IN THE MATTER OF KEITH LAYTON, ANCORA PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES(CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION) ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0463-15T4
IN THE MATTER OF KEITH
LAYTON, ANCORA PSYCHIATRIC
HOSPITAL, DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES.
_______________________________
Submitted May 3, 2017 – Decided June 6, 2017
Before Judges Accurso and Manahan.
On appeal from the Civil Service Commission,
Docket No. 2014-2108.
Jacobs & Barone, P.A., attorneys for appellant
Keith Layton (Louis M. Barbone and Daniel J.
Solt, on the brief).
Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
attorney for respondent New Jersey Department
of Human Services (Melissa Dutton Schaffer,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Peter
H. Jenkins, Deputy Attorney General, on the
brief).
Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
attorney for respondent New Jersey Civil
Service Commission (Pamela N. Ullman, Deputy
Attorney General, on the statement in lieu of
brief).
PER CURIAM
Keith Layton appeals from a final determination of the Civil
Service Commission (Commission) terminating his employment as a
sewage and water treatment plant operator at Ancora Psychiatric
Hospital (Ancora). The Commission adopted the decision of the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Following our review of the
arguments raised on appeal in light of the record and applicable
law, we affirm.
The factual background and procedural history are fully set
forth in the comprehensive written opinion of ALJ Sarah G. Crowley,
dated July 14, 2015, and need not be repeated in the same level
of detail here.
In October 2012, Layton was arrested and charged with theft
of metal materials from Ancora, but was subsequently accepted into
a Pretrial Intervention Program (PTI) in June 2013. Layton stole
manhole covers and other metals, removed them from Ancora, and
sold them to a salvage yard, all during work hours. As a result,
on October 12, 2012, the Department of Human Services (DHS) issued
a Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action and placed Layton on
indefinite suspension pending the outcome of his criminal charges
pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.5(a)(2). After Layton's admittance
into PTI, an amended Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action was
issued on December 19, 2013, charging Layton with conduct
unbecoming and other sufficient cause, specifically, leaving the
assigned work area, falsification of records, and theft of State
property.
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Following a departmental hearing, Ancora issued a Final
Notice of Disciplinary Action on February 11, 2014, sustaining the
disciplinary charges and indefinite suspension effective October
12, 2012. Layton appealed his termination and the matter was
transferred to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) as a
contested case.
The ALJ conducted a hearing on January 23, January 26, May
1, and May 7, 2015. The ALJ heard testimony from Officer John
Stafford with DHS assigned to Ancora; Robert Wright, Ancora's
supervisor for general support services; John Gerigitan, Ancora's
assistant engineer in charge of maintenance; Craig Farr, Ancora's
employee relations coordinator; Patrolman Hipolito Rivera with
DHS; Clarence J. Mattioli, Jr., Layton's attorney in connection
with the criminal charges; Alan Renouf, an Ancora employee and the
Local 195 union representative; Edmund Dillon, an administrative
employee at DHS; Anthony Neri, the contractor hired by Ancora;
Nereida Weisback, personnel assistant with DHS; and Robert Gatti,
an employee with Ancora. The ALJ also reviewed a video interview
of Layton, which was entered into evidence.
On July 14, 2015, the ALJ rendered a written decision setting
forth her fact-findings and conclusions of law. The ALJ concluded
that DHS had met its burden by a preponderance of the credible
evidence. Moreover, the ALJ found there was no written agreement
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or evidence otherwise supporting the existence of an agreement
between Layton and Ancora that if he successfully completed PTI,
Ancora would not remove him. In an August 24, 2015 written final
decision, the Commission accepted and adopted the ALJ's findings
of fact and conclusions of law.
On appeal, Layton contends the decision of the Commission was
not supported by sufficient, competent, and credible evidence and
that the doctrine of equitable estoppel requires his employment
at Ancora to be reinstated. We disagree.
Appellate review of an administrative agency decision is
limited. In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27 (2007). A strong
presumption of reasonableness attaches to the Commission's
decision. In re Carroll, 339 N.J. Super. 429, 437 (App. Div.),
certif. denied, 170 N.J. 85 (2001). Appellant has the burden to
demonstrate grounds for reversal. McGowan v. N.J. State Parole
Bd., 347 N.J. Super. 544, 563 (App. Div. 2002); see also Bowden
v. Bayside State Prison, 268 N.J. Super. 301, 304 (App. Div. 1993)
(holding that "[t]he burden of showing the agency's action was
arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious rests upon the appellant"),
certif. denied, 135 N.J. 469 (1994).
Appellate courts generally defer to final agency actions,
only "reversing those actions if they are 'arbitrary, capricious
or unreasonable or [if the action] is not supported by substantial
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credible evidence in the record as a whole.'" N.J. Soc'y for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep't of Agric., 196 N.J.
366, 384-85 (2008) (quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J.
571, 579-80 (1980) (alteration in original)). Under the arbitrary,
capricious, and unreasonable standard, our scope of review is
guided by three major inquiries: (1) whether the agency's decision
conforms with the relevant law; (2) whether the decision is
supported by substantial credible evidence in the record; and (3)
whether in applying the law to the facts, the administrative agency
clearly erred in reaching its conclusion. In re Stallworth, 208
N.J. 182, 194 (2011).
When an agency decision satisfies such criteria, we accord
substantial deference to the agency's fact-finding and legal
conclusions, acknowledging the agency's "expertise and superior
knowledge of a particular field." Circus Liquors, Inc. v.
Governing Body of Middletown Twp., 199 N.J. 1, 10 (2009) (quoting
Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992)).
We will not substitute our judgment for the agency's even though
we might have reached a different conclusion. Stallworth, supra,
208 N.J. at 194; see also In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 656 (1999)
(discussing the narrow appellate standard of review for
administrative matters).
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Our deference to agency decisions "applies to the review of
disciplinary sanctions as well." Herrmann, supra, 192 N.J. at 28.
"In light of the deference owed to such determinations, when
reviewing administrative sanctions, the test . . . is whether such
punishment is so disproportionate to the offense, in light of all
the circumstances, as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness."
Id. at 28-29 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). "The
threshold of 'shocking' the court's sense of fairness is a
difficult one, not met whenever the court would have reached a
different result." Id. at 29.
After thoroughly reviewing the record in light of the relevant
legal principles and standard of review, we are convinced that the
Commission's decision was neither arbitrary, capricious nor
unreasonable and was supported by substantial credible evidence
in the record. See Stallworth, supra, 208 N.J. at 194. According
deference, as we must, to the ALJ's credibility determinations,
there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the ALJ's
findings and conclusions, which the Commission, in turn, adopted.
Further, the penalty was not so wide of the mark as to justify our
substitution of the Commission's judgment.
Layton's remaining argument is without sufficient merit to
warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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