STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. SHELDON M. GOLDSBOROUGH (17-11-1056, CUMBERLAND COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3501-18T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
SHELDON M. GOLDSBOROUGH,
a/k/a SHELDON GOLDSBORO,
MIKEY GOLDSBORO, MICHAEL,
and MICKEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________
Submitted January 23, 2020 - Decided February 12, 2020
Before Judges Fuentes, Mayer and Enright.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Cumberland County, Indictment No. 17-11-
1056.
Lauren A. Wimmer, attorney for appellant.
Jennifer Webb-McRae, Cumberland County
Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Andre R. Araujo,
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals from an April 5, 2019 judgment of conviction based on
a guilty plea, focusing on a September 14, 2018 order denying his motion to
suppress evidence. We affirm but for reasons other than those expressed by the
judge.1
On November 29, 2017, defendant was charged in a multi-count
indictment with offenses associated with possession of heroin, including the
first-degree offense of maintaining or operating a facility for the production of
heroin, possession of weapons, and endangering the welfare of a child.
On December 16, 2017, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence
discovered at the time of his arrest. The trial court conducted an evidentiary
hearing on defendant’s motion on the following dates: March 27, 2018; April 3,
2018; April 20, 2018; July 6, 2018; and August 6, 2018. In a September 14,
2018 order and written decision, the judge denied defendant’s motion to
suppress.
On February 25, 2019, defendant entered into a negotiated agreement with
the State wherein he pleaded guilty to second-degree conspiracy to manufacture,
distribute, or possess heroin with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a)(1), and
1
"[B]ecause an appeal is taken from a trial court's ruling rather than reasons for
the ruling, we may rely on grounds other than those upon which the trial court
relied." State v. Adubato, 420 N.J. Super. 167, 176 (App. Div. 2011).
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2
second-degree possession of a firearm while committing a CDS offense,
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1(a). In exchange, the prosecutor agreed to recommend the
court sentence defendant to an aggregate ten-year term of imprisonment, with
fifty-two months of parole ineligibility.2 On April 5, 2019, the judge sentenced
defendant in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement.
At the suppression hearing, Detective Brian Cole testified on behalf of the
State. The following witnesses testified on behalf of defendant: Natrice
Tilghman, defendant's children, and Detective Charles Mackafee. The following
facts were adduced during the suppression hearing.
On August 31, 2017, law enforcement officers executed an arrest warrant
for defendant. Detective Cole was assigned to the U.S. Marshals Fugitive Task
Force and personally participated in the execution of the arrest warrant. The
warrant sought defendant's arrest for charges stemming from a double homicide.
Before executing the warrant, law enforcement officials discussed an
arrest plan. The police were familiar with defendant based on previous contacts
and knew he resided with Natrice Tilghman, his longtime girlfriend, and his
children at his home in Vineland. Detective Cole testified defendant "was
2
The second-degree possession of a firearm offense is subject to the mandatory
parole ineligibility provisions of the Graves Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6c.
A-3501-18T2
3
involved in narcotics distribution and manufacturing, assaults, [and] weapons
offenses." Based on defendant's criminal history, including weapons
possession, fourteen officers were assigned to execute the arrest warrant.
Defendant's home was a "split level," having stairs leading up to the main
level and stairs leading down to the basement. Upon entering the front door,
there was an interior landing allowing a person to see the ascending and
descending stairs in defendant's home.
When approaching defendant's home to execute the arrest warrant,
Detective Cole observed multiple cars parked outside. The number of cars
indicated to Detective Cole that several people may be inside the home at the
time. In executing the warrant, law enforcement approached the front door
armed and arrayed in a five-person line. The first person in the line held a
protective shield. Detective Cole, the third person in the line, knocked on the
door and identified the group as police officers. The officers wore plain clothing
with tactical gear identifying them as law enforcement personnel.
After knocking several times, Michael Loftin answered the door. As soon
as the door opened, the officers observed the ascending staircase to the right of
the landing and the descending staircase to the left of the landing. Loftin did
not cooperate with law enforcement. Not only did he refuse to tell the officers
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if defendant was present, Loftin would not state if there were other people inside
the home. The officers removed Loftin from the home and handcuffed him.
Loftin, who was not arrested, was detained for the safety of the officers
executing defendant's arrest warrant.
According to Detective Cole, while standing outside the home, he yelled
for defendant to exit the house. There was no response. Shortly thereafter,
several other individuals exited the home. The exiting people refused to tell the
police officers if defendant, or anyone else, remained inside the house.
The officers, still positioned outside the front door, continued to yell for
defendant, and any other persons present, to exit the building. Several minutes
later, defendant walked from the upper staircase to the front door. He was
arrested at the front doorway, handcuffed, and seated on the steps immediately
outside the front door.
At this point, the officers asked defendant if anyone else was inside the
home. Because defendant did not respond, the officers continued to call out to
determine if there were other people inside. With the front door open, the
officers heard "crying coming from the basement." The officer in charge of the
operation then authorized a protective sweep of the house. One group of officers
went to the right and walked upstairs, and another group of officers went to the
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left and walked downstairs. According to Detective Cole, the purpose of the
sweep was to ensure there was no one injured inside the home and there were
no additional persons in the house who could pose a threat to the officers.
Detective Cole was in the group of officers who went to the basement area
of the home. The officers opened the door to a basement bedroom and found
two young girls crying.3 An officer escorted the girls outside the home.
Detective Cole's group continued their protective sweep of the basement
area, which was dark and unfinished. It was in the unfinished area of the
basement that the officers saw a plastic straw, spoon, and a credit card. These
items were covered in a white powder. The officers also saw a container of
Inositol, commonly used to cut CDS, and plastic baggies, often associated with
packaging of illicit drugs. The officers also found two ballistic vests in the
laundry room adjacent to the area where the other items were found.
The officers reported their observations in the basement to the lead
investigator, Detective Mackafee. Detective Mackafee entered the basement
and confirmed the presence of the items observed by Detective Cole and his
team. Detective Mackafee decided to obtain a search warrant to search
3
The children in the basement bedroom were defendant's eleven year old twin
daughters.
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defendant's entire house. After obtaining a search warrant, officers found
multiple weapons and ammunition inside the house and in a detached shed.
They also found drug manufacturing equipment and paraphernalia.
The main defense witness, defendant's girlfriend, testified during the
suppression hearing and offered a different version of the events. According to
defendant's girlfriend, she repeatedly told the officers that her twin daughters
were in the basement bedroom. Other than her children, defendant's girlfriend
stated she told the officers at least six times that there was no one else in the
house. She also testified that she removed the children from the basement with
no involvement from the police.
At the conclusion of the testimony, the judge denied defendant's
suppression motion, finding the testimony of Detective Cole credible and the
protective sweep was "limited in duration, cursory in nature and confined to
areas where potential threats to the safety of officers on scene might be located."
The judge determined the protective sweep of defendant's home, incident to
defendant's lawful arrest, was valid to protect the safety of the police officers
and others.
The judge further concluded the items observed during the protective
sweep were in plain view and immediately apparent to be evidence of a crime
A-3501-18T2
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or contraband, constituting another exception to the warrant requirement.
According to the judge, the police were lawfully in the basement area because
the officers heard crying coming from that section of the house.
On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments:
POINT I
THE COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
THE EVIDENCE RECOVERED INCIDENT TO HIS
ARREST BECAUSE THE PROTECTIVE SWEEP IN
THIS CASE WAS NOTHING MORE THAN AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL WARRANTLESS SEARCH.
A. Officers did not restrict their sweep to the
spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from
which an attack might be launched and lacked a
reasonable articulable suspicion that the area to be
swept could be harboring an individual posing danger.
B. Officers created the danger that became the
basis for the protective sweep.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE
DEFENDANT'S RESIDENCE WAS REQUIRED TO
BE SUPPRESSED AS "FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS
TREE."
POINT III
THE EMERGENCY AID EXCEPTION IS NOT A
JUSTIFICATION FOR THE WARRANTLESS
A-3501-18T2
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ENTRY AND SWEEP OF THE DEFENDANT'S
RESIDENCE.
Our review of a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress is limited. State
v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 44-45 (2011). "[A]n appellate court reviewing a motion
to suppress must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision
so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the
record." State v. Rockford, 213 N.J. 424, 440 (2013) (alteration in original)
(quoting State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 15 (2009)). Further, "[a]n appellate court
'should give deference to those findings of the trial judge which are substantially
influenced by his [or her] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have
the "feel" of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.'" State v. Elders,
192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)).
However, issues of law are reviewed de novo. State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161,
176 (2010).
"Both the United States Constitution and the New Jersey Constitution
guarantee an individual's right to be secure against unreasonable searches or
seizures." State v. Minitee, 210 N.J. 307, 318 (2012). Searches and seizures
conducted without a warrant, "particularly in a home, are presumptively
unreasonable." State v. Edmonds, 211 N.J. 117, 129 (2012) (quoting State v.
Bolte, 115 N.J. 579, 585 (1989)). The State has the burden of proving by a
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preponderance of the evidence that such searches and seizures are "justified by
one of the 'well-delineated exceptions' to the warrant requirement." State v.
Shaw, 213 N.J. 398, 409 (2012) (quoting State v. Frankel, 179 N.J. 586, 598
(2004)).
An arrest warrant provides officers "limited authority to enter a dwelling
in which the suspect lives" to make the arrest. State v. Cleveland, 371 N.J.
Super. 286, 294 (App. Div. 2004) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
603 (1980)). Police "have the right to execute an arrest warrant on a defendant
at his or her home, and they may enter the home to search for the defendant
when there is probable cause to believe that he or she is there." State v. Jones,
143 N.J. 4, 13 (1995). In accordance with Rule 3:3-3(c), an arrest warrant is
deemed executed upon the arrest of the suspect.
The protective-sweep doctrine, one of the recognized exceptions to the
search warrant requirement, permits "a quick and limited search of [the]
premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police
officers or others." State v. Cope, 224 N.J. 530, 546 (2016). A protective sweep
"is narrowly confined to a cursory visual inspection of those places in which a
person may be hiding." State v. Davila, 203 N.J. 97, 113 (2010). "A protective
sweep may only occur when (1) police officers are lawfully within private
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premises for a legitimate purpose, which may include consent to enter; and (2)
the officers on the scene have a reasonable articulable suspicion that th e area to
be swept harbors an individual posing a danger." Id. at 102. Caution must be
taken to avoid invoking the protective sweep doctrine to justify an
unconstitutional warrantless search.
Defendant argued the officers unlawfully conducted a protective sweep
and therefore any contraband discovered must be suppressed. We agree that the
facts adduced by the judge based on the testimony and evidence at the
suppression hearing do not support the protective sweep exclusion to the search
warrant requirement.
Here, law enforcement was not lawfully within defendant's home when
they heard crying inside the residence. Defendant was arrested outside the
residence and remained outside his home while the officers waited for a vehicle
to take him to the police station. Law enforcement lost any lawful status on
defendant's property after defendant was arrested, handcuffed, and seated on the
front steps outside his home. Simply because law enforcement remained on the
front steps of the home waiting for an appropriate transport vehicle did not
justify the protective sweep exception to the search warrant requirement.
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However, based on the facts established during the suppression hearing,
the officers' entry into defendant's home was valid under the State's alternative
argument in opposition to defendant's motion to suppress. The State argued the
emergency-aid exception to the search warrant requirement was satisfied when
the officers heard crying coming from the basement of the home. Because the
judge determined the protective sweep doctrine justified the warrantless entry
and search of defendant's home, the judge did not address the State's alternative
argument.
When exigent circumstances are present, "[p]olice officers serving in a
community-caretaking role are empowered to make a warrantless entry into a
home under the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement." State v.
Vargas, 213 N.J. 301, 323 (2013). The emergency-aid doctrine "is derived from
the commonsense understanding that exigent circumstances may require public
safety officials, such as the police, . . . to enter a dwelling without a warrant for
the purpose of protecting or preserving life, or preventing serious injury." State
v. Hathaway, 222 N.J. 453, 469 (2015) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Frankel,
179 N.J. at 598). Under the emergency-aid exception, the State must show "(1)
the officer had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency
require[d] that he [or she] provide immediate assistance to protect or preserve
A-3501-18T2
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life, or to prevent serious injury and (2) there was a reasonable nexus between
the emergency and the area or places to be searched.'" Id. at 470 (first alteration
in original) (quoting Edmonds, 211 N.J. at 132).
"The emergency-aid doctrine, particularly when applied to the entry of a
home, must be 'limited to the reasons and objectives that prompted' the need for
immediate action." Edmonds, 211 N.J. at 134 (quoting Frankel, 179 N.J. at 599).
"If, however, contraband is 'observed in plain view by a public safety official
who is lawfully on the premises and is not exceeding the scope of the search,'
that evidence will be admissible." Hathaway, 222 N.J. at 470 (quoting Frankel,
179 N.J. at 599-600).
Here, Detective Cole heard crying coming from the basement of
defendant's home as the detective waited for defendant to be transported to the
police station. Based on the crying sound, the officers had "an objectively
reasonable basis to believe that an emergency require[d] . . . immediate
assistance." Edmonds, 211 N.J. at 132. Detective Cole testified he had "an
obligation to verify . . . why the crying's occurring." The officers were unsure
whether the crying was from someone who was injured or simply indicative of
another person inside defendant's house. According to Detective Cole, based on
defendant's known criminal history and convictions for weapons offenses, it was
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possible the crying sound came from an injured person present in the home who
required immediate emergency assistance.
Moreover, there was a nexus between the perceived emergency based on
the crying sounds and the places searched in the basement. Once the officers
located the two girls in the basement bedroom, the officers had a reasonable
suspicion that there may have been other individuals in the basement who
needed emergency aid. Except defendant's girlfriend, whose testimony the
judge did not find credible, the people who exited the house refused to tell the
officers whether any other individuals remained in the home. Without that
information, it was possible there were additional people in the basement who
cried out, compelling the officers to enter the home under the emergency-aid
doctrine.
Upon entering defendant's home under the emergency-aid exception to the
warrant requirement, the officers discovered facially illicit narcotics and related
paraphernalia in plain view in the basement of defendant's home. To apply the
plain view exception, the State must demonstrate the following: "(1) the officer
[was] lawfully in the viewing area when making the observation" and (2) it was
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immediately apparent that the items were evidence of a crime, contraband, or
otherwise subject to seizure. State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 91 (2016).4
Because law enforcement discovered the evidence in plain view while
performing a valid search under the emergency-aid exception, denial of
defendant's motion to suppress the seized evidence was proper.
Affirmed.
4
According to the record, after defendant exited the house, he was taken into
custody, searched, and handcuffed. The officers did not transport defendant to
police headquarters after his arrest, indicating a need to wait for a "transport
vehicle." There is no evidence in the record explaining the reason for this
procedure. However, under these circumstances, this decision is not legally
consequential. As our Supreme Court made clear in Gonzales, "[a]n objectively
reasonable search or seizure is constitutional despite an officer's questionable
motives[.]" Gonzales, 227 N.J. at 104 (emphasis added).
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