STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. FRANK CAMPIONE AND HOWARD KATZ (18-05-0685, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED) ( 2020 )


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  •                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NOS. A-1709-18T2
    A-1710-18T2
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    February 24, 2020
    v.
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    FRANK CAMPIONE and
    HOWARD KATZ,
    Defendants-Respondents.
    __________________________
    Argued October 21, 2019 – Decided February 24, 2020
    Before Judges Sabatino, Sumners and Geiger.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No. 18-05-
    0685.
    Maura Kathryn Tully, Assistant Prosecutor argued the
    cause for appellant (Christopher J. Gramiccioni,
    Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney; Maura
    Kathryn Tully, of counsel and on the briefs).
    Alton D. Kenney argued the cause for respondent Frank
    Campione (Starkey, Kelly, Kenneally, Cunningham &
    Turnbach, attorneys; Alton D. Kenney, on the brief).
    Robert A. Honecker, Jr., argued the cause for
    respondent Howard Katz (Ansell, Grimm and Aaron,
    PC, attorneys; Robert A. Honecker, Jr., of counsel and
    on the brief).
    Jodi Claire Krugman, Deputy Attorney General, argued
    the cause for amicus curiae the Attorney General of
    New Jersey in A-1709-18 (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney
    General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant
    Attorney General, of counsel; Jodi Claire Krugman, on
    the brief).
    The opinion of the court was delivered by
    GEIGER, J.A.D.
    On leave granted, plaintiff State of New Jersey appeals from a November
    16, 2018 order dismissing all counts of superseding Indictment No. 18-05-0685,
    in its entirety, against defendants Frank Campione and Howard Katz. The order
    also denied defendants' motion to sever without prejudice and compelled the
    State to "provide the [d]efendants with the names and addresses of any and all
    expert witnesses contacted by the State to review the file for this matter." The
    State also appeals from a December 19, 2018 order: (1) denying its motion to
    reconsider and vacate the discovery aspects of the November 16, 2018 order;
    and (2) ordering the State to "provide the [motion court] with a list of the names,
    addresses, and any oral or written opinions, and summaries thereof, of all expert
    witnesses contacted by the State in reference to this case for in camera review
    by Friday, December 21, 2018." We consolidate the appeals for purposes of
    issuing a single opinion.
    Following our review of the record, we affirm in part and reverse in part
    the November 16, 2018 order, and reverse the December 19, 2018 order.
    A-1709-18T2
    2
    I.
    Campione is a licensed physician assistant and the managing member of
    Acute Medical Housecalls, LLC (Acute). Katz is a licensed physician who
    began supervising Campione in 2011.
    In September 2012, Campione and Katz entered into a written contract
    whereby Campione would be responsible for the day-to-day operations of Acute,
    including "perform[ing] H&Ps and procedures for patients in the home setting,"
    "scheduling   of   patients,"   "maintaining   patient   health   records/charts,"
    "performing all patient eligibility checks for treatment," "order[ing] and
    fund[ing] all prescription blanks," and "handl[ing] all calls during and after
    hours for patients."   Katz agreed to "perform the duties of a supervising
    physician." His responsibilities included "review[ing] and sign[ing] all charts
    within seven (7) days of visit" and "maintain[ing] licensing for himself and
    compl[iance] with all rules and regulations as required by the New Jersey Board
    of Medical Examiners (Board)." Under this contractual arrangement, Campione
    would receive eighty percent of Acute's net profits and Katz would receive the
    remaining twenty percent.
    The Investigation
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    3
    The Monmouth County Prosecutor's Office (Prosecutor's Office)
    investigated Campione and Katz as part of its efforts to stem the proliferation of
    prescribed opioids that were not medically necessary. According to the State,
    the investigation revealed the following alleged facts.
    In October 2015, the Prosecutor's Office received information from a
    Middletown Police Department detective that K.M.1 and an associate were
    arrested for possession and distribution of prescription medications that were
    controlled dangerous substances (CDS). K.M. told police he had purchased the
    prescription blank 2 he used to obtain the CDS from an individual purporting to
    be a physician inside a McDonald's restaurant in Neptune Township.            The
    prescription blank was recovered by police. It was issued by the office of Frank
    Campione, RPA-C, Acute Medical Housecalls, LLC, and listed Howard Katz,
    D.O., as Campione's supervising physician.
    Upon receiving this information, the Prosecutor's Office began
    investigating Campione's medical practices.      A subpoena duces tecum was
    served on New Jersey Division of Consumer Affairs requesting all information
    1
    We refer to Campione's patients by initials to protect their privacy. See R.
    1:38-3(a).
    2
    Our references to a "prescription blank" mean a completed and signed
    prescription form for a prescription legend drug, a drug that can only be procured
    by prescription.
    A-1709-18T2
    4
    relating to Campione from the New Jersey Prescription Monitoring Program
    (NJPMP) from January 1, 2015 through November 5, 2015.              Documents
    revealed that Campione had prescribed medication to 166 patients. K.M. had
    been prescribed fifteen separate prescriptions for Adderall, Oxycodone, and
    Xanax between January 1, 2015 and September 21, 2015.
    An investigator in the Division of Consumer Affairs Enforcement Bureau
    advised the detective that Campione had a Physician's Assistant's license that
    was valid through August 31, 2017. The investigator also informed the detective
    there appeared to be no affiliation between Campione's practice, Acute, and
    Katz's medical practice in Colts Neck.
    A subpoena duces tecum served on Comcast revealed the identity of the
    subscriber for the phone number listed on Campione's prescription blank to be
    Campione's wife, and the address used for the account to be their residence in
    Brick Township.
    On December 2, 2015, as a result of information gathered during the
    investigation, detectives arrested and charged K.M. with fifteen counts of
    obtaining controlled dangerous substances by fraud, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-13. During
    a post-arrest interview, K.M. told the detectives he was referred to "Dr. Frank"
    by a third-party who he met at a methadone clinic. K.M. described where he
    met Campione, once inside a McDonald's restaurant in Neptune, and later inside
    A-1709-18T2
    5
    Campione's vehicle.     K.M. also described his interactions with Campione,
    including the examinations that took place, the prescriptions that he was
    provided, and how much he paid Campione each time.
    Detectives had K.M. call Campione and set up a controlled buy.
    Campione instructed K.M. to meet him at the Monmouth Mall the following day.
    The next day, investigators outfitted K.M. with a recording device and drove
    him to the Monmouth Mall parking lot to meet Campione. Detectives observed
    the meeting from a distance. When Campione arrived, detectives observed an
    unknown male, later identified as P.S., exit a vehicle and enter the front
    passenger seat of Campione's SUV. 3       P.S. eventually exited the vehicle,
    whereupon Campione drove over to where K.M. was standing.
    K.M. entered Campione's SUV and provided him with his previous
    prescription bottles.   In return, Campione provided K.M. with completed
    prescription blanks to be filled at a pharmacy and K.M. paid Campione $175 in
    cash. As K.M. attempted to exit the vehicle, Campione told him not to "runaway
    yet" because Campione was "not just somebody who hands out scripts," and he
    needed to "do a few things." Although it is unclear from the audio recording
    3
    NJPMP records revealed that P.S. had received twenty-one prescriptions from
    Campione between January 2015 and December 2015.
    A-1709-18T2
    6
    what occurred during the examination, there was mention of a check of K.M.'s
    breathing, blood pressure, and the amount of oxygen in his blood.4              The
    examination lasted less than two minutes. There was also some discussion about
    whether K.M. was taking his medications at the appropriate times.
    K.M. then exited the vehicle. After the completion of the controlled buy,
    K.M. turned over prescriptions for Xanax, Oxycodone, and Adderall that
    Campione had just issued.
    In December 2015, detectives served a subpoena duces tecum upon Katz
    for records relating to Acute. According to a detective's affidavit and grand jury
    testimony, Katz informed the detectives on December 14, 2015 that he was not
    involved in Acute's day-to-day practice. Katz explained that Campione's "role"
    was to meet with patients who were confined to their homes, or that were unable
    to travel to a doctor's office. Katz told the detectives that he does not review the
    prescription medications Campione prescribed for patients. Katz provided the
    detectives with an Excel spreadsheet list of "active" patients that he had received
    from Campione's wife on October 7, 2015. Detectives stated that K.M. was not
    on the list of active patients. Katz denied knowing who K.M. was, and likewise
    could not find him listed as a patient. From a later check of the NJPMP, it was
    4
    Although checking a patient's vital signs may have been appropriate,
    measuring vital signs alone appear inadequate to substantiate the medical
    necessity for CDS prescriptions.
    A-1709-18T2
    7
    learned that twenty-three patients who had received medications from Campione
    were not on the Excel patient list provided by Katz.
    A subpoena duces tecum was also served on TD Bank for financial records
    pertaining to Campione and Acute from January 1, 2015 to December 20, 2015.
    On February 2, 2016, P.S. was arrested and charged with two counts of
    obtaining CDS by fraud, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-13.         According to the detective's
    affidavit, during his post-arrest interview, P.S. informed detectives about his
    December 3, 2015 meeting with Campione in his vehicle at the Monmouth Mall
    parking lot. After Campione checked P.S.'s "basic vital signs," Campione gave
    P.S. two prescriptions for opioids. P.S. paid Campione $125 and exited the
    vehicle. P.S. further informed detectives that he had been seeing Campione for
    a couple years and several of their interactions occurred in the same manner.
    P.S. also stated Campione was originally prescribing him Percocet for
    pain management. According to P.S., however, Campione received a letter from
    "the Board" that stated Percocet should not be used for chronic pain. As a result,
    Campione switched the medication from Percocet to Opana (oxymorphone),
    another opioid pain medication. When P.S. felt Opana was not working well
    enough, Campione also began prescribing him Hydromorphone. P.S. stated
    these two medications were what he had been prescribed by Campione "for quite
    a while."
    A-1709-18T2
    8
    The Prosecutor's Office applied for a warrant to search Campione's
    residence, business, and vehicle for evidence of the unlawful practice of
    medicine, unlawful distribution of CDS, conspiracy to obtain CDS by fraud, and
    related offenses. A judge granted the search warrants, finding probable cause
    based on an affidavit that detailed the results of the investigation.
    The search warrants were executed on February 18, 2016. On that same
    day, Campione was arrested and charged with second-degree distribution of
    prescription medication, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(4); third-degree unlawful practice
    of medicine, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-20; and third-degree conspiracy to obtain a
    controlled dangerous substance by fraud, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a)(l) and N.J.S.A.
    2C:35-13.
    Campione moved for a probable cause hearing.            After a testimonial
    hearing, the motion court found that there was probable cause to charge
    Campione with the crimes contained in the warrant and denied his motion to
    dismiss the complaints.
    Campione subsequently moved to reopen the probable cause hearing
    pursuant to Rule 1:7-4(b). He also moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to
    Rule 3:25-3, claiming there was an unreasonable delay in presenting the charges
    to a grand jury. On September 15, 2016, the court denied the motions.
    A-1709-18T2
    9
    Shortly thereafter, Campione filed a renewed motion to dismiss the
    complaint pursuant to Rule 3:25-3. The court denied the motion as moot after
    being informed that Campione intended to testify before the grand jury.
    The First Indictment
    On March 16, 2017, a Monmouth County Grand Jury returned Indictment
    No. 17-03-0313 charging Campione with a single count of third-degree unlawful
    practice of medicine, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-20. Both Campione and Katz testified
    before the grand jury. Notably, Katz was not indicted by the grand jury.
    Campione next moved to dismiss the indictment, contending he was being
    prosecuted for a "non-crime." On May 25, 2018, the motion court issued an
    order and forty-four-page written opinion denying the motion. The court found
    "the State presented sufficient evidence to the grand jury that [Campione] held
    himself out to some patients as a doctor of medicine, rather than as a physician
    assistant." The court noted the evidence included a voicemail message left by
    Campione for K.M., where he "can be heard saying, 'This is Dr. Frank.'" The
    court also noted the State presented evidence "that other patients believed
    [Campione] held himself out to be a medical doctor." The grand jury testimony
    of Detective Hunter Brockriede described statements by three other patients who
    told detectives that Campione identified himself as a medical doctor. The court
    determined the State presented "'some evidence' that [Campione] may have held
    A-1709-18T2
    10
    himself out to patients as a medical doctor, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:21-
    20(c)."
    The court further found the State presented "some evidence" to the grand
    jury that Campione violated N.J.S.A. 2C:21-20(d) by engaging in an activity for
    which a license is necessary, when he prescribed CDS "without prior
    consultation with his supervising physician, in violation of N.J.S.A. 45:9-
    27.19(a)(1)," for non-terminal patients.      The court concluded that "[i]f
    [Campione] was prescribing [CDS] in violation of the statute, then he was
    engaging in activity that was outside the scope of his healthcare license." Thus,
    it determined the State presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate a violation
    of N.J.S.A. 45:9-27.19. The court also found the State presented evidence that
    Campione prescribed CDS to patients during their first meeting without
    reviewing their medical records beforehand.
    The motion court also rejected Campione's argument that Brockreide
    misled the grand jury by testifying that, "many patient charts were unsigned."
    The court noted that N.J.S.A. 45:9-27.18 requires patient charts prepared by a
    physician's assistant to be countersigned by their supervising physician.
    Investigators seized medical charts that were not countersigned by Katz during
    the search of Campione's residence and vehicle. The court found the charts were
    not reviewed or countersigned by Katz electronically.
    A-1709-18T2
    11
    The court also rejected Campione's argument that the State did not present
    exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, claiming investigators did not seize
    inactive patient files from his residence. The court concluded Campione did not
    "demonstrate how the prosecutor's presentment of the inactive files would have
    directly negated [Campione's] guilt and that the files were clearly exculpatory."
    The court noted the State alleged there were eighty-six patients that Campione
    had not disclosed to Katz, based on a comparison of the files seized from Katz
    to the list of patients obtained from the NJPMP and the list Katz provided to law
    enforcement.
    The court further rejected Campione's argument that the State made
    inaccurate statements about Physician Assistant Licensing Act (PALA),
    N.J.S.A. 45:9-27.10 to .28, to the grand jury. The court found the instructions
    given to the grand jury were not inaccurate, much less "blatantly wrong." The
    court likewise rejected Campione's argument that Brockriede did not answer a
    grand juror's question regarding the timing of countersigning by a supervising
    physician.
    The Second Indictment
    The State subsequently sought a superseding indictment against both
    Campione and Katz.       Brockriede testified during the second grand jury
    proceeding.    He presented the grand jury with the statements of eighteen
    A-1709-18T2
    12
    individuals who had obtained CDS prescriptions from Campione.              The
    statements were used in support of the State's argument that Campione and Katz
    had used their involvement in Acute to provide CDS prescriptions, in exchange
    for cash, without medical justification.
    On May 24, 2018, the grand jury returned superseding Indictment No. 18-
    05-0685. Both Campione and Katz were charged with third-degree conspiracy
    to commit the crime of unlawful practice of medicine, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, N.J.S.A.
    2C:2-6, and N.J.S.A. 2C:21-20(a), (c), (d) (count one); third-degree unlawful
    practice of medicine, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-20(a) (count two); third-degree unlawful
    practice of medicine, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-20(c) (count three); and third-degree
    unlawful practice of medicine, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-20(d) (count four).
    Only Campione was charged, in the same indictment, with thirteen counts
    of third-degree distribution and/or dispensation of CDS, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(5)
    (counts five, seven, eight, ten, twelve, thirteen, sixteen, seventeen, twenty,
    twenty-two, twenty-four, twenty-seven, and twenty-nine); eleven counts of
    third-degree distribution and/or dispensation of CDS, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(13)
    (counts six, nine, eleven, fourteen, fifteen, eighteen, nineteen, twenty-one,
    twenty-three, twenty-five, and twenty-six); fourth-degree distribution of CDS,
    N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(14) (count twenty-eight); fourth-degree possession of a
    prohibited weapon or device (hollow point bullets), N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(f) (count
    A-1709-18T2
    13
    thirty); and fourth-degree possession of a prohibited weapon or device (brass
    knuckles), N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(e) (count thirty-one).5
    The Dismissal Motion
    On August 15, 2018, Katz and Campione separately moved to dismiss the
    superseding indictment. Following a hearing on October 29, 2018, a different
    judge issued a November 16, 2018 order and oral decision granting the motion,
    dismissing the indictment in its entirety as to both defendants. The motion court
    engaged in the following analysis.
    As to the first count charging Campione and Katz with conspiracy to
    commit the unlawful practice of medicine, the court stated:
    The State alleges the mere fact that the
    defendants had a written contractual agreement for
    Acute Medical House Calls LLC shows their intent to
    enter into a conspiracy. However, creating a limited
    liability company is not a criminal act. It's more
    reasonable to assume that the lack of a memorialized
    business organization infers intent to enter into a
    criminal conspiracy. Therefore the [c]ourt finds Katz
    and Campione formed Acute Medical House Calls to
    establish a legitimate legal business, not to engage in a
    conspiracy. In fact, it was Campione's company, Katz
    was a supervising physician and/or independent
    contractor.
    The State also alleges that this agreement
    combined with Campione prescribing CDS to patients
    without Katz' oversight could create an inference that
    5
    For ease of reference, we attach a table setting forth the charges, criminal code
    citation, and defendant charged for each of the thirty-one counts.
    A-1709-18T2
    14
    defendants intended to engage in a criminal conspiracy.
    However, there's evidence that Katz did supervise
    Campione in his role as a physician assistant in
    electronically reviewing patients' files every week or
    discussing the files with Campione on a regular basis.
    Det. Mazariegos testified that Katz met with Campione
    at least once a week to review patient files, indicating
    Katz was supervising Campione to some extent.
    During the first Grand Jury proceeding the State
    called multiple witnesses who testified that they never
    saw Katz, and that Campione wrote the prescriptions on
    the first visit without having first reviewed their files.
    However, Melinda Campione, Campione's wife and
    office manager[,] submitted a sworn statement noting
    that she would ask patients medical history questions
    before Campione or Katz ever received the files. None
    of these witnesses could have accurately testified to the
    conversations that Katz and Campione had in reviewing
    patient files or as to whether or not Katz and Campione
    actually reviewed their files.
    The State misled the Grand Jury, making it seem
    as though Katz never signed or approved any patient
    files, specifically referring to the "Katz file" found in
    Campione’s car. However, Campione and Katz rebut
    the argument for the more reasonable inference that the
    file was in the car to be transported to Katz for
    approval. Additionally[,] there's evidence that the
    number of patients actually receiving CDS from
    Campione was a small fraction of the patients he saw.
    If Katz and Campione wished to engage in a criminal
    conspiracy to profit from the illegal distribution of CDS
    the number of patients receiving CDS prescriptions
    would be much higher than the approximately five
    percent of patients submitted.
    Moreover, it's undisputed that Campione
    administered physical exams to the patients, albeit
    cursory ones. Campione wrote the prescriptions for his
    A-1709-18T2
    15
    patients and it was up to the patients to go to a
    pharmacy to actually fill the prescription. The [c]ourt
    finds, giving the State the benefit of all reasonable
    inferences, the indictment could not be sustained and
    there's no sufficient actual or circumstantial evidence
    to infer that Katz and Campione were engaged in a
    conspiracy and [c]ount [one] will be dismissed
    accordingly.
    As to counts two, three, and four, charging Campione and Katz with the
    unlawful practice of medicine, the court stated:
    Katz and Campione cannot be charged under
    N.J.S.A. 2C:21-20(a), (c) or (d) because both
    defendants had the proper licensure from the State of
    New Jersey at the time of the indictment. There's no
    evidence to suggest that either defendant had suspended
    or revoked licenses at the time of the indictment or the
    alleged offenses. Although there's evidence that Katz
    and Campione may have exceeded the scope of their
    licenses to some extent, neither were charged under
    N.J.S.A. 2C:21-20(b) for exceeding the scope of
    practice permitted by Board order.
    As to the alleged violation of PALA by treating patients in personal
    vehicles, rather than in a traditional medical care setting, the court found the
    State failed to read PALA in its entirety. The court noted N.J.S.A. 45:9-27.15(a)
    permits a physician assistant to "practice in all medical care settings, including ,
    but not limited to, a physician's office, a health care facility, an institution, a
    veteran's home, or private home." The court further noted that two other judges
    had "previously stated that there was nothing criminal about Campione seeing
    patients in his vehicle." The court found "there's no law that prevents medical
    A-1709-18T2
    16
    professionals from seeing patients in a vehicle." The court stated patients are
    treated in ambulances every day, and "there's no law that distinguishes the use
    of a vehicle for medical purposes in emergent versus non emergent situations."
    Regarding the allegation that Campione unlawfully held himself out as a
    physician, the court stated:
    The weight of the evidence shows Campione
    made it clear he was a physician assistant. His scrubs
    were embroidered with the physician assistant
    abbreviation, the literature he distributed noted he was
    a physician assistant, the prescription pads Campione
    used stated he was a physician assistant, and multiple
    patients testified they knew Campione was a physician
    assistant. Though a couple of patients may have
    referred to Campione as Dr. Campione, his failure to
    correct them is not enough to say that the held himself
    out to be a doctor.
    Even though one voice mail from [K.M.'s] phone
    may have stated Campione once referred to himself as
    Dr. Campione, there's some dispute as to whether
    Campione actually referred to himself as doctor in the
    voice mail. The [c]ourt finds this isolated reference is
    not enough to support the conclusion that he held
    himself out to be a doctor. 6
    As to Katz's lack of direct supervision of Campione, the court stated:
    There is evidence that Katz may not have supervised
    Campione to the extent that he should have, and some
    evidence shows that the appropriate forms may not
    have been filed with the [Board].
    6
    The court reiterated this point in its analysis of the dismissal of counts five
    through twenty-nine.
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    17
    However[,] N.J.S.A. 45:9-27.15(b) specifically
    states that a "violation of any of the conditions of this
    section shall be deemed to have engaged in professional
    misconduct." . . . Furthermore, N.J.S.A. 45:9-27.17
    states that any supervising physician who allows a
    physician assistant to practice contrary to the
    provisions of N.J.S.A. 45:9-27.10 "shall be deemed to
    have engaged in professional misconduct and shall be
    subject to disciplinary action by the Board." . . .
    If Katz did indeed fail to properly supervise
    Campione, or if the appropriate notice of employment
    was not provided to the [Board] then this issue should
    be resolved according to that statute as a professional
    misconduct violation, not a criminal violation.
    The State also argues Campione violated
    N.J.A.C. 13:35-2B.12(c) by exceeding the legal
    restrictions for prescribing controlled dangerous
    substances.     The State contends that Campione
    prescribed CDS without Katz issuing the initial
    prescription and without consulting Katz before issuing
    the prescription.
    ....
    Katz and Campione could have discussed
    prescribing CDS to their patients via telephone,
    electronic communication or in person. Just because
    Campione is required to consult with Katz before
    prescribing CDS to a patient doesn't mean Katz is
    required to see every patient before Campione writes a
    CDS prescription.
    The [c]ourt finds these alleged violations to be
    regulatory in nature, not criminal.
    As to Katz's failure to file a "notice of employment" with the Board, the
    court concluded that "if the appropriate notice of employment was not provided
    A-1709-18T2
    18
    to the [Board] then this issue should be resolved according to [N.J.S.A. 45:9-
    27.15(b)] as a professional misconduct violation, not a criminal violation."
    As to counts five through twenty-nine, charging Campione with various
    CDS offenses, the court concluded the indictment should be dismissed because
    of multiple instances where the State did not present evidence to the grand jury.
    The court described the following examples:
    First, the State presented the case to grand jurors
    as if Katz and Campione were running an illegal CDS
    distribution business disguised as Acute Medical House
    Calls LLC when in fact the number of patients that were
    on CDS was a small fraction of the practice's overall
    patient account.
    If Katz and Campione were in business to
    illegally distribute CDS for profit, the number would
    most certainly be higher. In fact, Campione provided a
    number of services to patients, including administering
    influenza vaccinations, seeing elderly housebound
    patients in their homes and providing healthcare access
    to those who may not have been able to see a doctor in
    a formal office setting for lack of insurance.
    [K.M. and P.S.], two of the patients referenced by
    Det. Mazariegos, were prescribed CDS after they had
    been sent for MRIs by Campione. Both patients had
    been diagnosed with conditions warranting the
    prescription of CDS.
    Additionally, as Katz noted in his brief, patients
    obtaining CDS would have to be screened through the
    prescription monitoring program at a pharmacy. To
    infer that Katz and Campione were running a for-profit
    drug      distribution   business     is     a     gross
    mischaracterization of the facts. Indeed, review of the
    A-1709-18T2
    19
    prescription monitoring program would have shown if
    Campione was over-prescribing CDS to individuals.
    ....
    Third, the State led the [g]rand [j]ury to believe
    that the prescriptions Campione was writing were
    illegal or invalid. Campione was a licensed physician
    assistant, he had the ability to prescribe medication to
    his patients in accordance with the law.             Det.
    Mazariegos concluded that the prescriptions issued by
    Campione were legitimate, yet this evidence was not
    presented to the second Grand Jury. No evidence has
    been proffered to suggest that Campione was writing
    prescriptions in violation of New Jersey State law or
    that the prescriptions he wrote were invalid.
    Fourth, the State misled the Grand Jury during
    the second presentation because the Assistant
    Prosecutor told the Grand Jury they were only
    considering the matter of State versus Frank Campione.
    The State never told the Grand Jury that Katz was a
    target.
    Katz was not invited to appear at the second
    Grand Jury presentation and he doesn't have to be, but
    nor was his testimony given under oath from the first
    Grand Jury presentation read to the new Grand Jury.
    Katz was only considered a target after a Grand Jury
    posed a question to the Assistant Prosecutor asking
    whether charges were being considered against him.
    Fifth, the State misled the Grand Jury by overly
    emphasizing the fact that Campione saw some of his
    patients in a vehicle. By this point the State was well-
    aware there was nothing criminal about seeing patients
    inside a vehicle, yet the State still presented the case as
    though there were something criminal about the
    location of Campione's practice. As previously noted,
    A-1709-18T2
    20
    there's no statute or regulation that prohibits Campione
    from examining patients in a vehicle.
    The State also misled the Grand Jury by showing
    the jurors a number of texts that had little to no
    probative value in the case. One text in particular
    stated, "[M.] in rehab, won't be home until next week."
    The jury was left to infer that rehab meant drug rehab,
    yet this patient was never admitted to any drug
    rehabilitation facility and was never prescribed any
    controlled dangerous substances by Katz or Campione.
    In fact, this patient was in a subacute rehabilitation
    facility after he was discharged from a hospital. This
    was a strategic move by the State to mislead the [g]rand
    [j]ury into thinking that Katz and Campione were in
    business to supply CDS to drug seeking patients.
    Finally, the State consistently misstates
    Campione's patients were paying for prescriptions.
    Katz and Campione have consistently stated patients
    paid for their visits, the outpatient setting, and the
    examination. Katz and Campione did not provide
    patients with medication. Patients were required to
    take their prescriptions to a pharmacy to have them
    filled in order to obtain any medications. Multiple
    patients testified they paid a flat fee for their visit
    regardless of how many prescriptions if any they were
    given by Campione. There's no evidence to support the
    statement that Katz and Campione charged their
    patients for prescriptions.
    As to count thirty, which charged Campione with unlawful possession of
    hollow point bullets, and count thirty-one, which charged Campione with
    unlawful possession of brass knuckles, the court stated:
    No evidence of the hollow point bullets or the
    brass knuckles was presented to the first Grand Jury.
    However, the evidence was presented to the second
    A-1709-18T2
    21
    Grand Jury after the rejection of the global settlement
    offer. The State was aware of the bullets and the brass
    knuckles during the first Grand Jury proceeding yet did
    not present this evidence.
    Based on our Supreme Court’s holding in State v.
    Gregory, 
    66 N.J. 510
    (1975), the State was required to
    present evidence of the hollow point bullets and the
    brass knuckles at the first Grand Jury proceeding
    because the State was aware of Campione’s possession
    of those items at the time of the proceeding.
    Accordingly, [c]ounts [thirty] and [thirty-one] have to
    be dismissed.
    Campione then orally moved to compel the State to provide the names and
    addresses of any additional experts the State had asked to review the file in this
    matter. Over the State's objection, the court granted the motion, and ordered the
    State to "provide the [d]efendants with the names and addresses of any and all
    expert witnesses contacted by the State to review the file for this matter." The
    court concluded it was reasonable to require the State to identify the experts it
    consulted with because if the State were to successfully appeal from the
    dismissal, the defense "would conceivably need to get their own expert. And
    they certainly don't want to contact somebody that [the State had] contacted."
    The Reconsideration and Discovery Issues
    The State moved for reconsideration of the November 16, 2018 order
    regarding the additional expert discovery, contending the discovery issue was
    moot due to the dismissal of the indictment. Alternatively, it argued that even
    A-1709-18T2
    22
    if not moot, defendants were not entitled to such discovery. Following a hearing
    on December 17, 2018, the motion court orally ruled that the discovery issue
    was not moot because the State intended to appeal the dismissal of the
    indictment and the State was proceeding with civil forfeiture action against the
    property seized from Campione. The court further stated:
    Rule     3:13-3(b)     governs  post-indictment
    discovery. The comments to the rule state the rule
    requires discovery to defendant respecting proposed
    expert witnesses in general in the same manner as is
    provided in the Civil practice.
    The [c]ivil counterpart is Rule 4:10-2(d)(3). That
    rule states a party may discover[] facts known or
    opinions held by an expert other than the expert who is
    conducting an examination pursuant to Rule 4:19 who
    has been retained or specially employed by another
    party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial
    and it was not expected to be called as a witness for
    trial, only upon the showing of exceptional
    circumstances under which it is impractical for the
    party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on
    the same subject by other means.
    The court then engaged in a Brady7 analysis, concluding since "the State
    received information for a potential expert witness exculpating defendants, the
    State had a duty under Brady to turn that information over to defendants as a
    matter of due process." The court found it necessary to undertake an in camera
    7
    Brady v. Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
    (1963).
    A-1709-18T2
    23
    review of the names, addresses, reports, and opinions of the expert witnesses
    contacted by the State in order to determine whether a Brady violation occurred.
    In response to the State's argument, that discovery of its experts was moot
    due to the dismissal of the indictment, the court stated:
    Here, the defendant Campione had his license
    indefinitely suspended by the Board . . . and has a case
    pending there. His license will not be reinstated until
    this criminal matter is resolved apparently.
    As long as this case is possibly being appealed
    the issue [of the identity and findings of the consulting
    expert] is not moot. Moreover, as the State also has
    forfeiture proceedings going forward and they are
    simply not dismissing those, then it is not moot.
    Should the State not decide to appeal then the
    discovery issue would then be moot and the criminal
    indictment would remain dismissed.
    In response to defense counsel's request for additional discovery regarding
    potential experts, the court issued a December 19, 2018 order requiring the State
    to "provide the [c]ourt with a list of the names, addresses, and any oral or written
    opinions, and summaries thereof, of all expert witnesses contacted by the State
    in reference to this case for in camera review."
    The Board's Civil Proceedings and the Consent Order
    In February 2016, the Board brought administrative proceedings against
    Campione "upon receipt of information that [Campione] was suspected of
    engaging in the indiscriminate prescribing of [CDS], including the prescribing
    A-1709-18T2
    24
    of CDS without legitimate medical purpose, in violation of N.J.A.C. 13:45H-7.4
    and that [Campione] may have been practicing contrary to the provisions of
    [PALA]." Campione consented to the temporary suspension of his physician
    assistant license. On March 31, 2016, the Board entered an interim consent
    order (interim order) suspending Campione's physician assistant license pending
    further order of the Board and his CDS registration pending further order of the
    Director of the Division of Consumer Affairs. The interim order directed that
    Campione "immediately cease and desist from prescribing or dispensing
    medications and from practicing as a physician assistant." The interim order
    further provided: "[Campione] understands that this Interim Consent Order is
    independent of, and not in lieu of, proceedings on behalf or by the DEA, and
    further agrees that resolution of any pending DEA matters will not resolve any
    matter which has, or could, be brought before the Board or the Director." The
    parties stipulated that entry of the order was "without admission of any
    wrongdoing by [Campione]."
    On March 27, 2019, Campione appeared before a Preliminary Evaluation
    Committee of the Board to discuss the pending investigation.         Campione
    subsequently agreed to the entry of a September 24, 2019 consent order (consent
    order) that, in pertinent part: (1) suspended Campione's physician assistant
    license and CDS registration for a period of three years, retroactive to March
    A-1709-18T2
    25
    31, 2016; (2) required Campione to successfully complete Board-approved
    ethics, HIPAA, recordkeeping documentation, and CDS prescribing courses; (3)
    prohibited Campione from prescribing CDS until he successfully completed the
    CDS prescribing course; (4) limited Campione's practice "to meeting with and
    treating patients in a traditional medical setting such as a doctor's office, clinic,
    hospital or urgent care center" and prohibited "meeting with and treating patients
    and/or otherwise practicing outside of such a traditional, physical office
    location, including, but not limited to, mobile settings, in-home visits, nursing
    home facilities, assisted living facilities and private residences"; (5) required
    Campione to be supervised by a physician who had been pre-approved by the
    Board, and who must co-sign all of Campione's medical records and approve all
    prescriptions provided to patients; and (6) rendered Campione responsible for
    the costs and fees of the Board's investigation, totaling $48,837.94 . The costs
    and fees are stayed unless and until Campione is found in violation of the terms
    of the consent order, at which time they shall become due and owing.
    Notably, the consent order further states:
    10. The entry of this Order is without prejudice to
    further action, investigation, and prosecution by this
    Board, the Attorney General, the Drug Control Unit, the
    Director of the Division of Consumer Affairs, or any
    other law enforcement entities based upon
    [Campione's] conduct prior or subsequent to entry of
    this Order and not addressed by the terms of this Order.
    A-1709-18T2
    26
    11. The Board reserves the right to vacate this Order
    and initiate further action against [Campione's] license
    and CDS Registration in the event the dismissed
    Superseding Indictment against [Campione] referenced
    above is reinstated at any time and a resolution of the
    criminal matter results in a conviction and/or admission
    of guilt to any of the charges contained therein.
    The consent order concluded the Board's investigation of Campione,
    subject to reactivation in the event the superseding indictment was reinstated,
    and the criminal proceedings resulted in a conviction or admission of guilt.
    The State's Appeal
    The State appealed from both the November 16, 2018 and December 19,
    2018 court orders. We granted the State's application to stay the December 19,
    2018 order.     These appeals are advanced by the County Prosecutor.           We
    permitted the Attorney General to appear as an amicus, and he elected to have a
    Deputy Attorney General in the Division of Law do so.
    The State raises the following points on appeal:
    POINT I
    THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
    AND MISAPPLIED THE LAW IN DISMISSING
    COUNTS 1 THROUGH 29 OF THE INDICTMENT
    AS THE STATE PRESENTED MORE THAN
    SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO THE GRAND JURY
    THAT    DEFENDANTS   COMMITTED   SUCH
    CRIMINAL OFFENSES.
    A. Standard of Review.
    A-1709-18T2
    27
    B. The Lower Court Erred in Ruling That
    Defendants' Actions Could at Most Constitute
    Administrative Violations, Not Criminal
    Offenses.
    C. The Evidence of Defendants' Conduct in
    Violating the PALA as Presented to the Grand
    Jury Demonstrates a Prima Facie Case of
    Unlawful Practice of Medicine in Violation of
    N.J.S.A. 2C:21-20a and 20d. The Lower Court
    Abused Its Discretion and Misapplied the Law in
    Dismissing Counts 2 and 4.
    1. Defendants Violated the PALA by
    Campione Treating Patients in a Non-
    Medical Care Setting.
    2. Defendants Violated the PALA by
    Campione      Treating    Patients     and
    Prescribing CDS Without Appropriate
    Supervision by Katz, and by Failing to File
    the Required Notice of Employment With
    the State.
    D. The Evidence of Defendants' Conduct as
    Presented to the Grand Jury Demonstrates a
    Prima Facie Case of Unlawful Practice of
    Medicine in Violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:21-20c, as
    Defendant Campione Unlawfully Held Himself
    Out as a Licensed Physician to Numerous
    Patients. The Lower Court Abused its Discretion
    in Dismissing Count 3.
    E. The State Presented a Prima Facie Case of
    Conspiracy Between Campione and Katz. The
    Lower Court Abused Its Discretion is Dismissing
    Count 1.
    F. The State Presented a Prima Facie Case of
    Numerous Instances of Unlawful CDS
    A-1709-18T2
    28
    Distribution and/or Dispensation by Campione.
    The Lower Court Abused Its Discretion and
    Misapplied the Law in Dismissing Counts 5
    through 29.
    POINT II
    UNDER STATE V. HOGAN, 
    144 N.J. 216
    (1996),
    THE STATE HAS NO OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE
    NON-EXCLUPATORY EVIDENCE TO THE
    GRAND JURY, NOR WAS ITS PRESENTATION IN
    ANY WAY MISLEADING.
    A. The Lower Court Improperly Expanded the
    Duties of the Prosecutor as Set Forth in State v.
    Hogan, 
    144 N.J. 216
    (1996).
    B. The State Did Not Mislead the Grand Jury.
    POINT III
    THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
    AND MISAPPLIED THE LAW IN DISMISSING
    COUNTS 30 AND 31. THE STATE HAD NO
    OBLIGATION TO PRESENT EVIDENCE OF
    DEFENDANT CAMPIONE'S POSSESSION OF
    PROHIBITED WEAPONS TO THE FIRST GRAND
    JURY.
    POINT IV
    THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
    BY ORDERING POST-DISMISSAL DISCOVERY.
    A. The Lower Court Abused Its Discretion in
    Ordering Post-Dismissal Discovery as a Case in
    Controversy No Longer Existed.
    A-1709-18T2
    29
    B. The Law Does Not Entitle Defendants to the
    Discovery They Seek.
    II.
    "No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense, unless on the
    presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases" not applicable here.
    N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 8. "[T]he grand jury is asked to determine whether 'a basis
    exists for subjecting the accused to a trial.'" State v. Hogan, 
    144 N.J. 216
    , 227
    (1996) (quoting Trap Rock Indus., Inc. v. Kohl, 
    59 N.J. 471
    , 487 (1971)).
    "Equally significant is its responsibility to 'protect[] the innocent from
    unfounded prosecution.'" 
    Id. at 228
    (alteration in original) (quoting State v.
    Murphy, 
    110 N.J. 20
    , 29 (1988)).
    An indictment also "inform[s] the defendant of the offense charged
    against him, so that he may adequately prepare his defense." State v. Dorn, 
    233 N.J. 81
    , 93 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. LeFurge, 
    101 N.J. 404
    , 415 (1986)). Accordingly, an "indictment must allege all the essential facts
    of the crime." 
    Ibid. (quoting LeFurge, 101
    N.J. at 418). Therefore, "the State
    must present proof of every element of an offense to the grand jury and specify
    those elements in the indictment." 
    Id. at 93-94
    (quoting State v. Fortin, 
    178 N.J. 540
    , 633 (2004)).
    "While acknowledging the significance of the grand jury's role in our
    criminal justice system, [our Supreme] Court has recognized the grand jury's
    A-1709-18T2
    30
    independence and has expressed a reluctance to intervene in the indictment
    process." 
    Hogan, 144 N.J. at 228
    . To that end, our review of the dismissal of
    an indictment is guided by the following well-established principles:
    An indictment is presumed valid and should only
    be dismissed if it is manifestly deficient or palpably
    defective. A motion to dismiss is addressed to the
    discretion of the trial court and that discretion should
    not be exercised except for the clearest and plainest
    ground.
    At the grand jury stage, the State is not required
    to present enough evidence to sustain a conviction. As
    long as the State presents some evidence establishing
    each element of the crime to make out a prima facie
    case, a trial court should not dismiss an indictment. In
    a nutshell, a court examining a grand jury record should
    determine whether, viewing the evidence and the
    rational inferences drawn from that evidence in the
    light most favorable to the State, a grand jury could
    reasonably believe that a crime occurred and that the
    defendant committed it.
    [State v. Feliciano, 
    224 N.J. 351
    , 380-81 (2016)
    (citations omitted).]
    "We generally review a trial court's decision to dismiss an indictment
    under the deferential abuse of discretion standard." State v. Twiggs, 
    233 N.J. 513
    , 532 (2018) (citing 
    Hogan, 144 N.J. at 229
    ). When a decision to dismiss
    hinges on a purely legal question, however, our review is de novo and we need
    not defer to the motion court's interpretations. 
    Ibid. (citing State v.
    S.B., 
    230 N.J. 62
    , 67 (2017)).
    A-1709-18T2
    31
    III.
    Guided by these principles, we review the dismissal of all thirty-one
    counts of the superseding indictment as to both defendants.
    Count One: Conspiracy to Commit the Unlawful Practice of Medicine
    The State relied on the Acute contract in conjunction with Campione's
    prescribing CDS without Katz's oversight in support of its allegation that
    Campione and Katz conspired to engage in the unlawful practice of medicine.
    The State contends that such a violation of PALA provides the basis for criminal
    liability. We are unpersuaded by this argument.
    "[T]he agreement to commit a specific crime is at the heart of a conspiracy
    charge." State v. Samuels, 
    189 N.J. 236
    , 245 (2007). "It is the agreement that
    is pivotal." 
    Id. at 246
    (citation omitted). To sustain a charge of conspiracy the
    State must demonstrate an "overt act."        N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(d).     Here, the
    superseding indictment listed five overt acts that it alleged were contrary to
    N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6, and N.J.S.A. 2C:21-20(a), (c), (d) (relating to
    the unlawful practice of medicine). At its core, the State's listed overt acts
    indicate Campione and Katz conspired to violate PALA due to: (1) Katz's
    inadequate supervision of Campione; and (2) their failure to file the mandatory
    "notice of employment" required prior to 2016.
    A-1709-18T2
    32
    In order to be guilty of conspiracy, a person must, "with the purpose of
    promoting of facilitating its commission, agree with another person to "engage
    in conduct which constitutes such crime or an attempt to commit such crime."
    N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a) (emphasis added). An "agreement to commit a specific
    crime is at the heart" of the conspiracy statute. State v. Samuels, 
    189 N.J. 236
    ,
    245 (2007). A conspiracy requires an "actual agreement [with another] for the
    commission of the substantive crime." State v. Kamienski, 
    254 N.J. Super. 75
    ,
    93 (App. Div. 1992). An agreement to violate civil statutes or regulations is not
    a crime.
    Contrary to the State's arguments, we conclude that a violation of PALA
    is not criminal. PALA explicitly states "[a]ny physician assistant who practices
    in violation of any of the conditions specified in subsection a. of this section
    shall be deemed to have engaged in professional misconduct." N.J.S.A. 45:9-
    27.15(b). Such professional misconduct violations are resolved by the Board.
    N.J.S.A. 45:9-27.15(b); N.J.S.A. 45:9-27.17(b). The statutory provisions and
    related regulations authorize the Board to suspend or revoke a physician
    assistant license, but do not subject a physician assistant or a physician to
    criminal sanctions.    Indeed, Campione ultimately received a three-year
    suspension of his physician assistant license. He is also responsible for costs
    A-1709-18T2
    33
    and fees if he violates the consent order. These are civil penalties, not criminal
    sanctions.
    As we recently explained in State v. Saad, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div.
    2019):
    In addition, we do not accept the premise that the
    elements of a crime can be defined by an administrative
    regulation, which can be amended or repealed by [the
    Board] without involvement of the Legislature.
    Moreover, interpreting the statute to incorporate the
    regulation would introduce ambiguity as to which acts
    constitute criminal behavior, raising serious concerns
    regarding notice.
    [Slip op. at 12.]
    Accordingly, an agreement to promote or facilitate a violation of PALA is not a
    criminal conspiracy.
    While the State presented enough evidence to the grand jury showing
    Campione violated N.J.S.A. 2C:21-20(c) by knowingly holding himself out as a
    person eligible to practice medicine, the record does not support the State's
    theory that Katz and Campione conspired to make patients believe Campione
    was a medical doctor. In addition, there is insufficient evidence that Campione
    violated N.J.S.A. 2C:21-20(a) or (d) to impute Campione's alleged unlawful
    practice of medicine to Katz. For these reasons, we affirm the dismissal of
    count one with prejudice.
    A-1709-18T2
    34
    Counts Two, Three, and Four: Unlawful Practice of Medicine
    PALA provides "[a] physician assistant may practice in all medical care
    settings, including, but not limited to, a physician's office, a health care facility,
    an institution, a veterans' home, or a private home." N.J.S.A. 45:9-27.15(a).
    The State argues that a personal vehicle is not a "medical care setting" within
    the meaning of PALA. Conversely, Campione argues the statute does not
    expressly prohibit a physician assistant from visiting, treating and prescribing
    medications in locations determined by the physician assistant and his patients.
    Amicus Attorney General of New Jersey disagrees with both positions.
    Instead, the Attorney General notes "[f]rom the inception of the PALA, there
    were, and continue to be, significant limitations on where and how a physician
    assistant is permitted to practice." Although the Attorney General recognizes
    the language of the statute suggests a broad legislative intent for interpretation
    of "medical care settings," the examples provided by the Legislature reflect
    traditional medical care settings. Accordingly, the Attorney General suggests
    "it does not necessarily follow that a personal vehicle is an appropriate setting
    to provide medical care in all circumstances."
    The Attorney General goes on to state:
    [F]actors that may be considered include [(1)] whether
    the physician assistant was practicing within his scope
    of practice and under appropriate supervision, [(2)] the
    nature of the patient's condition, and [(3)] whether the
    A-1709-18T2
    35
    setting would provide sufficient space and opportunity
    to examine the patient in an appropriate fashion. Also
    to be considered is [(4)] whether the setting will permit
    the ability to protect patient privacy for the examination
    and possible treatment, [(5)] whether patient records
    can be appropriately made and maintained, and [(6)]
    whether the physician assistant has the ability to consult
    with the supervising physician, if needed. Any
    emergent needs of the patient and proximity to
    emergency services would also be relevant.
    [(Footnote omitted).]
    The Attorney General concludes that "whether a location is an appropriate
    'medical care setting' is fact-sensitive."
    The motion court determined that Campione did not violate PALA by
    examining and prescribing medications for patients while in a vehicle rather than
    a medical care setting. It further determined that examining and treating patients
    in a vehicle is not a criminal act. The court noted that patients are routinely
    treated in ambulances, residences, and other non-medical settings.
    Counts two and four allege Campione and Katz engaged in the unlawful
    practice of medicine by failing to have Campione practice "under the direct
    supervision of a physician" and failing to provide the appropriate notice of
    Campione's employment with the Board, in violation of N.J.S.A. 45:9-
    A-1709-18T2
    36
    27.15(a)(1) and (3).8 Campione and Katz were indicted under N.J.S.A. 2C:21-
    20(a) and (d). Campione was also indicted for violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:21-
    20(c). Both provisions state:
    A person is guilty of a crime of the third degree if he
    knowingly does not possess a license or permit to
    practice medicine and surgery or podiatric medicine, or
    knowingly has had the license or permit suspended,
    revoked or otherwise limited by an order entered by the
    [Board], and he:
    a. engages in that practice;
    ....
    c. holds himself out to the public or any person as being
    eligible to engage in that practice;
    d. engages in any activity for which such license or
    permit is a necessary prerequisite, including, but not
    limited to, the ordering of controlled dangerous
    substances or prescription legend drugs from a
    distributor or manufacturer[.]
    The State acknowledges that at all relevant times Campione was a licensed
    physician assistant and Katz was a licensed physician. Neither was an imposter.
    At the time Campione wrote the prescriptions in question his license
    allowed him to do so, subject to proper authorization by a "supervising
    physician." N.J.S.A. 45:9-27.19(a)(1). He was registered to prescribe CDS.
    8
    N.J.S.A. 45:9-27.15(a)(3) was subsequently deleted pursuant to P.L. 2015, c.
    224. It was in effect when Campione and Katz are alleged to have committed
    the crimes presented in superseding Indictment No. 18-05-0685.
    A-1709-18T2
    37
    His license and registration had not been suspended or revoked, nor had it been
    "limited by an order entered by the [Board]."         N.J.S.A. 2C:21-20.     Thus,
    Campione was licensed and registered to prescribe CDS. At no time was Katz's
    license suspended.
    The motion judge concluded that a physician assistant who violates PALA
    is subject to administrative penalties, not criminal sanctions.        He further
    concluded that defendants did not violate N.J.S.A. 45:9-27.15(a)(1) and (3). We
    agree.
    As previously noted, violation of PALA by a physician assistant is deemed
    professional misconduct. Similarly, "[a]ny physician who permits a physician
    assistant under the physician's supervision to practice contrary to the provisions
    of [N.J.S.A. 45:9-27.10 to .28] shall be deemed to have engaged in professional
    misconduct . . . and shall be subject to disciplinary action by the board."
    N.J.S.A. 45:9-27.17(b). Based upon PALA's plain language, we conclude the
    Legislature intended PALA violations by licensed practitioners to be resolved
    by the Board through civil penalties, not criminal prosecution.9
    9
    We view the violation of PALA by an unlicensed physician assistant
    differently because an unlicensed physician assistant is not permitted to
    prescribe medication. See N.J.S.A. 2C:21-20(a) and (d) (criminalizing such
    conduct).
    A-1709-18T2
    38
    In the circumstances presented here, Campione's alleged failure to
    practice "under the direct supervision of a physician" and the failure to provide
    notice of his employment to the Board involve professional misconduct, not
    criminal acts. Similarly, Katz's alleged failure to supervise Campione rendered
    him potentially liable for civil penalties, not criminal prosecution. Accordingly,
    the motion court properly dismissed counts two and four as to both defendants.
    The dismissal of counts two and four is with prejudice.
    Count three alleges Campione unlawfully engaged in the practice of
    medicine by repeatedly holding himself out as a physician, in violation of
    N.J.S.A. 2C:21-20(c).     The motion judge acknowledged a question of fact
    existed as to whether Campione held himself out as a medical doctor. Here, the
    State presented "some evidence" to the grand jury that Campione presented himself
    as a physician to several patients by referring to himself as a medical doctor. The
    State presented the grand jury with at least "'some evidence' as to each element of a
    prima facie case." State v. Bennett, 
    194 N.J. Super. 231
    , 234 (1984) (quoting State
    v. Donovan, 
    129 N.J.L. 478
    , 483 (Sup. Ct. 1943)). We reverse the dismissal of count
    three as to Campione.
    The State presented no evidence to the grand jury that Katz participated in
    Campione's alleged act of improperly holding himself out as a physician to patients.
    We therefore affirm the dismissal with prejudice of count three as to Katz.
    A-1709-18T2
    39
    Counts Five through Twenty-Nine: Distribution of CDS
    Counts five through twenty-seven and twenty-nine charge Campione with
    third-degree distribution or dispensation of CDS; count twenty-eight charges him
    with fourth-degree distribution of CDS. He argued "[d]espite the absence of any
    clearly exculpatory evidence," and without providing a fact-specific analysis of each
    count, the motion judge dismissed each of the CDS distribution counts because of
    "multiple instances where the State did not present evidence to the Grand Jury,"
    resulting in the grand jury receiving "a distorted version of the facts."
    The motion court based his ruling on the following aspects of the testimony
    presented by the State to the grand jury: (1) presenting the case as if Katz and
    Campione were running an illegal CDS distribution business when the number of
    patients prescribed CDS was only a small fraction of their patients; (2) repeatedly
    referring to Campione as a doctor to mislead the grand jury that he held himself out
    as a physician despite the weight of the evidence showing Campione made it clear
    he was a physician assistant; (3) leading the grand jury to believe that the CDS
    prescriptions were illegal or invalid despite Campione being a licensed physician
    assistant who was authorized to prescribe CDS; (4) overly emphasizing that
    Campione saw some of his patients in a vehicle; (5) showing the grand jury text
    messages that were misleading and had no probative value; and (6) consistently
    misstating that Campione's patients were paying for prescriptions rather than a flat
    A-1709-18T2
    40
    fee for visits and examinations in an outpatient setting, regardless of the quantity of
    prescriptions issued. The motion court found the State presented no evidence that
    Campione wrote illegal or invalid prescriptions. The court also found it significant
    that Campione "did not provide patients with medication." Instead, "[p]atients were
    required to take their prescriptions to a pharmacy to have them filled in order to
    obtain any medications."
    The following principles inform our review of the dismissal of the
    distribution of CDS charges. 'The grand jury's role is not to weigh evidence
    presented by each party, but rather to investigate potential defendants and decide
    whether a criminal proceeding should be commenced." 
    Hogan, 144 N.J. at 235
    .
    "Credibility determinations and resolution of factual disputes are reserved
    almost exclusively for the petit jury." 
    Ibid. "In seeking an
    indictment, the prosecutor's sole evidential obligation is to
    present a prima facie case that the accused has committed a crime." 
    Id. at 236.
    "A grand jury proceeding is not an adversary hearing in which the guilt or
    innocence of the accused is adjudicated." 
    Id. at 235
    (quoting United States v.
    Calandra, 
    414 U.S. 338
    , 343 (1974)). Therefore, prosecutors are generally not
    required to "provide the grand jury with evidence on behalf of the accused."
    
    Ibid. However, the State
    may not "deceive the grand jury or present its evidence
    in a way that is tantamount to telling the grand jury a 'half-truth.'" 
    Id. at 236.
    A-1709-18T2
    41
    Nevertheless, because grand jury proceedings are non-adversarial, "incomplete
    or imprecise legal interpretations [by the prosecutor] will not warrant dismissal
    of the indictment." State v. Laws, 
    262 N.J. Super. 551
    , 562 (App. Div. 1993)
    (citation omitted). Moreover, "the conduct of a prosecutor should not warrant
    dismissal unless it clearly invades the grand jury's decision-making function."
    
    Ibid. (citing State v.
    Schamberg, 
    146 N.J. Super. 559
    , 564 (App. Div. 1977)).
    Two factors should be considered in evaluating whether to dismiss counts
    of an indictment due to failure to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury:
    (1) does the evidence directly negate guilt; and (2) is it "clearly exculpatory."
    
    Hogan, 144 N.J. at 237
    . "[O]nly in the exceptional case will a prosecutor's
    failure to present exculpatory evidence to a grand jury constitute grounds for
    challenging an indictment." 
    Id. at 239.
    A licensed physician or physician assistant who is registered to prescribe
    CDS is not exempt from criminal prosecution for prescribing medically
    unnecessary CDS. State v. Vaccaro, 
    142 N.J. Super. 167
    , 172 (App. Div. 1976).
    As we explained in Vaccaro:
    A physician's license and registration authorizes
    him to dispense controlled dangerous substances, but
    the statute makes it clear that he is immune from
    criminal liability when he dispenses the same "in good
    faith . . . in the course of his professional practice only."
    If he engages in dispensing or selling such drugs
    beyond the necessities of the good faith practice of his
    profession, he is no less a 'pusher' of drugs—a
    A-1709-18T2
    42
    criminal—than a layman unadorned by the trappings of
    a license or registration. See United States v. Moore,
    
    423 U.S. 77
    (1975), for cases involving analogous
    federal statute.
    ....
    A physician who is honest and ethical, and
    dispenses the prohibited drugs in a good faith effort to
    treat and cure patients, has no fear of the criminal
    sanctions of the statute. However, his mere status as a
    licensed physician who has been properly registered as
    a dispenser of the prohibited drugs does not give him
    the blanket right to abuse his authority and profession
    by dispensing drugs without relation to his sworn
    professional obligations. See United States v. Moore;
    United States v. Doremus, 
    249 U.S. 86
    (1919); Webb v.
    United States, 
    249 U.S. 96
    (1919); Commonwealth v.
    Miller, 
    282 N.E.2d 394
    (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1972); State v.
    Jacobs, 
    503 P.2d 826
    (Sup. Ct. 1972).
    [Id. at 173-74.]
    New Jersey physicians have been criminally prosecuted as well as
    administratively penalized for prescribing unnecessary CDS. Indeed, physicians
    are regularly investigated by the DEA and prosecuted in federal court for
    prescribing CDS that is not medically necessary. 10 The fact they were licensed
    10
    According to one study, 257 criminal cases were initiated against physicians
    for drug trafficking, selling, illegally distributing, and racketeering, from 1998
    through 2006. Donald M. Goldenbaum, et al., Physicians Charged with Opioid
    Analgesic-Prescribing Offenses, 9 Am. Acad. of Pain Med. 737, 744 tbl. 4
    (2008). Of those physicians, "79.5% pled guilty or no contest to at least one of
    the criminal charges brought against them." 
    Id. at 743.
    Of those physicians who
    pled not guilty, 90.6% were found guilty of at least one criminal charge. 
    Ibid. A-1709-18T2 43 physicians
    did not prevent criminal prosecution. See, e.g., United States v.
    Maynard, 278 Fed. Appx. 214, 218 (3d Cir. 2008) ("[P]hysicians are subject to
    criminal liability 'when their activities fall outside the usual course of
    professional practice.'" (quoting 
    Moore, 423 U.S. at 124
    )); United States v.
    Tighe, 
    551 F.2d 18
    , 21 (3d Cir. 1977) (noting that "by placing a prescription for
    a controlled substance, issued outside of the usual course of medical practice, in
    the hands of an ultimate user a physician completes" a criminal act); United
    States v. Brandenburg, 
    155 F.2d 110
    , 111 (3d Cir. 1946) (finding that "under the
    guise of 'treating' a patient a physician may not by issuing prescriptions make it
    possible for drugs to be peddled or for known addicts merely to satisfy their
    craving" (citing United States v. Behrman, 
    258 U.S. 280
    , 287 (1922))).
    Accordingly, we reject Campione's argument that he cannot be guilty of
    distribution of CDS because he was a licensed physician assistant, who was
    registered to prescribe CDS to patients. This, however, does not end our inquiry.
    Although Campione was permitted to prescribe CDS, he may only do so
    in good faith when the CDS is medically necessary and appropriate. 
    Vaccaro, 142 N.J. Super. at 173
    . CDS prescriptions issued to substance abusing patients
    who do not have a legitimate medical need for such medication subjects the
    physician assistant to     potential criminal prosecution and conviction.
    Determination of the medical necessity and appropriateness of the prescription
    A-1709-18T2
    44
    is a fact question to be considered by the grand and petit jurors. An indicted
    charge should not be dismissed if there is "some evidence" that the CDS
    prescription was not issued in good faith because it was medically unnecessary
    or inappropriate.
    In addition to his own testimony, Brockriede presented the statements of
    eighteen patients, K.M., P.S., P.J., M.M., A.L., N.H., B.H., J.M., S.Q., A.M.,
    B.S., J.B., E.U., M.H., P.A., D.H., D.D., and C.M., to the grand jury. The State
    also presented text messages between Campione and his wife and other
    circumstantial evidence. Notably, the State did not present any expert witnesses
    or expert reports addressing the lack of medical necessity of the CDS
    prescriptions to the grand jury. To be sure, many of the patients ' statements
    described underlying medical conditions causing them to suffer from chronic
    pain. In several instances, Campione prescribed medications that had been
    previously prescribed to them by former physicians.
    The bulk of the statements presented to the grand jury focused on the
    location of the examinations, payment for services in cash, the cursory nature of
    the examinations, the amount Campione charged, and whether the patient was
    housebound or otherwise prevented from traveling to a medical office. We do
    not view such facts as evidence that the prescriptions were not medically
    necessary and, therefore, constituted illegal distribution of CDS within the
    A-1709-18T2
    45
    meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5. Many of the patients were seen by Campione in
    their homes, nearby locations, or in his personal vehicle. House calls are an
    appropriate "medical care setting" within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 45:9-27.15(a).
    Similarly, examining patients and prescribing them medication at nearby
    locations would not provide a basis for criminal prosecution as opposed to
    potential disciplinary action by the Board. And, as noted by amicus curiae
    Attorney General of New Jersey, "the statute does not expressly prohibit a
    personal vehicle from being a 'medical care setting.'"      It depends on the
    circumstances.
    Viewing the evidence presented to the grand jury as true and affording the
    State all reasonable inferences, we conclude there was "some evidence" that the
    CDS prescriptions issued by Campione to K.M., M.M., B.H. and A.M. were
    neither medically necessary nor issued in good faith. Consequently, the motion
    court erred by dismissing counts five, six, nine, thirteen, fourteen, seventeen,
    and eighteen.
    In so ruling, we are not commenting here on what evidence would be
    admissible at trial regarding the manner and locations of the examinations and
    treatment performed by Campione in his vehicle, at restaurants, or locations
    other than his office or the patient's residence.
    A-1709-18T2
    46
    On the other hand, our careful review of the grand jury testimony and
    exhibits leads us to conclude insufficient evidence was presented to the grand
    jury to make out a prima facie case as to counts seven, eight, ten, eleven, twelve,
    fifteen, sixteen, and nineteen through twenty-nine. Accordingly, the motion
    court properly dismissed those counts. 11
    By way of example, count seven charged Campione with distribution of
    CDS to P.S., yet during his statement to investigators, which was read to the
    grand jury, P.S. stated he provided Campione with his MRI report. He stated he
    had spinal stenosis and had difficulty walking. He saw Campione for pain
    management to address severe pain in his arms and legs.           P.S. noted that
    Campione refused to prescribe him Percocet because it was inappropriate for
    chronic pain. He understood that Campione was a physician assistant, not a
    medical doctor.
    11
    In so ruling, we note that the motion judge did not state that the pre -trial
    dismissal was with prejudice. A pre-trial dismissal does not implicate double
    jeopardy concerns unless it is "based on a finding of fact relating to the merits
    of the prosecution," rather than that the evidence presented to the grand jury was
    insufficient to support an indictment. Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court
    Rules, cmt. 3 on R. 2:3-1 (2020). We therefore consider the motion court's
    dismissal of counts five through twenty-nine to be without prejudice. Our
    affirmance of the dismissal of any of those counts is likewise without prejudice.
    The State may seek to re-indict Campione on the dismissed counts by presenting
    additional evidence to a grand jury, subject to the legal holdings we make here.
    We express no opinion as to likelihood of success of any such future attempt to
    re-indict.
    A-1709-18T2
    47
    Count twenty-six charged Campione with distribution of CDS to P.A.
    During her statement to investigators, which was read to the grand jury, P.A.
    stated she had been injured in a serious motor vehicle accident and suffered a
    fractured leg, anoxia resulting in a lengthy coma, seizures, and a cognitive brain
    injury. This led to Campione treating her for bed sores. Campione saw P.A. at
    her residence, had blood work done, checked her vitals, inspected her bed sores,
    and referred her for physical therapy. In addition to pain medication and Xanax,
    Campione prescribed sleeping pills, diabetes medication, diuretics, and special
    shoes for her diabetes. He also ordered additional testing to be performed by
    nurses.
    Count twenty-seven charged Campione with distribution of CDS to D.H.
    During his statement to investigators, which was read to the grand jury, D.H.
    stated he was referred to Campione by a pain management physician. He
    described his medical condition as three herniated discs, a bulging disc, and
    sciatica. He was treated at his residence. Campione examined and urine tested
    him each month to make sure he was not selling his medication. In addition to
    pain medications, Campione prescribed Adderall for ADHD. He noted that his
    previous psychiatrist had also prescribed Adderall for that condition. When he
    sought an increase in Oxycodone dosage, Campione refused because he would
    not over prescribe.
    A-1709-18T2
    48
    IV.
    Count thirty charges Campione with third-degree possession of hollow
    point bullets, a prohibited weapon. Count thirty-one charges Campione with
    fourth-degree possession of metal knuckles, a prohibited weapon. The motion
    judge dismissed both counts because the State did not present evidence of the
    hollow point bullets or metal knuckles to the first grand jury, even though it was
    aware of that evidence. Thus, Campione was not indicted by the first grand jury
    on those charges. The State presented evidence of the possession of those illegal
    weapons to the second grand jury, which true billed both counts.
    Following State v. Gregory, 
    66 N.J. 510
    (1975), the motion judge applied
    Rule 3:15-1(b) to implement mandatory joinder. The Court has interpreted the
    Rule to encompass four factors a defendant must show to gain dismissal of an
    indictment on this basis: "(1) the multiple offenses are criminal; (2) the offenses
    are based on the same conduct or arose from the same episode; (3) the
    appropriate prosecuting officer knew of the offenses at the time the first trial
    commenced; and (4) the offenses were within the jurisdiction and venue of a
    single court." State v. Yoskowitz, 
    116 N.J. 679
    , 701 (1989) (emphasis added);
    R. 3:15-1(b). Further, the mandatory joinder rule is codified at N.J.S.A. 2C:1-
    8(b), which provides in relevant part:
    [A] defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for
    multiple criminal offenses based on the same conduct
    A-1709-18T2
    49
    or arising from the same episode, if such offenses are
    known to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the time
    of the commencement of the first trial and are within
    the jurisdiction and venue of a single court.
    [(Emphasis added).]
    The judge misapplied the mandatory joinder rule. Here, Campione was
    not subjected to separate trials. "No disposition on the merits ha[d] taken place."
    State v. Phillips, 
    150 N.J. Super. 75
    , 77 (App. Div. 1977). Other than count one
    as to Campione, the charges presented to the second grand jury were different
    than those presented to the first grand jury. Moreover, the second indictment
    superseded the first. Here, presenting the superseding indictment to the grand
    jury did not implicate the double jeopardy clause or the mandatory joinder rule.
    "The mandatory joinder rule deals with offenses, not indictments." State v.
    Antieri, 
    180 N.J. Super. 267
    , 272 (Law Div. 1981), aff'd, 
    186 N.J. Super. 20
    (App. Div. 1982). The State may re-present charges to the grand jury multiple
    times until it secures an indictment. See State v. Shaw, 
    455 N.J. Super. 471
    ,
    489 (App. Div. 2018) (holding the trial court did not err in refusing to dismiss
    the indictment returned by a third grand jury where the State presented new and
    material evidence to the third panel). For these reasons, we reverse the dismissal
    of counts thirty and thirty-one.
    Campione also contends the State failed to recite the entire statute
    pertaining to metal knuckles when it presented count thirty-one to the grand
    A-1709-18T2
    50
    jury. He asserts that he had a "lawful purpose" for possessing the metal knuckles
    because he was a "weapons collector" and the State did not present this lawful
    defense to the grand jury. We find no merit in this argument. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
    V.
    We next address the post-dismissal discovery ordered by the motion court.
    The State argues the court abused its discretion by ordering post-dismissal
    discovery of the identity, opinions, and reports of the experts that it consulted.
    We agree.
    Rule 3:13-3(b)(1)(I) requires the State to provide the following post-
    indictment discovery:
    [The] names and addresses of each person whom the
    prosecutor expects to call to trial as an expert witness,
    the expert's qualifications, the subject matter on which
    the expert is expected to testify, a copy of the report, if
    any, of such expert witness, or if no report is prepared,
    a statement of the facts and opinions to which the expert
    is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for
    each opinion.
    As a result of the dismissal of the indictment in its entirety, the criminal
    action was no longer pending and no trial will occur unless the dismissal is
    overturned on appeal. Rule 3:13-3(b)(1)(I) does not apply when all charges have
    been dismissed. Moreover, Campione can renew his application for discovery
    on remand as to any reinstated counts.
    A-1709-18T2
    51
    Rule 3:13-3(b)(1)(I) is "parallel" to the civil standard regarding expert
    testimony. State v. LaBrutto, 
    114 N.J. 187
    , 205 (1989); Pressler & Verniero,
    cmt. 3.2.9 on R. 3:13-3(b)(1). The motion court misapplied the civil standard
    for discovery of expert witnesses.
    It is the clear intention of [Rule 4:10-2(d)(1)] that
    it generally apply only to experts who will be testifying
    at trial, leaving parties free to consult with other experts
    whose opinion is not discoverable. See Graham v.
    Gielchinsky, 
    126 N.J. 361
    (1991).                A party's
    consultation with an expert whose identity and opinion
    is not disclosed to the adversary is privileged,
    precluding the adversary from himself producing that
    expert in the absence of exceptional circumstances
    within the meaning of [Rule 4:10-2(d)(3)].
    [Pressler & Verniero, cmt. 5.2.1 on R. 4:10-2(d)(1).]
    Further, in the civil context, "a consulting expert is prohibited from
    testifying for an adversary at trial absent the same 'exceptional circumstances'
    that would have allowed discovery of that expert's identity and opinion under
    Rule 4:10-2(d)(3)." Fitzgerald v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 
    186 N.J. 286
    , 301 (2006)
    (citing 
    Graham, 126 N.J. at 373
    ).
    The fact that the State's civil forfeiture action was then still pending when
    the indictment was dismissed does not change the analysis. 12 The owners of
    12
    During oral argument before this court, counsel advised that the civil
    forfeiture action is now settled. Consequently, the issue of discovery that might
    have been necessary in the forfeiture proceeding is now moot.
    A-1709-18T2
    52
    property sought to be forfeited may seek discovery in the forfeiture action. See
    State v. 1987 Chevrolet Camaro, 
    307 N.J. Super. 34
    , 43-46 (App. Div. 1998)
    (noting the right to discovery in forfeiture actions and applying discovery
    enforcement rules).
    We likewise conclude that the pendency of license suspension
    proceedings brought against Campione by the Board, and his related temporary
    suspension, which will not be fully resolved until the criminal charges are
    resolved, does not provide a legal basis for ordering the State to provide post-
    dismissal expert discovery. Campione may seek permitted discovery in the
    administrative proceeding if those proceedings are reactivated as a result of our
    decision reinstating certain counts of the indictment. N.J.A.C. 1:1-10.1 to -10.6.
    Recent precedent, such as In re Cayuse Corp. LLC, 
    445 N.J. Super. 80
    (App. Div. 2016), does not compel a contrary result. The facts in Cayuse, which
    involved a challenge to the denial of a retail firearms dealer's license application,
    are materially distinguishable. Cayuse faced potential adverse consequences on
    future license applications as a result of the application denial being challenged.
    
    Id. at 97.
    Here, the dismissal of the indictment terminated the criminal case.
    VI.
    In sum, we affirm the dismissal with prejudice of counts one, two and
    four. We affirm the dismissal without prejudice of counts seven, eight, ten,
    A-1709-18T2
    53
    eleven, twelve, fifteen, sixteen, and nineteen through twenty-nine. We affirm
    the dismissal with prejudice of all charges against Katz.      We reverse the
    dismissal of counts three (as to Campione), five, six, nine, thirteen, fourteen,
    seventeen, eighteen, thirty, and thirty-one and remand those counts for further
    proceedings. We also reverse the orders compelling post-dismissal discovery.
    Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
    We do not retain jurisdiction.
    A-1709-18T2
    54
    TABLE – INDICTMENT NO. 18-05-0685
    Count:          Contrary to       Charging:   Patient:   Appellate
    N.J.S.A.:                                Disposition:
    One        (1): 2C:5-2, 2C:2-     Campione & N/A         Dismissed
    third-degree    6, and 2C:21-     Katz
    conspiracy      20(a), (c), (d)
    Two        (2): 2C:21-20(a)       Campione & N/A         Dismissed
    third-degree                      Katz
    unlawful
    practice     of
    medicine
    Three      (3): 2C:21-20(c)       Campione & N/A         Reinstated as
    third-degree                      Katz                   to Campione/
    unlawful                                                 dismissed as
    practice     of                                          to Katz
    medicine
    Four       (4): 2C:21-20(d)       Campione & N/A         Dismissed
    third-degree                      Katz
    unlawful
    practice     of
    medicine
    Five       (5): 2C:35-5(b)(5)     Campione    K.M.       Reinstated
    third-degree
    distribution
    of CDS
    Six (6): third- 2C:35-            Campione    K.M.       Reinstated
    degree          5(b)(13)
    distribution
    of CDS
    Seven      (7): 2C:35-5(b)(5)     Campione    P.S.       Dismissed
    third-degree
    distribution
    of CDS
    Eight      (8): 2C:35-5(b)(5)     Campione    P.J.       Dismissed
    third-degree
    distribution
    of CDS
    A-1709-18T2
    55
    Nine       (9):   2C:35-       Campione    M.M.   Reinstated
    third-degree      5(b)(13)
    distribution
    of CDS
    Ten       (10):   2C:35-5(b)(5) Campione   A.L.   Dismissed
    third-degree
    distribution
    of CDS
    Eleven (11):      2C:35-       Campione    A.L.   Dismissed
    third-degree      5(b)(13)
    distribution
    of CDS
    Twelve (12):      2C:35-5(b)(5) Campione   N.H.   Dismissed
    third-degree
    distribution
    of CDS
    Thirteen (13):    2C:35-5(b)(5) Campione   B.H.   Reinstated
    third-degree
    distribution
    of CDS
    Fourteen          2C:35-       Campione    B.H.   Reinstated
    (14):    third-   5(b)(13)
    degree
    distribution
    of CDS
    Fifteen (15):     2C:35-       Campione    J.M.   Dismissed
    third-degree      5(b)(13)
    distribution
    of CDS
    Sixteen (16):     2C:35-5(b)(5) Campione   S.Q.   Dismissed
    third-degree
    distribution
    of CDS
    Seventeen         2C:35-5(b)(5) Campione   A.M.   Reinstated
    (17):    third-
    degree
    distribution
    of CDS
    Eighteen          2C:35-       Campione    A.M.   Reinstated
    (18):    third-   5(b)(13)
    A-1709-18T2
    56
    degree
    distribution
    of CDS
    Nineteen          2C:35-       Campione    B.S.   Dismissed
    (19):    third-   5(b)(13)
    degree
    distribution
    of CDS
    Twenty (20):      2C:35-5(b)(5) Campione   J.B.   Dismissed
    third-degree
    distribution
    of CDS
    Twenty-One        2C:35-       Campione    J.B.   Dismissed
    (21):    third-   5(b)(13)
    degree
    distribution
    of CDS
    Twenty-Two        2C:35-5(b)(5) Campione   E.U.   Dismissed
    (22):    third-
    degree
    distribution
    of CDS
    Twenty-           2C:35-       Campione    E.U.   Dismissed
    Three (23):       5(b)(13)
    third-degree
    distribution
    of CDS
    Twenty-Four       2C:35-5(b)(5) Campione   M.H.   Dismissed
    (24):    third-
    degree
    distribution
    of CDS
    Twenty-Five       2C:35-       Campione    M.H.   Dismissed
    (25):    third-   5(b)(13)
    degree
    distribution
    of CDS
    Twenty-Six        2C:35-       Campione    P.A.   Dismissed
    (26):    third-   5(b)(13)
    degree
    A-1709-18T2
    57
    distribution
    of CDS
    Twenty-           2C:35-5(b)(5) Campione   D.H.   Dismissed
    Seven (27):
    third-degree
    distribution
    of CDS
    Twenty-Eight      2C:35-       Campione    D.D.   Dismissed
    (28): fourth-     5(b)(14)
    degree
    distribution
    of CDS
    Twenty-Nine       2C:35-5(b)(5) Campione   C.M.   Dismissed
    (29):    third-
    degree
    distribution
    of CDS
    Thirty (30):      2C:39-3(f)   Campione    N/A    Reinstated
    fourth-degree
    possession of
    a prohibited
    weapon
    (hollow point
    bullets)
    Thirty-One        2C:39-3(e)   Campione    N/A    Reinstated
    (31): fourth-
    degree
    possession of
    a prohibited
    weapon
    (metal
    knuckles)
    A-1709-18T2
    58