STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. BRIJ MOHAN SHARMA (18-034, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2020 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-4230-18T1
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    BRIJ MOHAN SHARMA,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Argued telephonically July 28, 2020 –
    Decided August 12, 2020
    Before Judges Sumners and Mayer.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Monmouth County, Municipal Appeal No.
    18-034.
    Larry S. Loigman argued the cause for appellant.
    Gregory James Cannon, Borough of Red Bank
    Municipal Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent
    (Christopher J. Gramiccioni, Monmouth County
    Prosecutor, attorney; Gregory James Cannon, on the
    brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant Brij Mohan Sharma appeals from an April 22, 2019 order of
    the Law Division finding him guilty of seven violations of the Red Bank
    municipal code after conducting a de novo review of the record developed in the
    municipal court pursuant to Rule 3:23-8. We affirm.
    Defendant owns residential rental property in Red Bank. In July 2018,
    the Red Bank code enforcement officer issued seven complaints for code
    violations at defendant's property. The violations were: failure to maintain fire
    protection; failure to obtain a certificate of occupancy for rental property; failure
    to maintain interior surfaces; overcrowding; two electrical hazards; and failure
    to exterminate the property. Defendant appeared in municipal court several
    times with counsel, including his attorney on this appeal. Prior to the municipal
    court trial, defendant requested and received discovery regarding the municipal
    code violations.
    On the day of trial, defendant moved before the municipal court to dismiss
    the charges, arguing the issued summons were void for lack of notice of the
    various municipal code violations and failure to serve pre -complaint notices.
    The municipal court judge denied defendant's motion without prejudice,
    concluding the arguments were premature because testimony was required to
    render a ruling. Based on the municipal court judge's denial of the motion to
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    dismiss, defendant entered conditional guilty pleas as to all charges, reserving
    the right to appeal the denial of his dismissal motion.
    During the plea colloquy before the municipal court judge, defendant
    admitted to the seven separate municipal code violations at his property. The
    municipal court judge found defendant was not "as diligent as he should have
    been in correcting these conditions . . . ." The municipal court judge required
    defendant to abate the conditions within thirty days and imposed a $14,000 fine,
    representing a $2,000 fine for each violation.
    On November 26, 2018, defendant filed an appeal from his municipal
    court conviction with the Superior Court, Law Division. A trial de novo was
    conducted by the Law Division judge on April 18, 2019. Defendant raised the
    same legal arguments in support of his motion to dismiss as asserted in the
    municipal court proceeding.
    The independent trial de novo fact-findings and legal conclusions by the
    Law Division judge were placed on the record on the trial date. The Law
    Division judge found defendant had sufficient notice of the violations and
    understood his need to correct the violations. Citing State v. Henry, 56 N.J.
    Super. 1, 4 (App. Div. 1959), the Law Division judge found "petitioner was put
    on sufficient notice in which to properly defend the claims and protect against
    double jeopardy."    The judge concluded "the complaints were sufficiently
    3                              A-4230-18T1
    descriptive under Henry to put [defendant] on notice for the crimes with which
    he was charged." Although defendant correctly stated that the "specific numbers
    on the complaints [did] not correspond to the most recent codification of
    Borough ordinances," the Law Division judge held "the description on the
    complaint . . . was sufficient notice to put defendant on notice of the charges and
    the specificities lodged against him." The judge further stated that defendant
    "had multiple opportunities to abate the conditions on the property, but was not
    diligent in doing so. The record shows [defendant] was aware of the conditions
    he needed to resolve, and therefore, the [c]ourt finds [defendant's] argument
    without merit."   Moreover, the Law Division judge determined defendant's
    "guilty plea essentially waived any deficiency to the complaints under [State v.]
    Marolda[, 
    394 N.J. Super. 430
    (App. Div. 2007)]. . . . [The] time to address the
    issue was in [m]unicipal [c]ourt, prior to the plea, and the amendment [to the
    complaints] would've easily resolved the issues." Thus, the Law Division judge
    concluded defendant "entered the plea with knowledge of the issues and the
    complaints, and thus, that he waived."
    In addition, because Red Bank was not taking measures to remedy
    defendant's violations of the municipal code, the judge rejected defendant's
    argument that the municipal Mayor and council should have been notified prior
    to the issuance of the complaints and that pre-complaint notice of the violations
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    should have been accorded to him. The Law Division judge held accepting
    defendant's argument that "code enforcement officers obtain . . . a resolution
    from [the] Mayor and Borough council in order to issue a complaint in the first
    place against any person who violates . . . an ordinance . . . would be wholly
    inefficient and contrary to precedent set by New Jersey [c]ourts."
    Based on his factual determinations, the Law Division judge found
    defendant "guilty . . . beyond a reasonable doubt, and . . . impose[d] the same
    fines that were imposed in the [m]unicipal [c]ourt." In an April 22, 2019 order,
    the Law Division judge denied defendant's municipal court appeal and reinstated
    the municipal court's sanction order.
    On appeal to this court, defendant argues the following:
    POINT I
    THE LAW DIVISION [JUDGE] ERRED IN FAILING
    TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINTS.
    A. THE SUMMONSES WERE VOID FOR LACK OF
    NOTICE.
    B. THE SUMMONSES WERE VOID FOR FAILURE
    TO SERVE PRE-COMPLAINT NOTICE.
    A trial court deciding a municipal appeal must review the record de novo
    and make its own decision regarding a defendant's guilt or innocence. State v.
    Avena, 
    281 N.J. Super. 327
    , 333 (App. Div. 1995). "[A]ppellate review of a
    municipal appeal to the Law Division is limited to 'the action of the Law
    5                               A-4230-18T1
    Division and not that of the municipal court.'" State v. Hannah, 
    448 N.J. Super. 78
    , 94 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting State v. Palma, 
    219 N.J. 584
    , 591-92 (2014)).
    "In reviewing a trial court's decision on a municipal appeal, we determine
    whether sufficient credible evidence in the record supports the Law Division's
    decision." State v. Monaco, 
    444 N.J. Super. 539
    , 549 (App. Div. 2016).
    Here, after the municipal court judge denied defendant's motion to dismiss
    the charges, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to all seven municipal
    ordinance violations. In order to accept a guilty plea, defendant had to proffer
    a basis for his admission to the ordinance violations and he did so. In addition,
    the summons adequately informed defendant of the various violations at his
    property and no citation to a specific ordinance provision was required. See
    State v. Fisher, 
    180 N.J. 462
    , 470-71 (2004) (holding complaints should be
    decided on the merits rather than dismissed because of mere technicalities).
    Defendant's extensive citation to, and reliance upon, State v. Nunnally,
    
    420 N.J. Super. 58
    , 65 (App. Div. 2011) in support of his argument is misplaced.
    In that case, the failure to cite the correct substantive offense for the issued
    traffic ticket was not a "technical defect" because the proofs required for a
    failure to submit to alcohol testing in a commercial driver's license refusal were
    different from the proofs required for a general refusal.
    Id. at 66-67.
    Nothing
    in Nunnally overruled our decision in Henry, requiring "a complaint . . . contain
    6                                A-4230-18T1
    an informative statement of the charge made." 
    Henry, 56 N.J. Super. at 8
    . It is
    "not necessary in charging a violation of a municipal ordinance to state the
    offense with such particularity and strictness as would be necessary in an
    indictment." Borough of Seaside Heights v. Olson, 
    7 N.J. Super. 111
    , 115 (App.
    Div. 1950) (quoting Dallas v. Atlantic City, 
    120 N.J.L. 314
    , 316 (Sup.Ct. 1938)).
    We also reject defendant's argument that the municipality's failure to
    provide pre-action notification of the ordinance violations warranted dismissal
    of the charges.     Because the municipality was not taking acti on against
    defendant's property, such as demolishing an unsafe structure or mowing
    overgrown vegetation, and placing a lien against the property for expenses
    incurred in remedying the violations, pre-action notification under the
    International Property Maintenance Code, incorporated by reference in the
    municipality's code, was not required.
    Here, the municipality did not take any action at the property. Rather, the
    municipality's code enforcer issued summonses seeking to have defendant
    remedy the violations or face monetary sanctions as could be imposed by a court
    if defendant failed to cure the violations.
    Having reviewed the record, we are satisfied the Law Division judge
    properly convicted defendant of the seven separate violations of the
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    municipality's ordinance code and rightly reinstated the monetary penalties
    imposed for those violations.
    Affirmed.
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Document Info

Docket Number: A-4230-18T1

Filed Date: 8/12/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/12/2020