STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. ALEXIS DEJESUS(99-01-0102, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )


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  •                         NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-0759-15T2
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    ALEXIS DEJESUS, a/k/a
    ALEXIS DEJESUS-REYES,
    ALEXIS RODRIGUEZ, "FRIJOL,"
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________________
    Submitted April 5, 2017 – Decided June 7, 2017
    Before Judges Alvarez and Lisa.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Law Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 99-
    01-0102.
    Alexis DeJesus, appellant pro se.
    Carolyn A. Murray, Acting Essex County
    Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Maria I.
    Guerrero,     Special     Deputy     Attorney
    General/Acting   Assistant   Prosecutor,   of
    counsel and on the brief.
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant appeals from the September 8, 2015 order denying
    his motion to correct an illegal sentence.        For the reasons that
    follow, we affirm.
    After being convicted by a jury for multiple crimes committed
    on July 25, 1998, defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of
    sixty-four years subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA),
    N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.    More specifically, the base terms imposed
    were forty-years for first-degree felony murder, and eight-years
    each for three counts of second-degree aggravated assault, with
    all terms ordered to be served consecutively.
    Defendant filed a direct appeal, and we issued our decision
    on February 17, 2004, State v. DeJesus, No. A-5736-00 (App. Div.
    February 17, 2004), certif. denied, 
    180 N.J. 452
     (2004).               We
    affirmed defendant's convictions and addressed the sentencing
    arguments he made.    In doing so, we reversed the NERA component
    of the felony murder sentence because it was not authorized under
    the version of NERA in effect at the time of defendant's crime or
    sentence.   On remand with respect to that issue, the trial court
    left in place the forty-year base term originally imposed, and
    replaced the eighty-five percent NERA parole disqualifier with a
    thirty-year parole disqualifier.       At the time of defendant's crime
    and sentence, and to the present time, thirty years is the minimum
    allowable parole disqualifier for murder.       N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b(1).
    2                            A-0759-15T2
    Defendant subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction
    relief, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel.   The petition
    was denied by the trial court.       We affirmed in our opinion of
    March 9, 2009.   State v. DeJesus, No. A-5322-06 (App. Div. March
    9, 2009), certif. denied, 
    199 N.J. 516
     (2009).
    Six years later, on August 26, 2015, defendant filed a pro
    se motion to correct an illegal sentence. Specifically, his motion
    challenged as illegal two aspects of the sentence imposed on the
    three second-degree aggravated assault counts:   (1) that the NERA
    component imposed on those sentences was illegal, and (2) that
    requiring those sentences to be served consecutively rather than
    concurrently was also illegal.
    The trial court denied the motion by order of September 8,
    2015, accompanied by a written statement of reasons.      The judge
    noted that defendant had raised both of those issues on direct
    appeal and they were both rejected by this court in our February
    17, 2004 decision.   The judge therefore concluded that defendant
    was barred from re-litigating them more than a decade after they
    had been resolved on appeal.
    In the present appeal, defendant presents these arguments:
    POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED THE EX POST
    FACTO CLAUSE BY ILLEGALLY IMPOSING THE NO
    EARLY RELEASE ACT TO COUNTS 2, 3, AND 4
    (Second-Degree Aggravated Assault Charges) AS
    THE DEFENDANT WAS SENTENCED PRIOR TO THE 2001
    3                          A-0759-15T2
    AMENDMENTS TO NERA, THEREFORE, DEFENDANT'S
    SENTENCE AS TO THOSE COUNTS ARE ILLEGAL AND
    MUST BE CORRECTED. (U.S. Const., Art. I, 10,
    cl. 1; N.J. Const. (1947), Art. IV, sec. VII,
    cl. 3) (Partially Raised Below).
    POINT II:     DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO THE
    PRESUMPTIVE    TERMS     FOR   SECOND-DEGREE
    AGGRAVATED ASSAULT COUNTS. (Raised Below).
    POINT III:   THE 40-YEAR SENTENCE IMPOSED ON
    COUNT SEVEN (Felony Murder) IS ABOVE THE
    MINIMUM   30-YEAR  SENTENCE   AUTHORIZED  BY
    N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b(1), THEREFORE MUST BE
    CORRECTED. (Not Raised Below).
    These arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a
    written opinion.     See R. 2:11-3(e)(2).   We provide these brief
    comments.
    The argument raised in Point I, that NERA should not have
    been applied to the three aggravated assault counts, was raised
    on direct appeal, and we rejected it.   See DeJesus, supra, No. A-
    5736-00 (slip op. at 26).    We explained in detail the reasons for
    rejecting this argument and there is no basis upon which to revisit
    it now.
    Likewise, although not referenced in the Point I heading, in
    the body of his argument defendant argues that he should have been
    given concurrent rather than consecutive sentences on the three
    aggravated assault counts.   In our prior opinion on direct appeal,
    we also considered and rejected that argument, explaining our
    reasons in detail.   DeJesus, supra, No. A-5736-00 (slip op. at 27-
    4                         A-0759-15T2
    30).    There is no basis upon which we should now address this
    matter, which we adjudicated more than a decade ago.
    In Points II and III, defendant argues that the base terms
    imposed were excessive. He did not raise these arguments on direct
    appeal or in his post-conviction relief proceeding.                 Further,
    these issues were not raised in the motion which is the subject
    of this appeal, and accordingly are not cognizable on appeal.
    State   v.   Robinson,    
    200 N.J. 1
    ,   20-22   (2009).     Finally,   the
    arguments are lacking in substantive merit.              The sentencing judge
    articulated,       with   adequate     support      in    the   record,    the
    applicability of two aggravating factors and the non-applicability
    of any mitigating factors.             The preponderance of aggravating
    factors justified the base terms imposed.
    Affirmed.
    5                              A-0759-15T2
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-0759-15T2

Filed Date: 6/7/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021