STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JOHN RICHARDSON (00-01-0167, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-4942-18T2
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    JOHN RICHARDSON,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    _______________________
    Submitted January 11, 2021 – Decided February 4, 2021
    Before Judges Gooden Brown and DeAlmeida.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 00-01-0167.
    John Richardson, appellant pro se.
    Theodore N. Stephens II, Acting Essex County
    Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Frank J. Ducoat,
    Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant
    Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant John Richardson appeals from the April 29, 2019 order of the
    Law Division denying his motion for a new trial on his 2001 convictions of first-
    degree murder and related offenses. We affirm.
    I.
    The following facts are derived from the record. In 1999, defendant was
    eighteen years old when he shot and killed Joseph Clair and shot and injured
    Terry Anderson. In 2001, a jury convicted defendant of first-degree murder,
    N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2); fourth-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A.
    2C:12-1(b)(4); unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); and
    possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a). He was
    sentenced to an aggregate term of thirty years of imprisonment, with a thirty -
    year period of parole ineligibility.
    In 2004, we affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence.        State v.
    Richardson, No. A-3667-01 (App. Div. Nov. 8, 2004). The Supreme Court
    denied certification. State v. Richardson, 
    182 N.J. 429
     (2005). In 2009, we
    affirmed the Law Division's denial of defendant's petition for post-conviction
    relief. State v. Richardson, No. A-3521-07 (App. Div. Apr. 30, 2009). The
    Supreme Court denied review. State v. Richardson, 
    200 N.J. 549
     (2009). In
    2013, the United States District Court denied defendant's petition for a writ of
    A-4942-18T2
    2
    habeas corpus. Richardson v. Ricci, Civ. No. 10-4954 (KM) (D.N.J. Jul. 24,
    2013).
    On October 30, 2018, defendant filed in the Law Division what he
    described as a motion for a new trial based on "newly discovered evidence of
    underdeveloped brains in those who are late teens." According to defendant,
    "[t]here is significant evidence and a growing medical consensus that key areas
    of the brain relevant to decision-making and judgment continue to develop into
    the early twenties." He argues that if this science had been known at the time
    of his trial "he could have had the jury so instructed on the relevance of the
    science" to his proffered diminished capacity defense. Defendant contends that
    admission of this evidence would have changed the outcome of his trial because
    if presented with this evidence "no reasonable jury would have found defendant
    guilty of first[-]degree murder, but of a lesser offense."
    Defendant did not include a copy of his trial court motion in his appendix.
    However, his appendix includes: (1) a copy of a February 2018 report to the
    House of Delegates of the American Bar Association urging the organization to
    oppose imposition of a death sentence on any person who was twenty-one or
    younger at the time of their offense; (2) a 2016 Fordham Law Review article
    entitled "Young Adulthood as a Transitional Legal Category: Science, Social
    A-4942-18T2
    3
    Change, and Justice Policy;" (3) a 2016 Temple Law Review article entitled
    "When Does a Juvenile Become an Adult? Implications for Law and Policy[;]"
    and (4) the transcript of a 2017 evidentiary hearing in a federal district court
    matter in which defendant was not a party. These documents identify scientific
    evidence relating to brain development in young adults. It is not clear from the
    record whether the items in defendant's appendix were submitted to the trial
    court.
    In its April 29, 2019 written opinion, the trial court described defendant's
    filing as an "application for resentencing pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 5[6]
    7 U.S. 460
     (2012); assignment of counsel, and grant of an evidentiary hearing for
    newly discovered evidence." As the trial court noted, in Miller, the United
    States Supreme Court held that mandatory life without parole for those who
    were under eighteen at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's
    prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. To satisfy the Constitution, a
    sentencing court must consider a juvenile offender's youth and attendant
    characteristics prior to imposition of sentence. 
    Id. at 476-77
    . The trial court
    concluded that defendant did not fall under the holding in Miller because he was
    eighteen when he committed his offenses and because he was not sentenced to
    a mandatory life term without parole.
    A-4942-18T2
    4
    The trial court denied defendant's request for a new trial because it was
    not supported by a certification or affidavit detailing the evidence on which he
    intended to rely. In addition, the court found that any evidence with respect to
    defendant's brain development as a young man would be speculative, given that
    he was thirty-seven at the time the court decided the motion. The court noted
    that the jury considered evidence of defendant's purported diminished capacity,
    which it rejected, and that the original trial court considered defendant's age at
    sentencing. The court summarily denied defendant's request for the appointment
    of counsel. An April 29, 2019 order memorializes the court's decision.
    This appeal follows. Defendant raises the following argument for our
    consideration.
    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
    DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
    BASED ON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE OF
    BRAIN SCIENCE FOR LATE ADOLESCENCE AS A
    CLASS   OF   OFFENDERS       HAVING    LESS
    CULPABILITY COMPARED TO MATURE ADULTS
    PURSUANT     TO     N.J.S.A.    2C:1-2(B)(7),
    THEREFORE, THE ORDER SHOULD BE
    REVERSED AND THE MATTER SHOULD BE
    REMANDED FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE
    DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS.
    A-4942-18T2
    5
    II.
    Defendant argues that the trial court misconstrued his motion as one
    seeking resentencing. He concedes that the holding in Miller does not apply to
    him because he was eighteen at the time of his offenses and because he was not
    sentenced to a mandatory life term without parole. He argues instead that he is
    entitled to a new trial because newly discovered evidence regarding brain
    development in people age eighteen to twenty-one, evidence similar to that
    which lead to the holding in Miller and related cases, suggests he could not have
    formed the necessary mens rea for first-degree murder.
    "The trial judge on defendant's motion may grant the defendant a new trial
    if required in the interest of justice." R. 3:20-1. Motions for a new trial are
    "addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge" and "shall not be reversed
    unless it clearly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law."
    State v. Armour, 
    446 N.J. Super. 295
    , 305-06 (App. Div. 2016) (quotations
    omitted). We review trial court decisions denying a motion for a new trial for
    an abuse of discretion. Id. at 306. Questions of law are reviewed de novo. State
    v. Miles, 
    229 N.J. 83
    , 90 (2017).
    "[T]o qualify as newly discovered evidence entitling a party to a new trial,
    the new evidence must be (1) material to the issue and not merely cumulative or
    A-4942-18T2
    6
    impeaching or contradictory; (2) discovered since the trial and not discoverable
    by reasonable diligence beforehand; and (3) of the sort that would probably
    change the jury's verdict if a new trial were granted." State v. Carter, 
    85 N.J. 300
    , 314 (1981). "All three tests must be met before the evidence can be said to
    justify a new trial." 
    Ibid.
    Defendant's argument must be examined in the context of recent legal
    developments concerning juvenile offenders. The United States Supreme Court
    has established, through a series of decisions issued between 2005 and 2016,
    that juveniles are developmentally different from adults and individualized
    consideration of these differences is necessary prior to imposing the harshest
    punishments available under law. See e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 
    543 U.S. 551
    ,
    578 (2005) (holding that imposing the death penalty on defendants convicted as
    juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment); Graham v. Florida, 
    560 U.S. 48
    , 82
    (2010) (holding that imposing life term without parole on juveniles convicted of
    non-homicide offenses is unconstitutional); and Miller, 567 U.S. at 465 (holding
    that mandatory life term without parole for juveniles convicted of homicide is
    unconstitutional). The Court's holdings in each of these cases were predicated
    on "scientific and sociological notions about the unique characteristics of youth
    A-4942-18T2
    7
    and the progressive emotional and behavioral development of juveniles." State
    in Interest of C.K., 
    233 N.J. 44
    , 68 (2018).
    In State v. Zuber, 
    227 N.J. 422
    , 446-47 (2017), our Supreme Court held
    that "Miller's command that a sentencing judge 'take into account how children
    are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing
    them to a lifetime in prison,' applies with equal strength to a sentence that is the
    practical equivalent of life without parole." (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 480)
    (citation omitted).
    Defendant argues that the scientific evidence that underpins the holding
    in these precedents has advanced to include the development of post-adolescent
    brains. He contends that he is entitled to a new trial in which he is able to present
    evidence of delayed brain development in eighteen-year-olds, as he was at the
    time of his offenses, to establish his lack of culpability for first-degree murder.
    Our careful review of the record reveals no abuse of the trial court's
    discretion. Defendant has not provided a precise description of the evidence he
    intends to introduce at a new trial. The record does not clearly identify what
    defendant presented to the trial court in support of his motion. The documents
    in defendant's appendix, assuming they were submitted with his motion, detail
    a number of scientific studies and other evidence from a variety of sources.
    A-4942-18T2
    8
    Defendant does not explain which, if any, of the experts identified in those
    sources would serve as witnesses at his trial or whether their opinions would
    apply to defendant's circumstances.
    In addition, the sources in defendant's appendix date from around the time
    the Court issued its opinion in Zuber. They contain evidence similar to that on
    which the Court relied to reach its holding in that case. Yet, there is no
    indication in Zuber, or the precedents on which the Court relied, that the
    constitutional protections established in recent precedents apply to defendants
    who commit offenses after they have reached the age of majority. See United
    States v. Marshall, 
    736 F.3d 492
    , 600 (6th Cir. 2013) (noting that, for Eighth
    Amendment purposes, an individual's eighteenth birthday marks the bright line
    separating juveniles from adults; "In short, Marshall is at the very most an
    immature adult. An immature adult is not a juvenile. Regardless of the source
    of the immaturity, an immature adult is still an adult.").
    Nor do Miller, Zuber, or the precedents on which they rely suggest a
    constitutional right for an adult defendant to introduce evidence of scientific
    studies of brain development to negate mens rea. Those precedents concern
    sentencing, in particular life sentences and their equivalent, which defendant is
    not serving, and not proofs relating to the elements of the crimes charged.
    A-4942-18T2
    9
    Finally, as the trial court noted, defendant had an opportunity at trial to
    present evidence that he did not form the requisite mens rea for first-degree
    murder. The jury found otherwise. He has made no convincing argument that
    the verdict would have been different had he presented scientific evidence of the
    type he describes in general terms as warranting a new trial.
    Affirmed.
    A-4942-18T2
    10
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-4942-18T2

Filed Date: 2/4/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 2/4/2021