STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JOSUE SERRANO-TORO (15-02-0252, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3849-15T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JOSUE SERRANO-TORO,
Defendant-Appellant.
Submitted May 9, 2017 - Decided May 24, 2017
Before Judges Sumners and Mayer.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County,
Indictment No. 15-02-0252.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Laura B. Lasota, Assistant
Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the
brief).
Christopher J. Gramiccioni, Monmouth County
Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Alissa
Goetz, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and
on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Josue Serrano-Toro appeals from his conviction for
third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance,
N.J.S.A. 2C: 35-10(a)(1). His appeal focuses on the court's denial
of his motion to suppress evidence of drugs found in his vehicle.
Defendant contends he did not consent to the search of his vehicle,
and the inevitable discovery rule did not apply. We disagree and
affirm.
We recite the facts relevant to defendant's contentions on
appeal. The State presented evidence that a Wall Township police
officer was in a marked patrol car with his K-9 partner on November
13, 2014. On that date, police officer Emmett Idzahl observed a
BMW with tinted front windows. Because tinted front windows are
a violation of the State's motor vehicle code, Officer Idzahl ran
a computer search on the vehicle's license plate, which confirmed
defendant was the registered owner of the vehicle and that
defendant's driver's license was suspended. Consequently, Officer
Idzahl activated his lights and requested defendant, who was
driving the vehicle, pull over to the side of the road.
Officer Idzahl approached defendant's car and smelled
marijuana. While requesting defendant's driving credentials, the
officer observed defendant was shaky and nervous. Specifically,
Officer Idzahl noted defendant's eyes were bloodshot and watery.
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Based on his observations, Officer Idzahl requested backup
support. Sergeant Jason Costantini responded in a vehicle equipped
with a dashboard video camera, which was used to record the
interaction between the police officers and defendant.
Based upon his observations, Officer Idzahl asked if
defendant would consent to the search of his vehicle. The request
to search the vehicle was premised on the smell of marijuana,
defendant's nervous behavior and body language, and defendant's
bloodshot eyes. While defendant denied having drugs in the
vehicle, he admitted smoking marijuana earlier in the day. Both
police officers explained to defendant that a search warrant could
not be obtained for at least four days.1 The police officers
further explained that if defendant consented to a search of his
vehicle and nothing was found, defendant could leave. After
1
Prior to defendant signing the consent to search form, Sergeant
Costantini explained that obtaining a search warrant would take
approximately four days due to vacation and staffing issues, and
the vehicle would be impounded in that case. Defendant
unequivocally voiced his desire to avoid impounding the car.
Because defendant's driver's license was suspended, even absent
finding suspected contraband, the vehicle may have had to be
impounded if defendant was unable to arrange for someone to drive
his vehicle home.
Judge Mellaci expressly found that the officers' comments about
the length of time it would take to obtain a warrant and where the
vehicle would be located while a warrant was obtained were not
said "as a way to subvert [defendant's] will to consent." Judge
Mellaci ruled that the officers' statements were "just a statement
of facts."
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considering the options defendant consented to a search of his
car.
Officer Idzahl reviewed the consent to search form with
defendant. The dashboard video camera in Sergeant Costantini's
vehicle recorded the proceeding with defendant's knowledge.
After the search commenced, defendant asked whether he could
stop the search. Sergeant Costantini explained that the search
could be discontinued, but the vehicle would be impounded while
an application was made for a search warrant. Despite this
information, defendant never asked the officers to cease searching
his vehicle.
Upon searching defendant's vehicle, Officer Idzahl found
suspected cocaine, a burnt marijuana cigarette, and nine "decks"
of suspected heroin. The officers then stopped the search to
impound the car and obtain a search warrant. Defendant was
arrested.
Defendant moved to suppress the drug evidence at trial. Judge
Anthony Mellaci, Jr. conducted the suppression hearing. At the
hearing, the State's evidence consisted of the testimony of Officer
Idzahl and the dashboard camera video. After considering the
evidence, Judge Mellaci denied defendant's motion.
In an oral decision, Judge Mellaci made extensive fact-
findings based upon his review of the evidence. Judge Mellaci
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concluded that the State satisfied its burden of demonstrating
probable cause to search the vehicle based upon the smell of
marijuana and Officer Idzahl's observations regarding defendant's
appearance. Based on this determination, Judge Mellaci also ruled
there was a reasonable and articulable suspicion of contraband
supporting the officers' request for consent to search the vehicle.
In his ruling, Judge Mellaci found the State proved, by clear
and positive testimony, that defendant's consent to search the
vehicle was knowing and voluntary. Judge Mellaci determined that
defendant's will was not overborne and that defendant "knowingly
and intelligently and voluntarily, signed the consent form to
search despite the comments of the officers." Judge Mellaci found
defendant understood his right to refuse to consent to the search
and the available options if he did not consent to the search.
In reviewing the video recording, Judge Mellaci noted
defendant and the officers were calm and "matter of fact." In the
video recording, it appeared to the judge that defendant was aware
the car would be searched, and hoped the drugs would not be
discovered during a brief roadside search. Because defendant was
not under arrest when he consented to the search of his vehicle,
did not refuse consent prior to giving his consent to search, and
was not threatened by the officers stating they would seek a
warrant, the judge determined the State proved the voluntariness
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of defendant's consent to search the car. Additionally, he stated
the consent to search form was read to defendant in its entirety,
and defendant was advised that he could refuse to consent to search
the vehicle. Moreover, the judge found defendant's signature on
the consent to search form negated any argument of coercion.
Judge Mellaci rejected defendant's argument that the
officers' statements were intended to coerce his consent to search
the vehicle. He concluded the officers' statements to defendant
were factually accurate and not designed to "subvert [defendant's]
will to consent."
Because Judge Mellaci concluded defendant's consent was
voluntary, he denied the suppression motion. The judge also ruled
that even if defendant's consent to the search was not voluntary,
under the inevitable discovery doctrine, the drugs would have been
found during a search conducted pursuant to a search warrant.
On appeal, defendant asserts the following arguments:
POINT I
BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT GIVE VOLUNTARY
CONSENT, THE SEARCH OF HIS VEHICLE
VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE
FRUITS OF THE SEARCH MUST BE SUPPRESSED.
POINT II
THE DRUGS WERE INADMISSIBLE BASED ON THE
INEVITABLE DISCOVERY DOCTRINE BECAUSE
THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE BY CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT A VALID SEARCH
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WARRANT FOR THE CAR WOULD HAVE BEEN
GRANTED.
In reviewing a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to the
factual and credibility findings of the trial court, "so long as
those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in
the record." State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 44 (2011) (quoting
State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007)). "[A]n appellate
tribunal must defer to the factual findings of the trial court
when that court has made its findings based on the testimonial and
documentary evidence presented at an evidentiary hearing or
trial." State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 269 (2015). We accord
deference to the trial court "because the 'findings of the trial
judge . . . are substantially influenced by his opportunity to
hear and see the witnesses and to have the "feel" of the case,
which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.'" State v. Reece, 222 N.J.
154, 166 (2015) (quoting State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471
(1999)).
Because the trial judge's ruling was based, in part, upon the
video recording from a dashboard video camera, we set forth the
standard of review governing video recordings. While an appellate
court may view the same video recording as the trial court, an
appellate court may not substitute its evaluation of the video
recording particularly where the trial court's determination on
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the motion is also based on the judge's opportunity to hear and
consider live testimony. Elders, supra, 192 N.J. at 244-45.
We find ample support in the record for Judge Mellaci's
finding that defendant's consent to search his vehicle was
"unequivocal, voluntary, knowing, and intelligent." State v.
Sugar, 108 N.J. 151, 156 (1987). First, Judge Mellaci concluded
that the State proved a "reasonable and articulable suspicion" of
criminal activity justifying the search of the vehicle based upon
the smell of marijuana and defendant's appearance. See State v.
Carty, 170 N.J. 632, 647 (2002), modified, 174 N.J. 351 (2002).
Next, Judge Mellaci found defendant's consent was "knowing" as
defendant was told more than once that he had the right to refuse
to consent to the search of his vehicle. See State v. Johnson,
68 N.J. 349, 354 (1975); State v. Crumb, 307 N.J. Super. 204, 243-
44 (App. Div. 1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215 (1998). Judge
Mellaci also determined defendant's consent was unequivocal as the
consent form was read aloud to defendant before he signed the
document. Carty, supra, 170 N.J. at 639. Lastly, Judge Mellaci
did not find the officers' statements to defendant were coercive.
See State v. Cancel, 256 N.J. Super. 430, 434 (App. Div. 1992),
certif. denied, 134 N.J. 484 (1993) (coercion not found unless the
explanation of the choices available were "a deceptive threat made
to deprive [defendant] of the ability to make an informed
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consent."). Judge Mellaci specifically found the officers'
statements were factually accurate descriptions of the options
available to defendant.
In addition to testimonial evidence, Judge Mellaci viewed the
video recording in ruling that defendant's consent to search was
voluntary. See State v. Diaz-Bridges, 208 N.J. 544, 565 (2012).
Judge Mellaci observed that defendant was calm when the officers
requested his consent to search the vehicle. It appeared to the
judge that defendant's behavior was "matter of fact" in analyzing
his options and then giving his consent to search the vehicle.
More importantly, in support of the "knowing" element for consent
to search the vehicle, the judge heard what the officers said to
defendant regarding his right to refuse consent, and confirmed
that the entire consent to search form was read aloud before
defendant signed the form. See State v. Chapman, 332 N.J. Super.
452, 467 (App. Div. 2000). Absent coercive statements, the reading
and signing of a consent form is persuasive evidence of a valid
consent to search. See State v. Binns, 222 N.J. Super. 583, 589-
90 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 624 (1988). Based on the
totality of the circumstances, Judge Mellaci properly determined
that the State met its burden by showing defendant intelligently,
voluntarily and knowingly consented to the search of his vehicle.
State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 352-53 (1965).
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We acknowledge that Judge Mellaci also denied defendant's
suppression motion based upon the inevitable discovery doctrine
exception. We affirm Judge Mellaci's denial of the suppression
motion on the alternative ground as the judge found the State
satisfied the requirements of that doctrine to admit evidence of
the drugs found in defendant's vehicle. Under the inevitable
discovery doctrine, "the State must show by clear and convincing
evidence that had the illegality not occurred, it would have
pursued established investigatory procedures that would have
inevitably resulted in the discovery of the controverted evidence,
wholly apart from its unlawful acquisition." See State v. Dion
Robinson, __ N.J. __,__ (2017) (slip op. at 29) (citing State v.
Sugar, 100 N.J. 214, 240 (1985)). Judge Mellaci concluded that
the drugs found during the search of defendant's vehicle at the
scene would have been found during a search of the vehicle
occurring elsewhere pursuant to a warrant.
Affirmed.
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