STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. ABAYUBA RIVAS (15-02-0114, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2021 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1994-18
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ABAYUBA RIVAS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Argued May 19, 2021 – Decided July 20, 2021
Before Judges Sumners and Geiger.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Union County, Indictment No. 15-02-
0114.
James K. Smith, Jr., Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E.
Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; James K. Smith,
Jr., of counsel and on the briefs).
Regina M. Oberholzer, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal,
Attorney General, attorney; Regina M. Oberholzer, of
counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Tried by a jury, defendant Abayuba Rivas was acquitted of the murder of
his wife Karla Villagra Garzon but was found guilty of the lesser-included
offense of first-degree aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1), and
other related offenses. He appeals, arguing that the trial judge, having
suppressed an earlier statement to law enforcement because it was obtained in
violation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, erred in not suppressing his
two subsequent statements in which he admitted killing his wife and aiding
law enforcement to locate the suitcase he used to transport and discard her
body. We disagree and affirm.
I
On February 24, 2014, defendant reported to the Elizabeth Police that
his wife was missing when she did not return from a pharmacy that she went to
at 10:00 p.m. the night before to get sinus medication. The police
subsequently discovered that Villagra Garzon was not on any of the
pharmacy's surveillance footage; no sinus medication was purchased from the
pharmacy; and no one had seen her around the pharmacy that evening.
On February 27, defendant voluntarily reported to the Elizabeth police
station where he gave a video-recorded statement to detectives detailing his
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interactions with his wife the day she went missing. He stated that he did not
try to locate her because he had to watch their two-year-old daughter. He gave
the police permission to search his apartment, vehicles, computer, and cell
phone. He also agreed to provide a buccal swab and to take a polygraph
examination.
During a search of defendant's apartment, detectives collected a shirt
with a stain on it that was found in a bedroom hamper. The stain tested
positive for Villagra Garzon's blood, and a sample from the shirt's collar
matched a partial profile of defendant's DNA. Also collected were several
stain samples from defendant's car seats, which, except for one of the samples
matching Villagra Garzon's DNA, were too small to draw any conclusions. A
cadaver dog indicated the presence of human remains in the master bedroom,
by a pair of brown work boots, and in the car's front passenger seat, driver's
seat, and rear cargo area. The police department's license plate reader system
revealed that defendant's vehicle had been driven in Elizabeth the night of
February 23 and morning of February 24. Defendant's vehicle was also seen
on surveillance camera videos collected from several businesses in Elizabeth.
Defendant was again interviewed by police on March 5 and March 13
After the later interview, defendant was arrested for endangering the welfare of
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a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a), and hindering one's own apprehension by
providing false information, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(4); he admitted leaving his
two-year-old daughter unattended at his apartment the night his wife went
missing.
On March 17, defendant injured himself while in jail and was taken to
the hospital. He was visited by Elizabeth Police Department Detectives
Raymond Smith and Juan Guzman, was advised of his Miranda 1 rights and
agreed to speak, but his statement was not recorded. He stated, contrary to his
previous statements, that he had accompanied his wife to the pharmacy, and
after leaving, they were carjacked by four men on the way to where defendant
stored his trailers. Defendant claimed the men directed him to drive, while his
wife sat in the backseat. The men told him that they knew where he and his
wife lived and that they had a child, and if defendant told anyone about what
had happened, "they would come back and kill him." The statement was cut
short when medical personnel interrupted to take defendant for a CAT scan.
The detectives decided not to wait, and defendant asked them to come back the
next day.
1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966).
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The detectives subsequently viewed surveillance camera recordings
taken the night of the alleged carjacking from the parking lot where defendant
kept his trailer. None of the events defendant described were confirmed on the
recordings.
On March 18, Detectives Smith and Guzman returned to the hospital
with Sergeant Larry Smith to continue interviewing defendant. Prior to
defendant giving an audio-recorded statement, the detectives read him his
Miranda rights. After a discussion about whether defendant needed an
attorney, which will be detailed later, defendant admitted to killing his wife
and disposing of her body in an abandoned house in Chatham. After the
interview, the police found his wife's body at the abandoned house. The
manner of death was determined to be homicide; the primary cause was
asphyxia due to suffocation and smothering with a contributing cause of blunt
force head trauma.
At the conclusion of the interview, the following colloquy occurred
between Detective Smith and defendant regarding defendant's request to talk
further:
[Smith]: I think that we're going to leave, okay.
[Defendant]: Who, you?
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[Smith]: Yeah me and Detective Guzman and my
brother, umm we're gonna go up to the house and
make sure that's the right house, umm and see if she's
there, okay? They're kind of waiting for us. Umm
cause we talked to you, you described it to us.
....
[Smith]: Yeah, we're moving forward, right?
[Defendant]: Yeah, I wanna talk with all of you three.
[Smith]: Okay.
[Defendant]: Why he's not here.
[Smith]: I don't know if we're gonna do it later or
maybe tomorrow.
[Defendant]: You coming tomorrow?
[Smith]: Oh, yeah tomorrow for sure.
[Defendant]: For sure.
....
[Defendant]: But[,] ah[,] okay if you can come
tomorrow.
[Smith]: Okay.
[Defendant]: For a little while.
[Smith]: Okay.
[Defendant]: I want to talk with you.
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[Smith]: If we don't
[Defendant]: Three of you together, someone else.
[Smith]: [Defendant] if we don't find her, we're gonna
come back and get, maybe we have the wrong house I
don't know.
....
[Smith]: Well[,] what we're gonna do tomorrow
probably is go look for the suitcase, and the clothes,
and then your phone.
[Defendant]: With me?
[Smith]: Yeah. You think you can find that?
[Defendant]: Wow that's too many days.
[Smith]: Cause that's just a random place on the
highway? Okay. Cause the house is different is kind
of unique[,] and we can kind of find that easy but the
other things.
[Defendant]: Things on the street maybe they clean
you know.
[Smith]: Okay. We'll take a look though.
[Defendant]: Yeah, we take a look.
[Smith]: We take a look, okay.
[Defendant]: Yeah, umm.
....
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[Smith]: [I appreciate your] honesty[,] and I think you
did the right thing.
[Defendant]: I was not honest at the beginning.
....
[Defendant]: And we're going forward.
[Smith]: We're going forward exactly.
[Defendant]: But don't forget that I need to talk with
all of you.
[Smith]: Of course.
[Defendant]: I need time to talk with you.
[(Emphasis added).]
The next day, March 19, defendant was discharged from the hospital and
was taken to the Union County Prosecutor's office for further questioning.
Once again, he was read and waived his Miranda rights and provided a video-
recorded statement detailing his activities on February 23.
Defendant revealed that in the evening, he got into a verbal and physical
altercation with his wife in their kitchen. After she bit his finger that he
pointed in her face, he punched her in the face, causing her to bleed. She then
"slapp[ed]" him, and he pushed her into the sink, grabbed a meat tenderizer
from the counter, and hit her on the side of her head. She continued slapping
him, so he hit her a second time with the meat tenderizer. Thinking she was
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dead after she bled and fell to the ground motionless, defendant cleaned the
kitchen floor and put tape over her eyes so that "she wouldn't see[,]" put tape
over her mouth "so she [could] rest in peace[,]" taped her hands, and then
placed her body in a suitcase.
Defendant left his sleeping daughter in the apartment and put the
suitcase and a plastic bag with his wife's stained clothes and the meat
tenderizer in his car. He then drove his car for some time until he came upon
an abandoned and unlocked house, where he left the body in the basement. On
his way home, defendant threw the plastic bag of things out the window and
separately disposed of the suitcase.
Later that day, defendant led members of the prosecutor's office to the
location of the suitcase, which they recovered. They were unable to recover
the items in the plastic bag that defendant discarded. Afterwards, defendant
was taken back to the prosecutor's office for another interview, which was
conducted by Detective Danika Ramos. After being read and waiving his
Miranda rights, defendant gave a brief statement explaining that he willingly
took detectives to find the suitcase.
Defendant was indicted for first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1)
and (2); fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d);
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third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-
4(d); second-degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a);
second-degree desecration of human remains, N.J.S.A. 2C:22-1(a)(1); third-
degree hindering one's own apprehension by concealment or destruction of
evidence, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(1); and two counts of third-degree hindering
one's own apprehension by giving false information, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(4).
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress several statements he made to
law enforcement. At the conclusion of a five-day evidentiary hearing, Judge
Robert A. Kirsch issued an oral and fifty-six-page written opinion suppressing
defendant's March 18 statement, but admitting his statements on February 25
and 27, March 5, March 13, March 17, and March 19. 2
Defendant testified at trial, giving a third version of what happened the
evening of February 23. He claimed that he was mugged by his wife's ex-
boyfriend and another person, taken to his apartment where they raped and
killed his wife, followed by their disposal of her body in the Chatham house.
He also stated they threatened to kill him and told him that he "should go to
the police" and "make a [police] report that [his] wife had left," which he did.
2
The February 25 and 27, March 5, March 13, and March 17 statements are
not relevant to this appeal so they will not be discussed in detail.
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The jury rejected defendant's testimony, convicting him for the lesser-included
offense of aggravated manslaughter, rather than murder, and all other charges.
II
Defendant appeals the admission of his two March 19 statements.
Because the suppression of the March 18 statement intertwines with the
admission of the March 19 statements, we first briefly detail Judge Kirsch's
reasoning for suppression. The judge determined that Detective Smith's
"subjective interpretation" that defendant did not want counsel before he gave
a statement "was arguably understandable," but
that [defendant's] words at the outset of the interview
were objectively unclear and ambiguous.
[Defendant's] statement, "Ah a lawyer, I need time to
find a lawyer. I need to see how much they charge
me," reasonably could be construed as an invocation
of his right to counsel, notwithstanding his beseeching
the officers the night before to "please, please come
back" to talk to him. [Defendant] could change his
mind at any time, and arguably did so.
In addition to the declaratory statement cited
above, after the officers sought to clarify or explain
the right to counsel, [defendant] again expressed a
lack of clarity: "It's a little confuse [sic]."
....
. . . The court finds [defendant's] statements regarding
invocation of counsel equivocal, and law
enforcement's attempt at clarification insufficient.
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Accordingly, the court will suppress the statements
made by [defendant] during the interview conducted
late in the afternoon and extending into the evening of
March 18.
As for the initial statement on March 19, the judge found that it was not
fruit of the poisonous tree warranting suppression as prescribed by State v.
O'Neill, 193 N.J. 148, 171 n.13 (2007), because in accordance with State v.
Hartley, 103 N.J. 252 (1986), defendant "without any doubt, actively sought
and initiated 'further communications' with law enforcement after the initial
tainted statement." The judge found "substantial 'intervening circumstances'
between the initial confession on March 18 and the subsequent interview on
March 19," including that: (1) the March 19 interview was conducted "about
twenty . . . hours" after the conclusion of the March 18 interview; (2)
defendant had been "medically discharged from the hospital, and
psychiatrically evaluated and cleared"; (3) the March 19 interview was
conducted in "a well-lit interview room at the [prosecutor's office] where
[defendant] sat across a table from . . . Smith and Guzman, both with whom he
had developed a mutually respectful rapport through their numerous prior
interactions and conversations"; (4) "[t]he March 19 interview lasted
approximately one . . . hour"; (5) defendant "was thoroughly advised of his
constitutional rights," indicated that he understood his rights, and agreed to
12 A-1994-18
waive them; (6) defendant was advised that the Consulate of Uruguay, his
native country, had reached out, and that his family would pay for a lawyer,
which he rejected; and (7) "there was no evidence" the detectives "engaged in
improper or coercive tactics, made threats or otherwise created an environment
of intimidation inducing duress or pressure."
In "consider[ing] the effect of [defendant's] confession on March 18 to
his statement on March 19," the judge was "mindful of the 'cat out of the bag'
scenarios where an accused, having already confessed, feels psychological
pressure to make a second confession." Nevertheless, the judge found that
"the two interviews [were] separate and distinct, both in time and location, and
not a single continuing event." Moreover, the judge found that the March 18
confession "was not the byproduct of hour upon hour of exhausting,
unrelenting interrogation where the accused was 'beaten down' and finally
confessed." His review of the March 19 interview did "not reveal any
comments by [defendant], or [anything in] his body language, which conveyed
any 'second thoughts' or regrets about his prior confession"; "he appeared
relaxed and made clear his desire to cooperate in any way he could." Thus,
Judge Kirsch deemed the first March 19 statement admissible.
13 A-1994-18
As for the second March 19 statement, the judge found that this
statement was also admissible, primarily for the same reasons as the first
March 19 statement.
III
Defendant argues the judge erred in finding that he had initiated further
communications with the detectives because "the record is clear that it was the
police who initiated the March 19[,] interrogation by bringing defendant from
the hospital to the [p]rosecutor's [o]ffice in a hospital gown and placing him in
an interview room." Additionally, defendant maintains "there clearly was not
a request for a 'discussion of the crimes for which [he] was being held'";
instead, "he only said that. . . he wished to speak to the officers, but did not say
why." We are unpersuaded.
When reviewing a judge's ruling on a motion to suppress, we defer to
those factual findings that are supported by sufficient record evidence but
disregard findings that are clearly mistaken. State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249,
262 (2015). We, however, review the judge's legal conclusions de novo. Id. at
263.
A suspect who invokes his or her right to counsel during a custodial
interrogation is "not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until
14 A-1994-18
counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused [him or her] self
initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police."
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981); see also State v. Alston,
204 N.J. 614, 620 (2011) (noting that after a suspect has requested counsel, "an
interrogation may not continue until 'the suspect is provided with counsel' or
the suspect initiates further communication sufficient to waive the right to
counsel").
A suspect is considered to have initiated further communication if he or
she invites "discussion of the crimes for which he [or she] was being held."
State v. Chew, 150 N.J. 30, 64 (1997) (quoting State v. Fuller, 118 N.J. 75, 82
(1990)). The State must establish that it was the accused, rather than the
police, who initiated any further questioning after the accused has invoked his
right to counsel. State v. Wright, 97 N.J. 113, 122-23 (1984). Yet, "[i]f an
accused does initiate a conversation after invoking his rights, that conversation
may be admissible if the initiation constitutes a knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary waiver of the accused's rights." Chew, 150 N.J. at 61 (citing
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444).
The record supports Judge Kirsch's determination that at the end of the
March 18 statement that was suppressed due to defendant's invocation of his
15 A-1994-18
right to counsel, defendant unequivocally stated he wanted to talk again. In
fact, after the interrogation ended because defendant had to have a CAT scan
performed, he stated four times that he wanted to talk again to the detectives.
When the detectives returned to the hospital the next day, some twenty hours
later, defendant was released; so, they took him to the prosecutor's office to
follow up on the aborted interview, as he requested. Defendant was read his
Miranda rights, knowingly waived them without asking for counsel and
provided a video-recorded statement detailing how he killed his wife by hitting
her with a meat tenderizer and taping her mouth, then how he disposed of her
body.
Defendant's reliance on State v. Wint, 236 N.J. 174 (2018), is misplaced.
(Db33-Db34). In Wint, after the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights,
he repeatedly and unequivocally requested counsel. Id. at 183-84, 201. After
questioning ceased and the defendant left the interview room, "the detectives
initiated an unrecorded verbal exchange with him[]," when they "wished him
good luck and stated, '[w]hen we get you back to Bucks County we can talk
about this again.'" Id. at 184. The defendant responded, "[y]eah, I'll talk to
you when we get back to Bucks County." Ibid. Several months later, the
detectives once again met with the defendant, who was being held in the
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Camden County jail, to collect DNA samples from him. Ibid. At that time,
"the detectives informed him that they were taking steps to transfer him to
Bucks County where they would like to talk to him." Ibid. The defendant
reportedly responded, "I'll talk to you when I get back to Bucks [County]."
Ibid. (alteration in original). Six months after his initial invocation, he was
transported to Bucks County. Ibid. Once there, he was taken to an interview
room where he was advised of his Miranda rights, which he agreed to waive.
Ibid. The defendant then provided a lengthy statement regarding his
involvement in the crime. Id. at 185. Our Supreme Court suppressed that
statement because, among other things, the "detectives initiated" the
conversations with the defendant. Id. at 205. In other words, the defendant
"did not 'initiate[] further communication, exchanges, or conversations with
police,' to open the door to an interrogation without counsel." Id. at 202
(alteration in original) (quoting Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485; citing Alston, 204
N.J. at 620).
This case differs from Wint, as here it was defendant who initiated
further conversation with detectives. As noted, defendant implored the
detectives four times to return to talk to him again the next day. Hence, Wint
does not support defendant's position.
17 A-1994-18
We also reject defendant's contention that the judge erred in emphasizing
factors such as the elapsed time between the two statements. He contends it
was error for the judge to "equate[] the Fifth Amendment right to counsel with
the right against self-incrimination," because as Edwards, 451 U.S. at 483,
held "additional safeguards are necessary when the accused asks for counsel."
However, defendant effectively asserts those additional safeguards are of no
moment when he initiates further conversation with law enforcement because,
in those instances, no Edwards violation has occurred. See Wint, 236 N.J. at
206 (holding that an Edwards violation could not be subject to an attenuation
analysis).
As the judge correctly recognized, an attenuation analysis is appropriate
to determine whether a second incriminating statement was the product of the
illegally obtained first statement, or in other words, was the "fruit of the
poisonous tree." Hartley, 103 N.J. at 282. Factors to consider include "the
time between confessions, any intervening circumstances, whether there was a
change in place, whether defendant received an adequate warning of his [or
her] rights, whether the defendant initiated the second confession, the effect of
his [or her] having previously made a confession, and the 'purpose and
flagrancy of police misconduct.'" Id. at 283 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422
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U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975); citing Robinson v. Percy, 738 F.2d 214, 221 (7th Cir.
1984); United States v. Wauneka, 770 F.2d 1434, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1985)).
Contrary to defendant's argument, it was not error for the judge to examine
factors such as the elapsed time between the two statements, the re-
administration of Miranda warnings, and the general tone of the March 19
interview, because defendant initiated further conversation with the detectives.
Therefore, the first March 19 statement was admissible under Edwards.
As for defendant's second March 19 statement disclosing the location of
the suitcase and his involvement in helping detectives locate it, the judge
properly admitted the statement for the same reasons he admitted the first
March 19 statement. Namely, that when defendant initiated further
conversation with detectives, nearly twenty hours had passed since the March
18 interview; Miranda warnings were re-administered; and the general tone of
the interview was nonconfrontational. Moreover, the second interview was
taken by Ramos, who had not been involved in either of the interviews that
took place at the hospital on March 18 or the first March 19 interview.
Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to a new trial, and thus, his
convictions remain undisturbed.
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Affirmed.
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