STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. DEON A. DOYLE-BAKER (16-06-1122, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2308-18T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DEON A. DOYLE-BAKER,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Submitted January 4, 2021 – Decided January 22, 2021
Before Judges Fasciale and Mayer.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 16-06-
1122.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Laura B. Lasota, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Patrick F. Galdieri, II,
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
After pleading guilty, defendant appeals from his convictions for second-
degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) with intent to
distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(2); and second-degree
possession of a firearm while possessing CDS with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A.
2C:39-4.1. The police conducted a proper field inquiry, obtained a search
warrant, and seized the CDS and loaded gun from defendant's car. The record
supports the order denying defendant's motion to suppress, and the sentence is
not excessive. We therefore affirm.
On appeal, defendant argues:
POINT I
THE TRIAL [JUDGE] ERRED IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE BECAUSE THE INITIAL
INTERACTION BETWEEN THE DETECTIVES
AND DEFENDANT WAS NOT A FIELD INQUIRY,
BUT RATHER, AN INVESTIGATORY STOP THAT
WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE
SUSPICION. THEREFORE, THE SEIZURE OF
CONTRABAND FROM DEFENDANT'S CAR
PURSUANT TO A LATER-OBTAINED SEARCH
WARRANT WAS FRUIT OF THE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL STOP THAT MUST BE
SUPPRESSED.
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POINT II
DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE IS MANIFESTLY
EXCESSIVE AND MUST BE REDUCED.
I.
In our review of the grant or denial of a motion to suppress, we "must
defer" to the motion judge's factual findings "so long as those findings are
supported by sufficient evidence in the record." State v. Dunbar, 229 N.J. 521,
538 (2017) (quoting State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 262 (2015)). We ordinarily
defer to those findings because they "are substantially influenced by [the
judge's] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the
case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy." State v. Lamb, 218 N.J. 300, 313
(2014) (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007)). We will disregard
those findings only when a trial judge's findings of fact are "so clearly mistaken
that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction." State v.
Hagans, 233 N.J. 30, 37-38 (2018) (quoting State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 425
(2014)). We review a motion judge's legal conclusions de novo. Dunbar, 229
N.J. at 538. Here, the facts regarding the detective's inquiries for identification
were essentially undisputed.
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Both the federal and State constitutions protect citizens against
unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.J. Const. art.
I, ¶ 7; see also State v. Terry, 232 N.J. 218, 231 (2018). "The test of
reasonableness cannot be fixed by per se rules; each case must be decided on its
own facts." Terry, 232 N.J. at 231 (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364, 372-73 (1976)). Defendant maintains that the initial inquiries of the
detectives amounted to an investigative stop unsupported by reasonable
suspicion.
There are three types of interactions with law enforcement, each involving
different constitutional implications depending on the event's impact on an
individual's freedom to leave the scene. First, a "field inquiry is essentially a
voluntary encounter between the police and a member of the public in which the
police ask questions and do not compel an individual to answer." State v.
Rosario, 229 N.J. 263, 271 (2017). The individual is free to leave; therefore,
field inquiries do not require a well-grounded suspicion of criminal activity
before commencement. Id. at 271-72; see also Elders, 192 N.J. at 246. Second,
an investigatory stop or detention, sometimes referred to as a Terry1 stop,
involves a temporary seizure that restricts a person's movement. A Terry stop
1
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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implicates a constitutional requirement that there be "'specific and articulable
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,' give rise
to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." Elders, 192 N.J. at 247 (quoting
State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 126 (2002)). Third, an arrest requires
"probable cause and generally [are] supported by an arrest warrant or by
demonstration of grounds that would have justified one." Rosario, 229 N.J. at
272.
When "determining whether a seizure occurred, a judge must consider
whether 'in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a
reasonable person would have believed that he [or she] was not free to leave.'"
State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 355 (2002) (alteration in original) (quoting United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)). To establish that a stop was
valid, the State has the burden of proving that the police were aware of "specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, [gave] rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." State v. Mann,
203 N.J. 328, 338 (2010) (quoting State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 20 (2004)); see
Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. If there was no reasonable suspicion, evidence discovered
during a search conducted during the detention is subject to exclusion. State v.
Chisum, 236 N.J. 530, 546 (2019).
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To determine whether reasonable suspicion exists, a judge must consider
the totality of the circumstances, viewing the "whole picture" rather than taking
each fact in isolation. State v. Nelson, 237 N.J. 540, 554-55 (2019) (quoting
Stovall, 170 N.J. at 361). This analysis also considers police officers'
"background and training," id. at 555, including their ability to "make inferences
from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that
'might well elude an untrained person.'" Ibid. (quoting United States v. Arvizu,
534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)). "'Furtive' movements by [a] defendant,"
unaccompanied by other circumstances, "cannot provide reasonable and
articulable suspicion to support a detention in the first instance." Rosario, 229
N.J. at 277; see State v. Dunbar, 434 N.J. Super. 522, 527 (App. Div. 2014).
Investigative stops are justified, even absent probable cause, "if the
evidence, when interpreted in an objectively reasonable manner, shows that the
encounter was preceded by activity that would lead a reasonable police officer
to have an articulable suspicion that criminal activity had occurred or would
shortly occur." State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 505 (1986). Judges are to
determine whether the totality of the circumstances gives rise to an "articulable
or particularized suspicion" of criminal activity, not by use of a strict formula,
but "through a sensitive appraisal of the circumstances in each case." Ibid. Our
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Supreme Court recognized the two-step analysis set forth in United States v.
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981),
for determining whether the totality of circumstances
creates a "particularized suspicion." A [judge] must
first consider the officer's objective observations. The
evidence collected by the officer is "seen and weighed
not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as
understood by those versed in the field of law
enforcement. [A] trained police officer draws
inferences and makes deductions . . . that might well
elude an untrained person. The process does not deal
with hard certainties, but with probabilities." Second,
a [judge] must determine whether the evidence "raise[s]
a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped
is engaged in wrongdoing."
[Davis, 104 N.J. at 501 (alterations in original)
(citations omitted) (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418).]
Here, the judge found two detectives observed defendant inspecting a
disabled vehicle with its hood up in a parking lot of a big box store. As the
judge indicated, the detectives did not know defendant's connection to the
vehicle or whether he needed help. The detectives were initially engaged in a
community caretaking function, and as part of a field inquiry, asked defendant
to identify himself and produce identification. In so doing, they learned that
defendant had an open warrant. Around this time, defendant shouted to an
unidentified male walking nearby to contact a tow truck and made a gesture with
his hand, which the officer interpreted to mean a firearm was in the vehicle. The
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detectives then obtained a search warrant, seized the gun and cocaine, arrested
defendant, and charged him with committing these second-degree crimes.
A mere request for identification does not escalate a field inquiry into an
investigatory stop, so long as the officer's questions are not overbearing and do
not give the impression that the person is not free to refuse the request or was
the target of an investigation. Here, there are no credible facts that show that
the request for identification escalated the inquiry to an investigative stop.
Indeed, there is no evidence of any demands or orders by the detectives that
defendant was not free to refuse. The record does not reflect the inquiries were
accusatory in any way, or that the detectives acted in an overbearing or harassing
manner.
II.
We reject defendant's argument that he received an excessive sentence.
After finding aggravating factors three, six, and nine outweighed the mitigating
factors, the judge sentenced defendant in accordance with the negotiated plea
agreement to an aggregate term of twelve years in prison with six years of parole
ineligibility. Defendant was extended-term eligible due to his criminal record,
which included four juvenile adjudications, municipal court convictions, and an
indictable adult conviction.
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Our review of a trial judge's sentencing determination is deferential. State
v. Lawless, 214 N.J. 594, 606 (2013). We are "bound to affirm a sentence, even
if [we] would have arrived at a different result, as long as the [sentencing judge]
properly identifie[d] and balance[d] aggravating and mitigating factors that
[were] supported by competent credible evidence in the record." Ibid. (quoting
State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458, 489 (2005)).
We may only vacate a sentence where: (1) "the sentencing guidelines[]
were violated"; (2) the aggravating or mitigating factors considered were not
"based upon competent credible evidence in the record"; or (3) "even though the
court sentenced in accordance with the guidelines, nevertheless the application
of the guidelines to the facts of th[e] case makes the sentence clearly
unreasonable so as to shock the judicial conscience." State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334,
364-65 (1984). "A sentence imposed pursuant to a plea agreement is presumed
to be reasonable because a defendant voluntarily '[waived] . . . his right to a trial
in return for the reduction or dismissal of certain charges, recommendations as
to sentence and the like.'" State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70-71 (2014)
(alterations in original) (quoting State v. Davis, 175 N.J. Super. 130, 140 (App.
Div. 1980)). However, "[e]ven a sentence recommended as part of a plea
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agreement . . . may be vacated if it does not comport with the sentencing
provisions of our Code of Criminal Justice." Id. at 71.
Exercising our deferential standard of review, we are satisfied that the
sentencing judge adhered to sentencing guidelines and relied upon competent
and credible evidence, and the sentence was not "clearly unreasonable so as to
shock the judicial conscience." Id. at 70 (quoting Roth, 95 N.J. at 365).
Affirmed.
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