STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JAMES L. MILLER (13-05-1564, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0346-18T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JAMES L. MILLER,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Submitted February 12, 2020 – Decided January 22, 2021
Before Judges Fuentes and Haas.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 13-05-1564.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Monique Moyse, Designated Counsel, on the
brief).
Jill S. Mayer, Acting Camden County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Maura Murphy Sullivan,
Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FUENTES, P.J.A.D.
Defendant James L. Miller appeals from the order of the Criminal Part
denying his post-conviction relief (PCR) petition. We affirm.
A Camden County Grand Jury returned a multi-count indictment against
defendant charging him with third degree aggravated assault, multiple counts of
unlawful possession of a weapon, third degree terroristic threats, and first degree
murder of Josue Rivera. On October 28, 2013, defendant entered into a
negotiated agreement with the State through which he pled guilty to first degree
aggravated manslaughter, by recklessly causing the death of Mr. Rivera,
N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1). In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining
charges in the indictment and recommend the court sentence defendant to a term
of imprisonment of twenty years, with an eighty-five percent period of parole
ineligibility and five years of parole supervision, as mandated by the No Early
Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2
The record of the plea hearing shows defendant provided a factual basis
of his crime in response to the following questions from defense counsel:
Q. Mr. Miller, I’m going to direct your attention to the
hours or the early evening hours of March 28th, into the
early morning hours of March 29th, 2012.
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Were you present [an address on] Tyler Avenue in the
City of Camden, County of Camden, the State of New
Jersey?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you have an altercation with your stepfather,
[Josue] Rivera at that time?
A Yes.
Q And at that time, during that altercation, did you
strike him with a hatchet, eventually causing his death?
A Yes.
At the sentencing hearing held on December 6, 2013, Judge Gwendolyn
Blue, the same judge who presided at the plea hearing, sentenced defendant in
accordance with the plea agreement to a twenty-year term of imprisonment
subject to NERA. Defendant filed a timely direct appeal to this court
challenging the sentence imposed by Judge Blue through the summary process
codified in Rule 2:9-11. When the appeal came before this court for oral
argument, appellate counsel claimed Judge Blue did not consider that defendant
was under the influence of PCP (phencyclidine) at the time he committed the
crime. Counsel argued that the Judge Blue erred by not considering defendant's
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state of intoxication as a basis to find mitigating factor four, N.J.S.A. 2C:44 -
1(b)(4).1
The prosecutor argued that the record of the sentencing hearing showed
that Judge Blue considered the intoxication issue at the sentencing hearing and
expressly rejected its application under the facts of this case.
JUDGE BLUE: There’s argument by counsel that the
system failed this young man, and I certainly get that
argument, and sometimes things do not work the way it
should work in our country, but I can’t find that a
system failed you when you decide to intoxicate
yourself, and you decide to hurt others. That’s a
conscious decision to take a drug or to hurt someone,
so I can’t find the system failed a person when they
decide to conduct violent acts, so I do not find that.
In an order dated June 1, 2015, this court summarily affirmed the sentence
imposed by Judge Blue.
On July 14, 2017, defendant filed a pro se PCR petition alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel. Judge Blue assigned counsel to represent
defendant in the prosecution of the PCR petition. PCR counsel filed a brief in
support of the petition. The matter came for oral argument before Judge Blue
1
Under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b), a sentencing judge may consider whether "[t]here
were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the defendant’s conduct,
though failing to establish a defense[.]"
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on August 15, 2018. Defendant was present. Both attorneys advised the judge
that they were relying on their briefs.
Judge Blue reviewed on the record the history of the case and applied the
relevant standard of review with respect to allegations of ineffective assistance
of counsel. She reviewed each of defendant's arguments and found he had not
established a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel and was thus
not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
Judge Blue held that defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel based on defense counsel's alleged failure to raise mitigating four factor
at the sentencing hearing was procedurally barred under Rule 3:22-5 because it
was raised and rejected on direct appeal. She also concluded that defendant's
remaining arguments were barred by Rule 3:22-4(a)(1), which states, in relevant
part, that:
Any ground for relief not raised in the proceedings
resulting in the conviction, or in a post-conviction
proceeding brought and decided prior to the adoption
of this rule, or in any appeal taken in any such
proceedings is barred from assertion in a proceeding
under this rule unless the court on motion or at the
hearing finds:
(1) that the ground for relief not previously asserted
could not reasonably have been raised in any prior
proceeding; or
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(2) that enforcement of the bar to preclude claims,
including one for ineffective assistance of counsel,
would result in fundamental injustice; or
(3) that denial of relief would be contrary to a new rule
of constitutional law under either the Constitution of
the United States or the State of New Jersey.
Finally, Judge Blue found defendant's belated claims that he killed his
stepfather (Mr. Rivera) because the latter "had a history of violence towards
[him], which had been going [on] for years" were self-serving and
uncorroborated by any competent evidence. Judge Blue ultimately concluded
that
[a]ll that the defendant offers in this matter are blanket
statements of abuse, without any real concrete support
[or] concrete evidence to support his claims. Further, I
emphasize that the evidence demonstrates that at the
time of this incident the victim was in his bed. I note
that the defendant had entered victim’s bedroom on
more than one occasion to fight with the victim.
Against this record, defendant raises the following arguments:
POINT ONE
THIS MATTER MUST BE REMANDED FOR A NEW
HEARING IN FRONT OF AN IMPARTIAL PCR
JUDGE.
POINT TWO
IN THE ALTERNATIVE [DEFENDANT] IS
ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON
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HIS CLAIM THAT HIS ATTORNEY RENDERED
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR
FAILING TO ARGUE ADEQUATELY AT
SENTENCING.
POINT THREE
THE PCR COURT ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT
[DEFENDANT'S] PETITION WAS
PROCEDURALLY BARRED AS TO THE PART OF
HIS CLAIM CONCERNING COUNSEL'S FAILURE
TO ARGUE FOR MITIGATING FACTORS THREE
AND FOUR.
We review a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the two-
prong test established by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and subsequently adopted by our Supreme
Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). First, defendant must demonstrate
that defense counsel's performance was deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
Second, he must show there exists "a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different." Id. at 694. We discern no legal basis to disturb the PCR judge's
findings and ultimate legal conclusions. Judge Blue's decision to deny
defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing is supported by the record and
constituted a proper exercise of her discretionary authority under Rule 3:22-10.
State v. Jones, 219 N.J. 298, 311 (2014). Defendant's argument attacking Judge
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Blue's impartiality is factually baseless and lacks sufficient legal merit to
warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
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