STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. WILLIAM P. JIMBO- AUCAPINA (15-06-0632, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2021 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0411-19
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
WILLIAM P. JIMBO-AUCAPINA,
a/k/a WILLIAM PATRICIO
ACUAPINA,
Defendant-Respondent.
______________________________
Submitted January 25, 2021 – Decided February 10, 2021
Before Judges Messano and Hoffman.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Morris County, Indictment No. 15-06-0632.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Frank M. Gennaro, Designated Counsel, of
counsel and on the brief).
Fredric M. Knapp, Morris County Prosecutor, attorney
for respondent (Paula Jordao, Assistant Prosecutor, on
the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant William Jimbo-Aucapina appeals the denial of his petition for
post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. Defendant pled
guilty to second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1) (causing or
attempting to cause serious bodily injury), and the lesser-included offense of
third-degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2).
Defendant admitted under oath repeatedly stabbing his ex-wife, including after
their ten-year-old daughter walked into the room. In accordance with the plea
bargain, the judge sentenced defendant to a seven-year term of imprisonment on
the aggravated assault, subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2,
and a consecutive three-year term of imprisonment on the endangering
conviction.
With the assistance of appointed counsel, defendant filed a timely PCR
petition alleging ineffective assistance of plea counsel. 1 Specifically, stated he
"did not speak English well at all," and he certified that plea counsel only spoke
to him three times prior to the guilty plea and was accompanied only once by a
Spanish interpreter. Although counsel supplied defendant with some of the
discovery, defendant did not read or understand English and plea counsel never
1
In his pro se petition, defendant said that he would be deported to Ecuador
upon completion of his sentence, and he only sought a sentence reduction so he
could be returned to his "home country" sooner.
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reviewed discovery with him. Defendant asserted counsel never told him the
plea bargain included consecutive sentences, and defendant understood that the
prosecutor had offered a lesser sentence recommendation of six years'
imprisonment.
Judge David H. Ironson, who was not the plea or sentencing judge,
considered oral argument on the petition. In a comprehensive oral opinion,
Judge Ironson reviewed the relevant case law, in particular the two-prong test
for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel formulated in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and adopted by our
Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987).
The judge noted that a certified Spanish interpreter translated for
defendant at the time of his guilty plea. At that time, under oath, defendant
acknowledged reviewing the plea form with his attorney and the interpreter.
Judge Ironson reviewed in detail the plea proceedings, including the plea judge's
explicit explanation to defendant that the State would recommend the court
impose consecutive sentences. He further noted the plea judge told defendant
"the State will recommend a total of [ten] years in New Jersey [S]tate
[P]rison . . . ." Judge Ironson concluded that "viewing these facts in a light most
favorable to the defendant, the proofs fail to establish that . . . defense counsel's
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representation was deficient." Judge Ironson also concluded defendant failed to
prove the second prong of the Strickland/Fritz test, i.e., that but for counsel's
deficient performance the result of the proceedings would have been different.
Before us, defendant contends he demonstrated a prima facie case of
ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to review all the
discovery and failed to use an interpreter when discussing the plea bargain. We
disagree and affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Ironson.
We add only the following brief remarks.
To establish a viable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC), a
defendant must show "that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment." Fritz, 105
N.J. at 52 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). Additionally, a defendant must
prove he suffered prejudice due to counsel's deficient performance. Strickland,
466 U.S. at 687. "In the specific context of showing prejudice after having
entered a guilty plea, a defendant must prove 'that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's errors, [he or she] would not have pled guilty
and would have insisted on going to trial.'" State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 351
(2012) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Nuñez-Valdéz, 200 N.J. 129, 139
(2009)). Our rules anticipate the need to hold an evidentiary hearing on IAC
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claims "only upon the establishment of a prima facie case in support of post -
conviction relief[.]" R. 3:22-10(b).
Simply put, there is no evidence supporting defendant's bald assertions
that trial counsel failed to communicate with him or review discovery. See State
v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013) (a defendant's PCR petition must contain
"specific facts and evidence supporting his allegations"). As Judge Ironson
aptly found, the transcript of the plea proceedings belies any support for
defendant's other claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Lastly, defendant
never asserted in either his pro se or counsel-assisted certification that but for
counsel's errors, he would not have pled guilty. Nunez-Valdez, 200 N.J. at 139
(citing State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994)).
Affirmed.
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