STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. LAVAR REYNOLDS (15-08-0671, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5551-18T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
LAVAR REYNOLDS,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Submitted January 4, 2021 – Decided January 25, 2021
Before Judges Fasciale and Mayer.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Passaic County, Indictment No. 15-08-0671.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Cody T. Mason, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (William P. Cooper-Daub, Deputy Attorney
General, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Lavar Reynolds appeals from a June 24, 2019 judgment of
conviction after pleading guilty to fourth-degree violation of a firearms
regulations, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-10(a). Defendant's guilty plea preserved the right
to appeal denial of his motions to dismiss the charges and reconsideration. We
affirm the conviction but remand for resentencing.
On October 11, 2014, defendant worked as a private security guard for an
after-hours party at a nightclub in Passaic County. Defendant had a nine-
millimeter handgun during the event. While the gun was registered and
defendant had a permit to own the weapon, he lacked a permit to carry the
handgun.1
While working security for the event, defendant and another individual
were arrested for failing to have the requisite carry permits for their guns. At
the time of his arrest, defendant was a constable, having been appointed by the
City of Paterson Municipal Council. His term as a constable ran from July 1,
2013, to June 30, 2016.
On August 10, 2015, defendant was indicted on one count of second-
degree misconduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2(a), and one count of second-degree
1
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) prohibits possession of a handgun without obtaining a
permit to carry the weapon.
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unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b).2 Defendant filed a
motion to dismiss the charges, which was heard on July 25, 2016. As a
constable, defendant claimed he was permitted to carry a firearm without a
permit in accordance with exceptions under state and federal statutes. The judge
denied the motion, stating ". . . I've listened to the arguments of counsel and
[t]he [c]ourt's decided to rule in favor of [t]he State on this. I don't believe that
the federal law permits [c]onstables to carry firearms under the circumstances."
In April 2019, defendant moved for reconsideration regarding dismissal
of the charges. A different judge heard the reconsideration motion. After
considering defendant's arguments anew, the judge denied defendant's motion
dismiss.
The judge first reconsidered whether the exceptions in the State statute,
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6, allowed him to carry a firearm without a permit. The judge
determined the statute's exception applied if the person had a contract with a
governmental agency for the supervision or transportation of persons charged
with or convicted of an offense. Defendant conceded he did not supervise or
2
The other individual arrested with defendant was charged with the same
offenses and pleaded guilty to the weapons charge in exchange for the State's
dismissal of the misconduct charge and recommendation of probation.
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transport persons charged with offenses. Nor did defendant produce a contract
or other agreement with any governmental agency to perform such tasks.
Further, in rejecting defendant's argument under the New Jersey statute,
the judge also noted the State adopted strict gun control laws. According to the
judge, if the State sought to include constables as persons allowed to carry a
weapon without a permit, the Legislature would have said so.
Defendant also argued federal law, specifically the Law Enforcement
Officers Safety Act of 2004 ("LEOSA" or "Act"), 18 U.S.C. § 926B, allowed
him to carry a weapon without a permit. The judge found defendant did not
qualify for an exemption under LEOSA because he was not paid by the County,
municipality, or any other government agency as an employee for his work as a
constable. He further determined defendant was not a "qualified law
enforcement officer" consistent with the Act, and lacked the necessary
identification card to qualify for an exemption under LEOSA.
Based on denial of defendant's motions to dismiss the charges, the matter
was scheduled for trial. On May 6, 2019, after jury selection, defendant
requested renewal of plea discussions. The judge agreed, and defendant entered
into a conditional plea to an amended charge of fourth-degree violation of a
firearms regulation, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-10(a)(1). In exchange, the State agreed to
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dismiss the misconduct charge and recommend probation with 364 days in the
county jail.
Defendant was sentenced on June 14, 2019. The judge had "some serious
misgivings" regarding the recommended sentence. He noted the State argued
defendant "had the temerity to challenge the constitutionality" of the statutory
exemptions related to right to carry a firearm without a permit and thus sought
imposition of a "punitive" sanction against defendant. The judge acknowledged
his ability to "undercut this plea," but stated "the ramifications would be such
that it would have a spill over effect on many other cases" and "would negatively
impact many other people."
The judge then reviewed the aggravating and mitigating factors. He found
aggravating factor one, the need to deter future violations of the law, based on
defendant's status as a constable. In reviewing the mitigating factors, the judge
found mitigating factor ten applicable because defendant would make "a good
probationer." He also determined defendant's leading a law-abiding life for a
substantial period of time rendered mitigating factor seven applicable. The
judge also considered a non-statutory factor, defendant's work history, in finding
the "mitigating factors substantially outweighed the aggravating factors . . . ."
Notwithstanding this finding, the judge explained defendant had "prior contacts
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with the criminal justice system" which would "vitiate . . . the presumption
against incarceration." The judge sentenced defendant in accordance with the
prosecutor's recommendation. Because the State agreed, the judge stayed the
sentence pending defendant's appeal from the denial of the motions to dismiss
the charges.
On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments:
POINT I
DEFENDANT WAS PERMITTED TO CARRY A
FIREARM BECAUSE HE WAS A LAWFULLY
EMPLOYED CONSTABLE.
A. Defendant Was a "Qualified Law
Officer" and Permitted to Carry a Firearm
Under Federal Law.
B. Defendant Could Carry a Gun Under
State Law Because He Supervised
Arrestees and Was Performing Official
Duties.
POINT II
RESENTENCING IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE
TRIAL COURT IMPOSED A CUSTODIAL TERM
THAT IT BELIEVED WAS UNWARRANTED AND
BECAUSE THE RECORD AMPLY SUPPORTED
ADDITIONAL MITIGATING FACTORS.
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Dismissal of an indictment is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge
and will be reversed only for abuse of discretion. State v. Warmbrun, 277 N.J.
Super. 51, 59 (App. Div. 1994). An indictment should only be dismissed on the
clearest and plainest ground, where it is manifestly deficient and palpably
defective. State v. Hogan, 144 N.J. 216, 228-29 (1996). Generally, "[d]ismissal
is the last resort because the public interest, the rights of victims and the integrity
of the criminal justice system are at stake." State v. Williams, 441 N.J. Super.
266, 272 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting State v. Ruffin, 371 N.J. Super. 371, 384
(App. Div. 2004)).
We defer to a trial court's findings of fact, which "should not be disturbed
simply because an appellate court 'might have reached a different conclusion
were it the trial tribunal.'" State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 44-45 (2011) (quoting
State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)). However, legal conclusions by a
trial court are reviewed de novo. State v. Reece, 222 N.J. 154, 167 (2015).
We first consider whether defendant, as a constable, was exempt pursuant
to State law from the requirement that he have a permit to carry a firearm.
Defendant argued he qualified for an exemption under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6(c).
A-5551-18T1
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Specifically, defendant claimed the judge erred in rejecting his exemption under
subsection (15) and subsection (1) of the statute.3 We disagree.
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6(c) sets forth exemptions to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5, requiring
a permit to carry a handgun. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6(c) reads in relevant part:
(1) A special agent of the Division of Taxation who has
passed an examination in an approved police training
program testing proficiency in the handling of any
firearm which the agent may be required to carry, while
in the actual performance of the agent's official duties
and while going to or from the agent's place of duty, or
any other police officer, while in the actual
performance of the officer's official duties; [or]
....
(15) A person or employee of any person who, pursuant
to and as required by a contract with a governmental
entity, supervises or transports persons charged with or
convicted of an offense . . . .
The judge found the exemptions set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6 did not
apply to defendant. The judge explained he was "not satisfied that constable
[wa]s a law enforcement office[r]" or that constables were covered by the
statute. The judge rejected the contention that defendant was essentially a police
3
Defendant did not present his argument for an exemption under subsection (1)
to the trial judge.
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officer, invoking the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius,"4 and
concluded if the Legislature intended constables to be exempt from N.J.S.A.
2C:39-5, it would have specifically referenced constables in N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6.
The statute's legislative history also supports the judge's determination.
Previously, constables were authorized to carry a firearm without a permit. See
State v. Nicol, 120 N.J. Super. 503, 506 (Law Div. 1972) (describing N.J.S.A.
2A:151-43(f), which provided a permit to carry a firearm was inapplicable to
"[a]ny jailer, constable, railway police, or any other peace officer, when in
discharge of his duties."). However, the constable exemption to the carry permit
requirement was removed in 1979 upon the State's adoption of the Code of
Criminal Justice. In re Rawls, 197 N.J. Super. 78, 88 n.2 (Law Div. 1984).
While the Legislature could have continued allowing constables to carry
firearms without a permit, it chose to remove the exemption.
The judge also noted New Jersey's strong position as a "gun control state"
and the Legislature's historical approach to "narrowly constru[ing] exceptions
to the gun carrying law" in determining defendant did not qualify for an
exemption under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6. See State v. Rovito, 99 N.J. 581, 587 (1985)
4
A well-known cannon of statutory construction, the phrase means the
expression of one thing suggests the exclusion of another left unmentioned. See
Brodsky v. Grinnell Haulers, Inc., 181 N.J. 102, 112 (2004).
A-5551-18T1
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("[E]xemptions from gun statutes should be strictly construed to better
effectuate the policy of gun control."); see also In re Preis, 118 N.J. 564, 569
(1990) ("Very few persons are exempt from the criminal provisions for carrying
a gun without a permit.").
We are satisfied defendant did not qualify for an exemption under
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6(c). Subsection (15) of this statute requires an individual to
undertake responsibility for supervising or transporting persons charged with an
offense pursuant to a government contract. While defendant may have been
authorized to supervise or transport persons charged with an offense in his
capacity as a constable, he was not performing such duties at the time of his
arrest. In fact, defendant never supervised or transported prisoners. Further,
defendant did not claim he had a contract to perform such duties. Thus, the
judge properly determined defendant did not qualify for an exemption under
subsection (15).
For the first time on appeal, defendant asserts he was permitted to carry a
gun without a permit under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6(c)(1), which allows individuals to
carry firearms pursuant to "official duties." He argues constables have
additional powers and privileges that have "grow[n] out of their official standing
. . . ." State v. Grimes, 235 N.J. Super. 75, 87 (App. Div. 1989).
A-5551-18T1
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In reviewing the record, we discern constables work for private hire and
are not paid for their work by a governmental agency. Working security at a
private function, as did defendant at the time of his arrest, does not constitute
"official duties" to qualify for an exemption under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6(c)(1).
Adopting defendant's logic would mean all work performed by a constable,
including the rendering of services on behalf of private persons, constitutes
"official duties." Such a reading of the exemption is overly broad and
inconsistent with the statutory intent to limit the exemption from the carry
permit requirement to persons acting within the scope of their "official duties."
We next consider defendant's argument he was exempt from the carry
permit requirement as a constable under federal law pursuant to LEOSA.
LEOSA preempts state laws by granting qualified immunity to certain law
enforcement officers and allowing those individuals to carry concealed firearms.
See 18 U.S.C. § 926B. The Act provides:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of the law of
any State or any political subdivision thereof, an
individual who is a qualified law enforcement officer
and who is carrying the identification required by
subsection (d) may carry a concealed firearm that has
been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce, subject to subsection (b).
[18 U.S.C. § 926B(a).]
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To be exempt under LEOSA, an individual must (1) be a qualified law
enforcement officer and (2) have the necessary identification.
A "qualified law enforcement officer" is defined as "an employee of a
governmental agency who":
(1) is authorized by law to engage in or supervise the
prevention, detection, investigation, or prosecution of,
or the incarceration of any person for, any violation of
law, and has statutory powers of arrest or apprehension
under [10 U.S.C. § 807(b)];
(2) is authorized by the agency to carry a firearm;
(3) is not the subject of any disciplinary action by the
agency which could result in suspension or loss of
police powers;
(4) meets standards, if any, established by the agency
which require the employee to regularly qualify in the
use of a firearm;
(5) is not under the influence of alcohol or another
intoxicating or hallucinatory drug or substance; and
(6) is not prohibited by Federal law from receiving a
firearm.
[18 U.S.C. § 926B(c).]
The judge determined LEOSA did not "apply for the reasons already
indicated under the state [law exemption] analysis" because defendant was not
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"employed as a police officer . . . or law enforcement, or [by an] agency." The
judge held:
[W]hile defendant [was] a constable, . . . he [was] not
[part of] a police department. He wasn't authorized by
a police department to take the test and be exempted
from having the carry permit. Even if I granted you that
he was law enforcement and I don't . . . grant you
because I'm not satisfied that a constable is a law
enforcement office[r] any more than broadly defined a
judge would be. Or other public servants.
I—I don't find that he falls within [an] exception either
because I don't see that imprimatur from a police
department. Nor is he a special law enforcement
officer. Nor is he an airport security officer which are
three specific exceptions . . . .
The judge reasoned the powers accorded to defendant as a constable were no
different than the powers granted to other public servants, therefore he was not
a qualified law enforcement officer under LEOSA.
In addition, the judge concluded a constable was not authorized to carry a
firearm "consistent with the restrictive nature of the State's gun control policy."
See In re Casaleggio, 420 N.J. Super. 121, 126 (App. Div. 2011) (denying a
retired assistant prosecutor's application for a carry permit under LEOSA b ased
on the State's restrictive gun policy). Because "exceptions from gun statutes
should be strictly . . . construed to better effectuate the policy of gun control ,"
the judge determined defendant could not carry a firearm absent a permit.
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We are satisfied the judge correctly concluded defendant was not a
qualified law enforcement officer to be exempt from the carry permit
requirement under LEOSA. First, defendant was not paid as an employee for
his work as a constable by any governmental agency. To the contrary, to be a
constable, defendant was required to pay the municipality an annual fee. See
N.J.S.A. 40A:9-12. Second, defendant failed to demonstrate he was authorized
to carry a firearm pursuant to LEOSA. There is no language in the Paterson
Municipal Code permitting a constable to carry a gun. We concur with the trial
judge, the right to carry a gun absent a permit "ha[d] to be specifically provided
. . . under standard statutory construction." In the absence of unambiguous
authorizing language, defendant was not authorized to carry a firearm under
LEOSA.
Further, defendant failed to present the necessary identification to qualify
for an exemption under LEOSA. Pursuant to LEOSA, "[t]he identification
required . . . is the photographic identification issued by the governmental
agency for which the individual is employed that identifies the employee as a
police officer or law enforcement officer of the agency." 18 U.S.C. § 926B(d).
Here, defendant's identification cards did not satisfy the requirements to trigger
an exemption under LEOSA. The Office of Emergency Management card
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produced by defendant was unrelated to his appointment as a constable. 5
Further, defendant's constable cards did not identify him as a police officer or
law enforcement officer.
After examining the record, we are satisfied the judge properly denied
defendant's motions to dismiss the indictment because the state and federal
statutory exemptions were inapplicable to defendant as a matter of law.
Thus, we turn to defendant's argument that the judge's qualitative analysis
during the sentencing hearing did not support the imposition of a custodial term
and the matter should be remanded for resentencing. We agree.
Our "review of sentencing decisions is relatively narrow and is governed
by an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Blackmon, 202 N.J. 283, 297
(2010). Sentencing courts are instructed to consider relevant aggravating and
mitigating factors to ensure a sentence is reasonable and fair. State v. Natale,
184 N.J. 458, 488 (2005). In sentencing, courts must engage in this required
analysis rather than "simply accept[ing] the terms of a plea agreement." State
v. Warren, 115 N.J. 433, 447 (1989) (citing State v. Spinks, 66 N.J. 568 (1975)).
However, "appellate courts are cautioned not to substitute their judgment for
5
Defendant's Office of Emergency Management card produce to the trial court
expired prior to the date of defendant's arrest.
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those of [the] sentencing courts." State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014) (citing
State v. Lawless, 214 N.J. 594, 606 (2013)). If a sentence "shock[s] the judicial
conscience" or "the trial court fail[ed] to identify relevant aggravating and
mitigating factors, or merely enumerates them, or foregoes a qualitative
analysis, or provides little 'insight into the sentencing decision,' the deferential
standard will not apply." Ibid. (quoting State v. Kruse, 105 N.J. 354, 363
(1987)). No deference is afforded if the sentencing court failed to follow the
sentencing guidelines. State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014).
Here, the judge sentenced defendant in accordance with the State's plea
recommendation despite finding the following mitigating factors: factor seven,
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7), defendant "led a lifetime . . . crime free[,];" factor ten,
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(10), defendant would "make a good probationer[;]" and one
non-statutory mitigating factor, defendant's work history. In analyzing the
aggravating factors, the judge found only factor nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9),
the need to deter "defendant and others from violating the law," applicable. The
judge also noted defendant's prior criminal history as negating the presumption
against incarceration. In accordance with the plea agreement, the judge
sentenced defendant to one-year probation conditioned on 364 days in a county
jail.
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Despite finding the "mitigating factors substantially outweigh[ed] the
aggravating factors," and suggesting jail time might not be appropriate under the
circumstances, the judge imposed a custodial term, explaining he did not want
to "undercut [t]he State" or "negatively impact . . . other people." These reasons
were insufficient to support the sentence.
The judge expressed "serious misgivings" with the State's sentencing
recommendation but felt "bound" by the recommendation. The judge noted the
State's position on sentencing reflected a "punitive" posture and suggested the
sentence served as a "sanction" for defendant's "temerity to challenge" the gun
charge. In addition, the judge found defendant "very sympathetic" and an
"upstanding person." Based on the judge's statements during sentencing, we are
satisfied he failed to conduct the necessary qualitative analysis to ensure
defendant's "individual characteristics and circumstances" were addressed prior
to imposing the sentence. Therefore, we remand to the trial court for
resentencing.
Because we remand for resentencing, defendant may raise any additional
mitigating factors for the judge's consideration. We leave it to the trial court to
address the applicability of additional mitigating factors offered by defendant at
resentencing.
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Affirmed as to the conviction and remanded for resentencing. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
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