STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. RANDY VIDAL (16-04-0523, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3891-19
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
RANDY VIDAL,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Argued June 21, 2021 – Decided July 9, 2021
Before Judges Fisher and Fasciale.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Hudson County, Indictment No. 16-04-0523.
Margaret McLane, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora,
Public Defender, attorney; Margaret McLane, of
counsel and on the brief).
Erin M. Campbell, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the
cause for respondent (Esther Suarez, Hudson County
Prosecutor, attorney; Erin M. Campbell, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant previously appealed from his conviction for second-degree
unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1). We remanded for
the judge to make specific findings and conclusions of law as to prong three of
the independent source doctrine, and to consider the State's argument—raised
for the first time—that the inevitable discovery doctrine was a separate basis to
deny defendant's motion to suppress. State v. Vidal, No. A-1124-18 (App. Div.
Nov. 26, 2019) (slip op. at 2). On remand, the judge applied the inevitable
discovery doctrine and denied defendant's motion to suppress the firearm. We
affirm. 1
On appeal, defendant raises the following argument for this court's
consideration:
POINT I
THE [JUDGE] ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
INEVITABLE DISCOVERY DOCTRINE SAVED
THE ILLEGAL SEARCH OF THE BASEMENT
APARTMENT, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE
[JUDGE'S] FINDING OF FLAGRANT POLICE
MISCONDUCT.
1
As we pointed out in our prior opinion, the independent source doctrine and
the inevitable discovery doctrine are two separate exceptions to the exclusionary
rule. Vidal, slip op. at 12-13. On remand, the judge found that the State failed
to establish the third prong on the independent source doctrine, which defendant
does not contest on appeal. Thus, our focus—like defendant's—is whether the
judge properly applied the inevitable discovery doctrine to deny his motion to
suppress.
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A. Introduction
B. The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine
1. [Judges] must stringently hold the State
to its burden to establish that the police
would have lawfully obtained the
evidence by carefully considering the
nature of the illegal actions.
2. If an independent source for the
evidence would be unduly tainted by the
illegal police conduct, then inevitable
discovery cannot save the evidence
from exclusion.
C. The State Failed To Establish The Prongs Of
Inevitable Discovery
In reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress, we will "uphold the
factual findings underlying the [judge's] decision so long as those findings are
supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Gamble, 218
N.J. 412, 424 (2014). We will only reverse if the motion judge's decision was
"so clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand intervention and
correction." Id. at 425 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). We
review the motion judge's legal conclusions de novo. Ibid.The exclusionary rule provides that evidence obtained in violation of an
individual's constitutional rights will be excluded as "fruit of the poisonous
tree." State v. Faucette, 439 N.J. Super. 241, 266 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting
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State v. O'Neill, 193 N.J. 148, 171 n.13 (2007)). The inevitable discovery
doctrine is an exception to the exclusionary rule which permits admission of
evidence resulting from an illegal search where the prosecution can show that it
would have discovered the evidence "had no illegality occurred." State v. Sugar,
100 N.J. 214, 238 (1985) (Sugar II). Its purpose is to "prevent[] the prosecution
from being in a better position than if the illegal conduct had not taken place"
rather than to "punish the prosecution by putting it in a worse place." State v.
Camey, 239 N.J. 282, 302 (2019) (citing Sugar II, 100 N.J. at 237). The State
must demonstrate that
(1) proper, normal and specific investigatory
procedures would have been pursued in order to
complete the investigation of the case; (2) under all the
surrounding relevant circumstances the pursuit of those
procedures would have inevitably resulted in the
discovery of the evidence; and (3) the discovery of the
evidence through the use of such procedures would
have occurred wholly independently of the discovery of
such evidence by unlawful means.
[Sugar II, 100 N.J. 238.]
The State is not required to demonstrate the exact circumstances that
would result in the discovery of the evidence. Camey, 239 N.J. at 302 (quoting
State v. Maltese, 222 N.J. 525, 552 (2015)). "[T]he State need only present facts
or elements—proving each such fact or element by a preponderance of the
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evidence—that in combination clearly and convincingly establish the ultimate
fact and lead to the conclusion that the evidence would be inevitably
discovered." Ibid. (quoting State v. Sugar, 108 N.J. 151, 159 (1987) (Sugar III)).
The State did that here. 2
As to the first prong, the record supports the judge's conclusion that
Sergeant McVicar followed proper, normal, and specific investigatory
procedures in obtaining the second search warrant, which the judge determined
was based upon probable cause "even without the information [Sergeant]
McVicar learned when he opened the door to the basement [apartment]." See
State v. Finesmith, 406 N.J. Super. 510, 524 (App. Div. 2009) (noting that prong
one is satisfied through the execution of a search warrant). Indeed, the record
supports the judge's finding that police would have inevitably discovered the
firearm in defendant's apartment.
As to the second prong, defendant does not argue that the State failed to
demonstrate that "under all of the surrounding relevant circumstances the pursuit
of those procedures would have inevitably resulted in the discovery of the
evidence." Sugar II, 100 N.J. at 238. For completeness, the judge concluded
that the State satisfied this prong as Sergeant McVicar testified that "based on
2
We rely on the facts set forth in our earlier decision. Vidal, slip op. at 2-3.
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what [defendant] had informed [the officers] and based on [his] observations, .
. . [he] would have wrote a search warrant for" the basement apartment. Police
would have discovered the firearm pursuant to the second search warrant. These
findings are supported by the record.
As to the third prong, the record supports the judge's finding that police
would have discovered the evidence "wholly independent of the unlawful
opening of the basement door." Sergeant McVicar testified that he "saw
defendant leave from the building's alleyway," which "led him to believe that
defendant exited from the basement apartment." Vidal, slip op. at 5-6.
Additionally, "[d]efendant said that he lived [in the] basement apartment during
his arrest" prior to McVicar improperly opening the basement apartment door.
Vidal, slip op. at 6. As a result, the information Sergeant McVicar learned
during defendant's arrest led to the conclusion that defendant lived in the
basement apartment, which was sufficient to establish probable cause for a
warrant without considering the information learned after opening the basement
apartment door.
Affirmed.
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