PETER A. MAZZA, JR. VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD (NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD) ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1392-15T3
PETER A. MAZZA, JR.,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY STATE
PAROLE BOARD,
Respondent.
_________________________________________
Submitted February 9, 2017 – Decided May 25, 2017
Before Judges Lihotz and O'Connor.
On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole
Board.
Peter A. Mazza, Jr., appellant pro se.
Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel;
Gregory R. Bueno, Deputy Attorney General,
on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Appellant Peter Mazza appeals from the October 22, 2015
final agency decision of the New Jersey State Parole Board
(Board) denying him parole and imposing a ninety-six month
future eligibility term (FET). We affirm.
In 1998, a jury convicted appellant of first-degree arson,
N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(d); second-degree aggravated arson, N.J.S.A.
2C:17-1(a); second-degree conspiracy to commit arson, N.J.S.A.
2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(d); and third-degree arson, N.J.S.A.
2C:17-1(b). In January 1999, appellant was sentenced in the
aggregate to a fifty-year term of imprisonment, with a sixteen-
year period of parole ineligibility.
Appellant became eligible for parole on May 2, 2014.
However, a two-member panel of the Board denied him parole and
referred his matter to a three-member panel (panel) to establish
a future eligibility term. The panel determined a ninety-six-
month FET was appropriate.
In a comprehensive decision, the panel noted that: (1)
appellant has an extensive prior criminal record, which includes
approximately twenty-five indictable convictions; (2) prior
opportunities on community supervision and previous
incarcerations failed to deter his criminal conduct; (3) during
his incarceration for the subject offenses, appellant committed
twenty-nine disciplinary infractions; (4) although he has some
limited understanding of the dynamics that cause him to succumb
to criminal activity, appellant continues to lack sufficient
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insight into why he commits crimes; and (5) appellant has not
yet confronted and resolved his predilection to abuse illicit
substances when under stress, the use of which in the past often
led to criminal activity.
After considering the applicable factors in N.J.A.C.
10A:71-3.11(b), the panel determined appellant remained a threat
to public safety, essentially for the reasons enumerated above.
The panel further found that, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A:71-
3.21(d), a FET of ninety-six months was appropriate given
appellant’s lack of progress in reducing the likelihood he would
engage in criminal behavior if released. The panel did observe
the ninety-six month FET, which commenced on May 2, 2014, will
be reduced by any commutation, work, or minimum custody credits
appellant earns. Given the credits he has earned so far,
appellant’s projected parole eligibility date is May 2019.
Appellant filed an appeal with the full Board. On October
22, 2015, the Board upheld the recommendation to deny parole and
to impose a ninety-six-month FET. This appeal ensued.
On appeal, appellant presents the following arguments for
our consideration:
POINT I: THE APPLICANT PETER MAZZA HAS
DEMONSTRATED GOOD CAUSE FOR THE
RECONSIDERATION OF THE RESULT OBTAINED BY
THE ADULT PANEL AT THE HEARING IN QUESTION.
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POINT II: THE ADULT PANEL SUBJECTED
APPLICANT TO THE VERY SORT OF UNJUST RESULT
THAT THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE
STANDARD WAS INTENDED WITH THE PURPOSE(S) TO
PREVENT.
POINT III: THE ADULT PANEL COMMITTED
PROCEDURAL ERROR BY THE OVEREVALUATION OF
IMPERMISSIBLE EXTRANEOUS INFORMATION
INFLUENCES.
POINT IV: THE BOARD PANEL ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION BY IMPOSING A FUTURE ELIGIBILITY
TERM OF (96) MONTHS ABOVE THE NORMAL (36)
MONTHS AUTHORIZED BY N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(a)
AND (c).
We have considered these contentions in light of the record
and applicable legal principles and conclude they are without
sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.
2:11-3(e)(1)(D). We affirm substantially for the reasons
expressed in the Parole Board's comprehensive written decision.
We add only the following brief comments.
We must accord considerable deference to the Board and its
expertise in parole matters. Our review of a Parole Board's
decisions is limited. Hare v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 368 N.J.
Super. 175, 179 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 180 N.J. 452
(2004). "'Parole Board decisions are highly individualized
discretionary appraisals,' and should only be reversed if found
to be arbitrary or capricious." Id. at 179-80 (citations
omitted) (quoting Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 166 N.J.
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113, 173 (2001)). We "must determine whether the factual
finding could reasonably have been reached on sufficient
credible evidence in the whole record." Id. at 179. In making
this determination, we "may not substitute [our] judgment for
that of the agency, and an agency's exercise of its statutorily-
delegated responsibilities is accorded a strong presumption of
reasonableness." McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 347 N.J.
Super. 544, 563 (App. Div. 2002) (citation omitted).
Accordingly, "[t]he burden of showing that an action was
arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious rests upon the appellant."
Ibid.
An inmate serving a minimum term in excess of fourteen
years is ordinarily assigned a twenty-seven-month FET after a
denial of parole. See N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(a)(1). However, in
cases where an ordinary FET is "clearly inappropriate due to the
inmate's lack of satisfactory progress in reducing the
likelihood of future criminal behavior," the Board may impose a
greater FET. N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(d).
Here, we discern no basis to disturb the Board's decision.
The Board considered the relevant factors in N.J.A.C. 10A:71-
3.11. Its decision is supported by sufficient credible evidence
in the record and is entitled to our deference. We are
satisfied the imposition of a ninety-six-month FET was neither
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arbitrary, capricious nor unreasonable. See McGowan, supra, 347
N.J. Super. at 565 (affirming the imposition of a thirty-year
FET based on appellant's high likelihood of recidivism).
Affirmed.
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