ESTATE OF ANDREW MURNIEKS VS. STATE OF NEW JERSEY (L-6227-14, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4197-18T3
ESTATE OF ANDREW
MURNIEKS by Administrator
Ad Prosequendum, RENEE
MURNIEKS, and RENEE
MURNIEKS, individually,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
SOUTH BRUNSWICK
TOWNSHIP POLICE
DEPARTMENT, OLD BRIDGE
TOWNSHIP POLICE
DEPARTMENT,
Defendants,
and
MIDDLESEX COUNTY
PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
and BRYAN DOEL,
Defendants-Respondents.
Argued September 23, 2020 – Decided October 23, 2020
Before Judges Fuentes, Whipple and Rose.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. L-6227-14.
Marc Adam Brotman argued the cause for appellants
(Pellettieri Rabstein & Altman, attorneys; Douglas S.
Grossbart, on the brief).
Bryan Edward Lucas, Deputy Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondents (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney
General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant
Attorney General, of counsel; Daniel M. Vannella,
Assistant Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Andrew Murnieks was fatally shot by police in his home in South
Brunswick hours after officers responded to his mother Renee's 1 call for
assistance. Pertinent to this appeal, Renee, individually and on behalf of
Andrew's estate, filed a wrongful death action against defendants Middlesex
County Prosecutor's Office (MCPO) and Bryan Dole, an Old Bridge police
officer assigned to the Middlesex County Special Operations Emergency
1
Because the parties share the same surname, we use first names for clarity.
We mean no disrespect in doing so.
A-4197-18T3
2
Response Team (SORT). The Estate also asserted a negligent supervision and
training claim against the MCPO. 2
At the close of discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment,
claiming they were entitled to immunity under section 3-3 of the Tort Claims
Act (TCA or Act), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 59:12-3, because their actions were either
objectively reasonable or performed in subjective good faith. Following oral
argument, the motion court reserved decision. Twelve days later, the court
issued an oral decision, accompanying its March 13, 2019 order, which granted
defendants' motion, thereby dismissing plaintiffs' complaint against defendants
in its entirety. This appeal followed.
On appeal, plaintiffs urge us to reverse, initially asserting the motion court
failed to comply with Rules 1:7-4, 2:5-1(b), and 4:46-2(c). Plaintiffs also raise
substantive challenges to the court's decision, contending genuine issues of fact
precluded summary judgment. Plaintiffs further posit that the court erroneously
rejected their negligent supervision and training claim, reprising their argument
that such claims do not implicate N.J.S.A. 59:3-3. Because the motion court's
2
Plaintiffs also sued the State of New Jersey, South Brunswick Township Police
Department [SBTPD], and Old Bridge Police Department [OBPD]. Plaintiffs'
claims against the SBTPD and OBPD were dismissed on summary judgment;
plaintiffs dismissed their claims against the State voluntarily.
A-4197-18T3
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conclusory factual findings and legal conclusions fall short of those required to
allow us to review the reasons for the court's decision, we reverse and remand
for further proceedings.
I.
In a terse oral decision, spanning nine transcript pages, the motion court
recited the following facts, without commenting whether they were disputed by
the parties3:
[Andrew] had been diagnosed with
schizophrenia. On the date of the incident, [Renee]
discovered that [Andrew] had stopped taking his
medication and called her other son, who then called
the police.
Several [SBTPD] officers arrived at [Renee]'s
house, and the situation escalated.
On November 20, 2013, [Renee] noticed that
[Andrew] had not been taking his medication. [Renee]
decided [Andrew] needed to go to the hospital and
spoke with her other son, Eric, who advised [Renee] to
leave the house while the police were called.
At least one [SBTPD] officer responded to the
scene while [Andrew] was inside and [Renee] was
outside.
3
The court apparently gleaned the facts from plaintiffs' responses to defendants'
statement of material facts in support of their motion, omitting those facts
plaintiff disputed.
A-4197-18T3
4
[Renee] informed the [SBTPD] officer that her
son needed to go to the hospital. Thereafter, an effort
was made to have [Andrew] leave the house, but
[Andrew] began yelling and slammed the door.
The [MCPO] was subsequently contacted, and it
dispatched . . . [the] SORT. As a member of SORT,
defendant Officer Bryan Doel responded to the scene.
After several hours, SORT made a decision to
breach the house in an attempt to try to take [Andrew]
out safely. Officer Doel was assigned to assist the
breach team for the front door entry and was the first
SORT member to enter the doorway. At this time,
Officer Doel was involved in a physical altercation with
[Andrew] where [Andrew] attempted to take Officer
Doel's firearm, which was subsequently discharged
striking [Andrew] in the chest.
Almost half of the court's oral decision summarized the parties'
arguments. In doing so, the court recognized plaintiffs raised several bases to
support their contention that material issues of fact precluded summary
judgment:
[One,] there are evidentiary discrepancies
relating to whether [Andrew] . . . assaulted defendant
Doel or to what extent.
Two, the circumstances and manner in which
defendant Doel's firearm was discharged.
Three, why defendant Doel proceeded into the
residence.
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Four, whether appropriate negotiations took
place prior to the [MCPO]'s decision to breach the
house.
Five, whether [Andrew] was threatening the
officers, and to what extent.
And six, whether the use of force was objectively
reasonable.
The court continued:
[P]laintiffs further argue, based on [their] own
expert's opinions, that defendants' conduct was
objectively unreasonable because plaintiffs allege that
defendant Doel used excessive force and violated
protocols when he entered the premises.
Plaintiffs also argue that . . . defendants engaged
in willful misconduct, and therefore, are not immune
under the [TCA].
In support of their argument, . . . plaintiffs
highlight their express opinions that defendants did not
follow reasonable police practices, training, and
procedures.
....
Further, plaintiffs argue that there remains
outstanding questions of material fact relating to
whether the [MCPO] is vicariously liable. . . . As
defendant Doel's supervisor, plaintiffs assert that no
immunity would apply for failure to supervise under
Title 59.
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Without citing any authority – other than a passing reference to Brill v.
Guardian Life Insurance Company of America, 142 N.J. 520, 532 (1995) – the
motion court granted defendants' motion, summarily concluding:
This court finds that the instant motion be [sic]
meritorious on the basis that . . . defendants qualify for
immunity under N.J.S.A. 59:3-3 because the actions
taken in this emergency situation were reasonable and
performed with subjective good faith.
Here the court concludes that . . . defendants'
actions were objectively reasonable and therefore
qualify for immunity under the statute.
II.
Pursuant to Rule 1:7-4(a), "the court shall . . . find the facts and state its
conclusions of law thereon . . . on every motion decided by a written order that
is appealable as of right[.]" See also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fisher, 408 N.J. Super.
289, 300-01 (App. Div. 2009). As our Supreme Court has long recognized, the
absence of an adequate expression of a trial judge's rationale "constitutes a
disservice to the litigants, the attorneys, and the appellate court." Curtis v.
Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 569-70 (1980) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, "naked conclusions do not satisfy the purpose of R[ule] 1:7-4." Id.
at 570. "Rather, the trial court must state clearly its factual findings and
correlate them with the relevant legal conclusions" as required by the Rule. Ibid.A-4197-18T3
7
"The absence of adequate findings . . . necessitates a reversal." Heinl v. Heinl,
287 N.J. Super. 337, 347 (App. Div. 1996).
In our review of a summary judgment decision, we are required to measure
the motion court's findings and conclusions "against the standards set forth in
Brill." Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Checchio, 335 N.J. Super. 495, 498 (App.
Div. 2000). Those standards are well-established: summary judgment should
be granted when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." Brill, 142 N.J. at 528-29;
see also R. 4:46-2(c). Issues of law are subject to the de novo standard of review,
and the trial court's determination of such issues is accorded no deference. Kaye
v. Rosefielde, 223 N.J. 218, 229 (2015).
Notwithstanding our de novo standard of review, "our function as an
appellate court is to review the decision of the trial court, not to decide the
motion tabula rasa." Estate of Doerfler v. Fed. Ins. Co., 454 N.J. Super. 298,
301-02 (App. Div. 2018) (internal citation omitted). We have recognized "[t]he
duty to find facts and state conclusions of law is explicit in R[ule] 1:7-4, iterated
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in connection with motions for summary judgment in R[ule] 4:46-2,[4] and
mandated where there is an appeal by R[ule] 2:5-1(b).[5]" Matter of Will of
Marinus, 201 N.J. Super. 329, 339 (App. Div. 1985); see also Pardo v.
Dominguez, 382 N.J. Super. 489, 491-92 (App. Div. 2006) (reversing summary
judgment, in part, due to the trial court's failure to provide reasons); Raspantini
v. Arocho, 364 N.J. Super. 528, 533-34 (App. Div. 2003) (reversing orders
granting summary judgment and denying reconsideration "to ensure that the
parties and, in the event of a further appeal, the court may have the bene fit of
findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with our analysis of the
applicable rules").
On the current record, we cannot discern from the motion court's terse oral
decision the bases for its determination to grant defendants' motion. The court
failed to correlate its factual findings with its naked conclusion of law, or
otherwise explain its decision. That decision is devoid of any citation to, and
analysis of the governing law. Moreover, the court dismissed plaintiffs'
4
Rule 4:46-2 requires the trial court to "find the facts and state its conclusions
in accordance with R[ule] 1:7-4."
5
Under Rule 2:5-1(b), the trial court may amplify its reasons within fifteen days
of the appeal; the motion court did not do so here. See Allstate, 408 N.J. Super.
at 300.
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negligent supervision claim without any factual findings or conclusions of law
whatsoever. Thus, there is nothing for us to review.
Under the circumstances presented, we have no alternative but to reverse
the motion court's order and remand this matter for further proceedings. In
doing so, we do not suggest a preferred result, but only that the court reconsider
the matter and fulfill its duty to the parties to fully address the factual and legal
arguments presented in this case. The court's decision should include detailed
findings of fact, correlated to comprehensive conclusions of law, addressing all
issues raised by the parties. By discharging its duty in this regard, the court will
ensure that "the litigants have been heard and their arguments considered .
Justice requires no less." Bailey v. Bd. of Review, 339 N.J. Super. 29, 33 (App.
Div. 2001).
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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