NYDIA BONEFONT VS. LAM PROPERTIES, LLC (L-4162-17, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4761-18T2
NYDIA BONEFONT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LAM PROPERTIES, LLC,
Defendant-Respondent,
and
CYDNEY SAVAGE and
JUDY BARNETT,
Defendants.
_________________________
Argued telephonically August 10, 2020 –
Decided August 24, 2020
Before Judges Whipple and Enright.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Camden County, Docket No. L-4162-17.
Robert Alan Jones argued the cause for appellant.
George Keahey argued the cause for respondent
(Venema, Proko, Keahey & Dalvet, attorneys; George
B. Keahey, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff, Nydia Bonefont, appeals from the May 24, 2019 summary
judgment dismissal of her complaint against defendant LAM Properties, LLC.
We affirm.
The following facts are derived from the evidence presented in support of,
in opposition to, and in reply to the motion for summary judgment, viewed in
the light most favorable to plaintiff. See Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
142 N.J. 520, 523 (1995). Plaintiff sustained injuries after tripping and falling
on a raised section of a public cement sidewalk in front of 3020 North Congress
Road in Camden, New Jersey (3020), a single-family residence commonly
known as a row house. Plaintiff's destination was an adjacent row house, 3018
North Congress Road (3018), owned by defendant but leased to a tenant.
Defendant, which owns approximately fifteen single and multi-family properties
that it rents in various locations, does not own 3020 or any adjoining property
other than 3018. Although 3018 has both front and back entrances, its main
entry way is located in the front. Plaintiff, who was walking to the front entrance
of 3018 when she tripped on the sidewalk in front of 3020, filed suit against
A-4761-18T2
2
defendant alleging it maintained a dangerous and hazardous condition that
caused her to fall and sustain injuries.
Plaintiff subsequently amended her complaint to add defendants Cydney
Savage and Judy Barnett, the owners of 3020 who reside there. On April 12,
2019, the court granted a Rule 4:46-2 dismissal for Savage and Barnett. Plaintiff
did not oppose the motion and is not appealing the dismissal of Savage and
Barnett.
One week later, defendant moved for summary judgment asserting it had
no liability because plaintiff did not injure herself on the sidewalk within the
property line of 3018. After hearing the motion argument, the court granted
summary judgment for defendant, rejecting plaintiff's argument that defendant's
duty extended beyond its own property line. This appeal followed.
We review the trial court's granting of the motion de novo, applying the
same legal standards that govern summary judgment motions. Steinberg v.
Sahara Sam's Oasis, LLC, 226 N.J. 344, 349-50 (2016). We consider the factual
record and reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those facts, "in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party" to decide whether the moving party
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. IE Test, LLC v. Carroll, 226 N.J.
166, 184 (2016) (citing Brill, 142 N.J. at 540; R. 4:46-2(c)). We accord no
A-4761-18T2
3
special deference to a trial judge's assessment of the documentary record, as the
decision to grant or withhold summary judgment does not hinge upon a judge's
determinations of the credibility of testimony rendered in court but instead
amounts to a ruling on a question of law. See Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp.
Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
In order to prove a claim of negligence, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1)
a duty of care, (2) that the duty has been breached, (3) proximate causation, and
(4) injury. Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 51 (2015) (citations omitted). A
plaintiff bears the burden of proving negligence, see Reichert v. Vegholm, 366
N.J. Super. 209, 214 (App. Div. 2004), and must prove that unreasonable acts
or omissions by defendant proximately caused his or her injuries. See Camp v.
Jiffy Lube No. 114, 309 N.J. Super. 305, 309-11 (App. Div. 1998). We review
the presence or absence of an enforceable duty as a question of law. Clohesy v.
Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 149 N.J. 496, 502 (1997) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff argues the court erred granting summary judgment, asserting
defendant had a duty to maintain a public sidewalk in front of a neighboring
property because it was the only means of ingress and egress to its rental
property, 3018. We find plaintiff's arguments to be unpersuasive and agree with
the motion judge that defendant's duty did not extend beyond its property line.
A-4761-18T2
4
We treat residential and commercial landowners differently under certain
circumstances. That is why, here, our analysis does not hinge upon defendant's
status as a commercial landowner, but upon the overall circumstances. In
Stewart v. 104 Wallace Street, Inc., 87 N.J. 146, 150 (1981), the Supreme Court
carved out an exception to the long-held concept that a property owner was not
subject to tort liability for the condition of a public sidewalk. The Stewart Court
held "[c]ommercial property owners are henceforth liable for injuries on the
sidewalks abutting their property that are caused by their negligent failure to
maintain the sidewalks in reasonably good condition." Ibid. The plaintiff in
Stewart walked out of a tavern, went a short distance and fell on the dilapidated
sidewalk in front of a vacant lot. Id. at 149-50. Although the complaint against
the owner of the vacant lot initially was dismissed, the Court reversed the
dismissal, finding a duty by the commercial property owner to maintain the
sidewalk. Id. at 150, 157. The Court limited the duty to maintain abutting
sidewalks "to owners of commercial property." Id. at 159.
The Court favored imposing liability at common law because an owner of
commercial property derives considerable benefits from the abutting sidewalks
and noted that "public use of commercial establishments is facilitated by the
existence of sidewalks." Id. at 152. Thus, the imposition of a duty of
A-4761-18T2
5
maintenance upon commercial property owners is "appropriate and not
arbitrary." Id. at 158.
The liability which Stewart imposes upon "abutting" landowners is
expressly tied to the use and benefit derived from the sidewalk by the owner of
the abutting "premises." Ibid. The Stewart Court "rationalize[d] our law by
enabling an injured person to recover damages for injuries sustained on the
sidewalk in front of a store as well as those sustained in the store." Id. at 160;
see also id. at 158. The Court also explained that as to "which properties will
be covered by the rule we adopt today, commonly accepted definitions of
'commercial' and 'residential' property should apply." Id. at 160. The Court
later clarified that the duty to the sidewalk user "flows from the economic
benefit that a commercial landowner receives from the abutting sidewalk and
from the landowner's ability to control the risk of injury." Kuzmicz v. Ivy Hill
Park Apts., 147 N.J. 510, 518 (1997).
We subsequently held a commercial "landowner's liability may extend
beyond the premises for activities that directly benefit the landowner," such as
crossing a public street or public way. Id. at 518-19. In Warrington v. Bird,
204 N.J. Super. 611, 617 (App. Div. 1985), a restaurant that provided parking
across the street had a duty to its patrons to provide safe passage. See also
A-4761-18T2
6
Mulraney v. Auletto's Catering, 293 N.J. Super. 315, (App. Div. 1996) (holding
caterer liable to a business invitee crossing the county highway). However, the
applicability of those decisions to the question presented is not seamless as
plaintiff suggests.
A commercial landowner has no liability for a tenant's injury that occurred
on a pathway on an adjacent property if the business "provided its tenants with
a safe exit to the public sidewalks." See Kuzmicz, 147 N.J. at 522-23 ("To
impose a duty on a landlord for the safety of tenants while on property over
which the landlord has no control and from which it derives no benefit would be
unprecedented."). Similarly, a commercial property owner is not liable for an
injury on a path through adjacent public property where a public sidewalk
"provided 'easy access.'" Chimiente v. Adam Corp., 221 N.J. Super. 580, 583-
84 (App. Div. 1987) ("Stewart . . . does not impose a duty upon commercial
landowners to maintain contiguous lands owned by others simply because the
public chooses to use the lands as a means of access to the commercial
property.").
Our Supreme Court stated the standard for imposition of a duty on
commercial landowners requires a flexible approach based in "an abiding sense
of basic fairness under all of the circumstances in light of considerations of
A-4761-18T2
7
public policy." Monaco v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 178 N.J. 401, 418 (2004)
(quoting Hopkins v. Fox and Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 439 (1993)). Thus,
our inquiry involves "identifying, weighing and balancing several factors
[including] the relationship of the parties, the nature of the attendant risk, the
opportunity and ability to exercise care, and the public interest in the proposed
solution." Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 439).
Plaintiff fell on the public sidewalk in front of 3020 while walking to
3018. Plaintiff concedes the neighbor owning 3020 has no legal liability as a
resident homeowner but presents no compelling argument as to why defendant
should be treated differently, other than it leases residential property to tenants.
While defendant is a commercial landowner that owns residences, it derived no
economic benefit from the sidewalk that was different from or in excess of the
benefits imparted to the other property owners whose residences abutted the
sidewalk. Plaintiff conferred no potential economic benefit to defendant when
she walked to 3018. Nor is there any suggestion in the record that defendant
had the ability or even a legal right to exercise any control over the distant public
sidewalk in front of its neighbor's property. We find no legal support for the
notion that a commercial landlord bears a heavier burden for the condition of
the public sidewalk in front of another neighbor's property, where it derived no
A-4761-18T2
8
economic benefit from the use of the sidewalk in any manner different than that
of any adjoining residential landowner. See Abraham v. Gupta, 281 N.J. Super.
81, 85-86 (App. Div. 1995).
Affirmed.
A-4761-18T2
9