STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. WILLIE MOORE (17-05-1345 AND 19-10-3056, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3222-19T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
WILLIE MOORE,
Defendant-Respondent.
Argued telephonically June 2, 2020 –
Decided June 25, 2020
Before Judges Accurso, Gilson and Rose.
On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior
Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County,
Indictment Nos. 17-05-1345 and 19-10-3056.
Matthew E. Hanley, Special Deputy Attorney
General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause
for appellant (Theodore N. Stephens II, Acting Essex
County Prosecutor, attorney; Matthew E. Hanley, of
counsel and on the brief).
John Walter Douard, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Joseph E.
Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; John Walter
Douard, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
By leave granted on the eve of trial, the State appeals two pretrial Law
Division orders: (1) granting defendant's motion in limine to bar "evidence from
a previous case" under N.J.R.E. 405(a); and (2) reversing a prior order that
granted the State's motion to join two indictments. We affirm the trial court's
first order for reasons other than those expressed by the trial court, see State v.
Heisler, 422 N.J. Super. 399, 416 (App. Div. 2011), and reverse the second
order, thereby joining the indictments at issue.
The orders under review involve the interplay of multiple offenses
charged against defendant in three separate indictments. We summarize the
procedural history and key facts, which are largely undisputed for purposes of
the present appeal. 1
I.
A. The 2014 charges
1
Because the State did not provide transcripts of the trials referenced in its
merits brief, we rely instead on the parties' summaries of those proceedings and
the documents contained in the parties' appendices on appeal.
A-3222-19T1
2
In 2014, defendant and his girlfriend, Kareemah Walker, were indicted for
weapons and receiving stolen property offenses, emanating from the seizure of
a handgun from a compartment hidden in the dashboard of a Honda Accord. The
car was registered to Walker but driven by defendant; they were found not guilty
of both charges after trial.
B. The 2017 charges
In 2017, defendant was charged in a multiple-count indictment with,
among other crimes, weapons and drug offenses. The charges in that matter
partially arose from evidence seized after police executed search warrants on
defendant's home, business, and Mercedes Benz. But the issue on this appeal
concerns contraband recovered from a Cadillac owned by defendant and
registered to Walker. After defendant and Walker gave police consent to search
the Cadillac, police seized a stolen handgun and prescription drugs from "an
electronic secret compartment" that was "attached to [the] front passenger seat"
of the Cadillac.
In September 2019, prior to trial on the 2017 charges, another court
granted the State's motion to admit evidence of the hidden compartment
A-3222-19T1
3
contained in the Honda under N.J.R.E. 404(b). 2 At trial, the State apparently
presented testimony of an officer involved in defendant's 2014 arrest, who
"testified about the trap in the car and defendant's behavior related to the trap,
specifically that [d]efendant was banging on the console of the car as the officers
approached the car." The officer also told the jury "a stolen gun and some
prescription bottles were found in the [Honda's] trap."
C. The 2019 charge
The alleged witness tampering offense occurred during a lunch break in
the trial on the 2017 charges, after the trial court had ordered defendant to refrain
from any contact with the State's witnesses. After the break, a State's witness
testified3 that defendant – whom she had known since 2014 – approached her in
the cafeteria, inquiring why she was present in the courthouse. The witness told
defendant "she was there to testify in his trial." Defendant responded: "You
ain't got to be here. Go home." But the witness told defendant "she was staying
to avoid arrest."
2
The State provided the court's order granting the State's motion, but did not
provide the transcript of the court's oral decision. Apparently, the trial on the
2017 charges was before the same judge that issued the orders on appeal,
although another judge decided the Rule 404(b) motion.
3
It is unclear from the record whether the witness testified about her encounter
with defendant at trial or during an N.J.R.E. 104 hearing.
A-3222-19T1
4
The jury convicted defendant of possession of hollow point bullets and
several drug charges; acquitted defendant of drug distribution; and failed to
reach a verdict on the weapons offenses, receiving stolen property, tampering
with evidence, and maintaining fortified premises. The following month, the
grand jury returned a separate indictment, charging defendant with witness
tampering related to his encounter with the State's witness during the trial on the
2017 charges.
II.
A. The order precluding evidence of the Honda's hidden compartment
Prior to the presently pending retrial, the court granted defendant's motion
to preclude the State from introducing in its case-in-chief evidence of the
Honda's hidden compartment under N.J.R.E. 405(a). In a written statement of
reasons accompanying its amended order, the court recognized the State again
intended to elicit testimony from the officer who had arrested defendant in the
2014 matter "to testify about the trap in the [Honda] and [d]efendant's conduct
pertaining to the trap." (Emphasis added).
Analyzing the proffered evidence under N.J.R.E. 405(a), the court framed
the State's position as seeking "to show a character trait of [d]efendant to use
traps in cars to hide weapons" because "that alleged character trait is relevant to
A-3222-19T1
5
[d]efendant's conduct in the instant case – that he used a trap in the Cadillac to
hide a stolen gun." Reasoning that defendant was acquitted of the 2014 charges,
the judge concluded evidence of his conduct during that arrest "cannot be used
in the instant case as evidence of [d]efendant's character trait pursuant to
N.J.R.E. 405(a)." The trial court stayed the retrial pending appeal.
On appeal, the State argues the trial court erred by precluding evidence of
"the existence of [the Honda's] secret compartment" under N.J.R.E. 405(a)
because the State does not seek to admit that evidence to prove defendant's
character. The State maintains the proffered evidence is admissible under
N.J.R.E. 404(b), pursuant to the test enunciated by our Supreme Court in State
v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328 (1992).
We agree with the State that the trial court erred by analyzing evidence of
the Honda's hidden compartment under N.J.R.E. 405(a) and failing to conduct a
Cofield analysis under N.J.R.E. 404(b). Accordingly, our review is de novo.
State v. Green, 236 N.J. 71, 81 (2018) (recognizing appellate courts owe no
deference to the trial court's evidentiary ruling when it "should have, but did not
perform a Cofield analysis").4
4
Although the State did not provide the first trial court's order and decision
admitting evidence of the Honda's hidden compartment in the first trial, that
A-3222-19T1
6
We briefly address the inapplicability of N.J.R.E. 405(a), which states that
a witness's character trait, including for truthfulness, cannot be proven by
specific instances of conduct other than prior convictions. State v. Parker, 216
N.J. 408, 418 (2014) (citing State v. Spivey, 179 N.J. 229, 242-43 (2004)). In
this case, the existence of the Honda's hidden compartment and its contraband
does not fall into the category of a specific instance of conduct and, as such,
Rule 405(a) is not applicable.
In fairness to the trial court, however, the State apparently argued that it
seeks to elicit testimony in the present retrial from the arresting officer in the
2014 matter – as it did in the trial on the 2017 charges – that defendant banged
on the dashboard of the Honda when police stopped that car and discovered a
stolen handgun and drugs in its hidden compartment. In its merits brief on
appeal, however, the State argues the existence of the Honda's hidden
compartment is relevant to defendant's "knowledge of the use of secret
compartments in cars used to conceal weapons and drugs"; it does not mention
decision neither binds the present trial court nor us in deciding whether the
evidence is admissible in the present trial. See State v. Reldan, 100 N.J. 187,
205 (1987) (recognizing the law of the case doctrine "as it is applied to rules or
orders of an interlocutory nature is itself discretionary" and "should be applied
flexibly to serve the interests of justice").
A-3222-19T1
7
defendant's conduct during the 2014 arrest. And at oral argument before us, the
State wavered, initially stating it seeks to admit evidence of the handgun and
drugs seized from the Honda; then claiming it only seeks to admit evidence of
the Honda's compartment. Although defense counsel counters the mere
existence of a hidden compartment within a vehicle is not a crime, the existence
of the compartment may be considered a "wrong" or "act" when it is utilized to
conceal contraband, warranting analysis under N.J.R.E. 404(b).
Generally, evidence of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" is not admissible,
unless used for "proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident when such matters are
relevant to a material issue in dispute." N.J.R.E. 404(b). Accordingly, the rule
is one of "exclusion rather than a rule of inclusion." State v. J.M., 225 N.J. 146,
161 (2016) (quoting State v. Willis, 225 N.J. 85, 100 (2016)). Courts must
therefore exercise caution when deciding whether to admit such evidence
because it "has a unique tendency to prejudice a jury." Willis, 225 N.J. at 97
(internal quotation marks omitted).
In particular, evidence admitted under Rule 404(b) "has the effect of
suggesting to a jury that a defendant has a propensity to commit crimes, and
therefore, that it is 'more probable that he committed the crime for which he is
A-3222-19T1
8
on trial.'" J.M., 225 N.J. at 158 (quoting Willis, 225 N.J. at 97) (citation
omitted). Ultimately, if the party seeking to admit the evidence "demonstrate[s]
the necessity of the other-crime evidence to prove a genuine fact in issue and
the court has carefully balanced the probative value of the evidence against the
possible undue prejudice it may create, the court must instruct the jury on the
limited use of the evidence." Cofield, 127 N.J. at 340-41.
In Cofield, the Court articulated a four-pronged test for the admission of
evidence under Rule 404(b):
1. The evidence of the other crime must be admissible
as relevant to a material issue;
2. It must be similar in kind and reasonably close in
time to the offense charged;
3. The evidence of the other crime must be clear and
convincing; and
4. The probative value of the evidence must not be
outweighed by its apparent prejudice.
[Id. at 338 (citation omitted).]
Turning to the first Cofield factor, it is well-settled that "evidence of the
prior bad act, crime or wrong [must] be relevant to a material issue that is
genuinely disputed." J.M., 225 N.J. at 160 (quoting State v. Covell, 157 N.J.
554, 564-65 (1999)). Put another way, "to be relevant, the other-crimes
A-3222-19T1
9
evidence must bear on a subject that is at issue at the trial, for example, an
element of the offense or some other factor such as motive, opportunity, intent,
or plan." State v. P.S., 202 N.J. 232, 255 (2010).
In this case, the State must prove defendant knowingly possessed the
handgun and contraband seized from the Cadillac. See N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b);
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a). In that regard, knowledge of the handgun and drugs is a
material element of both charges. Knowledge of the hidden compartment in the
former vehicle tends to prove knowledge of a hidden compartment in another
vehicle where, as here, defendant allegedly exercised control over both cars.
Although it is unclear from the record whether defendant disputes knowledge of
the Cadillac's hidden compartment in the present matter, the State must
nonetheless establish he knowingly possessed the handgun and drugs concealed
in that compartment. We conclude the existence of the Honda's hidden
compartment and its contents is relevant to defendant's knowledge of the
Cadillac's hidden compartment and its contents. See P.S., 202 N.J. at 255.
Accordingly, the State has established the first Cofield prong.
As to the second prong, the compartments in the Honda and Cadillac were
similarly covert, and three intervening years between defendant's possession of
two vehicles with those compartments meets the temporal requirement under the
A-3222-19T1
10
second Cofield prong. See State v. Williams, 190 N.J. 114, 131 (2007)
(observing the second Cofield prong is not explicitly stated in the rule and, as
such, that prong "need not receive universal application in Rule 404(b)
disputes").
We also agree that clear and convincing evidence established the existence
of the Honda's hidden compartment, even though defendant was acquitted of the
crimes of possessing the handgun and drugs allegedly found in its compartment.
Accordingly, the State has satisfied the third Cofield prong. See J.M., 225 N.J.
at 162-63 (observing "an acquittal will not always vitiate the 'clear and
convincing evidence requirement' especially when the State is not seeking to
prove that a defendant actually committed the prior crime").
Turning to the fourth prong, the inquiry is "distinct from the familiar
balancing required under N.J.R.E. 403[,]" which requires courts to consider
whether the probative value of the evidence sought to be admitted is
"substantially outweighed" by its potential for undue prejudice. Green, 236 N.J.
at 83-84. Instead, under N.J.R.E. 404(b), the court need only determine whether
"the probative value of such evidence is outweighed by [that] potential." Id. at
83.
A-3222-19T1
11
In its merits brief, the State argues the probative value of the evidence
outweighs its prejudice because hidden compartments in automobiles "are
extremely rare" and that evidence shows defendant "had knowledge of the
compartment and the gun in the compartment" of the Cadillac because
"defendant was twice tied to cars with such compartments." (Emphasis added) .
The State maintains any prejudice can be offset by a limiting instruction. See
Cofield, 127 N.J. at 340-41. We disagree.
Evidence of prior bad acts is not admissible to prove a criminal defendant
had a propensity to engage in criminal activity or acted in conformity with prior
criminal activity. Willis, 225 N.J. at 97. The concern in admitting evidence of
prior bad acts is that "the jury may convict the defendant because he is a bad
person in general." Cofield, 127 N.J. at 336 (1992) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Such evidence must be admitted with caution because
it "'has a unique tendency' to prejudice a jury," J.M., 225 N.J. at 158 (quoting
Willis, 225 N.J. at 97).
To the extent the State seeks to introduce evidence of the Honda's hidden
compartment and its contraband, we conclude the prejudicial value outweighs
its probative value. That contraband tends to show defendant has the propensity
to engage in criminal activity even though defendant was acquitted of the
A-3222-19T1
12
weapons and drug offense arising from his 2014 arrest. Accordingly, the State
has not met the fourth Cofield prong, and evidence of the Honda's hidden
compartment containing the handgun and drugs is not admissible in the State's
case-in-chief.
Defendant's knowledge of the Honda's secret compartment, however,
could be placed squarely at issue if defendant testifies and denies knowledge of
the Cadillac's hidden compartment. See State v. Prall, 231 N.J. 567, 582-83
(2018) (applying the Cofield analysis where defendant's testimony "open[ed] the
door" to otherwise inadmissible other crimes evidence). Under that limited
circumstance, evidence of the mere existence of the Honda's hidden
compartment is not outweighed by its prejudice because the jury will not learn
that the Honda's compartment contained contraband – or that defendant banged
on the dashboard when officers stopped the car.
Accordingly, if defendant testifies and denies knowledge of the existence
of the Cadillac's hidden compartment, the State may introduce evidence through
cross-examination of defendant or rebuttal testimony, limited to the existence of
the Honda's hidden compartment. The State may not inquire about defendant's
2014 arrest or his conduct when the car was stopped by police. In such event,
the trial court then must issue a limiting instruction when the evidence of the
A-3222-19T1
13
Honda's hidden compartment is introduced at the retrial and again during its
final charge. See Williams, 190 N.J. at 133-34; Model Jury Charges (Criminal),
"Proof of Other Crimes, Wrong, or Acts (N.J.R.E. 404(b))" (rev. Sept. 12, 2016),
n.1.
B. The order denying joinder of the 2017 and 2019 charges
Prior to trial, the court granted the State's motion to join the remaining
charges of the 2017 indictment with the 2019 indictment, charging witness
tampering that occurred during trial of the 2017 charges. 5 The trial court
initially determined joinder appropriate, finding the witness tampering offense
arose during the trial of the 2017 charges and involves two of the same
witnesses.
Recognizing that in the absence of joinder, the State nonetheless "would
be inclined to introduce testimony and evidence about the [witness tampering]
incident" to show defendant's consciousness of guilt the court concluded joinder
was proper "for the purposes of judicial efficiency." The court specifically
determined defendant would not be prejudiced by evidence of the witness
tampering charge in the retrial of the weapons and drug offenses because it "was
5
Following oral argument before us, the State provided the transcript of the
court's decision granting joinder, at our request.
A-3222-19T1
14
likely the testimony and evidence would come in anyway" in the event the
offenses were severed.
Following the court's oral decision, defense counsel raised concerns about
the court's joinder decision, claiming joinder would present "some sort of
apparent conflict" because the court would become "both the judge and . . . a
potential witness." Deeming counsel's application a reconsideration motion, the
court thereafter reversed its previous order. The court expressed concerns of "a
conflict of interest potentially or an appearance of impropriety" because it had
issued the instructions to defendant in the trial on the 2017 charges that provided
the foundation for the witness tampering charge. The court indicated it would
preside over the retrial of the 2017 offenses, and the witness tampering charge
would be tried before another court.
The trial court's decision to join offenses is discretionary and "entitled to
great deference on appeal." See State v. Brown, 118 N.J. 595, 603 (1990). We
will, however, reverse that decision, "if it constitutes an abuse of discretion."
State v. Weaver, 219 N.J. 131, 149 (2014).
Our Supreme Court has long recognized joinder of "similar or related
offenses" generally is preferred "[i]n the interests of [judicial] economy and
efficiency." State v. Coleman, 46 N.J. 16, 24 (1966). Indeed, "if separate
A-3222-19T1
15
offenses were required to be tried separately in all circumstances, the
multiplicity of trials would disserve the State and defendants alike." State v.
Manney, 26 N.J. 362, 366 (1958).
A trial court may order discretionary joinder of two or more indictments
for trial "if the offenses and the defendants . . . could have been joined in a single
indictment . . . ." R. 3:15-1(a). Two or more offenses may be joined in a single
indictment "if the offenses charged are of the same or similar character or are
based on the same act or transaction or on 2 or more acts or transactions
connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan." R. 3:7-
6. "Notwithstanding the preference for joinder, Rule 3:15-2(b) vests a trial court
with discretion to order separate trials if joinder would prejudice unfairly a
defendant." State v. Chenique-Puey, 145 N.J. 334, 341 (1996). The "defendant
bears the burden of demonstrating prejudice." State v. Lado, 275 N.J. Super.
140, 149 (App. Div. 1994).
In determining whether joinder is prejudicial, the critical inquiry is
"whether, assuming the charges were tried separately, evidence of the offenses
sought to be severed would be admissible under [N.J.R.E. 404(b)] in the trial of
the remaining charges." Chenique-Puey, 145 N.J. 334, 341 (alteration in
original) (quoting State v. Pitts, 116 N.J. 580, 601-02 (1989)). "If the evidence
A-3222-19T1
16
would be admissible at both trials, then the trial court may consolidate the
charges because 'a defendant will not suffer any more prejudice in a joint trial
than he would in separate trials.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Coruzzi, 189 N.J.
Super. 273, 299 (App. Div. 1983)).
The trial court initially ordered joinder of both indictments, correctly
recognizing the witness tampering charge was related to the 2017 indictment
and demonstrated defendant's consciousness of guilt. "Our courts have long
held that evidence of threats made by a defendant to induce a witness not to
testify is admissible because it illuminates the declarant's consciousness of
guilt." State v. Buhl, 269 N.J. Super. 344, 364 (App. Div. 1994); see also State
v. Goodman, 415 N.J. Super. 210, 232 (App. Div. 2010). Evidence that a
defendant instructed a witness not to testify is similarly admissible as
inconsistent with innocence. See Williams, 190 N.J. at 120, 129-30.
Nonetheless, if the indictments were tried separately, our courts have
repeatedly held that threats against a potential prosecution witness are not
subject to exclusion under N.J.R.E. 404(b) or its predecessor because they
manifest consciousness of guilt. See, e.g., State v. Yough, 208 N.J. 385, 402
n.9 (2011); State v. Hill, 47 N.J. 490, 500-01 (1966). As the trial court
recognized, the jury in the retrial would therefore hear testimony of defendant's
A-3222-19T1
17
alleged instructions to the witness during the lunch break to go home. If proven,
that testimony would be probative of his consciousness of guilt. Defendant's
"generalized concern about prejudice" cannot prevent joinder. State v. Handy,
215 N.J. 334, 354 (2013). The court should, however, issue the "multiple
charges" instruction as part of its final charge. Model Jury Charge (Criminal),
"Criminal Final Charge, Multiple Charges" (rev. May 12, 2014).
In our view, the trial court's initial decision joining the witness tampering
indictment with the remaining charges of the 2017 indictment was correct. The
court's reasons on reconsideration, reversing that decision, are based on its
perceived conflict and appearance of impropriety that can be resolved by
transferring the joined indictments to another judge for trial.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
A-3222-19T1
18