STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JAMIE L. LAWSON (17-10-1567, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3986-19T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JAMIE L. LAWSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________
Submitted September 21, 2020 – Decided October 26, 2020
Before Judges Rothstadt and Susswein.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Ocean County, New Jersey, Accusation No. 17-10-
1567.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Ernest A. Ryberg, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Bradley D. Billhimer, Ocean County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Samuel Marzarella, Chief
Appellate Attorney, of counsel; Shiraz I. Deen,
Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Jamie L. Lawson is currently serving a state prison sentence in a half-way
house. He appeals from a June 25, 2020 order issued by Judge Wendel E.
Daniels denying his motion for release from custody pursuant to Rule 3:21-
10(b)(2) or, in the alternative, for suspension of sentence (medical furlough)
pursuant to State v. Boone, 262 N.J. Super. 220 (Law Div. 1992). We have
carefully considered the record in light of the applicable legal principles and
affirm.
Because we affirm substantially for the reasons explained in Judge
Daniels' thorough fifteen-page opinion, we need not re-address all of Lawson's
arguments, but add the following comments. Lawson's application rests on
Governor Murphy's Executive Order 124, which declared a state of emergency
in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The gist of Lawson's argument is that
because of his underlying medical conditions, he faces an "irrefutable risk of
death" if exposed to the virus while he is in custody.
We agree with Lawson that he was not required to exhaust administrative
remedies by seeking relief before the parole board or the Department of
Corrections (DOC) prior to filing a motion with the court under Rule 3:21-10(b).
The Supreme Court in In re Request to Modify Prison Sentences, Expedite
Parole Hearings, and Identify Vulnerable Persons recently explained that
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"[i]ndividual inmates may also seek relief independently under Rule 3:21-
10(b)(2). They do not have to exhaust the remedies available under the
Executive Order before they may file a motion in court." 242 N.J. 357, 370
(2020).
However, as Judge Daniels correctly ruled, Lawson is not eligible for
release as he has yet to complete the mandatory term of parole ineligibility
imposed on his first-degree money laundering conviction. The Supreme Court
made clear in Request to Modify Prison Sentences that neither Rule 3:21-
10(b)(2) nor the other sources raised by the defendant in that case provide
authority for the courts to establish and oversee a broad-based program to
release or furlough state prison inmates. Id. at 378–79. Importantly, the Court
did not alter the eligibility requirements for an application pursuant to Rule 3:21-
10.
In State v. Mendel, we held that "a sentence cannot be changed or reduced
under R. 3:21-10(b) below the parole ineligibility term required by statute." 212
N.J. Super. 110, 113 (App. Div. 1986). In this instance, Lawson pled guilty to
first-degree financial facilitation of criminal activity (money laundering) and
third-degree theft relating to construction fraud perpetrated against
approximately forty homeowners whose homes were damaged by Superstorm
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Sandy. He was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement to a ten-year
prison term. As required by N.J.S.A. 2C:21-27(a), the sentence for the money
laundering conviction included a forty-two-month period of parole ineligibility.
Accounting for the credit for time served in jail before sentencing, Lawson is
not eligible for parole until December 15, 2020, and therefore is not eligible for
the relief he requests until that date.
Furthermore, Judge Daniels carefully reviewed the medical records,
certifications, and other submissions and determined that Lawson failed to
establish a severe depreciation of health sufficient to justify the relief he seeks.
Lawson's medical conditions include a blood clot in his leg, a broken nose, two
hernias, high blood pressure, and a low white blood cell count. Judge Daniels
recognized that Lawson may be at an increased risk for death or serious injury
if he were to contract COVID-19 but concluded that his medical condition does
not rise to the level of life-threatening. "Moreover," the judge explained, "there
exists no current depreciation of defendant's health whatsoever, let alone the
required 'severe depreciation.'" Judge Daniels concluded, "[d]efendant has
entirely failed to demonstrate that the strong protective measures adopted by the
DOC cannot adequately protect him from [COVID-19 risks], nor has he
provided any evidence that the DOC is unequipped to treat him, or that [the half-
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way house] is experiencing a significant outbreak." We see no reason to disturb
Judge Daniels' assessment of the health-related risks Lawson faces while in the
custody of the DOC.
Judge Daniels also considered the risk to public safety should Lawson be
released. The judge reasoned that because Lawson is not suffering from serious
illness, he would be physically able to return to criminal behavior upon release.
Judge Daniels emphasized,
[t]he defendant is a dangerous criminal who has
committed serious violent offenses such as robbery and
assault with a deadly weapon, and serious non-violent
offenses such as the current [first-degree money
laundering] offense. This court has a high degree of
concern regarding defendant's continued risk to the
public, due to both the gravity of this crime and the vast
amount of vulnerable people that exists in today's
global pandemic.
We add that Judge Daniels sentenced Lawson and thus is familiar with the
circumstances of the offense and his criminal background.
Affirmed.
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