STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JOSE PINTO (16-07-2162, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1622-17T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JOSE PINTO, a/k/a JOSE E.
PINTO, JR., JOSE N. PINTO,
and MUNCHO,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________
Submitted November 12, 2019 – Decided February 27, 2020
Before Judges Moynihan and Mitterhoff.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 16-07-2162.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Brian P. Keenan, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).
Jill S. Mayer, Acting Camden County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Linda Anne Shashoua, Special
Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor,
of counsel and on the brief).
Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief.
PER CURIAM
Defendant Jose Pinto was charged in a four-count indictment arising from
a motor-vehicle police pursuit, much of which was captured on dash-cam video,
ending in a crash that injured a third party; a controlled dangerous substance
(CDS) was found in defendant's vehicle. Defendant appeals from his conviction
by jury for second-degree eluding, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b) (count one), second-
degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(6) (count two), and third-degree
possession of CDS, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) (count four);1 and from his
extended-term, fourteen-year prison term on count two, concurrent seven-year
sentence on count one and consecutive three-year term on count four. In his
merits brief, he argues:
POINT I
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF
CHOICE WHEN THE JUDGE REFUSED TO GRANT
A CONTINUANCE SO THAT HE COULD RETAIN
PRIVATE COUNSEL PRIOR TO THE TRIAL
WITHOUT CAREFULLY CONSIDERING EACH OF
THE FACTORS SET FORTH IN CASES SUCH AS
STATE V. KATES.
1
Count three of the indictment charging second-degree aggravated assault,
N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(6), was dismissed before trial.
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POINT II
THE JUDGE IMPOSED A MANIFESTLY
EXCESSIVE SENTENCE REQUIRING REVERSAL.
A. ALTHOUGH SUPPORTED BY
AMPLE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD,
THE JUDGE F[A]ILED TO FIND
MITIGATING FACTOR ELEVEN.
B. THE SENTENCING JUDGE
ERRED IN DETERMINING THE
EXTENDED-TERM SENTENCING
RANGE FOR A SECOND-DEGREE
OFFENSE.
C. THE SENTENCING JUDGE
ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER
THE YARBOUGH FACTORS WHEN
IMPOSING A CONSECUTIVE TERM
ON THE UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF
CDS CHARGE.
In a pro se brief, he adds:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO
DECLARE A MISTRIAL AFTER THE JURY WAS
TAINTED.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY PERMITTING THE
STATE TO REVEAL THE NATURE OF
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS
IN CONTRAVENTION TO [N.J.R.E.] [] 609
(A)(2)(II).
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3
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED IT[S] DISCRETION
IN IMPOSING A[] [FOURTEEN] YEAR EXTENDED
TERM BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO
EXPLAIN HOW HE ARRIVED AT SETTING THE
TERM WITHIN THE EXTENDED TERM RANGE.
Because of errors committed in excusing a deliberating juror, we are constrained
to reverse and remand for a new trial.
During jury deliberations, the trial judge received a note that read: "Juror
[number eight] would like to request an alternate due to personal reasons." In a
subsequent colloquy with the judge, in both counsel's presence, when asked to
tell the reason for her request, the juror said: "Personal matters from a couple
years back. So I've been in a case, and I had to testify for someone. And like
I'm traumatized about that situation. So my opinion in this has me a little shaky."
The juror stated she felt she could not continue as a deliberating juror. The
colloquy continued:
[THE COURT]: Did anyone in the jury room in any
way try to compel or force you to withdraw as a
deliberating juror?
[JUROR NUMBER EIGHT]: No.
[THE COURT]: This is solely your decision based on
a past traumatic incident in your life?
[JUROR NUMBER EIGHT]: Yes.
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In response to defense counsel's concern, the judge asked the juror if she
discussed the issue with other jurors. The juror responded, "I talked to him
about it and explained everything that happened. And he just told me if I felt
like I'm not comfortable, then I should speak to you about the situation." 2 The
juror then responded affirmatively to the judge's question: "And this is solely
your decision because of the past traumatic event that you've gone through in
your life?" The judge then asked the juror to return to the jury room with an
instruction: "I'm going to ask that you ask the jurors not to conduct any further
deliberation. They'll be brought back into the courtroom shortly."
The judge commented to counsel immediately after the juror returned to
the jury room, "clearly she's emotionally upset about something that happened
in her past, to the extent [that] she's advised them that she feels she can't
deliberate any further." He announced his decision to release the juror and
replace her with an alternate juror. Defense counsel interjected:
Judge, my only concern is if there have been
discussions regarding the incident. I would be
compelled to ask for an individual polling to see if any
relation of the incident from [j]uror [number eight] as
to the other members of the panel effects their ability to
be fair and impartial going forward on the case.
2
The record is silent as to whom juror number eight referred when she said
"him" and "he."
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The judge declined to individually poll the jurors, explaining that his additional
instructions to the jury, including that to "disregard anything that's not been
presented as evidence[,]" should address any concerns. Defendant's counsel
responded, "Okay. Fair enough, [j]udge."
The jury returned and an alternate juror was selected. The judge instructed
the reconstituted jury:
Members of the jury, as you know, [j]uror
[number eight] was excused from the jury. An alternate
juror has been selected to take her place. The reason
that she was excused was entirely personal to her. It
had nothing to do with her views on this case or her
relationship with the other members of the deliberating
jury. Please do not speculate on the reasons why the
juror was excused.
As of this moment, you are a new jury, and you
must start your deliberations over again. The parties
have the right to have a verdict reached by . . . [twelve]
jurors who have had the full opportunity to deliberate
from start to finish.
The alternate juror has no knowledge of any
earlier deliberations. Consequently, the new
deliberating juror must start over at the very beginning
of deliberations. Each member of the original
deliberating jury must set aside and disregard whatever
may have occurred and anything that may have been
said in the jury room following my instructions to you.
You must give no weight to any opinion
expressed by [j]uror [number eight] during
deliberations before that juror was excused. Together,
as a new jury, you must consider all evidence presented
at trial as part of your full and complete deliberations
until you reach your verdict.
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And with that, I’m going to again ask that you
return to the jury room to begin your new deliberations.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the three counts it considered. 3
Appellate review "of a trial court's decision to remove and substitute a
deliberating juror because of an 'inability to continue,' pursuant to Rule 1:8-
2(d)(1), is deferential. We will not reverse a conviction unless the court has
abused its discretion." State v. Musa, 222 N.J. 554, 564-65 (2015) (quoting
State v. Williams, 171 N.J. 151, 168 (2002)); State v. Valenzuela, 136 N.J. 458,
473 (1994).
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to an
impartial jury at trial, U.S. Const. amend. VI, and this right "goes to the very
essence of a fair trial," State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39, 60 (1983). The jury must
be "free of outside influences and . . . decide the case according to the evidence
and arguments presented in court in the course of the criminal trial itself." Ibid.
3
The transcript does not indicate the length of jury deliberations before juror
number eight requested an alternate juror take her place. Nor does it indicate
the time the reconstituted jury deliberated before returning its verdict. We note
court proceedings that day began at 9:05 a.m., and the jury heard testimony from
four witnesses, including defendant. After proceedings outside of the jury's
presence, the court broke for lunch from 11:40 a.m. until 1:00 p.m. when it
resumed for a charge conference, followed by summations, jury instructions,
initial deliberations, colloquy with juror number eight and reconstitution of the
jury, final deliberations, return of the verdict and subsequent post-verdict
proceedings. The record indicates the "matter concluded at 3:16 p.m."
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New Jersey courts have noted that a defendant's right "to be tried by an impartial
jury is of exceptional significance," so it must be "as nearly impartial 'as the lot
of humanity will admit[.]'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Singletary, 80 N.J. 55, 62
(1979)).
Cognizant of defendant's constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury
trial, we conclude the judge initially addressed juror number eight's request
properly but went astray in failing to ascertain if her concerns tainted the
remaining jurors. When he first received the juror's note, the judge followed our
Supreme Court's instruction to "act swiftly to overcome any potential bias and
to expose factors impinging on the juror's impartiality." State v. R.D., 169 N.J.
551, 558 (2001). The judge heeded the Court's mandated obligation that he
"interrogate the juror, in the presence of counsel, to determine if there is a
taint[.]" Ibid.
Unfortunately, the colloquy did not provide sufficient information for the
judge to determine if juror number eight should be excused pursuant to Rule
1:8-2(d)(1) which provides:
If the alternate jurors are not discharged and if at any
time after submission of the case to the jury, a juror dies
or is discharged by the court because of illness or other
inability to continue, the court may direct the clerk to
draw the name of an alternate juror to take the place of
the juror who is deceased or discharged.
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Notwithstanding what the Court characterized as the Rule's
broad language, trial courts do not have unbridled
discretion to reconstitute deliberating juries in the face
of a jury crisis. On the contrary, the removal rule may
be used only in limited circumstances. . . . [to] be
invoked only as a last resort to avoid the deplorable
waste of time, effort, money, and judicial resources
inherent in a mistrial.
[State v. Hightower, 146 N.J. 239, 253-54 (1996).]
The Court reiterated the Rule's inability-to-continue standard, that to remove a
juror,
the record [must] adequately establish[] that the juror
suffers from an inability to function that is personal and
unrelated to the juror's interaction with the other jury
members. If a court suspects that the problems with the
juror are due to interactions with other jurors, the court
should instruct the jury to resume deliberations.
[Hightower, 146 N.J. at 254 (alterations in original)
(quoting Valenzuela, 136 N.J. at 472-73).]
The Hightower Court cautioned
the inability-to-continue standard may not be invoked
to remove a deliberating juror when the record merely
reveals that the juror has a position that is different
from that of other jurors. Nor may the standard be
employed to remove a deliberating juror where the
record reveals that the juror's problems are related to
both personal circumstances and factors arising from
the juror's interactions with other jurors. In other
words, the reason must be exclusively personal.
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[Id. at 255 (citations omitted).]
By way of example, the Court has
sanctioned the removal of a deliberating juror for
"inability to continue" when the juror has "expressed
refusal to abide by her sworn oath to follow the law,"
[State v. Jenkins, 182 N.J. 112, 130 (2004)],
complained of financial hardship, Williams, 171 N.J. at
167, stated that his nervous and emotional condition
"affect[ed] his judgment" and ability to render a fair
verdict, State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392, 401, 406-07
(1978), and "disregarded the court's unambiguous
admonitions" and had a "conversation with a relative
[that] patently influenced [her]," State v. Holloway,
288 N.J. Super. 390, 404 (App. Div. 1996). In those
examples, the removal is for reasons personal to the
juror and not for reasons relating to the interchange
between jurors or the deliberative process.
[Musa, 222 N.J. at 566-67 (second, third and fourth
alterations in original).]
Thus, in Valenzuela, the Court concluded the trial court abused its discretion in
discharging a juror where the record revealed "the juror's problems related not
only to personal circumstances but also to factors arising from the juror's
interactions with the other jurors. . . ." 136 N.J. at 473.
Although the trial judge elicited that no one compelled or forced juror
number eight to withdraw as a deliberating juror, the colloquy between the trial
court and juror number eight did not reveal if her request to be excused was
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based on any interaction with other jurors. In other words, the judge did not
discover if her request was based on her stance in deliberations as compared to
that of fellow jurors. Nor did the judge inquire as to the nature of her past
experience as a witness. In short, the trial court's colloquy was too short.
We recognize the trial court's role in questioning a deliberating juror
involves a delicate balance between ascertaining details of the juror's reasons
for seeking release from the deliberative process and maintaining the secrecy of
jury deliberations. See Musa, 222 N.J. at 568-69; Jenkins, 182 N.J. at 134-35.
"Generally, if a court inquires of a juror on the subject of 'inability to continue,'
the questions must be carefully crafted to elicit answers that only bear on reasons
personal to the juror and that in no way elicit the drift of the deliberations or
voting inclinations of any juror." Musa, 222 N.J. at 569.
But, without ascertaining the nature of the personal information that
caused the juror consternation—here, the nature of her testimony in another
matter—and the person to whom she "talked . . . about it," the judge's
questioning did not comport with the Court's instruction:
An appropriate voir dire of a juror allegedly in
possession of extraneous information . . . should inquire
into the specific nature of the extraneous information,
and whether the juror intentionally or inadvertently has
imparted any of that information to other jurors.
Depending on the juror's answers to searching
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questions by the court, the court must then determine
whether it is necessary to voir dire individually other
jurors to ensure the impartiality of the jury. That
determination should be explained on the record to
facilitate appellate review under the abuse of discretion
standard.
[R.D., 169 N.J. at 560-61.]
The judge's limited questioning of juror number eight was a mistaken exercise
of discretion.
We also determine the judge abused his discretion in both failing to
inquire with whom juror number eight had discussions and denying defendant's
request to voir dire the remaining jurors about the impact of juror number eight's
disclosure to "him" whom she referenced, or "them" that the judge alluded to
when he stated that the juror was "emotionally upset about something that
happened in her past, to the extent [that] she's advised them that she feels she
can't deliberate any further." The judge should have also inquired if juror
number eight said anything about her colloquy with the judge in court after she
returned to the jury room, especially because the judge did not instruct juror
number eight not to relate those discussions, or their subject matter, to the
remaining jurors. See State v. Wormley, 305 N.J. Super. 57, 70 (App. Div.
1997) (finding that even though the excused juror stated she did not discuss
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extraneous information with anyone, "there was a strong likelihood that, even
indirectly or unintentionally, she may well have," in that there "was at least one
break during which the jurors commingled"). The judge knew he was going to
instruct the jury after replacing juror number eight. He should have warned
juror number eight in light of that part of the instruction providing:
the excused juror's departure was prompted by personal
issues, rather than by his or her view of the case or
relationships with other jurors, . . . the reconstituted
jury should not speculate on the reasons for the juror's
departure, and . . . the jury should begin deliberations
anew by setting aside their previous discussions so that
the reconstituted jury may conduct full and complete
deliberations.
[State v. Ross, 218 N.J. 130, 151 (2014).]
See also Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Judge's Instructions When Alternate
Juror Empaneled After Deliberations Have Begun" (rev. Mar. 14, 2016). The
judge should have ensured that juror number eight did not inform the other jurors
of the reason for her departure.
Our Supreme Court cautioned the "determination that the reasons for the
removal of [a juror] were personal to [the juror] and not driven by the
deliberative process does not resolve the question of whether it was appropriate
to reconstitute the jury with an alternate juror." Jenkins, 182 N.J. at 130. The
trial court must determine if the jury was tainted by a juror's extraneous
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information. R.D. 169 N.J. at 559. "That determination requires the trial court
to consider the gravity of the extraneous information in relation to the case, the
demeanor and credibility of the juror or jurors who were exposed to the
extraneous information, and the overall impact of the matter on the fairness of
the proceedings." Ibid.
While "the decision to voir dire individually the other members of the jury
best remains a matter for the sound discretion of the trial court," to which no per
se rule pertains, id. at 561, the preferred practice, indeed duty, is to "ask probing
questions to protect the impartiality of the jury," id. at 563. As we said in State
v. Brown, 442 N.J. Super. 154, 181 (App. Div. 2015), "[a]lthough a deliberating
juror's bias or prejudice falls within the 'inability to continue' standard, the court,
in opting for substitution rather than a mistrial, must ensure, by appropriate voir
dire, that the other jurors were not tainted by the removed juror."
Unlike in R.D., where "there was no meaningful opportunity for the other
members of the jury to be tainted[,]" 169 N.J. at 563, juror number eight
admitted she had discussed her personal information with someone. Further,
she returned to the jury room after colloquy with the judge without any
instruction to refrain from relating that colloquy with the other jurors; she was
told only to "ask the jurors not to conduct any further deliberation."
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The judge's abbreviated questioning did not disclose sufficient
information for him to determine if the reason for juror number eight's request
was just personal to her or whether her interactions with her fellow jurors
influenced her request. Moreover, even if her excusal was appropriate, the
questioning did not provide him enough information to determine whether it was
appropriate to declare a mistrial or to empanel an alternate juror. The R.D. Court
recognized the trial court's discretion in deciding whether a new trial based on
juror taint is warranted, but affirmed its prior holding that
"[i]f the irregular matter has that tendency on the face
of it, a new trial should be granted without further
inquiry as to its actual effect. The test is not whether
the irregular matter actually influenced the result, but
whether it had the capacity of doing so." [Panko v.
Flintkote Co., 7 N.J. 55, 61 (1951)]; see also
[Hightower, 146 N.J. at 266-267] (stating "[a]ny juror
misconduct or improper intrusion into the deliberations
of a jury that 'could have a tendency to influence the
jury in arriving at its verdict in a manner inconsistent
with the legal proofs and the court's charge' is a ground
for a mistrial"). The right to an impartial jury is of
exceptional importance, and "that aspect of impartiality
mandating 'that the jury's verdict be based on evidence
received in open court, not from outside sources'" is
particularly critical to fulfilling the essence of that
right. [State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 45, 75 (1988)].
[R.D. 166 N.J. at 558-59 (first and fourth alterations in
original).]
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The trial judge did not develop a full record that would properly inform a
decision to replace juror number eight or to return her to deliberate; or to replace
juror number eight with an alternate or to declare a mistrial. That improper
exercise of discretion compels us to reverse defendant's conviction and remand
this matter for a new trial. In light of our decision, we need not address
defendant's other arguments.
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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