ROBERT J. TRIFFIN VS. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS Â HERNANDO COUNTY(DC-7774-15, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )


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  •                         NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-1956-15T2
    ROBERT J. TRIFFIN,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
    HERNANDO COUNTY,
    Defendant-Respondent,
    and
    JOHN GIORDANO and MELISSA
    GIORDANO,
    Defendants.
    —————————————————————————————————————-
    Argued March 2, 2017 – Decided June 7, 2017
    Before Judges Hoffman and Whipple.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Law Division, Special Civil Part, Monmouth
    County, Docket No. DC-7774-15.
    Robert J. Triffin, appellant, argued the cause
    pro se.
    James H. Rohlfing argued the cause for
    respondent (Law Offices of William E. Staehle,
    attorneys; Jaunice M. Canning, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Plaintiff Robert J. Triffin appeals from the December 8, 2015
    Law Division order dismissing his complaint against defendant
    Board of County Commissioners Hernando County (the Board) without
    prejudice.       Plaintiff argues "the trial court committed reversible
    error     when    it   .   .   .   dismissed   plaintiff's   complaint    in
    contravention of the mandatory venue selection provisions of 
    15 U.S.C.A. § 1692
    [i]."           Because we conclude this venue selection
    statute has no relevance to whether the trial court had personal
    jurisdiction over the Board, we reject plaintiff's arguments and
    affirm.
    I.
    The Board, a public entity in the State of Florida, issued a
    $176.93 refund check to John and Melissa Giordano of Middletown.
    The check concerned a Florida property in Hernando County.               The
    Giordanos cashed the check with Friendly Check Cashing (Friendly)
    in New Jersey.         The Board's bank declined to pay the check and
    returned it to Friendly because the Giordanos had previously cashed
    the check electronically.
    Friendly then assigned its rights to plaintiff, who filed
    this action against the Giordanos and the Board in Monmouth County.
    Only the Board filed an answer, in which it asserted lack of
    jurisdiction as a defense.          The Board promptly filed a motion to
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    dismiss plaintiff's claims against it based upon lack of personal
    jurisdiction, and plaintiff filed his opposition.                          After hearing
    oral argument, the motion court granted the Board's motion and
    dismissed plaintiff's claims against the Board without prejudice.
    II.
    We review a trial court's determination as to jurisdiction
    de novo.     YA Global Invs., L.P. v. Cliff, 
    419 N.J. Super. 1
    , 8
    (App. Div. 2011).          The court's factual findings, however, will not
    be disturbed if "supported by substantial, credible evidence."
    
    Ibid.
          "[W]e      do   not    disturb     the    factual      findings    and    legal
    conclusions of the trial judge unless . . . they are so manifestly
    unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and
    reasonably       credible     evidence       as     to   offend    the     interests      of
    justice."        Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co., 
    65 N.J. 474
    , 484 (1974) (quoting Fagliarone                  v. Twp. of N. Bergen, 
    78 N.J. Super. 154
    , 155 (App. Div. 1963)).                  Nevertheless, we do not defer
    to a trial court's application of the law to the facts.                        Manalapan
    Realty v. Manalapan Twp. Comm., 
    140 N.J. 366
    , 378 (1995).
    New Jersey may exercise long-arm jurisdiction if it comports
    with due process of law.            R. 4:4-4(b)(1); see also Charles Gendler
    & Co. v. Telecom Equip. Corp., 
    102 N.J. 460
    , 469 (1986) (stating
    New     Jersey     courts        exercise     jurisdiction         over     non-resident
    defendants       to    the    extent        permitted     by      the     United    States
    3                                           A-1956-15T2
    Constitution).     To   satisfy   due   process,   the   exercise     of
    jurisdiction must be adequate and reasonable; that is, the non-
    resident defendant must have (1) sufficient minimum contacts with
    the forum state and (2) reliance upon those contacts to establish
    personal jurisdiction do not "offend 'traditional notions of fair
    play and substantial justice.'"     Blakey v. Cont'l Airlines, 
    164 N.J. 38
    , 65 (2000) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 
    326 U.S. 310
    , 316, 
    66 S. Ct. 154
    , 158, 
    90 L. Ed. 95
    , 102 (1945)).
    The "adequacy" of minimum contacts depends on the type of
    jurisdiction sought.     Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court
    Rules, cmt. 3.1.1. on R. 4:4-4 (2016).      "There are two types of
    personal jurisdiction: specific and general."          Jacobs v. Walt
    Disney World Co., 
    309 N.J. Super. 443
    , 452 (App. Div. 1998).
    Specific jurisdiction is established when a
    defendant's acts within the forum-state give
    rise to the cause of action.     In contrast,
    when the defendant's presence in the state is
    unrelated to the subject matter of the
    lawsuit, general jurisdiction may be obtained
    based on the defendant's continuous and
    substantial contacts with the forum.
    [Ibid. (citations omitted).]
    Inquiry   into   specific    jurisdiction    centers     around     "the
    relationship [between] the [non-resident] defendant, the forum,
    and the litigation."    Lebel v. Everglades Marina, Inc., 
    115 N.J. 317
    , 323 (1989) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 
    433 U.S. 186
    , 204,
    
    97 S. Ct. 2569
    , 2579, 
    53 L. Ed. 2d 683
    , 698 (1977)).     Specifically,
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    "[t]he record must demonstrate that the [non-resident] defendant
    has purposefully availed [it]self of the privilege of engaging in
    activities within the forum state, thereby gaining the benefits
    and protections of its laws."       Waste Mgmt. v. Admiral Ins. Co.,
    
    138 N.J. 106
    , 120-21 (1994), cert. denied, 
    513 U.S. 1183
    , 
    115 S. Ct. 1175
    , 
    130 L. Ed. 2d 1128
     (1995); see also Lebel, 
    supra,
     
    115 N.J. at 324
     ("The question is whether 'the defendant's conduct and
    connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably
    anticipate being haled into court there.'" (quoting World-Wide
    Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 
    444 U.S. 286
    , 297, 
    100 S. Ct. 559
    ,
    567, 
    62 L. Ed. 2d 490
    , 501 (1980))).
    The burden to prove the sufficiency of a defendant's contacts
    with the forum state rests with the plaintiff, most readily
    accomplished "through the use of 'sworn affidavits, certifications
    or testimony.'"    Walt Disney World, 
    supra,
     309 N.J. Super. at 454
    (quoting Catalano v. Lease & Rental Mgmt. Corp., 
    252 N.J. Super. 545
    , 547-48 (Law Div. 1991)).         Where plaintiff cannot prove
    sufficient contacts to establish specific jurisdiction, it makes
    the   existence   of   continuous   and   systematic   activity    highly
    unlikely.   Id. at 453 ("[A] plaintiff seeking to overcome the
    challenge to general jurisdiction must show substantially more
    than mere minimum contacts to establish this form of personal
    jurisdiction.").
    5                                   A-1956-15T2
    "[T]he venue section of the Federal Fair Debt Collection
    Practices Act (Act), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692i, requires that debt
    collection actions be filed either in the county where the debtor
    lives or in the county where the debtor signed the contract
    underlying the debt."    Rutgers-The State University v. Fogel, 
    403 N.J. Super. 389
    , 391 (App. Div. 2008).   However, "for purposes of
    section 1692i, venue must be laid in the state judicial unit which
    has jurisdiction over the claim, if that unit is smaller than a
    county."   
    Id. at 399
    .     More specifically, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692i
    states:
    (a) Venue. Any debt collector who brings any
    legal action on a debt against any consumer
    shall—
    (1) in the case of an action to enforce
    an interest in real property securing the
    consumer's obligation, bring such action
    only in a judicial district or similar
    legal entity in which such real property
    is located; or
    (2) in the case of an action not
    described in paragraph (1), bring such
    action only in the judicial district or
    similar legal entity—
    (A) in which such consumer signed
    the contract sued upon; or
    (B) in which such consumer resides
    at the commencement of the action.
    15 U.S.C.A. § 1692a defines "consumer" as "any natural person
    obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt."   Consequently,
    6                              A-1956-15T2
    if a defendant is not a natural person, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692i is
    irrelevant to a court's jurisdiction over a defendant concerning
    a debt collection claim.          Moreover, personal jurisdiction is a
    distinct legal requirement from venue.            See R. 4:4-4 (addressing
    in personam jurisdiction); R. 4:3-2 (addressing venue).
    Plaintiff argues that because 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692i required
    him to file his complaint against the Giordanos in Monmouth County,
    the motion court should have found it had jurisdiction over the
    Board.    This argument clearly lacks merit.                While plaintiff
    correctly notes he had to file his debt collection claim against
    the   Giordanos   in   Monmouth       County,   see   U.S.C.A.   §   1692i,   he
    incorrectly asserts this venue provision enables him to sue a
    defendant in a court that lacks personal jurisdiction over it.
    See R. 4:4-4(b)(1); Charles Gendler & Co., supra, 
    102 N.J. at 469
    ;
    Fogel, 
    supra,
     
    403 N.J. Super. at 399
    .
    The Board's only contact with New Jersey was the check it
    issued to the Giordanos, who then cashed it with a New Jersey
    company after previously cashing it electronically.              This contact
    is inadequate to satisfy "traditional notions of fair play and
    substantial justice."     Blakey, 
    164 N.J. at 65
     (quoting Int'l Shoe
    Co., supra, 
    326 U.S. at 316
    , 
    66 S. Ct. at 158
    , 
    90 L. Ed. at 102
    ).
    Further, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692i is irrelevant to whether the trial
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    court had personal jurisdiction over the Board, which is not a
    natural person.   See U.S.C.A. § 1692a.
    Affirmed.
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