RANDY JOHNSON VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD (NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD) ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4598-18T1
RANDY JOHNSON,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY STATE
PAROLE BOARD,
Respondent.
_____________________________
Submitted September 22, 2020 – Decided September 29, 2020
Before Judges Fisher and Gummer.
On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole Board.
Randy Johnson, appellant pro se.
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Christopher C. Josephson, Deputy
Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Randy Johnson appeals a final agency decision of the Parole Board,
denying parole and setting a seventy-two-month future parole eligibility term
("FET"). We affirm.
In 1985, a jury convicted Johnson of felony murder, two counts of
robbery, aggravated assault, and unlawful possession of a weapon. He was
sentenced to an aggregate term of life in prison, with a thirty-three-year and
four-month period of parole ineligibility. Johnson became eligible for parole in
2017.
In 2018, after a prior decision to deny parole had been vacated, a two-
member panel of the Board denied parole. Considering among other factors his
prior criminal history and incarcerations, his institutional infractions , and
mitigating factors such as participation in behavior-specific and institutional
programs, the panel concluded that Johnson was only in the "beginning stages
of understanding his crime" and that his "numerous infractions . . . suggest that
he has continued his criminal behavior." The panel also found that he minimizes
his conduct, lacked a "viable parole plan," and had not addressed sufficiently a
substance-abuse problem. The panel concluded that a substantial likelihood
existed that Johnson would commit a new crime if released on parole.
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A three-member panel of the Board imposed a seventy-two-month FET,
expressing its rationale in a thorough written opinion. The panel found that the
factors supporting denial of parole were "of such a serious nature" as to warrant
the setting of a seventy-two-month FET, which the panel believed necessary to
provide Johnson with an opportunity to address the multiple issues identified by
the panel.
Johnson appealed those decisions to the full Board. The full Board issued
a final agency decision, affirming the panels' parole denial and establishment of
a seventy-two-month FET.
Johnson appeals, arguing:
POINT I
THERE WERE INSUFFICIENT REASONS TO
DENY PAROLE.
POINT II
A LIFE SENTENCE SHOULD NOT BE A DEATH
PENALTY.
POINT III
THE ACOLI RULING SHOULD NOT APPLY.
POINT IV
THE ACOLI RULING VIOLATES THE
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL PROCESS.
We find insufficient merit in these arguments to warrant discussion in a written
opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(2) and add only the following few comments.
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The scope of our review is limited. In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194
(2011). The Board is "the 'agency charged with the responsibility of deciding
whether an inmate satisfies the criteria for parole release under the Parole Act
of 1979.'" Acoli v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 224 N.J. 213, 222 (2016) (quoting In
re Application of Hawley, 98 N.J. 108, 112 (1984)). The Board's decisions are
highly "'individualized discretionary appraisals.'" Trantino v. N.J. State Parole
Bd., 166 N.J. 113, 173 (2001) (quoting Beckworth v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 62
N.J. 348, 359 (1973)). Accordingly, the Board's decisions are entitled to a
presumption of validity, In re Vey, 272 N.J. Super. 199, 205 (App. Div. 1993),
aff'd, 135 N.J. 306 (1994), and deference to the Board's "expertise in the
specialized area of parole supervision," J.I. v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 228 N.J.
204, 230 (2017). We intervene in a Board decision denying parole or imposing
a particular FET only if the appellant demonstrates that the decision is
"arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable" or that it could not "reasonably have
been reached on the credible evidence in the record." McGowan v. N.J. State
Parole Bd., 347 N.J. Super. 544, 563 (App. Div. 2002). An "agency's exercise
of its statutorily-delegated responsibilities is accorded a strong presumption of
reasonableness." Ibid.
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The Board's determinations to deny parole and to impose a seventy-two-
month FET were well-supported by the evidence. On the record presented, the
Board's decisions were not arbitrary or capricious, and the Board did not abuse
its discretion.
Johnson faults the Board for not accepting his versions of the details of
the crimes for which he was imprisoned and his characterization of the
infractions he committed while incarcerated. We are satisfied that the Board
based its decision "on the aggregate of all pertinent factors, including material
supplied by the inmate and reports and material which may be submitted by any
persons or agencies which have knowledge of the inmate." N.J.A.C. 10A:71-
3.11(a). Johnson's attempt to minimize the thirteen infractions he committed
while incarcerated is not supported by the record.
Johnson also faults the Board for failing to recognize that he is not the
same person now that he was when he was arrested. To the contrary, the Board
expressly acknowledged Johnson's participation in institutional and behavior-
specific programs and his recent effort to obtain a GED credential. The Board
found that Johnson is not now the person he needs to be to merit parole given
his insufficient understanding of his crime, his conduct, his motivations and
triggers to negative behavioral choices, and his continuing anti-social behavior
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and his resulting lack of satisfactory progress in reducing the likelihood of
future criminal behavior. In reaching that conclusion and in determining that a
seventy-two-month FET is an appropriate term to enable him to take the
necessary steps to make that required progress, the Board relied on substantial
credible evidence in the record and was not acting arbitrarily, capriciously, or
unreasonably.
Affirmed.
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