R.T. VS. Z.S. (FV-12-0199-19, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2020 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3738-18T3
R.T.,1
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Z.S.,
Defendant-Respondent.
________________________
Argued February 12, 2020 – Decided June 23, 2020
Before Judges Fuentes, Haas and Mayer.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County,
Docket No. FV-12-0199-19.
Adam G. Rosenberg argued the cause for appellant.
Charly Gayden argued the cause for respondent (Reid
Weinman, attorney; Reid Weinman, of counsel; Charly
Gayden, on the brief).
1
We refer to the parties by initials to protect their privacy. R. 1:38-3(d)(10).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff R.T. appeals from the order of the Family Part that granted
defendant S.Z.'s motion for an award of counsel fees pursuant to Rule 5:3-5,
following the court's decision to deny plaintiff a final restraining order (FRO)
against defendant under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA),
N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. We reverse.
The parties dated for five years. During the last two years of their
relationship, both parties filed multiple complaints alleging acts of domestic
violence against each other, many of which were found to be meritless and
dismissed. On July 24, 2018, plaintiff filed his fourth domestic violence
complaint against defendant alleging three predicate acts under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-
19, to wit: harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4; stalking, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10; and
criminal mischief, N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3. Plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining
order (TRO) against defendant, with a return date of September 11, 2018 for the
FRO hearing.
After considering the testimony from both parties and defendant's
witnesses, the Family Part judge issued an oral decision in which he dismissed
plaintiff's complaint and vacated the TRO against defendant as a matter of
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credibility. In the judge's own words: "frankly . . . I don't find [plaintiff] to be
credible."
On October 24, 2018, defendant's counsel filed a certification in support
of an application for attorney's fees pursuant to Rule 5:3-5. In an order dated
November 16, 2018, the Family Part judge awarded defendant $2800 in counsel
fees without opposition from plaintiff. It is uncontested, however, that
defendant's counsel inadvertently failed to serve plaintiff's counsel with the
motion papers. Once he received the court's order awarding counsel fees,
plaintiff's counsel immediately moved for reconsideration.
The matter came for oral argument before the Family Part judge on
February 13, 2019. After some initial discussions, the judge asked plaintiff's
counsel whether it was his position that a "defendant in a domestic violence
matter, if successful, [could] never be awarded attorney's fees." In response,
plaintiff's counsel stated that a defendant who prevails in a PDVA case can only
be awarded counsel fees if the court finds the complaint was frivolous or was
brought in bad faith under N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1. Plaintiff's counsel further
emphasized that the PDVA authorized a court to grant counsel fees only to the
plaintiff as part of compensatory damages.
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The judge rejected this argument outright and stated: "I disagree with you
that it has to be frivolous litigation for attorney's fees to be awarded. That's
where we part ways . . . you may have to go to the Appellate Division; I don't
agree with you." The judge thereafter provided the following explanation for
granting defendant's application for an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Rule
5:3-5:
The [c]ourt can award attorney's fees and . . . [under]
Rule 5:3-5. There it says under subsection (c), an
award of attorney's fees is subject to provisions of Rule
4:42-9(b), (c), and (d). In the discretion of the [c]ourt,
the [c]ourt may make . . . allowances for attorney's fees.
It says . . . on final determination . . . the [c]ourt finds
that it would be deemed just in any successful -- party
that is successful in an action. It can be in a claim for
divorce, dissolution of a civil union, termination of
domestic partnership.
It goes on and then it has a catchall, and any other
claims relating to family type matters, which is the
catchall. It gives the [c]ourt the right to – to award
attorney's fees. The problem with the only application
is that there's no applications of services. In this case
the [c]ourt notes that the parties have been in court
multiple times.
And the [c]ourt finds that at the time – at the hearing
the [c]ourt finds that . . . the plaintiff was not credible.
And counsel wants to argue that he brought the claim
in good faith. The [c]ourt, trying to preserve some level
of decorum if you will, did not outright call the plaintiff
a liar, but I found that he lacked credibility. And if you
were to take that argument further, the [c]ourt would
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find that it was brought in bad faith. The [c]ourt notes
that these parties go back to 2015. And there had been
complaints filed by both parties.
But here the [c]ourt finds more importantly that the
discussions of settlements and good faith and all of that
is of no consequence. The rule simply says that in the
[c]ourt's discretion, if the [c]ourt deems it to be just,
that attorney's fees can be awarded. I find that to be the
case.
Twenty-five years ago in M.W. v. R.L., 286 N.J. Super. 408 (1995), this
court was asked to decide, as a matter of first impression, whether a prevailing
defendant in an action filed by a plaintiff under the PDVA could recover counsel
fees. Writing for the court, then Judge Long 2 explained why an award of counsel
fees to a defendant in this context would directly undermine the public policy
underpinning the PDVA:
In our view, even if a domestic violence complaint
could be conceived of as a family type matter for
purposes of [Rule] 4:42-9, the rule cannot be invoked
to award counsel fees to a prevailing non-victim in a
domestic violence case. Otherwise, the chilling effect
the Legislature tried to avoid by limiting the award of
fees to victims under the Domestic Violence Act would
certainly result. By invoking [Rule] 4:42-9(a)(1), a
prevailing non-victim would, in effect, succeed in
obtaining by indirection a benefit intentionally made
2
Justice Virginia Long served on the Appellate Division from 1984 until 1999,
when she was appointed by Governor Christine Wittman to serve as an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court. Justice Long retired from the Court in 2012.
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unavailable under the Domestic Violence Act. This
cannot be countenanced.
[Id. at 411.]
Thus, the Legislature expressly provided counsel fees under the PDVA as
part of a list of compensatory damages imposed on defendants to compensate
victims of domestic violence:
An order requiring the defendant to pay to the victim
monetary compensation for losses suffered as a direct
result of the act of domestic violence. The order may
require the defendant to pay the victim directly, to
reimburse the Victims of Crime Compensation Office
for any and all compensation paid by the Victims of
Crime Compensation Office directly to or on behalf of
the victim, and may require that the defendant
reimburse any parties that may have compensated the
victim, as the court may determine. Compensatory
losses shall include, but not be limited to, loss of
earnings or other support, including child or spousal
support, out-of-pocket losses for injuries sustained,
cost of repair or replacement of real or personal
property damaged or destroyed or taken by the
defendant, cost of counseling for the victim, moving or
other travel expenses, reasonable attorney's fees, court
costs, and compensation for pain and suffering. Where
appropriate, punitive damages may be awarded in
addition to compensatory damages.
[N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29b(4) (emphasis added).]
Against this backdrop, Judge Long explained in M.W. that when "a party
files a domestic violence complaint in bad faith, based on his or her own perjured
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testimony or suborned perjured testimony, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1 permits the
award of counsel fees in order to punish the filing party and deter the improper
conduct of litigation in the future." 286 N.J. Super. at 412 (emphasis added).
Here, although the Family Part judge did not find plaintiff's testimony credible,
he did not find plaintiff filed this domestic violence complaint in bad faith or
presented perjured testimony within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:28-1.
The "American Rule" provides that "the prevailing litigant is ordinarily
not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys' fee from the loser." Redine v.
Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 321 (1995) (quoting Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975)). "Although New Jersey
generally disfavors the shifting of attorneys' fees, a prevailing party can recover
those fees if they are expressly provided for by statute, court rule, or contract."
Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427, 440 (2001) (internal
citations omitted) (emphasis added).
New Jersey's frivolous litigation statute "has been recognized as serving
a dual purpose." Tolls Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of W. Windsor, 190 N.J. 61, 67
(2007). "On the one hand, 'the statute serves a punitive purpose, seeking to deter
frivolous litigation.' On the other hand, the statute serves a compensatory
purpose, seeking to reimburse 'the party that has been victimized by the party
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bringing the frivolous litigation.'" Ibid. (quoting Deutch & Shur, P.C. v. Roth,
248 N.J. Super. 133, 141 (App. Div. 1995)).
N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1a(1) authorizes an award of attorneys' fees if the judge
finds that "a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim or defense of the
nonprevailing person was frivolous." In making such a finding, the trial court
must determine whether:
(1) The complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim or
defense was commenced, used or continued in bad
faith, solely for the purpose of harassment, delay or
malicious injury; or
(2) The nonprevailing party knew, or should have
known, that the complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim or
defense was without any reasonable basis in law or
equity and could not be supported by a good faith
argument for an extension, modification or reversal of
existing law.
[N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1b(1) to -59.1b(2).]
Rule 1:4-8(f) provides "[t]o the extent practicable, the procedures
prescribed by this rule shall apply to the assertion of costs and fees against a
party other than a pro se party pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1." In Bove v.
AkPharma Inc., we held:
Strict compliance with each procedural requirement of
Rule 1:4-8 is "a prerequisite to recovery[,]" and failure
to conform to the rule's procedural requirements will
result in a denial of the request for an attorney's fees
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sanction. [State v. Franklin Sav. Account No. 2067, 389
N.J. Super. 272, 281 (App. Div. 2006).] For example, a
frivolous litigation motion must be filed "no later than
[twenty] days following the entry of final judgment."
R. 1:4-8(b)(2). Also, subsection (b)(1) of Rule 1:4-8
requires a party seeking frivolous litigation sanctions to
"file a separate motion [for the sanction] describing the
specific conduct alleged to be a violation of the Rule."
Toll Bros., 190 N.J. at 69. Prior to filing such a motion,
the litigant seeking the sanction must "serve a written
notice and demand on the attorney or pro se party,
which must include a request that the allegedly
frivolous paper [or pleading] be withdrawn." Ibid. This
notice is generally referred to as a "safe harbor" notice.
Ibid. The notice must "set [] forth 'with specificity' the
basis for his or her belief that the pleading is frivolous.
The notice must be sufficiently specific and detailed to
provide an opportunity to 'withdraw the assertedly
offending pleadings.'" Ferolito v. Park Hill Ass'n, 408
N.J. Super. 401, 408 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting Trocki
Plastic Surgery Ctr. v. Bartkowski, 344 N.J. Super. 399,
406 (App. Div. 2001)). See R. 1:4-8(b)(1)(i)-(ii).
[460 N.J. Super. 123, 149-50 (App. Div. 2019)
(alterations in original) (emphasis added).]
Our Supreme Court has explained the importance of these procedural
requirements:
Although the notice requirement may have a limiting
impact on the compensation that one may receive for
costs and fees, the public policies underlying N.J.S.A.
2A:15-59.1 militate in favor of requiring that claims
against parties meet the Rule's procedural requirements
to the fullest extent possible. By insisting on
compliance as soon as practicable, the salutary benefits
of adhering to the notice requirement will more
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promptly rid the judicial forum of frivolous litigation
behavior and will concomitantly provide
reimbursement for the fees and costs actually
attributable to an adversary's uncorrected offending
conduct.
[Tolls Bros., 190 N.J. at 72 (emphasis added).]
Although the Family Part judge invoked Rule 5:3-5(c) for his authority to
grant defendant's motion for an award of attorney's fees, his decision was
premised on the alleged frivolous nature of plaintiff's domestic violence claims.
However, the record does not contain any evidence of defendant's attempt to
comply with the procedural requirements of Rule 1:4-8. While defense counsel
represented orally that he served plaintiff's counsel with a letter indicating that
he would pursue attorney's fees, there was no separate formal motion filed as
required by Rule 1:4-8(b)(1). Without the letter in the appellate record, there is
no way to determine whether defendant made a good faith attempt to comply
with the "safe-harbor" provisions of Rule 1:4-8(b)(1). Finally, defendant filed
this application for counsel fees forty-three days after the entry of final
judgment, well beyond the twenty-day timeframe set out in Rule 1:4-8(b)(2).
In short, the Family Part judge's decision does not reflect an appreciation
for these substantive and procedural requirements and is utterly irreconcilable
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with a dispositive, precedential opinion from this court published a quarter
century ago.
Reversed.
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