STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. DENNIS T. CLIVER (18-11-0414, SALEM COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2020 )


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  •                                       RECORD IMPOUNDED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any co urt." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-0150-19T4
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    DENNIS T. CLIVER,
    Defendant-Respondent.
    ______________________________
    Submitted February 24, 2020 – Decided March 20, 2020
    Before Judges Sabatino and Sumners.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Salem County, Indictment No. 18-11-0414.
    John T. Lenahan, Salem County Prosecutor, attorney
    for appellant (David M. Galemba, Assistant Prosecutor,
    of counsel and on the brief).
    John A. Ferzetti, attorney for respondent.
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant Dennis T. Cliver was accused of fondling the penis of a boy
    under the age of thirteen on multiple occasions in 2015 and 2016. Defendant
    was indicted on November 14, 2018, for second-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A.
    2C:14-2(b), and second-degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A.
    2C:24-4(a)(1). Six months later, defendant, sixty-one years old, sought entry
    into PTI after the trial court, with the prosecutor's consent, allowed him to file
    his application out-of-time.
    Upon reviewing defendant's PTI application, the prosecutor rejected the
    compelling reasons defendant raised in support of the application.          In its
    rejection letter to defense counsel, the prosecutor acknowledged some of the
    "compelling reasons" that supported defendant's PTI admission. The prosecutor
    noted defendant's exemplary life, including his honorable discharge from the
    United States Air Force, his strong familial ties, an offense-free past, and that
    he had agreed to a permanent final restraining order as a condition of admittance
    into PTI. Nonetheless, the prosecutor believed defendant was not a suitable
    candidate based on a thorough consideration of the Guidelines for Operation of
    Pretrial Intervention in New Jersey (the Guidelines), Rule 3:28, as well as
    N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12. The prosecutor also cited the "strong oppos[ition]" the
    victim's family's had towards defendant's admission. In conclusion, the State
    maintained it "weighed . . . defendant's amenability to correction and
    responsiveness to rehabilitation, against the nature of the offense and the need
    A-0150-19T4
    2
    for deterrence, and [found] that . . . defendant would be ineligible to participate
    in PTI due to the nature of the offense and . . . [other] reasons" mentioned above.
    Defendant subsequently filed a motion to appeal the prosecutor's
    rejection. To support his declaration that the rejection was a patent and gross
    abuse of the prosecutor's discretion, defendant contended the prosecutor relied
    solely on the nature of the allegations against him, which were uncorroborated
    and full of contradictory statements, and that he met or exceeded most of the
    criteria under Guidelines 1 and 2 to warrant his admission.
    In opposing defendant's motion, the prosecutor assessed all of the
    Guidelines' factors, citing both those in and not in defendant's favor, and stressed
    that to allow defendant into PTI would "demean the serious nature of the sexual
    assault allegations," under factor one. The prosecutor also argued most of
    defendant's contentions raised factual disputes, which needed to be determined
    by a jury, and reiterated the victim's family's strong opposition to defendant's
    entry into PTI.
    On August 2, 2019, after hearing the parties' respective arguments, the
    court remarked:
    I do find that the State has considered all the statutory
    factors, but the defense has challenged that all of the
    arguments made by the State are premised upon the
    victim; the victim's age, the victim's statements, the
    A-0150-19T4
    3
    victim's willingness to testify[,] what the victim wants
    and what his family wants. It's all centered around the
    victim and there's been no contact with the victim since
    June of 2018.
    The court questioned if the "State ha[d] given due consideration to the nature of
    the offense and the ability to prosecute th[e] case, keeping in mind that the
    State’s overriding obligation is to see that justice is done, not to prosecute cases
    because a victim, and/or the victim’s family, wants a case prosecuted."
    Concerned about the State's ability to present a "viable case" given its lack of
    contact with the victim, the court continued the motion for a month to allow the
    prosecutor to contact the victim to assess its ability to prosecute the charges.
    On September 6, the prosecutor informed the court that the victim's father
    was in the courtroom, and he advised his son would be available to assist in trial
    preparation following his son's release from the hospital in ten days. After
    hearing defendant's assertion that "nothing has changed" since the last court
    date, the court remarked:
    The weight of the State’s case is not a determining
    factor in a PTI analysis.         And in ordinary
    circumstances, I can’t imagine that it would result in
    admission to PTI simply because the State had a weak
    case.
    This case has another layer to it which is rather
    disturbing in that the State, on behalf of the State of
    New Jersey, not on behalf of any particular victim, has
    A-0150-19T4
    4
    an obligation to see that justice is done not for the
    particular victim, but for society as a whole. And I’m
    wondering how the State can do that when they have
    had no contact with the victim for sixteen months, and
    I recall previously being told that they were not allowed
    to have contact with the victim.
    That is of concern to the [c]ourt. And so the question
    becomes whether it is such a degree of concern that the
    State has infused its discretion by not allowing the
    defendant [to] enter [into] PTI and thereby requiring
    him to continue to go through the legal process,
    including having -- this case put on the trial list and
    having a trial date set many months from now, given
    our court schedule, only to find out at some point along
    the way, after much time and expense, that, in fact, the
    victim is not available for the trial.
    One has to wonder whether that would be justice for
    anyone. And that is the concern that I have.
    The court next commented on the PTI factors, then stated:
    [The prosecutor] create[d] the impression that either
    there is a bar to PTI for people charged with this . . .
    type of crime, which should not be the case, or this . . .
    defendant, is being denied PTI simply because the
    victim in this case, the victim's father, strongly objects
    to PTI, which should not be the determinative factor
    either.
    [T]he State, while doing its utmost to protect this
    particular victim and wanting to see that the victim has
    his day in court, despite having no contact with him for
    sixteen months, has lost sight of its obligation to see
    that justice is done and to treat each one of these cases
    fairly with an open mind and to give due weight to all
    of the factors set forth in the statute. . . .
    A-0150-19T4
    5
    [T]herefore, in this particular case, . . . the State has
    abused its discretion in denying the defendant
    admission into PTI[.]
    Four days later, confirming its oral decision to grant defendant's motion, the
    court entered an order admitting defendant into PTI over the State's objection.
    Before us, the State argues the trial court misapplied the law in overriding
    the prosecutor's rejection of defendant's PTI application. The State maintains the
    court mischaracterized its rejection of defendant's application by finding it was
    based solely on the type of offense. The State contends it properly weighed the
    entire Guidelines, including the victim's desire and interests, and the societal
    interest in prosecuting defendant, when it decided to reject defendant's
    application. We agree with the State.
    Initially, we point out that effective July 1, 2018, the Guidelines were
    eliminated, with" many of their prescriptions — with significant variations —
    [now] contained in Rules 3:28-1 to -10." State v. Johnson, 
    238 N.J. 119
    , 128
    (2019). However, neither the trial court nor the parties, before the court or
    before us, acknowledged this change. Although the parties' present arguments
    speak to the Guidelines, we see no need to remand because the reasons cited in
    the court's decision, the record provided, and the parties' arguments allow us to
    determine whether it was appropriate for the court to admit defendant into PTI.
    A-0150-19T4
    6
    The prosecutor's consideration of a PTI application is based on the criteria
    set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e) as well as those found in Rule 3:28-4(b). R.
    3:28-4(a). In accordance with Rule 3:28-1(d)(1), a "person who is charged with
    a crime, or crimes, for which there is a presumption of incarceration or a
    mandatory minimum period of parole ineligibility" is ineligible for PTI without
    prosecutorial consent. A defendant charged with a first- or second-degree crime
    must also enter a guilty plea prior to admission into PTI "[t]o be admitted into
    [PTI], a guilty plea must be entered for a defendant who is charged with: . . . a
    first or second degree crime[.]" R. 3:28-5(b)(2); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:43-
    12(g)(3). The prosecutor's withholding of consent and an order overruling a
    prosecutor's objection to a defendant's entry into PTI are subject to appeal as set
    forth in Rule. 3:28-6.
    It is the "fundamental responsibility" of the prosecutor to decide whom to
    prosecute, State v. Kraft, 
    265 N.J. Super. 106
    , 111 (App. Div. 1993), and
    prosecutors have wide latitude in PTI determinations, State v. Wallace, 
    146 N.J. 576
    , 582 (1996); State v. Nwobu, 
    139 N.J. 236
    , 246 (1995).            Essentially,
    deciding whether to admit a defendant into PTI is a "quintessentially
    prosecutorial function," 
    Wallace, 146 N.J. at 582
    , that calls for an
    "individualized assessment of [a defendant's] 'amenability to correction' and
    A-0150-19T4
    7
    potential 'responsiveness to rehabilitation,'" along with a consideration of all the
    statutory factors and guidelines. State v. Roseman, 
    221 N.J. 611
    , 621-22 (2015)
    (quoting State v. Watkins, 
    193 N.J. 507
    , 520 (2008)). It is well-established that
    "the PTI process is not designed to assess the weight of the State's case. '[T]he
    appropriate administration of the program militates against basing enrollment
    upon the weight of the evidence of guilt.'" 
    Nwobu, 139 N.J. at 252
    (quoting
    State v. Smith, 
    92 N.J. 143
    , 147 (1983)).
    A prosecutor's objection to PTI admission is afforded "extreme
    deference," 
    Nwobu, 139 N.J. at 246
    , which has also been referred to as
    "enhanced" or "extra" deference, State v. Baynes, 
    148 N.J. 434
    , 443-44 (1997).
    In short, defendants are saddled with "a heavy burden" when seeking to
    overcome prosecutorial vetoes. 
    Nwobu, 139 N.J. at 246
    . And courts may set
    aside a prosecutor's objection "only" when the prosecutor's decision constitutes
    a "most egregious example[] of injustice and unfairness." State v. DeMarco,
    
    107 N.J. 562
    , 566 (1987).
    To overturn a rejection of a PTI application, a defendant must "clearly and
    convincingly establish that the prosecutor's refusal . . . was based on a patent
    and gross abuse of . . . discretion." 
    Wallace, 146 N.J. at 582
    (quoting State v.
    Leonardis, 
    73 N.J. 360
    , 382 (1977)). An abuse of discretion occurs when the
    A-0150-19T4
    8
    "prosecutorial veto (a) was not premised on a consideration of all relevant
    factors, (b) was based upon a consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors,
    or (c) amounted to a clear error in judgment." 
    Id. at 583
    (quoting State v.
    Bender, 
    80 N.J. 84
    , 93 (1979)). The error complained of rises to the level of a
    "patent and gross abuse of discretion" when the prosecutor's abuse of discretion
    "will clearly subvert the goals underlying [PTI]." 
    Ibid. With these principles
    in mind, we are constrained to conclude the court
    mistakenly ordered defendant's admission into PTI over the prosecutor's
    objection. Our review of the record convinces us that the prosecutor considered,
    weighed, and properly balanced all the requisite factors, including those
    personal to defendant as well as the facts and circumstances of the offenses. We
    therefore do not conclude the prosecutor's rejection of defendant's PTI
    application was a patent abuse of discretion amounting to a clear error of
    judgment.
    The linchpin of the court's contrary conclusion, and of defendant's
    appellate arguments in support of the court's decision, was the belief that the
    prosecutor rejected defendant's PTI application based upon the offense involved,
    the victim's father's strong objection to PTI, and the possible difficulties the
    State may have in prosecuting the charges due to a reluctant or unavailable
    A-0150-19T4
    9
    victim. We appreciate that the prosecutor gave significant weight to the fact
    that defendant is charged with second-degree offenses of sexual assault and
    endangering the welfare of a minor – both having a presumption of incarceration
    – but as the State maintains that is within its prerogative. See Kraft, 265 N.J.
    Super. at 117 (citing State v. Litton, 
    155 N.J. Super. 207
    , 215 (App. Div. 1977))
    ("Certainly, a reviewing court is not permitted to 'discount the prosecutor's
    responsiveness to the prevailing level of local public anxiety over certa in forms
    of misconduct and its proper effect upon him in choosing between the goals of
    public deterrence and the least burdensome form of rehabilitation for the
    offender.'").   Of further importance is that "[i]n nearly identical language,
    N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e) and Rule 3:28-4(c) require prosecutors . . . to 'give due
    consideration to the victim's position' on whether the defendant should be
    admitted into PTI." RSI Bank v. Providence Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 
    234 N.J. 459
    ,
    475 n.5 (2018). Even if reasonable minds differ in analyzing and balancing the
    applicable factors in this case, the trial court's disagreement with a prosecutor's
    reasons for rejection does not equate to prosecutorial abuse of discretion to merit
    override of the prosecutor's decision.
    Reversed.
    A-0150-19T4
    10