STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. RONALD J. TAYLOR (17-09-0997, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3892-18
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
RONALD J. TAYLOR,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________
Submitted February 1, 2021 – Decided February 19, 2021
Before Judges Mayer and Susswein.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Burlington County, Indictment No. 17-09-
0997.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Monique Moyse, Designated Counsel, on the
brief).
Scott A. Coffina, Burlington County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Nicole Handy, Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals from a February 22, 2019 order denying his petition
for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm for
the reasons expressed in the thorough written decision issued by Judge Mark P.
Tarantino.
Defendant was charged with first-degree attempted murder, N.J.S.A.
2C:5-1(a)(1) and 2C:11-3(a)(1) (count one); third-degree endangering an injured
victim, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2(a) (count two); third-degree possession of a weapon
for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d) (count three); fourth-degree
unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d) (count four); fourth-
degree obstruction, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a) (count five); and third-degree
hindering, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(1) (count six). He pleaded guilty to count one
as amended to second-degree assault. Two weeks after his guilty plea, defendant
was sentenced as a third-degree offender to a three-year term of imprisonment
subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. All remaining counts
were dismissed.
Defendant did not file a direct appeal. Two months after sentencing,
defendant filed a pro se PCR petition. He was assigned counsel, and counsel
filed an amended petition and supporting brief. In his PCR petition, defendant
argued he was interrogated by detectives despite repeated statements he wished
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to consult with an attorney. Based on the detectives' interrogation absent the
presence of counsel, defendant claimed his trial counsel should have filed a
motion to suppress, and the failure to do so constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel. Defendant also asserted his trial counsel failed to properly advocate on
his behalf at the sentencing hearing.
Judge Tarantino heard the arguments of counsel on the PCR petition. In
denying the PCR petition, the judge concluded defendant failed to satisfy either
prong of the Strickland/Fritz 1 test to establish ineffective assistance of counsel.
The judge determined nothing defendant claimed should have been done by his
trial counsel would have resulted in a lesser sentence, and defendant received
the exact sentence as negotiated, "which was extremely favorable to him."
In his Strickland/Fritz analysis, the judge also rejected defendant's
contention his trial counsel failed to present certain mitigating factors during
sentencing. Defendant claimed trial counsel should have raised mitigating
factors three, four, eight, and eleven.
1
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984); State v. Fritz, 105 N.J.
42, 58 (1987).
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Regarding mitigating factor three, defendant acted under a strong
provocation, this factor was inapplicable based on the victim's statement that
defendant started the fight and possessed the knife the entire time.
Judge Tarantino rejected mitigating factor four, defendant's drug
dependency and alcohol abuse, in excusing defendant's actions. He noted
substance abuse issues may be used to explain why defendant acted a certain
way but could not "be used to justify or excuse a defendant's actions." Thus, the
judge found the assertion of mitigating factor four by trial counsel "would not
have made a difference at sentencing."
Regarding mitigating factor eight, defendant's conduct is unlikely to recur,
there was no evidence to support application of this factor. Defendant failed to
demonstrate he would never become angry enough to assault someone in the
future.
Nor was mitigating factor eleven, imprisonment causing a hardship to
defendant's children, applicable. Defendant's children were not in his custody
at the time of the crime or sentencing. Therefore, defendant failed to
demonstrate any harm would be suffered by the children if he was incarcerated.
Even if these mitigating factors had been presented by trial counsel, Judge
Tarantino held the outcome would not have been different "because there [were]
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not enough mitigating factors in this case to outweigh the aggravating factors."
In addition, the judge noted defense counsel negotiated an extremely favorable
plea that included significantly less jail time and dismissal of all but one charge.
Accordingly, the judge found defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective in
failing to present these four mitigating factors at sentencing.
Regarding defendant's claim his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to
file a suppression motion, Judge Tarantino found this argument was "without
merit." He concluded defendant failed to demonstrate "the proceedings against
him would have ended differently" if such a motion had been filed. Judge
Tarantino also determined a suppression "motion would not have succeeded at
trial" because, consistent with State v. Alston, 204 N.J. 614, 620-21 (2011),
ambiguous statements by a subject regarding a lawyer do not require the police
to cease an interrogation. The judge found defendant continued to "re-initiate
conversation with the officer about the events" despite the officer's repeated
statements that she had to review the Miranda2 rights and determine if defendant
wanted to waive his rights or if he wanted an attorney before she could speak
with him. Based on these facts in the record, the judge held "a motion to
2
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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suppress would not have succeeded, and therefore [defendant] was not
prejudiced."
On appeal, defendant raises the following argument:
[DEFENDANT] IS ENTITLED TO AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HIS CLAIM THAT
HIS ATTORNEY RENDERED INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR FAILING TO
ARGUE ADEQUATELY AT SENTENCING AND
FOR FAILING TO FILE A PRETRIAL
SUPPRESSION MOTION.
Having reviewed the record, we affirm for the reasons expressed by Judge
Tarantino. We add the following comment.
During a police interrogation, if a person makes "a request, 'however
ambiguous,' to terminate questioning or to have counsel present[, it] must be
diligently honored." State v. Hartley, 103 N.J. 252, 263 (1986) (quoting State
v. Kennedy, 97 N.J. 278, 288 (1984)). If the police are unsure if a suspect
invoked his or her right to counsel, the police must either "(1) terminate the
interrogation or (2) ask only those questions necessary to clarify whether the
defendant intended to invoke his [or her] right to silence." State v. S.S., 229
N.J. 360, 383 (2017) (citing, State v. Johnson, 120 N.J. 263, 283-84 (1990)).
In determining whether the right to counsel was invoked, a court must
analyze "the totality of the circumstances, including consideration of the
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suspect's words and conduct." State v. Maltese, 222 N.J. 525, 545 (2015) (citing
State v. Diaz-Bridges, 208 N.J. 544, 568-69 (2012)). "The . . . statement [must
be] evaluated in the full context in which [it was] made . . . ." Ibid. (citing State
v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 231-33 (1993)).
Applying these principles here, we discern no error in Judge Tarantino's
determination that a motion to suppress would not have succeeded. Defendant's
statements regarding his wish to speak to a lawyer and also speak to the
detectives were ambiguous, and the officers' continued discussions with
defendant simply sought to clarify defendant's words. Once "the accused
himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the
police," an accused has waived the right to counsel and an interrogation may
continue. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981).
Defendant's claim he unambiguously requested an attorney, compelling
the cessation of the interrogation, is belied by the transcript of his statement to
the police. Defendant clearly equivocated in his desire to speak with an attorney
and his need to speak with the detectives about the events. Defendant vacillated
several times, stating he wished to speak with an attorney while at the same time
expressing his desire to speak with the detectives. Each time, the detectives
explained defendant had the right to speak with an attorney but could waive that
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right. Based on defendant's conflicting statements, the detectives re-read the
Miranda card to defendant. Defendant repeated he wanted an attorney but then
continued to engage in discussions with the detectives. Eventually, defendant
confirmed he wished to speak to the detectives without the presence of an
attorney and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Thereafter, defendant never
invoked his right to remain silent or requested an attorney.
Under the totality of the circumstances, we are satisfied defendant
voluntarily engaged in substantive discussions with the detectives regarding the
incident. The detectives' questions were part of their effort to clarify defendant's
ambiguous and confusing responses about speaking to an attorney and
continuing to talk about the events with the detectives. Under these
circumstances, Judge Tarantino properly ruled defendant's statements were
admissible.
Because we agree with Judge Tarantino that defendant failed to satisfy
either prong of the Strickland/Fritz analysis, there was no requirement he
conduct an evidentiary hearing. State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462 (1992).
The remainder of defendant's arguments are without sufficient merit to
warrant further discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
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