DCPP VS. S.E.M. AND J.E., IN THE MATTER OF THE THE GUARDIANSHIP OF R.S.E. (FG-09-0227-19, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2020 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0100-19T2
NEW JERSEY DIVISION
OF CHILD PROTECTION
AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
S.E.M.,
Defendant,
and
J.E.,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE
GUARDIANSHIP OF R.S.E.,
a minor.
_________________________
Argued October 1, 2020 – Decided October 26, 2020
Before Judges Vernoia and Enright.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County,
Docket No. FG-09-0227-19.
Anne E. Gowen, Designated Counsel, argued the cause
for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender,
attorney; Robyn Veasey, Deputy Public Defender, of
counsel; Anne E. Gowen, on the briefs).
Ellen L. Buckwalter, Deputy Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney
General, attorney; Sookie Bae, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Ellen L. Buckwalter, on the brief).
Louise M. Cho, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for minor (Joseph E. Krakora, Public
Defender, Law Guardian, attorney; Meredith Alexis
Pollock, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; Louise
M. Cho, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant J.E.1 appeals from an August 19, 2019 guardianship judgment
terminating his parental rights, as well as the parental rights of defendant
S.E.M.,2 to their daughter, R.S.E. (Rose). We affirm, substantially for the
reasons set forth in the well-reasoned opinion of Judge Bernadette DeCastro.
1
We refer to the adult parties by initials, and to the child by a fictitious name,
to protect their privacy. R. 1:38-3(d)(12).
2
S.E.M. is not involved in this appeal.
A-0100-19T2
2
The evidence is set forth in detail in the judge's opinion, and only a
summary is required here. Rose was born prematurely in November 2017. On
December 10, 2017, she was due to be discharged from the hospital. The
Division received a referral from the hospital because S.E.M.'s parental rights
to her two other children were terminated in June 2017, and the hospital had
limited information about Rose's father.
The Division quickly learned J.E. was the father but he had not visited
Rose since S.E.M. was discharged on November 30, 2017. The Division
contacted J.E. to develop a plan for Rose's placement and asked him to meet at
the hospital before Rose was discharged. Through a series of phone calls on the
evening of December 10, 2017, J.E. informed the Division he would come to the
hospital. However, he did not arrive when he said he would. J.E. also advised
he needed to secure a bassinette for the baby and would have to leave his job to
care for Rose. Additionally, J.E. disclosed he was "between addresses," living
at his girlfriend's home and that of his sister, and he had a criminal history. J.E.
stopped answering the Division's phone calls for over two hours that night as
staff waited for him at the hospital. At approximately 10:30 p.m., the Division
was able to reach J.E. by phone and he stated he would get to the hospital
"eventually." The Division advised him Rose's discharge was postponed to the
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following day. J.E. agreed to reschedule his meeting with the Division.
Although the parties dispute whether the meeting was postponed to the
following day or to December 12, 2017, Division records from December 11,
2017 indicate a worker expected to meet J.E. at a local office that day.
On December 11, 2017, a Division worker attempted to locate J.E.
throughout the day. The worker visited the home of J.E.'s sister, tried calling
J.E., and went to his mother's home. J.E.'s mother advised the Division she did
not know where J.E. was. Accordingly, the Division effectuated a "Dodd"
removal3 that night, and placed Rose with her maternal grandmother, B.M. Rose
remained in B.M.'s physical custody throughout this litigation. The next day,
the Division worker notified S.E.M. and J.E.'s mother that there would be a
hearing regarding Rose's status on December 13, 2017 and asked both women
to let J.E. know.
On December 13, 2017, the Division filed an Order to Show Cause
("OTSC") under the abuse-and-neglect (FN) docket, seeking temporary custody
of Rose. J.E. did not appear for the hearing. The trial court granted the
Division's application, due to defendants' unresolved substance abuse and
3
A "Dodd" removal refers to the emergency removal of a child from a home
without a court order, pursuant to The Dodd Act. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 to -8.82.
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4
housing issues, as well as the report of an outstanding warrant for J.E. At that
hearing, the trial court found Rose's removal was necessary to avoid an ongoing
risk to her life, safety, or health. On the return date of the OTSC in January
2018, the trial court granted defendants supervised parenting time. Reportedly,
J.E. sporadically exercised his right to visit Rose in January and February 2018.
By March 1, 2018, he was incarcerated for a violation of probation and
terminated from a Drug Court program.
Following J.E.'s incarceration, the Division met with him and provided
him with updates about the case and Rose's progress. The Division also arranged
for Rose to visit J.E. when he transferred to the Kintock Halfway House in mid-
October 2018. Moreover, before his incarceration, the Division referred J.E. for
three substance abuse assessments in January and February 2018. He missed
every appointment. Due to his incarceration, J.E. also did not submit to a
scheduled psychological evaluation in May 2018 with Dr. Robert Kanen. He
eventually completed this evaluation in November 2018.
J.E. appeared before Judge DeCastro at a compliance review hearing on
December 4, 2018. That day, the judge approved the Division's plan to terminate
defendants' parental rights and permit B.M. to adopt Rose.
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In mid-January 2019, J.E. was released from the halfway house. He
appeared with counsel at a hearing before Judge DeCastro on January 31, 2019.
That day, based on the filing of a guardianship complaint, Judge DeCastro issued
an order terminating the FN litigation. The judge further questioned the Law
Guardian as to whether she gave J.E. a 5A form to secure counsel when she
served him with the complaint and the Law Guardian confirmed J.E. was given
the 5A form. Judge DeCastro asked that the 5A be brought to court the next
hearing date and warned counsel that the matter would be delayed if J.E. did not
submit the completed 5A form. At the next two court dates, in February and
March 2019, J.E. did not appear but his counsel did.
By the end of February 2019, J.E. was incarcerated for a violation of
parole. In April and June 2019, J.E. appeared with counsel for additional
hearings, but he remained in prison for the balance of the guardianship matter
and waived prison visits with Rose during this period of incarceration .
Shortly before trial, J.E. asked the Division to place Rose with his parents
or sister. The Division sent rule-out letters to J.E.'s parents after J.E.'s mother
notified the Division it should not contact her again. By the time J.E.'s sister
expressed interest in Rose living with her, the Division, in consultation with Dr.
Kanen, determined it would not be in Rose's best interest to be removed from
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B.M.'s home, as B.M. was the only caretaker Rose had known for well over a
year and Rose was living with her two step-brothers, whom B.M. adopted when
S.E.M.'s rights to the children were terminated. J.E.'s sister also received a rule-
out letter. Neither she nor J.E.'s parents appealed from the rule-out letters or
asked for reconsideration of the rule-out. Additionally, J.E. did not request a
"best interests" hearing to review alternative options for Rose's placement.
The three-day guardianship trial commenced and ended in July 2019.
During the trial, the Division elicited testimony from an adoption worker, Betty
Mata, B.M. and Dr. Kanen. The Law Guardian did not offer any documentary
or testimonial evidence but supported the Division's application for termination
of J.E.'s parental rights.
Ms. Mata testified about the Division's involvement following Rose's
birth, the services it offered to J.E., and his lack of compliance with the
Division's recommendations. Ms. Mata also provided testimony about visits the
Division arranged for J.E. and Rose.
B.M. testified that she was S.E.M.'s adoptive mother and the adoptive
mother of S.E.M.'s two sons. Further, she confirmed she was aware of the
differences between kinship legal guardianship (KLG) and adoption. According
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to her testimony, she preferred to adopt Rose to provide her with greater
stability.
Consistent with his earlier reports, Dr. Kanen opined to a reasonable
degree of certainty that J.E. posed a risk of harm to Rose, and that J.E.'s
cognitive limitations and mental health issues made it unlikely that he could
competently interact with doctors, social service agencies, and the educational
system on Rose's behalf. Additionally, Dr. Kanen concluded that J.E. suffered
from "severe parenting deficits." Further, the doctor attested that J.E. needed to
demonstrate that he could stay out of jail, and find and maintain employment
and stable housing, before he could provide Rose with a permanent, safe, and
secure home. Dr. Kanen determined neither defendant was in a position to
parent Rose at that time, nor for the foreseeable future.
Pursuant to the bonding evaluations he conducted, Dr. Kanen also testified
that Rose did not view J.E. as a parental figure, as he had never been consistent
and reliable in her life. On the other hand, Dr. Kanen opined that Rose was
securely attached to B.M., as Rose's maternal grandmother provided her with a
safe, permanent, and secure home. Additionally, Dr. Kanen testified Rose
would suffer serious and enduring harm if she was not allowed to remain with
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B.M., and J.E. would be unable to help Rose recover from this harm if she were
placed with J.E. This expert testimony was uncontroverted.
J.E. and S.E.M. also testified at trial. Over J.E.'s objection, Judge
DeCastro excluded testimony from J.E.'s sister, following a proffer from J.E.
that his sister would testify she might consider KLG for Rose and would have
been willing to care for Rose if she was asked to do so earlier in the litigation.
On August 19, 2019, Judge DeCastro issued her opinion, terminating
defendants' parental rights. The judge found the Division met its burden of proof
and established by clear and convincing evidence the four prongs under N.J.S.A.
30:4C-15.1(a). Regarding J.E.'s fitness to parent, the judge calculated J.E. was
incarcerated for all but three months of Rose's life, adding:
[H]is inability to live a criminal[-]free life as he
continues to be arrested and incarcerated speaks
volumes . . . . [J.E.] has demonstrated that he is prone
to infractions and cannot comply with the basic rules of
parole. Furthermore, once released, [J.E.] needs to
complete the required services and demonstrate that he
can be an appropriate guardian to [Rose]. This process
could take another year or more, and that is assuming
[J.E.] can remain out of prison. [Rose] simply cannot
wait.
On appeal, J.E. raises several arguments, including: (1) the Division
improperly effectuated a Dodd removal without a finding of "imminent harm;"
(2) J.E. was prejudiced by the deprivation of counsel during critical stages of
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9
the litigation; (3) the Division failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence,
that it made "reasonable efforts" to reunify J.E. with Rose; (4) the trial court
erred in excluding his sister from testifying; and (5) the trial court erred in
finding there were no "alternatives to termination" because B.M. did not
understand the differences between KLG and adoption. Having considered
these and other arguments pressed by J.E., we are not persuaded.
As a threshold matter, the scope of appellate review in a termination of
parental rights case is limited. We defer to a trial judge's expertise as a Family
Part judge, Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998), and are bound by the
judge's factual findings so long as they are supported by sufficient credible
evidence. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007)
(citing In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super. 172, 188 (App. Div. 1993)).
A parent's right to maintain a relationship with a child is constitutionally
protected. In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 346 (1999) (citing
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)). Courts honor and recognize this right,
imposing strict standards for terminating parental rights. Id. at 347. A court
may terminate parental rights only if the State proves, by clear and convincing
evidence, the four prongs of the "best interests" test. N.J. Div. of Youth &
Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 604-11 (1986). Specifically, before
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termination can occur, the State must show by clear and convincing evidence
that:
(1) The child's safety, health, or development has been
or will continue to be endangered by the parental
relationship;
(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the
harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to
provide a safe and stable home for the child and the
delay of permanent placement will add to the harm.
Such harm may include evidence that separating the
child from his resource family parents would cause
serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm
to the child;
(3) The division has made reasonable efforts to provide
services to help the parent correct the circumstances
which led to the child's placement outside the home and
the court has considered alternatives to termination of
parental rights; and
(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more
harm than good.
[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).]
Regarding the third prong, the Division must demonstrate that it made
reasonable efforts to provide services to a parent to help correct his or her
circumstances and to consider alternatives to parental termination. In re
Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365, 386 (1999) (citing N.J.S.A. 30:4C-
15.1(a)(3)). Reasonable efforts include:
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(1) consultation and cooperation with the parent in
developing a plan for appropriate services;
(2) providing services that have been agreed upon, to
the family, in order to further the goal of family
reunification;
(3) informing the parent at appropriate intervals of the
child's progress, development, and health; and
(4) facilitating appropriate visitation.
[Id. at 387 (citing N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(c)).]
In analyzing this prong, the Division's "efforts to provide services '[are]
not measured by their success.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.R.,
405 N.J. Super. 418, 441 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting D.M.H., 161 N.J. at 393).
Where the Division has exerted efforts such as seeking out relatives to care for
the children, supporting the parent in maintaining a relationship with the
children, supervising visitation, and sending the parent to therapy and treatment
programs, the third prong is satisfied, despite the parent's failure to rehabilitate
him or herself. K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 354; see also N.J. Div. of Youth & Family
Servs. v. C.S., 367 N.J. Super. 76, 119 (App. Div. 2004).
Guided by these principles, we turn to J.E.'s first argument and note that
if an error has not been brought to the trial court's attention, the appellate court
will not reverse on the ground of such error unless the appellant shows plain
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error, i.e., that the error was "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." R.
2:10-2. Here, we observe that at no point during the FN or guardianship
litigation did J.E. formally move to challenge the Dodd removal. Additionally,
we note that although J.E. did not secure counsel until the FN litigation was well
underway, even when he had the benefit of counsel, he failed to challenge the
Dodd removal before or after the FN litigation was dismissed.
Although we are not obligated to consider an issue raised for the first time
on appeal, Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973), we are
satisfied the Division properly effectuated Rose's removal on the evening of
December 11, 2017. Indeed, the Division took this step only after trying to meet
with, and contact J.E. on December 10 and 11.
As of December 10, 2017, J.E. had not visited with Rose for
approximately ten days, did not have a bassinette for her, was "between
addresses," admitted to a criminal history, and stated he would have to leave his
employment "for now" and stay with Rose. J.E. also told the Division he wanted
to pick up Rose that evening and he agreed to meet with the Division to discuss
his plans for Rose before she was discharged. Yet, he never appeared at the
hospital that day. Thus, Rose's discharge was postponed. Moreover, he could
not be located the next day, and did not appear for a meeting at the local Division
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office to discuss Rose's situation, despite his statement to the Division that he
would meet with staff.
On December 11, 2017, Rose again faced imminent discharge from the
hospital. But she could not be placed with S.E.M. in light of S.E.M.'s recent
history with the Division, and the Division could not locate J.E. Therefore, we
are satisfied the Division properly effectuated a Dodd removal before placing
her with her maternal grandmother and step-siblings. Further, we agree with the
Division that this step was reasonable, as B.M. was a relative caregiver with
whom the Division was familiar, and there was no basis to further delay the
infant's discharge from the hospital. We also do not ignore the fact that within
forty-eight hours of Rose's removal, J.E. failed to appear at the OTSC hearing,
although he was noticed to appear, and he did not appear on the return date of
the OTSC in January 2018. Further, in January and February 2018, he opted to
take advantage of his court-ordered right to supervised parenting time with Rose,
rather than challenge Rose's removal.
Regarding J.E.'s claim that the guardianship judgment should be reversed
because he was deprived of counsel for almost a year after Rose's removal, and
his lack of counsel caused him to be unable to defend his parental rights , we do
not agree. Again, the record reflects J.E. did not appear for the OTSC hearing
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in December 2017 nor on the return date of the OTSC in January 2018, despite
being noticed for these hearings. Additionally, he was noticed for hearings in
April and August 2018, but did not attend the proceedings because he was
incarcerated in March 2018. Thus, the trial court was unable to advise him of
his right to counsel until he appeared in court, which happened in December
2018. See N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.43.
Although J.E. did not receive a 5A form until the FN litigation was well
underway, we are satisfied the delayed appointment of counsel does not warrant
reversal of the guardianship judgment. Indeed, even when J.E. had legal
representation, J.E.'s counsel did not move for J.E. to assume custody during
those brief periods when J.E. was not incarcerated. We find this noteworthy
because the Division discussed reunification possibilities with J.E. as late as
December 2018. Given the totality of circumstances, including J.E.'s repeated
incarcerations throughout the FN and guardianship litigation, his mental health
issues, his lack of stable housing, his lack of compliance with the Division's
recommendations, and Dr. Kanen's uncontroverted testimony that J.E. was
unable to parent Rose, J.E. has not demonstrated that the preliminary lack of
legal representation wrongfully deprived him of the ability to serve as Rose's
caregiver.
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Finally, we recognize that "[a]buse-or-neglect and termination
proceedings are brought under separate statutory schemes, require different
burdens of proof, and allow for different remedies." N.J. Div. of Youth &
Family Servs. v. K.M., 136 N.J. 546, 555 (1994). Therefore, we do not accept
that the results of the dismissed FN litigation denied J.E. a meaningful
opportunity to prevail in the guardianship matter.
We next find no merit to J.E.'s argument that Judge DeCastro erred in
finding the Division made reasonable efforts toward reunification and
considered alternatives to termination. Having carefully reviewed the extensive
record in this matter, we are satisfied the record overwhelmingly supports the
judge's finding.
The record reflects the Division provided referrals for substance abuse and
psychological evaluations to J.E. It also made recommendations for J.E. to
enroll in certain programs while incarcerated and coordinated supervised visits
for J.E. and Rose until he refused prison visits. The Division also offered him
bus passes for visits when J.E. was not incarcerated and discussed a plan for his
reunification with Rose. Further, the agency kept J.E. abreast of his daughter's
progress, as well as court proceedings. Accordingly, we perceive no basis to
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disturb the judge's finding that the Division satisfied its burden under th e third
prong of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).
J.E.'s contentions that the Division failed to consider alternative
placement options and failed to consider KLG as an alternative to termination
are equally unavailing. We recognize the Division has an obligation to "initiate
a search for relatives who may be willing and able to provide the care and
support required by the child." N.J. Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. M.F.,
357 N.J. Super. 515, 529 (App. Div. 2003) (quoting N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12.1a).
Here, the Division properly considered J.E.'s parents and his sister as caregivers.
In June 2019, following J.E.'s request that his parents be considered as resource
parents, J.E.'s mother stated she did not want the Division contacting her again.
The Division sent rule-out letters to J.E.'s parents after this phone call, giving
them the opportunity to appeal, which they did not.
J.E. also claims his sister should have been considered for placement upon
Rose's removal. Although Judge DeCastro found J.E. did not request that his
sister be considered as a resource caregiver until April 2019, the judge was
satisfied Rose would not have been placed with J.E.'s sister after the Dodd
removal as J.E. told the Division he sometimes resided at his sister's home. As
the judge observed, it would have been contrary to Division policy to place Rose
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in a home where her father was living, following a Dodd removal of the child
from his care.
When the Division ruled out J.E.'s sister as a caregiver in June 2019, it did
so because it determined Rose had a strong attachment to B.M. at that point and
it was not in Rose's best interest to be removed from the only caregiver she had
known since birth. The Division's determination is consistent with the results
of Dr. Kanen's bonding evaluation of Rose and her maternal grandmother.
Moreover, we are hard pressed to find error in the judge's decision to support
the Division's rule-out decisions since neither J.E.'s parents nor his sister asked
for them to be reviewed or reconsidered.
J.E. next argues Judge DeCastro improperly excluded testimony from his
sister and that her testimony would have refuted the Division's proofs of its
purported "reasonable efforts" and its exploration of alternatives to termination.
Again, we do not agree.
Evidentiary rulings are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
N.J. Div. of Child. Prot. & Permanency v. K.G., 445 N.J. Super. 324, 342 (App.
Div. 2016) (citing State v. J.A.C., 210 N.J. 281, 295 (2012)). "Absent a manifest
denial of justice, we do not disturb a trial judge's reasoned exercise of his or her
broad discretion when making relevance and admissibility determinations." N.J.
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Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. N.S., 412 N.J. Super. 593, 622 (App. Div.
2010) (citing Lancos v. Silverman, 400 N.J. Super. 258, 275 (App. Div. 2008)).
During the trial, the Division challenged the admissibility of the testimony
of J.E.'s sister, T.E., and requested a proffer for her testimony. A discussion
ensued, whereby the judge asked why T.E. would be testifying if she was ruled
out. Counsel for J.E. responded that the Division knew about T.E. at the outset
of the FN litigation, and T.E. would testify that if she had been asked to be
Rose's caretaker, she would have accepted and "possibly" would have testified
she would have pursued KLG. The Division countered that J.E. "never actually
even offered his sister as a resource," that T.E. did not approach the Division
until April 2019 to be considered as a resource parent, and she was ruled out.
The Division explained it
made a determination . . . based on how long the child
had been there, the lack of contact between [T.E.] and
the child and the expert opinion of Doctor Kanen that
there was a bond[,] that . . . the child would suffer
severe harm if she was removed. And so the Division
made a best interest determination.
Judge DeCastro found J.E. failed to pursue a "best interests" hearing prior
to trial to contest the Division's rule-out decision of his sister. Further, the judge
concluded it was too late to argue T.E. would have been a viable alternative to
termination, because Rose had been with B.M. for well over a year and B.M.
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had testified she was willing to adopt Rose. Thus, the judge also found that
having T.E. testify she "possibly" would have pursued KLG was irrelevant.
Certainly, the Division is authorized to rule out a caretaker on best
interests grounds, understanding that the trial court is the "ultimate arbiter of the
child's best interests" in a guardianship proceeding. N.J. Div. of Youth &
Family Servs. v. J.S., 433 N.J. Super. 69, 84-86 (App. Div. 2013). Based on our
review of the record, we are confident Judge DeCastro understood her role and
that she would have concluded the Division failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that there were no alternatives to termination of JE.'s
parental rights had the Division been arbitrary in its assessment of T.E. As the
judge had the benefit of a substantial record, including the testimony of Dr.
Kanen and B.M., before making her evidentiary ruling, and she was aware J.E.
had not challenged the Division's rule out of T.E., we decline to find the judge
abused her discretion when excluding T.E.'s testimony.
Finally, we are satisfied the judge correctly determined KLG was not a
viable alternative to termination. KLG functions as a potential alternative to the
termination of parental rights. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Perm. v. M.M., 459
N.J. Super. 246, 259 (App. Div. 2019). The Legislature established KLG as an
option for children who are in the care of a relative who does not wish to the
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adopt the child. Ibid. (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. L.L., 201
N.J. 210, 222-23 (2010)); N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-1(c). If a trial court approves KLG
as an alternative to termination, the birth parent retains the right to consent to
his or her child's adoption and name change. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Perm.
v. M.M., 459 N.J. Super. at 260 (citing N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-4(a)(2) to (5)). Also,
the natural parent can enjoy visits with the child and remains obligated to pay
child support. Ibid. Accordingly, a caregiver's consent regarding adoption
needs to be informed, unconditional, unambiguous, and unqualified. Id. at 264.
"[W]hen the permanency provided by adoption is available, [KLG] cannot
be used as a defense to termination of parental rights." Ibid. (quoting N.J. Div.
of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.P., 180 N.J. 494, 513 (2004)). Here, B.M.
expressly testified she wanted to adopt Rose, noting she already had adopted
S.E.M.'s other two children. The record also reflects B.M. was S.EM.'s adoptive
mother. B.M. testified the Division explained the differences between adoption
and KLG. Additionally, B.M. signed a form acknowledging she received the
fact sheet regarding the difference between the two options.
When asked why she preferred adoption, B.M. stated, "[b]ecause I think
[Rose] needs the stability and knowing . . . that we're there instead of . . .
constantly being uprooted." On cross-examination, she clarified she did not
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think Rose would be uprooted but she preferred to adopt Rose since under KLG,
"the parents still had their rights. And, they still could be involved in the baby’s
life. And, [with] adoption . . . they don’t have any rights. I have the rights. But,
I still don’t have any problem with them coming to see the baby like they’re
supposed to."
Although B.M. did not resort to legalese to convey her understanding of
the differences between adoption and KLG, we are satisfied that based on her
prior adoption experiences, her acknowledgment of the differences between
adoption and KLG, and her unwavering testimony that she preferred adoption,
the judge properly found KLG was not a reasonable alternative to termination
and that there were no other reasonable alternatives to termination. This finding
is amply supported by credible evidence in the record.
To the extent we have not addressed J.E.'s remaining arguments, they lack
sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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