JEFFREY J. SOUTHARD VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD (NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD) ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1322-15T4
JEFFREY J. SOUTHARD,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY STATE
PAROLE BOARD,
Respondent.
_________________________
Submitted March 6, 2017 – Decided March 15, 2017
Before Judges Haas and Currier.
On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole
Board.
Jeffrey J. Southard, appellant pro se.
Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel;
Gregory R. Bueno, Deputy Attorney General, on
the brief).
PER CURIAM
Appellant Jeffrey Southard appeals from the March 25, 2015
final administrative decision of the New Jersey State Parole Board
("Board") denying him parole and imposing a twenty-month Future
Eligibility Term ("FET"). We affirm.
On June 15, 2009, appellant pled guilty to one count of first-
degree money laundering and one count of second-degree securities
fraud. On December 4, 2009, the trial court sentenced appellant
to a fifteen-year prison term on the money laundering charge, with
a five-year period of parole ineligibility, and to a concurrent
ten-year term on the securities fraud charge.
In October 2014, appellant appeared before a two-member panel
of the Board, at which he was considered for parole for the first
time since his incarceration. The panel denied parole for several
reasons. Among other things, the panel noted that appellant was
incarcerated for a multi-crime conviction, had committed numerous,
serious disciplinary infractions, and lacked sufficient problem
resolution because he had no remorse for his actions and still
sought to portray himself as a victim.
Appellant filed an appeal with the full Board. On March 25,
2015, the full Board similarly concluded that appellant was
ineligible for parole, and imposed a twenty-month FET.1 The Board
noted that there were several mitigating factors, including
1
This was the presumptive FET for appellant's convictions because
he was serving a mandatory minimum term of between four and eight
years. N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(a)(3).
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appellant's lack of a prior criminal record, and his participation
in appropriate institutional programs. However, the Board found
that appellant continued to minimize his conduct, which involved
the misappropriation of over $1 million in funds. In addition,
defendant had multiple institutional infractions, including one
in May 2014 that involved appellant operating an unauthorized
business at the prison.
Because the Board found that there was a reasonable
expectation that appellant would violate the conditions of parole
if he were released, the Board denied parole. This appeal
followed.
On appeal, appellant contends that the Board's decision is
arbitrary and capricious and should be set aside. We disagree.
We must accord considerable deference to the Board and its
expertise in parole matters. Our standard of review of the Board's
decisions is limited, and "grounded in strong public policy
concerns and practical realities." Trantino v. N.J. State Parole
Bd., 166 N.J. 113, 200 (2001) ("Trantino V"). "The decision of a
parole board involves 'discretionary assessment[s] of a
multiplicity of imponderables[.]'" Id. at 201 (alteration in
original) (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr.
Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 10, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2105, 60 L. Ed. 2d 668,
677 (1979)).
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"To a greater degree than is the case with other
administrative agencies, the Parole Board's decision-making
function involves individualized discretionary appraisals." Ibid.(citing Beckworth v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 62 N.J. 348, 358-59
(1973)). Consequently, our courts "may overturn the Parole Board's
decisions only if they are arbitrary and capricious." Ibid. We
will not disturb the Board's factual findings if they "could
reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence in
the whole record." Id. at 172 (quoting Trantino v. N.J. State
Parole Bd., 154 N.J. 19, 24 (1998) ("Trantino IV") (quoting N.J.
State Parole Bd. v. Cestari, 224 N.J. Super. 534, 547 (App. Div.),
certif. denied, 111 N.J. 649 (1988))); see also McGowan v. N.J.
State Parole Bd., 347 N.J. Super. 544, 563 (App. Div. 2002)
(applying that standard).
Having reviewed the record in light of these well-accepted
standards, including the materials in the confidential appendix,
we conclude that appellant's arguments are without sufficient
merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-
3(e)(1)(D). There is abundant support in the record for a
conclusion that there is "a reasonable expectation that
[appellant] will violate conditions of parole . . . if released
on parole at that time." N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a). Therefore, we
discern no basis for disturbing the Board's decision to deny
4 A-1322-15T4
parole. We are likewise satisfied that the presumptive twenty-
month FET imposed by the Board is supported by the record and is
neither arbitrary or capricious.
Affirmed.
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