie firm and other amounts rolled in
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    7
    from two other accounts. The parties "assumed" these monies went into account
    C, but they did not. The court found credible defendant's testimony that "no one
    was really focused on this." The court found that if the parties had known the
    monies in the Nationwide account were premarital, it would have been included
    in section 5.1 of the MSA. The court was not rewriting the agreement by
    awarding plaintiff a portion of the premarital funds. Rather, the "[N]ationwide
    account is entirely premarital and not subject [to] equitable distribution."
    On appeal, plaintiff argues that
    THE MARITAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WAS
    INTENDED TO AVOID POST-JOD HAGGLING
    OVER THE 'SOURCE' OF THE MARITAL ASSETS
    THE PARTIES AGREED TO DISTRIBUTE; JUDGE
    PUGLISI WAS CORRECT IN HER ORIGINAL
    DECISION AND THIS COURT SHOULD VACATE
    THE AUGUST 23, 2019 RECONSIDERATION
    ORDER.
    Plaintiff argues the trial court had no basis to reform the parties MSA by
    recategorizing an asset absent a finding of "unconscionability, fraud or
    overreaching," citing Miller v. Miller, 
    160 N.J. 408
    , 419 (1999). She concludes
    the MSA should be enforced as any other contract, pursuant to its intent. The
    parties assumed the source of the Nationwide account was commingled assets.
    She argues the judge should not be able to revisit one of the assets to place it
    under section 5.1 instead of 5.5.
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    We defer to the factual findings of the Family Part judge when there is
    substantial credible evidence in the record to support them. N.J. Div. of Youth
    & Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 
    196 N.J. 88
    , 104 (2008). In doing so, we are mindful of
    the "special expertise of judges hearing matters in the Family Part," according
    due deference to factual findings. Parish v. Parish, 
    412 N.J. Super. 39
    , 48 (App.
    Div. 2010); see also Cesare v. Cesare, 
    154 N.J. 394
    , 413 (1998). However, "[a]
    trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from
    established facts are not entitled to any special deference."         Hitesman v.
    Bridgeway, Inc., 
    218 N.J. 8
    , 26 (2014) (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp.
    Comm. of Manalapan, 
    140 N.J. 366
    , 378 (1995)).
    Both parties agreed that premarital assets were not to be subject to
    equitable distribution under the MSA. This was consistent with the general
    notion that for an asset to be subject to equitable distribution, it must be
    "property . . . legally and beneficially acquired by [the parties] or either of them
    during the marriage." Orgler v. Orgler, 
    237 N.J. Super. 342
    , 350 (App. Div.
    1989) (alterations in original) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23). It is generally
    understood that property owned by a party "at the time of marriage will remain
    the separate property of such spouse . . . ." Painter v. Painter, 
    65 N.J. 196
    , 214
    (1974); see Scavone v. Scavone, 
    230 N.J. Super. 482
    , 488-89 (Ch. Div. 1988).
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    9
    The MSA itself was careful to distinguish between these concepts.
    Section 5.1 addressed defendant's property. Section 5.2 addressed plaintiff's
    property. Section 5.4 listed an account that they both agreed was subject to
    equitable distribution. Section 5.5 were the accounts where a portion was
    supposed to be marital and subject to division.
    Plaintiff believed that section 5.5 did not include premarital assets and
    that the amounts listed in 5.5 were net of these amounts. However, the court
    found defendant was credible that at the time of the divorce neither party focused
    on the source of the funds for the Nationwide account. That is consistent with
    the language of the MSA to the extent it said the parties would share the marital
    portion of the assets in section 5.5. Section 5.5 also contemplated that the parties
    would determine after the MSA was signed what part of the accounts were
    premarital. They were to "exchange the necessary documents to each other
    within [thirty] days . . . so that each party's portion of these accounts can be
    properly titled in their own name."
    Plaintiff did not contest that the 401K from Schibell & Mennie and the
    funds from the other two accounts that also funded the Nationwide account were
    premarital. Rather, she testified that because the monies had been rolled into
    the Nationwide account in 2010, they became marital at that time. That was not
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    10
    consistent with her testimony that certain funds of hers were premarital or that
    premarital funds were not subject to equitable distribution.
    The plenary hearing resolved that none of the Nationwide account
    included marital funds, having been derived entirely from premarital funds.
    This was amply supported by the evidence presented by defendant. There was
    no abuse of discretion in determining that these funds were not subject to
    equitable distribution.
    "A settlement agreement is governed by basic contract principles." Quinn
    v. Quinn, 
    225 N.J. 34
    , 45 (2016) (citing J.B. v. W.B., 
    215 N.J. 305
    , 326 (2013)).
    In interpreting and enforcing a settlement agreement, a court is to "discern and
    implement the intentions of the parties." 
    Ibid.
     (citation omitted). An agreement
    will not be enforced if it was the product of "unconscionability, fraud or
    overreaching in the negotiations of the settlement[.]" 
    Id. at 47
     (alteration in
    original) (quoting Miller, 
    160 N.J. at 419
    ).      We are not to make a better
    agreement for the parties. See Quinn, 225 N.J. at 45.
    The court's order was consistent with the parties' intent as expressed in the
    MSA. The MSA left open that the accounts in section 5.5 could be a mixture of
    funds. In this case, the Nationwide account was entirely premarital. The Family
    A-0523-19T1
    11
    Part judge simply applied the MSA as it was written once it was clear these
    funds were premarital.
    Defendant requests an award of attorney's fees for the appeal under Rule
    2:11-4 but did not file the required motion. We will not address what is not
    properly before us. Bandler v. Melillo, 
    443 N.J. Super. 203
    , 212 n.5 (App. Div.
    2015).
    Affirmed.
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    12