STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JAZAAR R. REDDING (04-11-2729, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2021 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4150-18
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JAZAAR R. REDDING,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Submitted January 21, 2021 – Decided March 9, 2021
Before Judges Alvarez and Sumners.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No. 04-11-
2729.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Steven E. Braun, Designated Counsel, on the
brief).
Christopher J. Gramiccioni, Monmouth County
Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Monica do
Outeiro, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Jazaar R. Redding appeals Law Division orders of August 2,
2013 and August 23, 2018, denying his petitions for post-conviction relief
(PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
The basis for defendant's petitions arises from his claim that trial counsel
advised him that he would be receiving community supervision for life (CSL)
and not the more stringent parole supervision for life (PSL) when he pled guilty
on January 10, 2005, to third-degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A.
2C:24-4(a). The record reveals that defendant was placed on CSL and PSL, and
then just PSL.
Trial counsel stated the Megan's Law plea form, including "[t]he special
one that . . . explains to [defendant] exactly what community supervision for life
entails[,]" was "filled out[]" with and "explained" to defendant. Defendant
confirmed this, also stating that he read and understood the plea form. The
Megan's Law conditions were reinforced by the judge's admonition to defendant
that he would be "subject to [the] provisions of Megan’s Law. That is
community supervision for life . . . . [A]mong other things, . . . you can’t leave
the state without anybody telling you to, and there has been a two-page
document explaining to you in detail what community supervision for life is."
After defendant admitted that he had "sexual relations" with a fourteen-year-old
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girl, the judge accepted his plea because it was entered "with full
understanding[]" and "voluntarily[.]"
In accordance with the plea agreement, defendant was sentenced by the
same judge on April 29, 2005, to two years' probation and time served. The
judge stated he would be subject to "[t]he provisions of Megan’s Law[,]" with
"parole supervision for life." There was no mention of CSL. The judgment of
conviction (JOC) entered on May 3, 2005, noted that, with two pre-filled check
boxes indicating defendant was sentenced to "community supervision for life"
and "a LIFE . . . term of parole supervision[.]" Defendant did not file a direct
appeal.
On December 2, 2005, an amended JOC dated November 28, 2005, was
entered, noting: "THE IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE IS SUSPENDED, AND
THE DEFENDANT IS SENTENCED TO PAROLE SUPERVISION FOR
LIFE."
On April 19, 2012, nearly seven years after his May 3, 2005 JOC and six-
and-a-half years after his December 2, 2005 amended JOC, defendant filed a pro
se PCR petition alleging counsel was ineffective for not fully explaining the
concept of PSL and not arguing that he should not be subject to PSL because,
among other reasons, the victim was not raped and she misled him to believe
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she was eighteen years old, and he was not a sexual predator. After being
assigned counsel, defendant argued that the five-year statutory time limit to file
for PCR should not apply "because he did not understand the law or the benefits
of appealing his case, and he felt that the case was closed once he was
convicted."
Defendant's petition was dismissed with prejudice in an August 2, 2013
order, when he failed to appear for oral argument. PCR counsel did not know
why defendant was not present. He advised the judge that the last time they met
he told defendant of the court date, and that "every [phone] number I . . . have
right now is off and not working." The judge stated defendant's petition was
filed "almost" six-and-a-half years after the amended JOC, "well outside the
five-year time limit[] mandated by [Rule] 3:22-12(a)(1)." Despite noting that
he "was not overly impressed with [defendant's] argument[,]" the judge did not
address "the merits of the petition in light of the fact that defendant has failed
to" appear.
Defendant did not appeal the August 2, 2013 dismissal order, but over
thirteen months later, on November 12, 2014, a different defense counsel filed
a motion to reconsider the order. Defendant asserted that prior PCR counsel
failed to advise him of the August 2, 2013 argument date. He also alleged that
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prior counsel forged his signature on a "Notice of Right to Appeal (Post-
Conviction Relief)" form.
The same PCR judge who dismissed defendant's first PCR petition, heard
argument, and denied the application in a July 10, 2015 order and written
decision. The judge initially determined that the motion to reconsider was
untimely because it was filed over a year past the twenty-day period to file a
reconsideration motion required by Rule 1:7-4(b). Considering the motion a
second PCR because it alleged that the first PCR counsel failed to advise
defendant of PCR argument date, the judge determined the application was
untimely under Rule 3:22-12(a)(2)(C) because it was not filed within one year
of the August 2, 2013 dismissal of the first PCR petition. Defendant's
application was three months and ten days late. The judge further pointed out
that defendant failed to provide an affidavit or certification supporting the
allegation that he was not advised of the August 2, 2013 hearing date. See State
v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999).
The judge also addressed the merits of defendant's underlying PCR claim
that counsel was ineffective for not fully explaining the concept of PSL and,
therefore, he should not be subject to PSL. Noting the claim was untimely filed
over nine years after defendant was sentenced in April 2005, the judge found
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there was no proof of excusable neglect for the late filing. R. 3:22-12(a)(1).
The judge further found there was no showing that a fundamental injustice
would result because defendant professeed no claim of innocence to the
conviction of endangering the welfare of a child, but merely asserted he should
not be subject to PSL. R. 3:22-12(a)(1). Defendant did not appeal the July 10,
2015 order.
Nearly three years later, a self-represented defendant filed another PCR
petition dated June 28, 2018. Based upon the record, it is not apparent what
defendant alleged because that petition is not provided. Defendant's two-page
form affidavit in support of PCR, specifying his conviction, sentence, and prior
PCR petition, is provided, but it makes no mention of his claims.
A different judge, treating the petition as a "second" PCR petition, denied
relief in an August 23, 2018 order stating the:
. . . petition is out of time under Rule 3:22-12(a)(3),
which only permits a second petition for post-
conviction relief to be treated as a first petition if filed
within 90 days of the date of the judgment on direct
appeal, and Rule 3:22-12(a)(2), which requires a
second petition for post-conviction relief be filed
within one year after the denial of the first petition
....
Before us, defendant argues:
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POINT I
TRIAL DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE
BY FAILING TO PROPERLY INFORM
DEFENDANT THAT HE WAS SUBJECT TO
PAROLE SUPERVISION FOR LIFE, THEREBY
MAKING DEFENDANT'S PLEA UNKNOWING
AND INVOLUNTARY. HE ALSO FAILED TO
OBJECT OR CORRECT THE TRIAL COURT WHEN
IT IMPOSED PAROLE SUPERVISION FOR LIFE.
POINT II
DEFENDANT WAS NOT AWARE OF THE AGE OF
THE ALLEGED VICTIM, AND THUS HIS GUILTY
PLEA WAS NEITHER KNOWING NOR
VOLUNTARY[.]
We find no merit in these arguments.
Defendant's appeal of the August 2, 2013 order, which dismissed his first
PCR petition, was not timely filed within forty-five days. R. 2:4-1(a). It is too
late to challenge that order in his appeal. The petition was also deficient because
it was filed well after five years of the conviction being challenged, with no
showing of excusable neglect for its tardy filing and that fundamental injustice
would occur if relief were denied. R. 3:22-12(a)(1)(A).
Defendant's appeal of the September 5, 2018 order likewise suffers from
a timeliness deficiency. The order properly denied essentially defendant's third
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PCR petition filed on June 28, 2018, because it was filed well after one year of
the second or subsequent petition. R. 3:22-12(a)(2)(C).
No further discussion is needed in this opinion as defendant's arguments
lack sufficient merit. 1 R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
1
The appendix to defendant's merits briefs includes a May 22, 2019 certification
from an Assistant Public Defender and a September 6, 2018 letter to defendant
from the Office of Attorney Ethics of the Supreme Court enclosing a Court order
of the same date stating that trial counsel was suspended from the practice of
law for three months as a result of an ethics complaint defendant filed against
counsel. The Court agreed with the findings of the Disciplinary Review Board
that counsel violated
RPC 1.2(a) (failure to abide by a client's decisions
concerning the scope and objectives of the
representation)[;] RPC l.4(b) (failure to keep a client
reasonably informed about the status of the matter)[;]
RPC 3.3(a)(l) (knowing[ly] making a false statement of
material fact or law to a tribunal)[;] RPC 4.l(a)(1)
(knowingly making a false statement of material fact or
law to a third person)[;] RPC 8.1(a)(knowingly making
a false statement of material fact in connection with a
disciplinary matter)[;] and RPC 8.4(c)(conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation)[.]
Because the Court's order was not brought to trial court's attention and
defendant's brief does not explain how the order impacts this appeal, we do not
consider it. See State v. Marroccelli, 448 N.J. Super. 349, 373 (App. Div. 2017)
(holding we "decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to
the trial court . . . unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction
of the trial court or concern matters of great public interest.") (alteration in
original) (quoting State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 20 (2009)); Gormley v. Wood-
A-4150-18
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Affirmed.
El, 218 N.J. 72, 95 n.8 (2014) (recognizing an issue not briefed is deemed
waived).
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