STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JOSEPH L. CODY (12-11-2741, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0754-18T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JOSEPH CODY, a/k/a JOSE
CODY, JOSIE L. CODY,
JOISE CODY and LEE CODY
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________
Submitted April 21, 2020 – Decided May 22, 2020
Before Judges Yannotti, Currier and Firko.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 12-11-2741.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Amira Rahman Scurato, Designated
Counsel, on the brief).
Theodore N. Stephens II, Acting Essex County
Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Barbara A.
Rosenkrans, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief.
PER CURIAM
Defendant Joseph Cody appeals the May 29, 2018 Law Division order
denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR), claiming he received
ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. We affirm.
I.
We briefly summarize the relevant facts from the record. Defendant was
convicted of second-degree conspiracy to commit robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and
N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(b); first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; fourth-degree
unlawful possession of a blunt object under inappropriate circumstances,
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d); and third-degree possession of a weapon with an unlawful
purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d) following a jury trial. The convictions arose from
the robbery of Surjit Singh, an attendant at a gas station in Newark.
After eleven hours of deliberations, the jury reported they were at an
impasse. The trial court, who was also the PCR court, instructed the jury to
continue its deliberations, gave the instruction approved in State v. Czachor, 82
N.J. 392 (1980), and provided a written copy of the jury charge over the
objection of defense counsel. The jury also heard readbacks of Singh and
Lorraine Bellamy's testimony.
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Following a guilty verdict on all counts, the trial court imposed a sentence
of twenty-five years imprisonment with an eighty-five percent period of parole
ineligibility, pursuant to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2,
and five years of parole supervision upon release. The judge also imposed a
discretionary extended term for persistent offenders under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-
7.1(b). We affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence. State v. Cody, No.
A-5005-13 (App. Div. June 20, 2016). The Supreme Court denied defendant's
petition for certification. State v. Cody, 228 N.J. 503 (2017).
Thereafter, on April 11, 2017, defendant filed a pro se petition for PCR
alleging ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel and seeking an
evidentiary hearing. In his petition, defendant raised the following issues:
POINT I
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY
DEFICIENT FOR FAILURE TO MOTION THE
TRIAL COURT FOR A MOTION TO SUPPRESS
THE INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM
PETITIONER DUE TO "FRUITS OF SUCH AN
UNLAWFUL ARREST," WHICH VIOLATED BOTH
THE UNITED STATES AND NEW JERSEY
CONSTITUTIONS['] GUARANTEE [OF] THE
RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES. U.S. CONST. AMEND
IV; N.J. CONST. ART. 1, 7.
POINT II
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TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE DURING
THE PLEA NEGOTIATIONS WHEN HE
MISADVISED PETITIONER THAT THE VIDEO
AND CLOTHING EVIDENCE WOULD NOT BE
USED AGAINST HIM AT TRIAL.
In his petition, defendant argued that the Newark police officers had
reasonable suspicion to stop the gold Nissan he was a passenger in and being
operated by co-defendant Arthur Armstrong, but did not have probable cause to
arrest him. An off-duty fireman, Tashon Brown, was in the gas station's
convenience store when the robbery took place. Brown followed defendant and
co-defendant, his brother Victor Cody, and observed them enter the Nissan.
Brown called the police and gave them the license plate number and the location
of the vehicle. Defendant claimed the evidence seized as a result of his arrest
should have been suppressed and appellate counsel's failure to raise th is
argument on appeal constituted ineffective assistance.
Additionally, defendant asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective
during plea negotiations because he advised defendant that the surveillance
video would only be admissible for "show-up identification evidence" and no
other purpose at trial. He also claimed trial counsel led him to believe that
evidence obtained at the time of his arrest would be inadmissible at trial because
none of the witnesses described the clothing he wore. According to defendant,
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if Victor's trial counsel had not misled them on these proofs, he likely would
have accepted the ten-year plea deal offered by the State instead of proceeding
to trial.
Defendant was assigned PCR counsel. In addition to defendant's
arguments, PCR counsel argued the following points:
POINT I
PETITIONER WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CONSTI-
TUTIONALLY GUARANTEED TO HIM PRE-
TRIAL, AT TRIAL AND ON APPEAL,
NECESSITATING GRANTING HIS PETITION FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF. U.S. CONST.
AMENDS. VI, XIV; N.J. CONST. ART. 1, PAR. 10.
A. Trial And Appellate Counsels' Failure To
Address The Trial Court Not Making The
Required Inquiry Of The Clearly Deadlocked
Jury "Whether Further Deliberations Would
Likely Result In A Verdict" Resulted In
Ineffectiveness Of Trial And Appellate Defense
Counsel.
B. Appellate Counsel's Failure To Raise The Trial
Court's Sua Sponte And Unasked For Intrusion
Into Jury Deliberations Resulted In The
Conviction's Affirmance By The Appellate
Division And In Ineffective Assistance Of
Counsel.
C. Trial Counsel's Failure To File And Argue A
Motion To Suppress Resulted In The Admittance
Of The Distinctive Shirt And Other Items Into
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Evidence And In Ineffective Assistance Of
Counsel.
D. Counsel's Failure To Move To Suppress All
Evidence And Identifications Of The Defendants
And Appellate Counsel's Failure To Raise This
Issue On Appeal, Resulted In Ineffectiveness Of
Counsel.
E. Trial Counsel's Lack Of Substantial Interaction
With The Petitioner, Failure To File Motions,
And Failure To Pursue An Exculpatory
Explanation For The Recovered Money, Resulted
In Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel.
F. The Petitioner Adopts The Points And
Arguments Submitted On Behalf Of The Co-
Defendant, [Victor] Cody.
On April 16, 2018, the PCR court heard oral argument and reserved
decision. On June 1, 2018, the PCR court issued a comprehensive, twenty-five
page written opinion denying defendant's petition without an evidentiary
hearing. The PCR court considered the merits of each of defendant's claims and
found he failed to demonstrate either his trial counsel or appellate counsel was
ineffective.
The PCR court held defendant "failed to establish a prima facie case in
support of any claim" and "an evidentiary hearing would not aid this court in its
decision to deny all of [defendant's] claims." The PCR court further determined
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that some of defendant's claims were raised, addressed on the merits, and
rejected on direct appeal.
Ultimately, the PCR court concluded defendant failed to demonstrate that
either his trial counsel or appellate counsel was ineffective. More specifically,
the PCR court found the restraint on defendant's liberty "arose to an
investigative detention, rather than a custodial arrest," pursuant to Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968). The PCR court noted that "[s]ome restraint of a suspect's
liberty is inherent in any 'show-up'" and the detention was no longer than
reasonably necessary to facilitate the identification process, lasting fifteen
minutes. Therefore, the PCR court determined that defendant failed to establish
his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress the show -up
identifications under Rule 3:5A.
The PCR court found defendant was not arrested until Singh identified
him and Victor Cody as the perpetrators. Singh stated defendant "struck him in
the eye with some type of object." At that point, the PCR court determined the
officer had probable cause to arrest defendant. A passerby, Bellamy, observed
the robbery and physically described defendant and his brother as they ran from
the scene of the crime. Surveillance video showed two men—one "wore a
hooded coat while the other wore a shirt with a distinctive cross pattern on the
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back . . . ." Defendant's clothing matched the description given by Bellamy to
the police. The PCR court found the officers had "sufficient objective
justification to remove" defendant from the Nissan and his "clothing remained
visible on the front passenger floorboard" in plain view.
Moreover, the PCR court concluded that appellate counsel's failure to
raise these claims on direct appeal did not rise to the level of ineffective
assistance of counsel. On appeal, defendant raises the following points:
POINT I
THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR PCR WITHOUT
AFFORDING HIM AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
TO FULLY ADDRESS HIS CONTENTION THAT HE
FAILED TO RECEIVE ADEQUATE LEGAL
REPRESENTATION AT THE TRIAL AND
APPELLATE LEVELS.
A. RELEVANT CASE LAW.
B. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
OCCURRED WHEN TRIAL COUNSEL OBJECTED
TO THE ISSUE OF THE COURT'S IMPROPER
RESPONSE TO THE JURY'S QUESTION
REGARDING BEING DEADLOCKED AND
APPELLATE COUNSEL FAILED TO RAISE THE
ISSUE ON APPEAL.
C. THE PCR COURT WAS FACTUALLY
INCORRECT IN DENYING PCR FOR THE REASON
THAT THE MATTER HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY
RAISED ON DIRECT APPEAL WHEN PCR
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COUNSEL CLEARLY SHOWED THAT THE ISSUE
HAD NOT BEEN RAISED DUE TO
INEFFECTIVENESS OF PRIOR COUNSEL.
In his pro se supplemental brief, defendant raises the following additional
points:
POINT I
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR
FAILING TO OBJECT TO THE JURY
INSTRUCTIONS FOLLOWING THE JURY'S
QUESTION REGARDING BEING DEADLOCKED
WHICH VIOLATED THE PETITIONER'S FEDERAL
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A
FAIR TRIAL.
POINT II
APPELLATE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR
FAILING TO RAISE THAT THE TRIAL COURT
IMPROPERLY HANDLED THE JURY'S
QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO THEM BEING
DEADLOCKED WHICH VIOLATED THE
PETITIONER'S FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL.
POINT III
TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO PROPERLY
CONSULT WITH PETITIONER, TO FILE
MOTIONS, AND TO PURSUE [AN]
EXCULPATORY DEFENSE FOR THE MONEY
RECOVERED THAT WAS IN DISPARITY WITH
WHAT WAS TAKEN FROM THE VICTIM
CONSTITUTED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL WHICH VIOLATED THE PETITIONER'S
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FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO A FAIR TRIAL.
POINT IV
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF TRIAL AND
APPELLATE COUNSEL'S ERRORS DEPRIVED
PETITIONER OF HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND A FAIR TRIAL
UNDER THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT[S] WHICH VIOLATED THE
PETITIONER'S FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT[S] TO A FAIR TRIAL.
II.
We first turn to defendant's contention that he was denied effective
assistance of trial counsel because his attorney did not file a motion to s uppress
evidence obtained at the time of the stop. Defendant argues he was under arrest,
not merely detained, because he was placed against the car, patted down,
handcuffed, and subjected to a show-up identification. We disagree.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must meet the two-prong test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687 (1984), and adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J.
42, 58 (1987). The first prong of the Strickland test requires a defendant to show
that his or her attorney's performance was deficient. 466 U.S. at 687.
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To do so, a defendant must establish that counsel's alleged acts or
omissions fell "outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance."
Id. at 690. This requires a showing "that counsel made errors so serious that
counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment." Id. at 687.
To satisfy the second prong of Strickland, the defendant "must show that
the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Ibid. The defendant must
establish "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. "These
standards apply to claims of ineffective assistance at both the trial level and on
appeal." State v. Guzman, 313 N.J. Super. 363, 374 (App. Div. 1998) (citations
omitted).
The test also applies to defendants who reject plea offers and go to trial,
alleging that their decision was due to an attorney's ineffective counseling.
However, in these cases, specific instances of attorney ineffectiveness existed,
such as assuring a client that the plaintiff had no proof of their case. Lafler v.
Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 164 (2012).
Petitioner bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case. State v.
Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 350 (2012). "[W]e consider [a] petitioner's contentions
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indulgently and view the facts asserted . . . in the light most favorable to him."
State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999).
In order to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing, the defendant must
establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, that there are
material issues of disputed fact that cannot be resolved by reference to the
existing record, and that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve the claims
for relief. R. 3:22-10(b). An evidentiary hearing shall not be granted "if an
evidentiary hearing will not aid the court's analysis of the defendant's
entitlement to post-conviction relief" or "if the defendant's allegations are too
vague, conclusory or speculative." R. 3:22-10(e).
We review the legal conclusions of a PCR court de novo. State v. Harris,
181 N.J. 391, 420 (2004) (citing Mickens-Thomas v. Vaughn, 355 F.3d 294, 303
(3d Cir. 2004); Hakeen v. Beyer, 990 F.2d 750, 758 (3d Cir. 1993)). The de
novo standard of review applies to mixed questions of fact and law. Ibid. Where
an evidentiary hearing has not been held, it is within our authority "to conduct a
de novo review of both the factual findings and legal conclusions of the PCR
court . . . ." Id. at 421. We apply that standard here.
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Having carefully considered defendant's arguments, we affirm
substantially for the reasons expressed by the PCR court in its well-reasoned
written opinion. We add the following comments.
Defendant's contention that the PCR court erred in rejecting the claim that
his trial counsel was ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress evidence
lacks merit. Here, Brown was in the gas station's convenience store when the
robbery took place. He followed defendant and co-defendant Victor Cody and
saw them enter the Nissan. Brown called the police and provided them with the
license plate number and the location of the vehicle.
The police stopped the Nissan and ordered defendant and his brother out
of the car. Defendants were brought back to the gas station for a show-up
identification. Singh identified defendant and his brother as the perpetrators of
the robbery and assault fifteen minutes after the acts were committed.
According to Singh, co-defendant Victor Cody held him while defendant struck
him in the face with a metal object.
We are convinced the PCR court properly rejected defendant's argument
and denied the petition. The record supports the PCR court's finding that
defendant and his brother were not arrested until after Singh identified them as
the perpetrators. They were stopped and detained on reasonable suspicion
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pending the identification procedure. The PCR court aptly found that the
detention was no longer than reasonably necessary to facilitate the identificatio n
process.
We also reject defendant's argument that the PCR court erred in denying
the claim that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to accurately inform
him of the severe sentence he faced if he turned down the plea offer. Defendant
asserted that if his attorney had been forthright about certain incriminating
evidence that could be admitted at trial, he would have accepted the State's plea
offer and not proceeded to trial. He claims Victor Cody's attorney told them that
the evidence obtained after their arrest would not be used against them at trial
because none of the witnesses had described the perpetrator's clothing.
Where it is claimed that trial counsel's mistaken advice regarding potential
sentencing exposure caused a defendant to reject a plea offer and proceed to
trial, the defendant establishes prejudice under the second prong of the
Strickland standard by demonstrating that he would have accepted the plea offer
if he had been aware of his sentencing exposure, that his guilty plea would have
been accepted by the court, and that the conviction and sentence he would have
received under the plea offer would have been less severe than those resulting
from the trial. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 164.
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The PCR court concluded that defendant's clothing was properly obtained
pursuant to the plain view doctrine. Bellamy reported seeing defendant and his
brother to Brown and described the clothing (one defendant wore a dark blue
jacket and the other a white shirt or sweatshirt). Brown observed the defendants
hastily remove their clothing. The record supports the court's finding.
Defendant contends the PCR court wrongly rejected his claim that his
appellate counsel was ineffective by not raising the alleged Fourth Amendment
violations on direct appeal. We are unpersuaded by this argument. The PCR
court determined appellate counsel was not obligated to raise a meritless
argument, including that the investigative detention violated defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights. The PCR court held that appellate counsel was not required
to assert "contentions that are palpably and clearly unmeritorious." State v.
Kyles, 132 N.J. Super. 397, 401 (App. Div. 1975). We are convinced that the
PCR court correctly determined that defendant had not been denied the effective
assistance of appellate counsel.
In his pro se supplemental brief, defendant argues that his trial counsel
was ineffective for not objecting to the modified Allen1 charge, approved by our
Supreme Court in Czachor. When the jurors reported they had reached an
1
Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
A-0754-18T2
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impasse, the trial court instructed them to continue their deliberations and gave
them a Czachor instruction. Defendant contends his trial counsel was ineffective
because counsel failed to object and request the court inquire whether further
deliberations would result in a verdict. And, defendant asserts that the trial court
should not have provided the jury with written instructions. He also contends
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise these issues on appeal.
Defendant's arguments are without merit.
In Czachor, our Court disapproved the charge for a deadlocked jury that
had been sanctioned by the Supreme Court of the United States in Allen. 82
N.J. at 402. The Court held in Czachor that the conventional Allen charge was
unduly coercive and did not "permit jurors to deliberate objectively, freely, and
with an untrammeled mind." Ibid. Before a trial court gives a jury a Czachor
charge, it should inquire whether further deliberations would be fruitful,
however, that is not always required.
In this case, the trial court provided the jury with the charge approved by
the Court in Czachor, and set forth in our Model Jury Charges (Criminal). The
record shows that the trial court did not coerce the jury into reaching a verdict.
Defense counsel objected to the instruction but, at that point, the jury had only
been deliberating eleven hours. The jury continued its deliberations and
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returned a verdict. Defendant has not shown that the result here would have
been different if the judge had questioned the members of the jury before giving
the Czachor charge. Appellate counsel also was not ineffective in failing to raise
this issue on appeal. We are satisfied that the PCR court's determination was
not erroneous.
Defendant further argues that the PCR court erred by finding that the issue
regarding the trial court's response to the jury's note had been raised on direct
appeal. Our opinion on the appeal indicates that defendant did raise that issue
in his pro se supplemental brief. Cody, slip. op. at 4. Co-defendant Victor Cody
also raised the issue in his appeal. The appeals were consolidated and addressed
in one opinion. We rejected Victor Cody's contention that the trial judge erred
by providing the Czachor instruction. Id. at 32. Therefore, the issue was
adjudicated.
For these reasons, we conclude that defendant failed to establish a prima
facie claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and appellate counsel. As
to defendant's remaining arguments, including that his trial attorney was
ineffective for not consulting with him, failed to file motions, pursue an
exculpatory defense, and cumulative errors at trial, we are convinced from our
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review of the record that they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion
in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Accordingly, an evidentiary hearing was not necessary to resolve
defendant's petition, and we affirm the PCR court's denial of defendant's petition
for PCR.
Affirmed.
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