STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. WILLIAM A. SPARROWÂ (12-12-2128, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3166-14T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
WILLIAM A. SPARROW, a/k/a
JONATHAN TAYLOR, DAVID GIBSON
and ILL WILL,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________________
Submitted April 4, 2017 – Decided August 2, 2017
Before Judges Ostrer and Vernoia.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County,
Indictment No. 12-12-2128.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Frank Pugliese, Assistant
Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the
brief).
Esther Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Eric P. Knowles,
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant William A. Sparrow appeals his convictions
following a guilty plea for leaving the scene of a fatal motor
vehicle accident and possession of a handgun by a person not
permitted to possess weapons. More particularly, he challenges the
trial court's denial of his motion to suppress statements he made
during a custodial interrogation. We affirm.
I.
Jersey City police officers responded to a report of guns
being fired in the parking lot of a diner. They discovered a
fatally injured man wedged between a motor vehicle and the diner's
wall. It was reported the vehicle's driver and passenger were
involved in an exchange of gunfire with others in the parking lot,
during which the vehicle crashed into the wall causing the victim's
death. The vehicle's driver, who was identified as defendant, left
the scene before the police arrived.
About two months later, the police located defendant and when
they approached him, he fled on foot and reportedly dropped a
handgun. Defendant was apprehended, found in possession of heroin,
and taken into custody. During a recorded custodial interrogation
of defendant, he acknowledged being the vehicle's driver at the
diner.
Defendant was charged in an indictment with criminal offenses
related to the diner incident and the events at the time of his
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arrest. He moved to suppress the statements made during his
interrogation, claiming the police failed to properly advise him
of his Miranda1 rights and honor an alleged invocation of his right
to remain silent.
During the evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion, the
State presented testimony from Detective Roberto Aviles, one of
the officers who interrogated defendant. A recording of the
interrogation was admitted in evidence.
The recording showed defendant was interrogated by Aviles and
Detective Jeff Kearns. Aviles told defendant that prior to asking
any questions, he wanted to advise defendant of his rights and
that defendant must understand his rights. Aviles then read to
defendant the following from a Miranda rights form:
You have the right to remain silent. Anything
you say can and will be used against you in a
court of law. You have the right to talk to a
lawyer for advice before we ask you any
questions, and to have him or her with you
during questioning. If you cannot afford a
lawyer, one will be appointed for you at the
point of questioning if you wish. If you
decide to answer questions without a lawyer
present, you would still have a right to stop
questioning at any time. You also have the
right to stop answering at any time until you
talk to a lawyer.
1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d
694 (1966).
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After Aviles read the Miranda rights to defendant, Kearns asked
defendant if he understood everything Aviles told him. Defendant
nodded his head affirmatively and said "yes."
Aviles gave defendant the Miranda rights form. It included
the following paragraph:
I have read the statement of my rights and
understand what my rights are. I am willing
to make a statement and answer questions. I
do not want a lawyer at this time. I understand
and know what I am doing. No promises or
threats have been made to me, and no pressure
or coercion of any kind has been used against
me.
Aviles asked defendant to read the paragraph aloud and defendant
did so.
When defendant concluded reading the paragraph, Kearns
explained that "basically" what it meant was:
. . . (inaudible) ask you a couple of questions
about our investigation, maybe clear some
things up. No one is taking you and beating
you up, making any promises. I just have a
couple of questions I wanted to ask you so we
can get it out of the way and we can go about
our business.
That's all basically what paragraph
states in that you're here. We want to talk
to you about the reason why down here. And no
one basically threatened you or beat you up
and said sign this paper or we'll [sic] going
to kick your ass if you don't talk to us.
The detectives then asked if defendant was willing to talk to
them, and defendant said they could ask him questions. Defendant
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signed the Miranda rights waiver form and the detectives began the
interrogation.
During the interrogation, Kearns and defendant discussed the
diner incident. Kearns advised defendant that the police had a
recording showing defendant in the diner parking lot holding a
handgun. Defendant challenged the existence of the recording and
exchanged banter with Kearns about whether there actually was a
recording. Finally, defendant stated, "I do not want to talk about
this anymore, all we going to do is go back and forth about the
situation." The interrogation then continued for approximately an
hour.
The judge denied the suppression motion, finding that based
on his review of the recording, defendant was fully informed of
his Miranda rights, and knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently
waived his rights. The court rejected defendant's claim that he
invoked his right to remain silent during the interrogation. The
judge found that based on the totality of the circumstances and
considering the context of defendant's statement, "I do not want
to talk about this anymore," defendant did not invoke his right
to remain silent, but instead clearly expressed only a desire to
end the debate about the existence of the recording.
Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to second-degree
leaving the scene of a fatal accident, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1, and
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second-degree certain persons not to possess weapons, N.J.S.A.
2C:39-7(b). The court imposed concurrent five-year sentences. The
sentence on the certain persons offense is subject to the
requirements of the Graves Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c), (d). This
appeal followed.
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED
BECAUSE IT WAS TAKEN IN VIOLATION OF
[MIRANDA;] U.S. CONST. AMENDS. V, XIV; N.J.
CONST. ART. I, PARA. 1.
A. Defendant's Miranda Waiver Was Not
Knowing and Intelligent Where He Was Not
Permitted To Finish Reading A list of His
Rights To Himself And Where He Was
Misleadlingly Told That Waiver Was Just
A Formality Before Questioning Could
Begin.
B. Defendant's Fifth Amendment Rights
Were Violated by the Failure of the
Authorities to Terminate Questioning
When Defendant Expressly Stated "I Don't'
Want to Talk About That No More." U.S.
Const., amends V, XIV.
II.
We "engage in a 'searching and critical' review of the record"
when reviewing the trial court's denial of a Miranda motion. State
v. Maltese, 222 N.J. 525, 543 (2015) (quoting State v. Hreha, 217
N.J. 368, 381-82 (2014)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct.
1187, 194 L. Ed. 2d 241 (2016). We defer to the trial court's
findings supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record,
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particularly when they are grounded in the judge's feel of the
case and ability to assess the witnesses' demeanor and credibility.
State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 15 (2009); State v. Elders, 192
N.J. 224, 243-44 (2007). Our deference is required even where the
motion court's "factfindings [are] based on video or documentary
evidence," such as recordings of custodial interrogations by the
police. State v. S.S., __ N.J. __, __ (2017) (slip op. at 18, 24-
25).
We will not reverse a motion court's findings of fact based
on its review of a recording of a custodial interrogation unless
the findings are clearly erroneous or mistaken. Id. at 16-17. We
review issues of law de novo. Id. at 25; State v. Shaw, 213 N.J.
398, 411 (2012).
"The right against self-incrimination is guaranteed by the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and this state's
common law, now embodied in statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19, and
evidence rule, N.J.R.E. 503." State v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383,
399, cert. denied, 558 U.S. 831, 130 S. Ct. 65, 175 L. Ed. 2d 48(2009). "Confessions obtained by the police during a custodial
interrogation are barred from evidence unless the defendant has
been advised of his or her" Miranda rights. State v. Knight, 183
N.J. 449, 461 (2005).
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At a hearing challenging the admission of statements made
during a custodial interrogation, the "state must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that a defendant's confession was voluntary and
was not made because defendant's will was overborne." Id. at 462.
The State must also prove "the defendant was advised of his rights
and knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived them." State
v. W.B., 205 N.J. 588, 602 n.3 (2011).
Defendant first argues the court erred by denying the
suppression motion because the police failed to fully inform him
of his Miranda rights. We find no support in the record for the
contention. Aviles read each of the defendant's Miranda rights,2
Kearns asked if defendant understood everything Aviles said, and
defendant responded in the affirmative. The record supports the
court's finding that defendant was advised of his Miranda rights
and understood them.
Defendant also argues Kearns misled defendant when, following
defendant's reading of the waiver paragraph, Kearns said
"basically what the paragraph states" is that no one "beat up,"
2
A suspect must be advised of "the right to remain silent, that
anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that
he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he
cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to
any questioning if he so desires." Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at
479, 86 S. Ct. at 1630, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 726. A defendant must be
afforded the "[o]pportunity to exercise these rights . . .
throughout the interrogation." Ibid.8 A-3166-14T1
threatened, or made any promises to defendant. Defendant argues
the statement was inaccurate and the court therefore erred by
finding defendant knowingly waived his Miranda rights. We
disagree.
Kearns's statement did not misinform defendant about his
Miranda rights or contradict Aviles's statement of defendant's
rights. Cf. State v Pillar, 359 N.J. Super. 249, 268 (App. Div.)
("A police officer cannot directly contradict, out of one side of
his mouth, the Miranda warnings just given out of the other."),
certif. denied, 177 N.J. 572 (2003). To the contrary, Kearns's
statement pertained solely to the waiver paragraph on the Miranda
rights form. Kearns said only that he was explaining what "that
paragraph" said.
Also, Kearns's statements were consistent with the waiver
paragraph. In part, the paragraph states that defendant had not
been threatened or coerced, no pressure had been used against him,
and no promises were made to him. That is precisely what Kearns
told defendant.
The paragraph includes additional information concerning
defendant's waiver of his rights that Kearns did not mention, and
thus it may be argued his statement was incomplete or otherwise
inaccurate because he also said that he was describing what the
paragraph "basically" provided. We reject the argument because the
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record shows that independent of Kearns's statements, defendant
actually read the waiver paragraph before he signed it. Thus,
there was sufficient credible evidence that defendant was fully
informed of the complete content of the waiver paragraph and
indicated his agreement to waive his rights by signing the waiver
rights form after he read it.
Moreover, any inadequacies in Kearns's statement concerning
the waiver paragraph do not require a reversal of the court's
denial of defendant's suppression motion because a written waiver
of defendant's Miranda rights was not required, and the record
otherwise shows that even without defendant's execution of the
waiver form, he knowingly waived his Miranda rights.
A written waiver was not required for defendant to knowingly
waive his Miranda rights. State v. Faucette, 439 N.J. Super. 241,
262 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 221 N.J. 492 (2015). "Failure to
sign a form of waiver does not preclude a finding of waiver, nor
does it make further questioning a violation of [a] defendant's
constitutional rights." State v. Warmbrun, 277 N.J. Super. 51,
63 (App. Div. 1994) (quoting United States v. Filiberto, 712 F.
Supp. 482, 487 (E.D.Pa. 1989)), certif. denied, 140 N.J. 277(1995). "The voluntariness of [a] defendant's waiver is tested
by the totality of all the surrounding circumstances," only one
of which is defendant's execution of a written waiver. Id. at 62-
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63; see also North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S.
Ct. 1755, 1757, 60 L. Ed. 2d 286, 292 (1979) ("An express written
or oral statement of waiver of the right to remain silent or of
the right to counsel is usually strong proof of the validity of
that waiver, but is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient
to establish waiver.")
A waiver of Miranda rights "need not take a designated legal
form nor need it be expressed in designated legal terminology."
State v. Yough, 49 N.J. 587, 596 (1967). "Any clear manifestation
of a desire to waive is sufficient." State v. Kremens, 52 N.J.
303, 311 (1968). Here, the court reviewed the recording showing
the detectives' interactions with defendant, and considered the
totality of the circumstances surrounding defendant's waiver of
his Miranda rights. In addition to defendant's execution of the
waiver form, there was other sufficient credible evidence
supporting the court's finding defendant knowingly waived his
Miranda rights. As noted, Aviles read the Miranda rights to
defendant and defendant understood them. Moreover, defendant read
the waiver paragraph aloud. The detectives then asked defendant
if he was willing to talk to them, defendant said they could ask
him questions, and he thereafter responded to the questions. Based
on the totality of the circumstances presented, we are therefore
convinced there was ample support for court's determination that
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defendant knowingly waived his Miranda rights. S.S., supra, slip
op. at 27.
We are also not persuaded by defendant's argument that the
court erred by rejecting his claim that he invoked his right to
remain silent when he said "I do not want to talk about this
anymore." The police are required to stop a custodial interrogation
when a suspect unambiguously invokes the right to remain silent
and to "diligently honor[]" a request, however ambiguous, to
terminate questioning. S.S., supra, slip op. at 29 (quoting State
v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 142 (1998)). "In those circumstances in
which the suspect's statement is susceptible to two different
meanings, the interrogating officer must cease questioning and
'inquire of the suspect as to the correct interpretation.'" Ibid.(quoting State v. Johnson, 120 N.J. 263, 283 (1990)).
However, it is "[n]ot merely the words spoken, . . . but the
full context in which they were spoken [that] have to be considered
in determining whether there has been an invocation of the right
to remain silent." State v. Roman, 382 N.J. Super. 44, 64 (App.
Div. 2005), certif. granted, 188 N.J. 219 (2006), certif. dismissed
as improvidently granted, 189 N.J. 420 (2007). In determining
whether the right to remain silent has been invoked, the totality
of the circumstances are considered, including "the words used and
the suspect's actions or behaviors," to discern whether "the
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investigating officer should have reasonably believed that the
right was being asserted." State v. Diaz-Bridges, 208 N.J. 544,
565 (2012). Officers need not cease their interrogation if the
defendant's "words or conduct could not reasonably be viewed as
invoking the right to remain silent," but if the officers "are
reasonably uncertain whether the person is asserting the right to
remain silent, they may only ask questions directed to resolving
that uncertainty." State v. Burno-Taylor, 400 N.J. Super. 581, 590
(App. Div. 2008).
The court thoroughly reviewed the totality of the evidence
presented here. Nyhammer, supra, 197 N.J. at 402. It carefully
considered the context in which defendant stated that he did "not
want to talk about this anymore" and determined defendant expressed
only a desire to end his short debate with Kearns over whether a
videotape existed, and not that he wished to invoke his right to
remain silent or end the interrogation. Indeed, defendant's
statement is part of a longer assertion, "I don't think you can
even show me a video of me with a gun, but I'm saying we gonna, I
do not want to talk about this anymore, all we going to do is go
back and forth about the situation." Further, as found by the
court, after making the statement defendant continued his
discussion with the officers without hesitation or any indication
he wanted to remain silent.
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Based on our review of the record, we find nothing clearly
mistaken or erroneous in the court's findings of fact. S.S., supra,
slip op. at 27. We therefore defer to the court's findings and
discern no basis to reverse the court's conclusion that defendant's
statement was not an invocation, ambiguous or otherwise, of his
right to remain silent.
Affirmed.
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