WILLIAM H. VINA VS. BOARD OF TRUSTEES (TEACHERS' PENSION AND ANNUITY FUND) ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1737-18T1
WILLIAM H. VINA,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
TEACHERS' PENSION
AND ANNUITY FUND,
Respondent-Respondent.
__________________________
Argued March 9, 2020 – Decided March 26, 2020
Before Judges Sabatino and Geiger.
On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the Teachers'
Pension and Annuity Fund, Department of the
Treasury.
Jason Earl Sokolowski argued the cause for appellant
(Zazzali Fagella Nowak Kleinbaum & Friedman,
attorneys; Jason Earl Sokolowski, of counsel and on the
briefs).
Robert E. Kelly, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney
General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant
Attorney General, of counsel; Robert E. Kelly, on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Petitioner William H. Vina appeals from a November 1, 2018 final
decision of respondent Board of Trustees (the Board) of the Teachers' Pension
and Annuity Fund (TPAF), denying his application for accidental disability
retirement benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:66-39(c).
The parties have stipulated to the following facts. Vina was employed by
Matawan-Aberdeen Regional School District as a high school teacher. Vina was
injured in an incident on February 2, 2015. He filed an application for accidental
disability retirement dated March 16, 2016.
On October 6, 2016, the Board considered and denied Vina's application
for accidental disability retirement. The Board determined that Vina was totally
and permanently disabled from the performance of his regular and assigned job
duties. The Board found Vina was physically or mentally incapacitated from
the performance of his usual or other duties that his employer was willing to
offer. The Board also found that the event that caused Vina's reported disability
was identifiable as to time and place, undersigned and unexpected, caused by
circumstances external to Vina, and not as a result of a pre-existing disease.
Additionally, the Board found that Vina's reported disability was not the result
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of his willful negligence. However, the Board noted that the event did not occur
during and as a result of Vina's regular or assigned duties. Consequently, the
Board only granted Vina ordinary disability retirement benefits effective
September 1, 2016.1
Vina appealed and the matter was transferred to the office of
Administrative Law as a contested case. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
conducted a one-day trial. Vina was the only witness. Eight exhibits were
admitted in evidence, including the stipulation of facts. The parties agreed that
the only issue to be determined was whether Vina "was injured on a premise
owned or controlled by the employer during and as a result of his regular or
assigned duties as required by N.J.S.A. 43:15A-43."
Vina claimed he suffered disabling injuries when he slipped and fell on a
snow-covered exterior walkway following a mandatory faculty meeting. The
meeting took place after classes had been dismissed and after-school activities
cancelled due to a snowstorm.
1
A person retired on an ordinary disability pension receives significantly lower
benefits than one retired on an accidental disability pension. Kasper v. Bd. of
Trs., Teachers' Pension & Annuity Fund, 164 N.J. 564, 573-74 (2000) (citing
N.J.S.A. 18A:66-41, -42).
A-1737-18T1
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The thirty-minute faculty meeting was held in the school's library. Vina
testified that when the meeting ended, he stepped outside to use a slightly uphill
walkway to go to the main office and the door locked behind him. When asked
by the ALJ why he chose to walk outside, Vina stated: "I enjoy getting outside
as much [as] I can, it's also, I've been taking that route for over eight years, and
it's a shorter distance to get to the office [than] it is to go out the library down
the hall . . . ." Vina testified that because the library has no windows, he did not
know an inch of snow had fallen. After walking only forty to fifty feet he fell.
Vina testified he was on his way to the school's main office to sign out at
the end of the day, pick up his mail, and drop off materials from his last class.
As a result of his fall, Vina alleges he suffered serious injuries to the bicep,
tricep and tendons of his right arm, a fractured right shoulder, three toe fractures,
and a bone bruise to his right hip. He claims he is in constant pain and is unable
to raise his right arm more than "half[-]way up."
Vina testified that his car, which was parked in an adjacent parking lot,
"was closer than the main office." He walked to his car, "[t]o seek safety in [his]
car first." When asked what he needed safety from, Vina replied: "It was very
slippery outside and I was a little disheveled after I fell, saw my vehicle, and I
said, 'You know what, I'm just going to get there so I can gather my thoughts.'"
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From inside his car, Vina called the main office and told secretary Nancy
Zange that he "didn't sign out," and asked if she could "sign [him] out or tell the
principal I fell?" Vina explained, "I'm not gonna come back in because, I'm just
gonna get out of here, because I'm hurt." Vina drove away but did not seek
medical treatment until the following day.
Vina did not call Zange as a witness. The record does not reflect the
results of Vina's workers' compensation application. Nor does it include any
accident reports prepared by Vina or other school employees.
A map of the school property that showed the interior layout of the
building was admitted in evidence. Using the map, Vina indicated where he fell
and where the walkway, main office, library, and parking lot were located.
Following submission of written closing arguments, the ALJ issued a July
25, 2018 written Initial Decision affirming the Board's determination that Vina
was not eligible for accidental disability retirement benefits. After noting the
procedural history, basic contentions, stipulated facts, and single issue
presented, the ALJ made the following findings:
In his application for accidental retirement
benefits, Vina wrote that he fell leaving a faculty
meeting; that he sustained injuries and that he can no
longer perform his regular or assigned duties.
A-1737-18T1
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At the hearing, Vina provided greater detail. But,
due to the limited issue, we only had testimony from
the appellant. Simply put, his testimony was not
credible in terms of his factual recitation of the case as
well as the manner in which it was given. The delivery
of his testimony confused and compounded his ability
to prove the facts of the case by a preponderance of the
evidence. Many of his answers included a long
preamble before an actual response which muddied
understanding the answer. Also, much of his testimony
was highly exaggerated and was not only not credible,
but also not realistic. His answers were "canned" and
not genuine as well as not believable about the location
of his fall. Instead of answering questions directly, he
would answer them in a manner that served his purpose.
It was obvious that he attempted to "sell" his version of
the facts to the undersigned that he fell on the sidewalk.
The ALJ concluded that Vina "was not injured . . . during or as a result of
the actual performance of his or her duties or in an activity preparatory but
essential to that duty, whether or not the injury occurs before or after official
work hours."
The ALJ noted "the traumatic event must have occurred during and as a
result of the member's regular or assigned duties." The ALJ distinguished the
facts in this case from those in Kasper; Pollara v. Board of Trustees, Police and
Firemen's Retirement System, 183 N.J. Super. 505 (App. Div. 1982); and In re
Carlson, 174 N.J. Super. 603 (App. Div. 1980). Unlike the petitioners in those
cases, the ALJ found Vina was not credible.
A-1737-18T1
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Further, the ALJ stated that "[u]nlike [in] Pollara, Vina had finished the
actual performance of his regular or assigned duties. I do not find his testimony
that he was on his way back to the office to 'check out' as credible." Moreover,
"unlike [in] Kasper, Vina was not engaged in an activity preparatory but
essential to that duty. He was going home."
Vina filed exceptions to the Initial Decision. On November 1, 2018, the
Board adopted the Initial Decision and affirmed the denial of accidental
disability retirement benefits. This appeal followed.
Before this court, Vina argues: (1) the ALJ's findings were contrary to
the evidence presented; (2) Vina's accident occurred during and as a result of
regular or assigned work duties, thereby entitling him to accidental disability
retirement benefits; and (3) the Board's adoption of the ALJ's decision that failed
to determine the location of the traumatic event and mistakenly concluded that
Vina was commuting home rather than performing his job duties, constituted
reversible error.
We have considered these arguments in light of the record and applicable
legal standards. We affirm.
Our review of a final decision of an administrative agency is limited.
Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011) (citing
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In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27 (2007)). The agency's decision should be upheld
"unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable,
or that it lacks fair support in the record." Ibid. (quoting Herrmann, 192 N.J. at
27-28). "The burden of demonstrating that the agency's action was arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable rests upon the [party] challenging the administrative
action." In re Arenas, 385 N.J. Super. 440, 443-44 (App. Div. 2006) (citations
omitted).
"We recognize that agencies have 'expertise and superior knowledge . . .
in their specialized fields.'" Hemsey v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret.
Sys., 198 N.J. 215, 223 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting In re License
Issued to Zahl, 186 N.J. 341, 353 (2006)). We therefore accord deference to the
"agency's interpretation of a statute" it is charged with enforcing. Thompson v.
Bd. of Trs., Teachers' Pension & Annuity Fund, 449 N.J. Super. 478, 483 (App.
Div. 2017) (quoting Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys.,
192 N.J. 189, 196 (2007)), aff'd o.b., 233 N.J. 232 (2018). "'Such deference has
been specifically extended to state agencies that administer pension statutes, '
because 'a state agency brings experience and specialized knowledge to its task
of administering and regulating a legislative enactment within its field of
A-1737-18T1
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expertise.'" Id. at 483-84 (quoting Piatt v. Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 443
N.J. Super. 80, 99 (App. Div. 2015)).
The factual "findings of an ALJ 'are considered binding on appeal, when
supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence.'" Oceanside Charter
Sch. v. Dep't of Educ., 418 N.J. Super. 1, 9 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting In re
Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 656 (1999)). "The choice of accepting or rejecting
testimony of witnesses rests with the administrative agency, and where such
choice is reasonably made, it is conclusive on appeal." Ibid. (quoting In re
Application of Howard Sav. Bank, 143 N.J. Super. 1, 9 (App. Div. 1976)).
Deference is "especially appropriate when the evidence is largely testimonial
and involves questions of credibility." In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149
N.J. 108, 117 (1997) (citing Bonnco Petrol, Inc. v. Epstein, 115 N.J. 599, 607
(1989)).
"A reviewing court 'may not substitute its own judgment for the agency's,
even though the court might have reached a different result.'" In re Stallworth,
208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011) (quoting In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 483 (2007)). "This
is particularly true when the issue under review is directed to the agency's
special 'expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field.'" Id. at 195
(quoting Herrmann, 192 N.J. at 28).
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That said, when the facts are undisputed, whether an injury occurred
"'during and [as] a result of her regular or assigned duties' is a legal question of
statutory interpretation, which we review de novo." Bowser v. Bd. of Trs.,
Police & Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 455 N.J. Super. 165, 170-71 (App. Div. 2018).
Conversely, when controlling facts are disputed, we afford deference to the
Board's factual findings. Oceanside Charter Sch., 418 N.J. Super. at 9.
With those principles in mind, we consider whether the Board's decision
was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by substantial credible
evidence in the record.
A TPAF member may be retired on an accidental disability pension if the
employee is "permanently and totally disabled as a direct result of a traumatic
event occurring during and as a result of the performance of his regular or
assigned duties." N.J.S.A. 18A:66-39(c); accord Kasper, 164 N.J. at 573.
Vina argues the ALJ erred: (1) by not specifically citing to portions of his
testimony that were incredible; (2) by not acknowledging the parties' stipulation
that Vina's fall occurred on school property; and (3) by misapplying Kasper,
resulting in Vina's disqualification from accidental disability retirement
benefits. We are unpersuaded by these arguments.
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We first note that an ALJ's factual findings of lay-witness credibility
generally receive deference. See N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c) ("The [Board] may not
reject or modify any findings of fact as to issues of credibility of law witness
testimony unless . . . the findings are arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or are
not supported by sufficient, competent, and credible evidence in the record.").
In considering that evidence, "the reviewing court should give 'due regard to the
opportunity of the one who heard the witnesses to judge of their credibility. '"
Clowes v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 109 N.J. 575, 587 (1988) (quoting Close v.
Kordulak Bros., 44 N.J. 589, 599 (1965)). "[I]t is not for us or the agency head
to disturb that credibility determination, made after due consideration of the
witnesses' testimony and demeanor during the hearing." H.K. v. Dep't Human
Servs., 184 N.J. 367, 384 (2005).
In this matter, the ALJ was not required to point to specific instances of
Vina's testimony that he felt were incredible. Our deference to an ALJ's findings
"extends to credibility determinations that are not explicitly enunciated if the
record as a whole makes these findings clear." In re Snellbaker, 414 N.J. Super.
26, 36 (App. Div. 2010). Here, the lack of credible evidence presented by Vina
supports the ALJ's findings.
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For instance, Vina explains that he was "the only witness to the accident,
and therefore was the only witness who could provide firsthand knowledge of
the slip and fall." However, Vina also asserts that his job requirements included
signing out at the end of each day, picking up mail, and performing other
administrative tasks—all in the school's main office. He also avers the faculty
meeting was mandatory and that he customarily took the outside walkway rather
than interior hallways to the main office.
To qualify for accidental disability benefits, it was Vina's burden to show
by a preponderance of the evidence that his injuries were a "result of the
performance of his regular or assigned duties." N.J.S.A. 18A:66-39(c). At the
hearing, Vina did not offer an corroborating evidence in support of his assertions
that: (1) he customarily took the exterior pathway from the library to the main
office; (2) he called Zanga after the fall; and that (3) Zanga relayed his message
to the school principal. Considering Vina's lack of credibility together with the
absence of corroborating evidence, the ALJ determined that Vina failed to
demonstrate he was injured during the course of "his regular or assigned duties."
N.J.S.A. 18A:66-39(c).
Lastly, Vina points to the stipulation that his fall occurred on school
property, as proof that the ALJ erred in his determination. While the parties
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stipulated the fall occurred on school property, they did not stipulate the exact
location where the fall occurred. Moreover, the ALJ clarified that "the only
issue to be determined by this court is whether or not the traumatic event
occurred during and as a result of Vina's regular or assigned duties." We concur
that this is the dispositive issue; not the fact that the fall occurred on school
grounds.
In Kasper, the employee had "parked her car, crossed the street to the
school, and was negotiating the stairs" of the school when the incident occurred.
164 N.J. at 588. The Court made clear that to qualify for accidental disability
retirement benefits, "an employee cannot be 'coming or going' to work, but must
be engaged in his or her employment duties." Id. at 581.
Rather, the employee "must be engaged in his or her employment duties
on property owned or controlled by the employer." Ibid. Therefore, "in order
to qualify for accidental disability benefits, employees must satisfy the statutory
criteria that they were on the work premises and performing a function causally
connected to their work." Mattia v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys.,
455 N.J. Super. 217, 223 (App. Div. 2018) (citing Kasper, 164 N.J. at 588). A
teacher who is required to stay late for a faculty meeting "qualifies for an
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accidental disability pension if [he] receives a disabling traumatic injur y while
performing [that] duty." Kasper, 164 N.J. at 586.
Vina did not meet this requirement merely by falling on school grounds.
He presented insufficient evidence to prove he was still performing "his regular
or assigned duties" when he fell. N.J.S.A. 18A:66-39(c); see also Mattia, 455
N.J. Super. at 223 (noting that a petitioner for accidental disability benefits must
meet the two-fold requirement of being "on the work premises and performing
a function causally connected to their work").
Vina fell outside the school building after classes and the after-school
faculty meeting had ended. After falling, he walked to his car and drove away.
The ALJ discredited Vina's testimony that he was headed to the main office to
sign out and retrieve his mail. The ALJ concluded that Vina did not prove he
was performing a job duty or was engaged in an activity preparatory but essential
to that duty when he fell. On the contrary, the ALJ found "Vina had finished
the actual performance of his regular or assigned duties" and "was going home."
Injuries suffered during commuting do not qualify for accidental disability
retirement benefits. Kasper, 164 N.J. at 581; Mattia, 455 N.J. Super. at 223.
We conclude from our review of the record that the ALJ's findings, which
the Board adopted, are supported by the record. The Board's decision was not
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arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Accordingly, we discern no basis to
overturn the Board's determination that Vina was ineligible for accidental
disability retirement benefits. See In re Young, 202 N.J. 50, 71 (2010)
(upholding an agency decision where "there was substantial credible evidence
in the record as a whole to support the agency's findings").
Affirmed.
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