NAFIS KEDAR VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS) ( 2020 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-4045-18T1
    NAFIS KEDAR,
    Appellant,
    v.
    NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT
    OF CORRECTIONS,
    Respondent.
    ___________________________
    Submitted June 4, 2020 – Decided June 18, 2020
    Before Judges Alvarez and Suter.
    On appeal from the New Jersey Department of
    Corrections.
    Nafis Kedar, appellant pro se.
    Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
    respondent (Jane C. Shuster, Assistant Attorney
    General, of counsel; Kimberly Gail Williams,
    Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Nafis Kedar, an inmate at Northern State Prison, appeals from an April
    11, 2019 Department of Corrections (DOC) final administrative decision
    adjudicating him guilty of prohibited act *.252, encouraging others to riot;
    *.306, conduct disrupting or interfering with the security or orderly running of
    the correctional facility; and *.256, refusing to obey an order of any staff
    member, all in violation of N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a). We affirm, concluding that
    Kedar's arguments on appeal are so lacking in merit as to not warrant discussion
    in a written decision. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
    Kedar was present, along with others, when an inmate assaulted an officer
    on April 8, 2019. That officer called out for everyone to lie down on the floor.
    Kedar, along with at least one other inmate, remained on his feet, yelling.
    The incident was captured on film, and reviewed the following day by two other
    prison officers. Kedar was served with disciplinary charges the following day.
    He was assigned counsel substitute.
    "A finding of guilt at a disciplinary hearing shall be based upon substantial
    evidence that the inmate has committed a prohibited act." N.J.A.C. 10A:4-
    9.15(a). "Substantial evidence" is "such evidence as a reasonable mind might
    accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corrs.,
    
    414 N.J. Super. 186
    , 192 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas
    A-4045-18T1
    2
    Co., 
    35 N.J. 358
    , 376 (1961)). Such evidence must furnish a reasonable basis
    for the agency's action. 
    Ibid.
     (quoting McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 
    347 N.J. Super. 544
    , 562 (App. Div. 2002)).
    Furthermore, an inmate is not entitled to the full panoply of rights in a
    disciplinary proceeding ordinarily extended to a defendant in a criminal
    prosecution. Avant v. Clifford, 
    67 N.J. 496
    , 522 (1975). Prisoners are entitled
    to written notice of the charges at least twenty-four hours prior to the hearing;
    an impartial tribunal; a limited right to call witnesses and present documentary
    evidence; a limited right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses; a
    right to a written statement of the evidence relied upon and reasons for the
    sanctions imposed; and, where the charges are complex, the assistance of a
    counsel substitute. 
    Id. at 525-33
    ; accord Jacobs v. Stevens, 
    139 N.J. 212
     (1995);
    McDonald v. Pinchak, 
    139 N.J. 188
     (1995).
    We do not address the merits of Kedar's first two points of error because
    they simply express his disagreement with the conclusion the hearing officer
    and the prison administrator reached after reviewing the evidence.           That
    evidence included a video. Kedar was afforded the opportunity to refute the
    evidence; whatever the reason, he chose not to do so. Thus, the finding of guilt,
    A-4045-18T1
    3
    given the unrefuted report of the officer present and the video of the incident
    was based upon substantial evidence.
    Kedar's third point is that sanctions he received involved "more time" than
    the sanctions imposed on others involved in the incident. As to that claim,
    nothing in the record supports this new ground for appeal.
    Affirmed.
    A-4045-18T1
    4