STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. CHARLES J. SMITH (17-03-0042, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3662-19
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CHARLES J. SMITH,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Submitted March 22, 2021 – Decided April 9, 2021
Before Judges Fasciale and Rothstadt.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 17-03-0042.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Phuong V. Dao, Designated Counsel, on the
brief).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Daniel Finkelstein, Deputy Attorney
General, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals from a March 2, 2020 order denying his petition for
post-conviction relief (PCR). He maintains his plea counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by giving him erroneous advice about jail credits and by not filing a
suppression motion. Judge Francisco Dominguez entered the order and rendered
an oral opinion.
On appeal, defendant argues:
POINT I
BECAUSE DEFENDANT RECEIVED
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF [PLEA]
COUNSEL, HE PLED GUILTY AND THEREFORE,
HE IS ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY
HEARING.
A. [Plea] Counsel Misinformed Defendant as to
Jail and Gap-Time Credits.
B. [Plea] Counsel Failed to File a Motion to
Suppress.
POINT II
DEFENDANT HAS MADE A PRIMA FACIE
SHOWING OF INEFFECTIVENESS ASSISTANCE
OF [PLEA] COUNSEL, AND THUS, THE PCR
[JUDGE] ERRED IN NOT GRANTING AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARING.
2 A-3662-19
We conclude that defendant has not demonstrated a prima facie claim of
ineffective assistance of plea counsel. We affirm substantially for the reasons
given by Judge Dominguez. We add these brief remarks.
When a PCR judge does not hold an evidentiary hearing—like here—this
court's standard of review is de novo as to both the factual inferences drawn by
the PCR judge from the record and the judge's legal conclusions. State v. Blake,
444 N.J. Super. 285, 294 (App. Div. 2016).
To establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must satisfy the two-pronged test enumerated in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), which our Supreme Court adopted in
State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). To meet the first Strickland/Fritz prong,
a defendant must establish that his counsel "made errors so serious that counsel
was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment." 466 U.S. at 687. The defendant must rebut the "strong
presumption that counsel's conduct [fell] within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance[.]" Id. at 689. Thus, this court must consider whether
counsel's performance fell below an object standard of reasonableness. Id. at
688.
3 A-3662-19
To satisfy the second Strickland/Fritz prong, a defendant must show "that
counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
whose result is reliable." Id. at 687. A defendant must establish "a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694. "[I]f counsel's
performance has been so deficient as to create a reasonable probability that these
deficiencies materially contributed to defendant's conviction, the constitutional
right will have been violated." Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58. Both the United States
Supreme Court and the New Jersey Supreme Court have extended the
Strickland/Fritz test to challenges of guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance
of counsel. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162-63 (2012); Missouri v. Frye,
566 U.S. 134, 140 (2012); State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 456-57 (1994).
Defendant must demonstrate with "reasonable probability" that the result would
have been different had he received proper advice from his attorney. Lafler, 566
U.S. at 163 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
A defendant is only entitled to an evidentiary hearing when he "'has
presented a prima facie [claim] in support of [PCR],'" meaning that a defendant
must demonstrate "a reasonable likelihood that his . . . claim will ultimately
4 A-3662-19
succeed on the merits." State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997) (quoting
State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 463 (1992)). A defendant must "do more than
make bald assertions that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel" to
establish a prima facie claim entitling him to an evidentiary hearing. State v.
Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999). A defendant bears the
burden of establishing a prima facie claim. State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 350
(2012). We "view the facts in the light most favorable to a defendant to
determine whether a defendant has established a prima facie claim." Preciose,
129 N.J. at 463-64.
Here, defendant pled guilty to second-degree armed burglary, N.J.S.A.
2C:18-2(a)(2); and second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A.
2C:39-5(b)(1). The judge sentenced him to a seven-year prison sentence subject
to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, on the burglary
conviction, concurrent with a five-year prison term with forty-two months of
parole ineligibility on the weapons conviction. 1 Defendant acknowledged plea
counsel would argue at sentencing for jail credit for a certain period. During the
plea colloquy, plea counsel and the plea judge told defendant that counsel's
argument for jail credit might be rejected by the sentencing judge. The record
1
Defendant did not file a direct appeal.
5 A-3662-19
establishes that defendant plead guilty regardless, freely, and knowingly. He
did so without any pressure, without being under the influence of any substances
that would have impaired his ability to fully understand what he was doing and
expressed that he was fully satisfied with plea counsel.
As to his contention that plea counsel rendered ineffective assistance by
failing to file a suppression motion, defendant provided insufficient information
that he was under the influence when he confessed, did not submit a verified
petition, his allegations amount to bald assertions, and importantly, he has not
shown prejudice. Insisting that defendant negotiate a favorable plea agreement
rather than face trial on multiple charges, and the overwhelming evidence that
defendant was caught with an assault rifle, does not constitute ineffective
assistance under either prong of Strickland/Fritz.
Affirmed.
6 A-3662-19