LAWRENCE JUSTIN MILLS VS. STATE OF NEW JERSEY (L-2491-18, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5356-18T2
LAWRENCE JUSTIN MILLS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
DIVISION OF STATE POLICE
and DAVID ROBBINS,
Defendants-Respondents.
__________________________
Argued telephonically July 13, 2020 –
Decided August 3, 2020
Before Judges Suter and Natali.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Mercer County, Docket No. L-2491-18.
Donald M. Doherty, Jr. argued the cause for appellant.
Suzanne M. Davies, Deputy Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondents (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney
General, attorney; Raymond R. Chance, Assistant
Attorney General, of counsel; Suzanne M. Davies, on
the brief).
PER CURIAM
The sole issue in this appeal is the quantum of attorney's fees to which
plaintiff Lawrence Justin Mills is entitled as a result of his partial success in
obtaining a declaratory judgment requiring defendant, the New Jersey State
Police (NJSP), to produce certain documents related to his arrest under the Open
Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, and the common law right
of access. The trial court reduced plaintiff's fee request from $13,248 to $2376
and failed to award $362.95 in costs. We affirm the fee award but remand with
respect to plaintiff's request for costs as the court did not address the issue.
I.
According to the certification of defendant and NJSP custodian of records
Lieutenant David Robbins, plaintiff was arrested on November 2, 2017 for theft
by deception for allegedly "paying . . . individuals to open online internet
gaming accounts to receive . . . new account bonuses and using those . . .
bonuses to obtain $6000 to which he was not entitled." After the charges were
dismissed, plaintiff served the NJSP on October 2018 with a number of requests
under OPRA for records related to his arrest.
Robbins received plaintiff's requests and attested that because the charges
involved internet gaming fraud, a "highly complex and sensitive crime[,]" he
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was required to "extensive[ly] review . . . the records and coordinat[e] with
various law enforcement agencies." Robbins sought two-week extensions to
respond to plaintiff's requests on October 12 and 26, 2018. He sought yet
another extension on November 14, 2018 which plaintiff promptly denied in a
November 14 responsive email. In that communication, plaintiff advised
Robbins that he did not consent to any further extensions. Instead of responding
to the initial OPRA requests, or plaintiff's November 14, 2018 email, Robbins
instead sought another extension until December 12th. Three days later, on
December 3, 2018, plaintiff filed a verified complaint and order to show cause.
After defendants failed to appear at a December 20, 2018 scheduled
teleconference, the court issued an order that day rescheduling the conference
for January 7, 2019. On January 8, 2019, the court issued a case management
order directing defendants to respond to plaintiff's OPRA requests by January
11th and to address the bases for refusing to produce any document. It also
directed defendants to provide a privilege log and a copy of any withheld
document for in camera review.
On January 11, 2019, the NJSP denied plaintiff's requests, filed opposition
to the verified complaint, and provided the court with the entire investigation
file regarding plaintiff's arrest for in-camera review. The NJSP also claimed it
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did not have responsive records to certain of defendant's requests and denied
others relying on N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1, claiming a number of documents
constituted exempt criminal-investigatory, security, and surveillance records.
After plaintiff challenged defendants' response, the court heard oral
argument on February 5, 2019 and ordered defendants to produce a "Vaughn"1
index which defendants subsequently produced for the entire investigatory file.
In that index, defendants did not assert the criminal-investigatory exemption for
the complaint/summons, arrest report, affidavit of probable cause, or dismissal
documents. The NJSP asserts on appeal that it did not previously provide these
records to plaintiff as they were not specifically requested, and they were already
in his possession from the criminal proceedings.
On April 16, 2019, after considering the Vaughn index, the parties'
supplemental briefing and reviewing the documents in camera, the court issued
a comprehensive order that granted in part and denied in part plaintiff's requests.
1
"A Vaughn index is comprised of affidavits containing a 'relatively detailed'
justification for the claim of privilege being asserted for each document. The
judge analyzes the index to determine, on a document-by-document basis,
whether each such claim of privilege should be accepted or rejected." Paff v.
Div. of Law, 412 N.J. Super. 140, 161 n.9 (App. Div. 2010) (citing Vaughn v.
Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 826-27 (D.C. Cir. 1973)). The affidavits "ordinarily" omit
"excessive reference to the actual language of the document." Vaughn, 484 F.2d
at 826-27.
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The court concluded defendants correctly denied plaintiff's requests under
OPRA for "[computer aided dispatch (CAD)] reports, video footage of his
incarceration . . . , mug shots, and records of searches of his [i]Phone and
MacBook" because no such records existed. The court also found that the
remaining responsive records were properly denied under the criminal-
investigatory records exemption of OPRA, except for the
"[c]omplaint/[s]summons, [a]ffidavit of [p]robable [c]ause, [a]rrest [r]eport . . .
, and documents confirming the dismissal of the charges." Plaintiff's counsel
conceded that he had previously been provided the complaint, probable cause
affidavit, and the letter dismissing the charges, but claimed the two-page arrest
report was never produced.2 The court accordingly ordered the NJSP to provide
plaintiff with the arrest report.
2
In plaintiff's reply brief, he maintains he "did not have the records when the
decision was rendered" and "did not know [what] the records he would be getting
included . . . because [defendants] refused to tell him what was being withheld."
In its June 28, 2019 oral decision, however, the court stated that "[t]he
complaint/summons, and the affidavit of probable cause, and the dismissal
record, while they were public records under OPRA, . . . plaintiff conceded that
he was in possession of them." The court further noted in its April 16, 2019
order that "[c]ounsel for [plaintiff] agreed that the [c]omplaint/[s]ummons and
[a]ffidavit of [p]robable [c]ause had earlier been provided to [plaintiff], but
asserted at argument that the arrest report had not previously been provided." In
light of the court's comments and plaintiff's failure to include the February 5,
2019 oral argument transcript in the appendix, we find no record support for
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The court next considered plaintiff's requests under the common law right
of access and determined that plaintiff was entitled to an additional forty-six
pages of records, including certain gaming receipts, a redacted version of the
investigation report and statements from certain witnesses. The court denied
plaintiff's requests for approximately 120 pages of additional documents,
including surveillance footage from the Golden Nugget casino.
After the NJSP produced the ordered records, plaintiff filed an application
seeking $13,248 in attorney's fees and $362.95 in costs, which reflected
expenses related to filing fees for the complaint and order to show cause, copies,
and postage. As noted, the court granted plaintiff's application in part and
awarded a total of $2376 in counsel fees and did not address plaintiff's request
for costs.
The court determined that plaintiff was a partially prevailing party under
OPRA as defendant failed to produce plaintiff's arrest report, but was
unsuccessful as to the remaining records, including the complaint, probable
cause affidavit and dismissal documents, as those materials were already in his
possession. The court also concluded that although plaintiff was entitled to fees
plaintiff's claim. See Spinks v. Twp. of Clinton, 402 N.J. Super 465, 474-75
(App. Div. 2008) (It is plaintiff's "responsibility to refer us to specific parts of
the record to support their argument.").
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under OPRA as a partially successful litigant, his success in receiving
documents under the common law did not warrant the award of fees as there
"wasn't anything here to justify going outside of the American [R]ule to give a
counsel fee for a common law cause of action."
When determining the fee award, the court considered the Rules of
Professional Conduct (RPC) 1.5 factors and found the issues presented in the
verified complaint were not novel and the requisite time necessary to address
the issues was not extensive, particularly for plaintiff's counsel who was an
experienced OPRA attorney and whose brief contained "boilerplate" legal
arguments. The court also noted, however, that defendants failed to respond in
an appropriate and timely fashion to plaintiff's initial OPRA request, the initial
conference, and imposed numerous unilateral extensions. The court recognized
that plaintiff was successful in obtaining the arrest report and in compelling
production of the Vaughn index and ultimately concluded plaintiff's minimal
success under OPRA warranted a fee award of $2376, which represented 6.6
hours of work at the reasonable rate of $360 per hour.
In determining its fee award, the court declined to award fees related to
plaintiff's efforts to obtain documents under the common law right of access.
The court explained that the "the issue of counsel fees under the common law
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was not before the [Mason v. Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51 (2008)] court and was not
decided by the Supreme Court." The court concluded that while plaintiff's
counsel was entitled to counsel fees as plaintiff was a prevailing party under
OPRA, plaintiff's counsel was "not entitled to fees for the work that led to the
release of documents under the common law."
This appeal followed.
II.
On appeal, plaintiff raises two primary arguments. First, he contends that
although a 45% (16.6 hours) or 30% (11.1 hours) reduction would have been
"understandable[,]" the court's cutting 82% of his hours from 36.8 to 6.6
resulting in a reduction of his requested fee from $13,248 to $2376 was
"excessive." Second, plaintiff contends that the court erred in denying his
request for $362.95 in costs under Rule 4:42-8. We disagree that the court
abused its discretion in reducing plaintiff's fee request and remand for the court
to resolve in the first instance his request for costs.
Whether OPRA applies to a litigant's application for fees is a "legal
conclusion[] subject to [our] de novo review." Wronko v. N.J. Soc'y for
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 453 N.J. Super. 73, 79 (App. Div. 2018)
(citing O'Shea v. Twp. of W. Milford, 410 N.J. Super. 371, 379 (App. Div.
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2009)). If it does, we review awards of counsel fees for an abuse of discretion.
McGowan v. O'Rourke, 391 N.J. Super. 502, 508 (App. Div. 2007).
Determinations regarding counsel fees "will be disturbed only on the rarest of
occasions, and then only because of a clear abuse of discretion." Ibid. (quoting
Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427, 443-44 (2001)).
"Subject to certain categorical exceptions provided by statute or court
rule, New Jersey courts abide by the American [R]ule that all parties in civil
litigation pay their own legal fees. R. 4:42-9. The fee-shifting provision within
OPRA, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6, constitutes such an exception to the American
[R]ule." Smith v. Hudson County Register, 422 N.J. Super. 387, 393 (App. Div.
2011). Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6, an OPRA "requestor who prevails in any
proceeding shall be entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee" upon a determination
by the court that the "custodian [of the record] unjustifiably denied access to the
record in question[.]" New Jerseyans for a Death Penalty Moratorium v. N.J.
Dep't of Corr., 185 N.J. 137, 153 (2005); see also Wronko, 453 N.J. Super. at
82.
The purpose of the fee shifting provision of OPRA is to ensure "that
plaintiffs with bona fide claims are able to find lawyers to represent them[,] . . .
to attract competent counsel in cases involving an infringement of statutory
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rights[,] . . . and to ensure justice for all citizens." Coleman v. Fiore Bros., Inc.,
113 N.J. 594, 598 (1989). Our courts use the "catalyst theory" to determine
whether a plaintiff is a prevailing party in a litigation. A plaintiff must
demonstrate: "(1) 'a factual causal nexus between plaintiff's litigation and the
relief ultimately achieved'; and (2) 'that the relief ultimately secured by plaintiffs
had a basis in law.'" Mason, 196 N.J. at 76 (citing Singer v. State, 95 N.J. 487,
494 (1984)).
Applying these guiding principles, we conclude that the court correctly
determined defendant was a partially prevailing party under OPRA as he
obtained the arrest report which should not have been withheld. A clear factual
nexus existed between plaintiff's litigation and the production of the document.
Furthermore, there was a basis in law for the relief granted to defendant under
OPRA.
Turning to the judge's determination of the amount of counsel fees
awarded, we discern no abuse of discretion. In determining the amount of the
award, a court must calculate the "lodestar," which is the number of hours
reasonably expended by the successful party's counsel, multiplied by a
reasonable hourly rate. Litton Indus., Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc., 200 N.J. 372,
386 (2009). In calculating the "lodestar," the court considers:
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(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and
difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill
requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the
acceptance of the particular employment will preclude
other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for
similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the
circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer
or lawyers performing the services;
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
[Id. at 387 (citing RPC. 1.5(a)).]
The lodestar may be reduced "if the level of success achieved in the
litigation is limited as compared to the relief sought." Death Penalty
Moratorium, 185 N.J. at 154 (quoting Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 336
(1995)). An award of counsel fees should not, however, be reduced "simply
because the plaintiff failed to prevail on every contention raised in the lawsuit."
Ibid. (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983)).
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To determine a prevailing requestor's degree of success, a court "should
conduct a qualitative analysis that weighs such factors as the number of
documents received versus the number of documents requested, and whether the
purpose of [ ] OPRA was vindicated by the litigation." New Jerseyans, 185 N.J.
at 155. "[S]uccess under [ ] OPRA – even a high degree of success – might be
acquiring that one smoking gun record hidden amongst hundreds of pages or . .
. it may be the absence of any records." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the court concluded that counsel's hourly rates were reasonable but
that the number of hours expended by counsel were excessive "because of the
minimal success . . . in terms of compelling an answer which only was brought
about by virtue of the lawsuit." Specifically, of the twenty-seven groups of
records listed in the Vaughn index that contained over 170 pages of documents
as well as numerous DVD interviews and surveillance tapes, plaintiff succeeded
in obtaining only a two-page arrest report under OPRA. The remaining records
he obtained were released under the common law.
The court further found that "there was not a novelty of issues here" and
that the time and labor required were "not extensive." The court emphasized
that plaintiff's counsel "is a very experienced OPRA attorney" and that "from
reviewing the papers in this case and other cases[,] . . . a lot of boilerplate legal
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argument [was] used." Consequently, after evaluating plaintiff's limited success
and the amount of work performed, she awarded defendant approximately 18%
of the fees sought. We are satisfied from our conscientious review of the record
that the trial court conducted the proper qualitative analysis and discern no abuse
of discretion in its decision as the court's factual findings are amply supported
by the record.
We are unpersuaded by plaintiff's reliance on Silva v. Autos of Amboy,
Inc., 267 N.J. Super. 546, 559 (App. Div. 1993), to support his argument that
the trial court improperly relied on a mathematical approach to reduce the fee
by "employ[ing] a nearly straight line percentage breakdown of the fee sought
awarded." In Silva, we rejected the trial court's calculation of the fee which was
obtained by mechanical division of the lodestar based on the number of counts
in the complaint. We reiterated the notion that "the court must focus on the
'significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours
reasonably expended on the litigation'" and that "[i]f a plaintiff achieves
excellent results in a lawsuit, counsel fees should not be reduced on the ground
that the plaintiff did not prevail on each claim . . . ." Id. at 556. Accordingly,
we held that it was error for the trial judge to award plaintiff one-seventh of the
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reasonable fees incurred because she prevailed on only one count of a seven
count complaint. Id. at 559.
As our Supreme Court has more recently explained:
We reject "a mathematical approach comparing the
total number of issues in the case with those actually
prevailed upon" because "[s]uch a ratio provides little
aid in determining what is a reasonable fee in light of
all the relevant factors." Stated differently, "the fee
award should not be reduced simply because the
plaintiff failed to prevail on every contention raised in
the lawsuit."
[New Jerseyans, 185 N.J. at 154 (citations omitted).]
Here, the court did not simply count the number of documents requested
and award fees based on a mathematical ratio of what plaintiff actually obtained
under OPRA. To the contrary, the court's ruling tracked this court's direction in
Silva and "consider[ed] plaintiff's limited success and other pertinent factors,"
267 N.J. Super at 560, in calculating the fee. Indeed, in addition to the arrest
report that plaintiff obtained, the court also took into consideration RPC 1.5
factors as well as the fact that plaintiff "was persistent and got the Vaughn
index" and "prevailed upon getting a response from the defendants, even though
it was a denial."
Furthermore, plaintiff's contention that he prevailed in the entire case as
he obtained "a few [records] under OPRA and dozens more under the common
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law right of access" is unpersuasive. And in this regard, we find no error in the
court's reliance on Mason and the American Rule in denying plaintiff's fee
request related to his limited success under the common law right of access.
Although N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6 expressly permits an award of counsel fees under
OPRA, there is no statutory authority for such an award to a prevailing party in
a common law right of access to public records lawsuit. Further, the Mason
court did not state that it was abrogating the American Rule and establishing a
new class of cases where attorneys' fees could be awarded to a prevailing
plaintiff. Instead, the Court directed trial courts to conduct a "fact-sensitive
inquiry on a case-by-case basis" to determine when an award of fees is
appropriate. Mason, 196 N.J. at 79.
If a plaintiff has achieved "'only partial or limited success, the product of
hours reasonably expended on the litigation as a whole times a reasonable hourly
rate may be an excessive amount.'" Rendine, 141 N.J. at 336 (quoting Hensley,
461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983)); see also Litton Indus., Inc., 200 N.J. at 386-88; R.
4:42-9. Thus, trial courts are authorized to '"attempt to identify specific hours .
. . that should be eliminated [or] simply reduce the award to account for the
limited success.'" Szczepanski v. Newcomb Med. Ctr., Inc., 141 N.J. 346, 356
(1995) (alterations in original).
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Here, as noted, the court clearly conducted such a fact-based analysis
when reducing plaintiff's fee request. Plaintiff's initial request for documents
was denied by the NJSP either because no such records existed or based on
exceptions for criminal investigatory records and that certain documents
contained surveillance information that would compromise security. Other
documents were not produced as they contained personal identifying
information, or because plaintiff already possessed documents through his
criminal prosecution.
After an in camera review, the court determined that all documents other
than the complaint/summons, affidavit of probable cause, arrest report, and
those related to dismissal were "protected from disclosure by the criminal
investigatory records exception of OPRA." And, of the four documents not
covered by that exception, the court found that NJSP already provided plaintiff
with all except the arrest report.
As to the documents released under the common law, the trial court
determined that while defendant was entitled to over forty pages of records, a
redacted version of the investigation report, and three DVDs of witness
interviews, defendants properly withheld over 100 other pages of documents
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that plaintiff requested. 3 Again, in light of the court's analysis, we are satisfied
that the court did not abuse its discretion in determining the fee award.
III.
With respect to plaintiff's request for $362.95 in costs, Rule 4:42-8 states
that "[u]nless otherwise provided by law, these rules or court order, costs shall
be allowed as of course to the prevailing party." If a party prevails, that party
3
While the trial court notes in its June 28, 2019 oral decision that plaintiff cited
to statements in Mason pertaining to the awarding of counsel fees in a common
law suit under the catalyst theory, plaintiff fails to raise a similar argument on
appeal in either his initial or reply brief. In fact, plaintiff cites to Mason only in
his reply brief and in support of a different legal proposition entirely. To the
extent we can discern such an argument from plaintiff's briefs, we conclude it is
waived. See Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 417 N.J. Super. 648, 657 (App. Div. 2011)
("An issue not briefed on appeal is deemed waived."). Were plaintiff to raise
such an argument in any event, we note that "[u]nlike a citizen's absolute
statutory right of access [under OPRA], a plaintiff's common-law right of access
must be balanced against the State's interest in preventing disclosure." Higg-A-
Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 46 (1995). Although a requestor
may establish "'a wholesome public interest or a legitimate private interest'" in
the public document, id. at 47 (quoting Loigman v. Kimmelman, 102 N.J. 98,
112 (1986)), release is not automatic. Rather, a court must then engage in a
deliberative process that involves consideration of a number of factors in order
to determine whether the requestor's interest in access to the document
outweighs the State's interest in non-disclosure. Id. at 46-48. Therefore,
disclosure pursuant to the common law right of access contemplates a fact -
specific weighing process that will vary in each situation. Id. at 49. Here, we
conclude that the NJSP should not be penalized for withholding documents
under the assumption that they are not proper for public access as the court
determined that a majority of the records for which plaintiff sought access were
unquestionably criminal records maintained by the NJSP.
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should receive costs as a matter of course even if there is an "incomplete
success." Gallo v. Salesian Soc'y, 290 N.J. Super. 616, 660 (App. Div. 1996).
"[A] prevailing party may be denied an award of costs only for 'special reasons.'"
Knight v. AAA Midatlantic Ins. Co., 394 N.J. Super. 333, 337 (App. Div. 2007)
(quoting Schaefer v. Allstate N.J. Ins. Co., 376 N.J. Super. 475, 487 (App. Div.
2005)).
It does not appear from the record that the court ruled on plaintiff's request
for costs, which as noted included typical expenses for filing fees, copies, and
postage. Accordingly, on remand, the court should address plaintiff's cost
application and if it concludes they are not recoverable in whole or in part,
should clearly identify the "special reasons" supporting that conclusion. See
Knight, 394 N.J. Super. at 337 (quoting Schaefer, 376 N.J. Super. at 487).
To the extent we have not addressed any of plaintiff's remaining
arguments it is because we conclude they are sufficiently without merit to
warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed in part and remanded in part.
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