CHILDREN OF AMERICA, INC. VS. PAVILION PROPERTIES, LLC (L-1056-16, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2020 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-4610-17T1
    CHILDREN OF AMERICA, INC.,
    and CHILDREN OF AMERICA
    (PARSIPPANY), LLC,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    and
    VISITEL ENTERPRISES, CORP.,
    Plaintiff,
    v.
    PAVILION PROPERTIES, LLC,
    and MICHAEL PUSCHAK,
    Individually,
    Defendants-Respondents.
    _______________________________
    Submitted October 3, 2019 – Decided July 14, 2020
    Before Judges Alvarez and Nugent.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Morris County, Docket No. L-1056-16.
    Joseph V. Meyers, attorney for appellants.
    LaGrotta Law, LLC, attorneys for respondents (Robyne
    D. LaGrotta, of counsel and on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    This appeal is the latest phase of a longstanding dispute over the terms of
    a commercial lease. The tenant, Children of America (Parsippany), LLC, and
    its parent company, Children of America, Inc., (collectively "Children") appeal
    three orders, which granted the landlord, Pavilion Properties, LLC ("Pavilion"),
    the relief it sought in an order to show cause. Pavilion sought to compel
    Children to comply with a lease term and execute a tenant estoppel certificate
    for the lender with whom Pavilion was attempting to refinance the leased
    property.   Although the parties' previous appeal and cross-appeal from a
    judgment entered after a contentious bench trial involving different issues (the
    "first appeal") was pending in the Appellate Division when Pavilion filed the
    order to show cause, Pavilion filed the show-cause action in the Law Division
    under the same docket number, without a verified complaint.
    On appeal, Children present the following arguments:
    POINT [I]: The Lower Court Erred In Hearing This
    Order To Show Cause.
    POINT [II]: The Lower Court Erred in Ordering Tenant
    To Sign The Lender's Form of TEC.
    A-4610-17T1
    2
    POINT [III]: The Lower Court Erred in Awarding
    Damages.
    POINT [IV]: The Lower Court Erred in awarding
    Counsel Fees.
    POINT [V]: The Lower Court Erred in Ordering
    Appellant's Counsel to Rescind An
    Email and/or Documents.
    POINT [VI]: The Lower Court Erred in Ordering
    Tenant To Sign The TEC Without The
    Addendum.
    We dismiss the appeal for three reasons: Children have not made a proper
    legal argument on one of their points, most of the other points appear to be moot,
    and the one point that may not be moot involves an issue that was not finally
    decided and disposed of in the trial court, thus rendering the appeal
    interlocutory.
    Because we are writing this opinion primarily for the benefit of the parties,
    who are fully familiar with the facts, and because the facts are detailed in the
    first appeal, Children of Am. Inc. v. Pavilion Props., LLC, No. A-4967-16, (App.
    Div. Aug. 16, 2019), a short summary of the factual backdrop will suffice.
    Pavilion owns property in Parsippany on which it constructed the shell of an
    office building in 2005.
    Id. (slip op.
    at 2). In 2007, Pavilion and Children signed
    a lease. Pavilion was to provide a "turnkey" day care center, including a
    A-4610-17T1
    3
    playground, and obtain the certificate of occupancy. Children were to obtain
    the state and local approvals to operate the day care center.                   The
    "commencement date," which triggered Children's obligation to pay rent and
    other expenses, was contingent upon events that included an unconditional
    certificate of occupancy and all state and local approvals needed to operate a
    day care center on the site.
    Id.
    (slip op.
    at 3-4).
    Substantial delays in obtaining municipal approvals—more than four
    years—and the intervening enactment of the Site Remediation Reform Act (the
    "Act"), N.J.S.A. 58:10C-1 to -29, precipitated sharp disputes among the parties
    over the commencement date of the lease, compliance with the lease terms,
    responsibility for compliance with the Act, and responsibility for the cost of
    such compliance. The parties filed actions that were consolidated and tried
    during a three-day bench trial.
    Id. (slip op.
    at 10-13). The parties filed an appeal
    and cross-appeal following the trial court's entry of judgment.
    The parties engaged in additional motion practice in the trial court after
    the appeal and cross-appeal were filed. The first series of motions resulted in
    the trial court ordering Children to produce specified financial documents
    required by Pavilion's current or proposed lenders. While the first appeal was
    still pending, Pavilion filed the order to show cause at issue on this appeal.
    A-4610-17T1
    4
    Pavilion did not file a new complaint; rather, it filed the order to show cause
    under the same docket number as the action on appeal and supported it with its
    counsel's certification. Pavilion filed the order to show cause on April 23, 2018.
    Pavilion sought to have Children show cause why they should not be
    compelled to sign an Estoppel Certificate and Subordination, Non Disturbance
    and Attornment Agreement (the "Estoppel Documents"), pay legal fees, and face
    sanctions for defying the court's previous orders. Pavilion's counsel averred that
    she sent Children the Estoppel Documents, which the lease required them to
    sign. The lease provided:
    ESTOPPEL CERTIFICATION
    7.02 Tenant or Landlord, as the case may be,
    upon request and without charge, shall deliver a written
    instrument to Landlord or Tenant or to any other party
    designated by Landlord or Tenant, duly executed and
    acknowledged, certifying:
    (1) That this Lease is unmodified and in full force
    and effect, or if there has been any modification, stating
    such modification and stating that the same is in full
    force and effect, as modified;
    (2) Whether there are any then known defaults by
    Landlord or Tenant, as the case may be, hereunder or
    existing set-offs or defenses against the enforcement of
    any of the terms, agreements, covenants, conditions,
    and limitations of this Lease and any modification
    hereof and if so, specifying the same:
    A-4610-17T1
    5
    The dates to which all payments provided for
    hereunder have been paid; and
    Such other matters as may be reasonably
    requested by Landlord or Tenant of such other
    party designated by Landlord or Tenant.
    Pavilion's counsel certified that the holder of the first mortgage would charge an
    additional $25,568 if the loan were not paid off by the end of the month.
    Children would not sign the documents.         Rather, Children's attorney
    emailed Pavilion's counsel and informed her Children did not "want to sign the
    Estoppel Letter unless [Pavilion's principal] agrees to repay all the monies owed
    as per the appeal plus the $28,000 for signage which is approximately $300,000
    in total. This can be repaid by reducing the rent $5000 per month for the next
    [sixty] months. This is their offer."
    In response to the order to show cause, Children filed a certification of
    Children of America, Inc.'s founder, who averred he was also the majority owner
    of Children of America (Parsippany), LLC. Contradicting the previous email
    from his attorney, he explained Children could not sign the Estoppel Documents
    because "the terms contained therein [were] not 100% true and accurate." He
    contended there was no reference in the Estoppel Documents to the pending
    appeal or whether Pavilion was in default of any of its obligations.             He
    challenged the accuracy of the following provision of the Estoppel Documents:
    A-4610-17T1
    6
    That the Lease is not in default on the part of
    either the Landlord or the Tenant; that there are no
    circumstances existing which with notice and/or the
    passage of time would constitute a default by either
    Landlord or the Tenant thereunder; that the Lease is in
    full force and effect; that, as of the date hereof, the
    Tenant is entitled to no credit, offset or deduction in
    rent; and that there are no defenses, setoffs or
    counterclaims by the Tenant against the Landlord under
    the Lease other then [sic] a pending appeal under
    Docket No. A-004967-16T2.
    Children of America, Inc.'s founder further explained in his certification
    Pavilion was in default of the lease because it had not assumed responsibility,
    as allegedly required by DEP, to install monitoring devices and to continue to
    monitor the property for contamination. He averred the reference to the pending
    appeal was not in the original documents he had been asked to sign and the
    Estoppel Documents proposed by Pavilion charged Children with the
    affirmative obligation to notify the lender in the event of a default. This
    provision was not required by the lease and was unacceptable.            Last, he
    explained that in addition to these issues, "and because the landlord continues
    to be difficult with our organization, we are considering closing our doors at the
    end of this school year or in December 2018, unless we are able to prevail on
    the appeal and re-coup what we believe we are entitled to receive from the
    landlord."
    A-4610-17T1
    7
    The trial court entered the first of the orders Children challenge on appeal.
    The court ordered Children to sign and return the Estoppel Documents. The
    order provided in part:
    3.     If [Children] fail[] to comply with [this order],
    they shall be responsible for all costs and expenses of
    [the first mortgage holder] and [the second mortgage
    holder] incurred after April 30, 2018 until the loans are
    paid off due to the failure to provide [the Estoppel
    Documents] and to comply with prior orders of the
    Court; and
    ....
    5.    [Children] shall pay legal fees to [Pavilion's
    counsel] for the preparation of this Order to Show
    Cause and the court appearance today to be determined
    by certification to be submitted by [Pavilion's counsel.]
    Children signed the Estoppel Documents but attached an addendum,
    which stated:
    1.    Paragraph 4 of the [Estoppel Certificate] is
    amended to state that Landlord has failed to obtain a
    Remedial Action Protectiveness/Bienneial [sic]
    Certification from the DEP, which was due on June 11,
    2017 and is overdue. See copy of notice . . . attached
    hereto.
    2.     [Children] is in the process of assessing its
    viability as an entity and may close its doors on
    November 30, 2018 if the Parsippany, New Jersey
    center is unable to become profitable.
    A-4610-17T1
    8
    Pavilion reported the addendum to the court, and on April 30, 2018, three
    days after issuing the first order, the court issued a second order mandating
    Children "sign the [Estoppel Documents] as attached . . . without adding any
    addendum."     The court directed Children's counsel to "send an email to
    [Pavilion's counsel] no later than noon on May 1, 2018, stating that the
    addendum sent on Friday April 27, 2018 is rescinded." After the trial court
    denied Children's motion for reconsideration, Children appealed.
    On appeal, Children first argue the trial court should not have heard the
    order to show cause because the matter was on appeal. We reject Children's
    two-paragraph, conclusory argument, which is devoid of analysis and precedent.
    Parties to an appeal are required to make a proper argument, "[s]upporting [their]
    legal argument with appropriate record reference [and providing] the
    law." State v. Hild, 
    148 N.J. Super. 294
    , 296 (App. Div. 1977); see also
    Sackman v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 
    445 N.J. Super. 278
    , 297-98 (App. Div.
    2016). An argument based on conclusory statements is insufficient to warrant
    appellate review. Nextel of N.Y., Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 
    361 N.J. Super. 22
    ,
    45 (App. Div. 2003). Children's failure to provide any legal analysis is, without
    more, a sufficient reason for rejecting their argument.         Nonetheless, the
    argument's conclusory assertion is not necessarily correct.
    A-4610-17T1
    9
    Ordinarily, the filing of an appeal "divests the trial court or agency of
    jurisdiction to act in the matter under appeal, unless directed to do so by the
    appellate court." In re Petition of S. Jersey Gas Co., 
    447 N.J. Super. 459
    , 474
    (App. Div. 2016) (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan,
    
    140 N.J. 366
    , 376 (1995)). However, when a motion filed after the notice of
    appeal is "functionally equivalent to a new action" and that motion will not
    "affect, impair or destroy the subject matter of the appeal," the trial court may
    properly address the motion because it is "collateral to the issues pending on
    appeal." Van Horn v. Van Horn, 
    415 N.J. Super. 398
    , 410-11 (App. Div.
    2010). Here, Children acknowledge in their brief that the issues raised by the
    order to show cause constituted a "cause of action [that] was unrelated" to the
    issues on appeal. Consequently, it is difficult to discern the basis for Children's
    conclusory statement, "[t]he [trial] Court erred in hearing the Order to Show
    Cause which is the subject of this appeal."
    In their second, fifth and sixth arguments, Children contend the trial court
    erred by ordering them to sign the lender's form of Estoppel Documents, and by
    ordering their counsel to rescind the addendum and execute the Estoppel
    Documents without the addendum.
    A-4610-17T1
    10
    In its opposition brief, Pavilion represents that the lender who required
    the Estoppel Documents declined to refinance after receiving the addendum
    Children's counsel had prepared. Pavilion further represents that some months
    later, Pavilion found another lender who was willing to refinance. Due to this
    appeal, Pavilion did not pursue a separate action against Children for refusing
    to provide the Estoppel Documents as required by the lease. Pavilion intends to
    pursue that action once this appeal is final. For these reasons, Pavilion takes no
    position concerning Children's argument that the court erred in ordering its
    counsel to rescind the addendum. In view of Pavilion's refinancing with another
    lender, Pavilion considers the issue moot.
    Because Pavilion has obtained refinancing, it is no longer in need of
    Estoppel Documents from Children. Accordingly, we agree with Pavilion these
    issues are moot, at least with respect to the orders from which Children appealed.
    In any event, the appeal is interlocutory. In their third and fourth points,
    Children argue the court erred by awarding damages and counsel fees. As
    Pavilion correctly points out, the trial court did not award damages, nor did it
    enter any damage judgment against Children.
    Concerning attorney's fees, Children's discussion of fee shifting misses
    the mark. Here, the trial court announced that it would award fees, at least in
    A-4610-17T1
    11
    part, for Children's non-compliance with a previous court order. Courts are
    authorized to award fees for such non-compliance. R. 4:23-2(b).
    Significantly, the court did not enter an order of judgment against
    Children for counsel fees. Rather, it directed Pavilion's counsel to submit a
    certification. Pavilion's counsel had yet to do so when Children filed a notice
    of appeal. Thus, this appeal is interlocutory.
    It is settled that "[t]o be appealable without leave granted, the judgment
    or administrative determination must be final as to all parties and all issues." In
    re Donohue, 
    329 N.J. Super. 488
    , 494-95 (App. Div. 2000) (citing Stigliano v.
    St. Rose High School, 
    198 N.J. Super. 520
    , 523 n. 1 (App. Div. 1984)). An
    order "is not a final judgment appealable as of right [if] it does not include a
    final determination of [a party's] application for counsel fees and costs." Gen.
    Motors Corp. v. City of Linden, 
    279 N.J. Super. 449
    , 454 (App. Div. 1995),
    rev'd on other grounds, 
    143 N.J. 336
    (1996). Because Pavilion's attorney never
    submitted a certification, and because the court did not enter a final order as to
    the amount of the fees, all issues as to all parties had not been disposed of by
    the trial court. The appeal is interlocutory. Children should have filed a motion
    for leave to appeal or waited until the trial court entered a final order or judgment
    A-4610-17T1
    12
    as to counsel fees before filing a notice of appeal. In re Donohue, 329 N.J.
    Super. at 494.
    Appeal dismissed.
    A-4610-17T1
    13