STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. ALFREDO LOPEZ (12-06-9271 AND 13-10-1370, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2020 )


Menu:
  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-3786-19T4
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    ALFREDO LOPEZ,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Submitted August 10, 2020 – Decided August 25, 2020
    Before Judges Moynihan and Mawla.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Bergen County, Indictment Nos. 12-06-9271
    and 13-10-1370.
    Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
    appellant (Jennifer M. Blum, Assistant Deputy Public
    Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
    Mark Musella, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney for
    respondent (William P. Miller, Assistant Prosecutor, of
    counsel and on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    While defendant Alfredo Lopez was serving a ten-year prison sentence
    with five years of parole ineligibility, 1 he filed a motion to suspend the
    remainder of the custodial term "until the current COVID-19 pandemic ceases,"
    or, alternatively, to amend his sentence to permit his release under Rule 3:21-
    10(b)(2) because of illness. Defendant appeals from the trial court's order
    denying his motion, arguing:
    POINT I
    THE    TRIAL  COURT    MISAPPLIED        THE
    PREVAILING LAW AS IT RELATES TO THE
    'SERIOUS NATURE OF DEFENDANT'S MEDICAL
    CONDITION AND THE DELETERIOUS EFFECT OF
    INCARCERATION ON DEFENDANT'S HEALTH'
    UNDER STATE V. PRIESTER, 
    99 N.J. 123
    (1985).
    POINT II
    THE TRIAL [COURT] FAILED TO PROPERLY
    WEIGH ALL OF THE PRIESTER FACTORS IN
    DETERMINING        THAT   DEFENDANT WAS
    INELIGIBLE . . . FOR RELEASE.
    We disagree and affirm.
    1
    Defendant completed an aggregate seven-year prison term with forty-two
    months of parole ineligibility under Indictment No. 12-06-9271 before
    commencing a current consecutive term under Indictment No. 13 -10-1370.
    A-3786-19T4
    2
    Defendant sought to amend his sentence and permit his release under Rule
    3:21-10(b)(2) because the stage IV renal failure from which he suffered when
    he was sentenced advanced to stage V, and he recently had an arterial venous
    fistula implanted to facilitate kidney dialysis treatment. 2 He was thus required
    to first demonstrate a change of circumstances resulting in a severe depreciation
    of his health since sentence was imposed.        
    Priester, 99 N.J. at 136-37
    . If
    defendant made that predicate showing,
    the trial court [would be compelled to] weigh various
    factors that affect the decision whether to grant a
    release such as, the nature and severity of the crime for
    which he is imprisoned, his criminal record, the risk
    that might result to the public by his release, . . . the
    nature of th[e] illness and the availability of appropriate
    medical services in prison to adequately treat or cope
    with that illness.
    [State v. Wright, 
    221 N.J. Super. 123
    , 127 (App. Div.
    1987).]
    Defendant had to also establish "that the medical services unavailable at the
    prison would be not only beneficial . . . but are essential to prevent further
    deterioration in his health." 
    Priester, 99 N.J. at 135
    .
    2
    Defendant did not advance in his merits brief that any other medical condition,
    including hypertension and secondary hyperthyroidism that are noted in the St.
    Francis Medical Center records submitted to the trial court, are cause for the
    relief he seeks.
    A-3786-19T4
    3
    From the trial court's oral decision, we glean that the it considered 2017
    prison records, a medical expert's submission detailing "statistics and data and
    the risk posed by the spread of COVID-19 in our prison systems," and "more
    recent medical records from St. Francis Medical Center," which the court found
    "corroborate[d] and verif[ied] the medical conditions" from which defendant
    suffers.
    The trial court found medical documentation provided to the sentencing
    court established defendant was diagnosed with stage IV kidney failure in 2005.
    After reviewing defendant's lengthy criminal record—including "a long history
    of dealing drugs, including substantial quantities of heroin"—for which he
    received multiple state-prison terms, the trial court deduced defendant's renal
    failure did not prevent his escalating criminal activity, and did not "deter
    [defendant] from getting arrested, getting convicted[] and re-offending," up
    through the charges for which he was most recently sentenced which included:
    second-degree eluding involving "a high-speed chase through several . . .
    towns,"; third-degree hindering apprehension; second-degree possession of
    heroin—approximately 2250 glassine bags—with intent to distribute; and third-
    degree possession of heroin, consecutive to defendant's current sentence for
    first-degree possession of heroin—10,750 glassine envelopes—with intent to
    A-3786-19T4
    4
    distribute. The court found that despite defendant's profession of reformation,
    "[t]hat does not lessen the severity or the risk in the event he were released "
    because of defendant's repeated recidivism after release from prison.
    From the medical records, the trial court found: proof of defendant's
    diagnosed medical condition; the spread of COVID-19 "within the New Jersey
    prison system"; and "that he is at higher risk than the general population of
    suffering serious illness or death in the event he contracts COVID -19." Further,
    the trial court found the advancement of defendant's renal failure to stage V
    "coupled with the increased risk . . . posed by the spread of COVID-19"
    amounted to a change of circumstances. 3
    The trial court also found defendant was not yet undergoing dialysis
    treatment, and was not presently infected with COVID-19.           And, despite
    establishing the predicate change of circumstances, the court concluded
    "defendant has been and continues to be provided with all necessary and
    3
    Our Supreme Court recently considered the impact of the COVID-19
    pandemic and found "the worldwide pandemic that has afflicted New Jersey and
    its prison system amounts to a change in circumstances under . . . Rule [3:21-
    10(b)(2)]." In re Request to Modify Prison Sentences, Expedite Parole Hearings,
    & Identify Vulnerable Prisoners, ___ N.J.___, ___ (2020) (slip op. at 21).
    A-3786-19T4
    5
    essential treatment for his medical conditions while in prison" by the
    Department of Corrections (DOC).
    The trial court also considered the details of the crimes for which
    defendant was sentenced, their severity, his criminal record, and the risk to the
    public if defendant were released. We note the court carefully delineated the
    facts that led to those findings. See 
    Wright, 221 N.J. Super. at 127
    (reiterating
    the Court's mandate in State v. Tumminello, 
    70 N.J. 187
    , 194-95 (1976), that
    "the trial court is required to detail the reasons for granting or denying the relief
    to the end that there may be a meaningful review"). The trial court balanced the
    evidence relating to the Priester factors and denied defendant's Rule 3:21-
    10(b)(2) motion.
    Recognizing a sentencing amendment under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) "must be
    applied prudently, sparingly[] and cautiously," 
    Priester, 99 N.J. at 135
    , we
    determine the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion, see
    id. at 137;
    Tumminello, 70 N.J. at 193
    . In his merits brief, defendant concedes,
    as he admitted to the court during oral argument, he is able to receive dialysis
    treatment inside the prison facility. Although he argues the trial court did not
    properly evaluate that "it is the very real risk of contracting the virus . . . th at
    creates the serious risk to [defendant's] health," our Supreme Court made clear
    A-3786-19T4
    6
    "[a] generalized fear of contracting an illness is not enough." In re Request to
    Modify Prison Sentences, ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 21).
    We note the dearth of proof relating to the impact of the prison
    environment on defendant's particular medical condition. See Wright, 221 N.J.
    Super. at 130. As the trial court noted, defendant did not present any medical
    evidence that his condition deteriorated in the three months prior to the motion
    hearing, and he had twice refused to allow the implantation of the port used to
    facilitate dialysis treatment, which had not yet commenced at the time the
    motion was heard.      Unlike the defendant in Tumminello—a case which
    defendant argues is apposite—whose worsening diabetes mellitus necessitated
    multiple amputations and who was unable to maintain the sanitary conditions in
    prison necessary to avoid ulcerations, infections and further 
    amputations, 70 N.J. at 190
    , defendant has not established that continued imprisonment would
    cause his renal condition to deteriorate or that the DOC is unable to address his
    medical needs. And unlike defendant, the defendant in Tumminello was a first-
    time offender
    , id. at 193-94,
    whose medical condition was unknown to the
    sentencing court
    , id. at 193.
    "To prevail on a [Rule 3:21-10(b)(2)] motion, inmates must . . . present
    evidence of both an 'illness or infirmity' -- a physical ailment or weakness -- and
    A-3786-19T4
    7
    the increased risk of harm incarceration poses to that condition." In re Request
    to Modify Prison Sentences, ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 20-21). The trial court
    properly considered all the pertinent factors and did not abuse its discretion in
    balancing those factors and denying defendant's motion.
    Defendant's remaining arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant
    discussion in this opinion.      R. 2:11-3(e)(2). The record belies defendant's
    contention that the trial court failed to consider the impact of defendant's efforts
    at rehabilitation on his risk of re-offense and that posed to the community.
    During the first motion hearing, the court heard defense counsel's recitation of
    defendant's in-prison efforts, and listened as defendant read what the trial court
    characterized in its decision as a "heartfelt" letter describing those efforts and
    more at the second motion hearing. The court stated it was
    certainly . . . incorporating [defendant's] statements to
    the [c]ourt . . . regarding his remorse, what he submits
    to th[e c]ourt is a change and a repentant attitude for his
    past crimes, and his assertion that he will change and,
    if released, he will not re-offend. So [the court]
    certainly consider[s] all of that in terms of [its] decision
    as well, although much of . . . it goes to the relative risk
    of re-offense and risk to the community.
    But the trial court concluded,
    although [it] appreciate[s] his sentiments . . . and
    hope[s] they're sincere, that maybe . . . now he
    A-3786-19T4
    8
    appreciates the impact that his conduct and others who
    do the same thing have had on the community[, t]hat
    does not lessen the severity or the risk in the event he
    were released.
    We also reject defendant's contention that the trial court failed to properly
    weigh the DOC's decision to transfer defendant to full-minimum status thus
    recognizing defendant does not represent a risk. The risk posed by defendant
    within the prison system does not equate with the risk the trial court found if
    defendant was released. 4
    Defendant does not challenge the trial court's denial of his motion to
    suspend the remainder of the custodial term "until the current COVID -19
    pandemic ceases," mentioning only in the combined procedural history and
    statement of facts section of his merits brief that the trial court distinguished this
    case from State v. Boone, 
    262 N.J. Super. 220
    (Law Div. 1992). See Jefferson
    Loan Co. v. Session, 
    397 N.J. Super. 520
    , 525 n.4 (App. Div. 2008). In any
    event, we determine the trial court properly found Boone inapposite. As our
    Supreme Court described:
    4
    We agree with the State that defendant's inclusion of the DOC's reason for
    disapproving of defendant's release under Executive Order #124 should not be
    considered. That denial was made subsequent to the trial court's motion
    decision. Defendant did not move to supplement the record, R. 2:5-5, and this
    appeal does not involve the DOC's decision.
    A-3786-19T4
    9
    The Law Division's decision in Boone does not
    afford a basis for a broad-based judicial furlough
    process. Boone involved an extraordinary situation that
    the Commissioner brought to the court's attention: an
    inmate with a rare and potentially dangerous condition
    needed to be examined quickly for possible aortic
    replacement surgery, which could be performed only at
    a hospital in 
    Texas. 262 N.J. Super. at 222
    . The
    Commissioner had no statutory authority to grant a
    furlough outside of New Jersey, so he asked the court
    to intervene.
    Ibid. The trial [court]
    relied on the court's
    "inherent authority to act to preserve life" and "granted
    a judicial furlough."
    Id. at 223.
    At the same time, the
    court noted "this power should be sparingly utilized in
    the very rarest of cases."
    Id. at 224.
    [In re Request to Modify Prison Sentences, ___ N.J. at
    ___ (slip op. at 19).]
    Defendant's medical condition does not present one of those "rarest of cases."
    Affirmed.
    A-3786-19T4
    10
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-3786-19T4

Filed Date: 8/25/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/25/2020