JARROD KAUFMAN VS. LUMBER LIQUIDATORS, INC (L-5358-14, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)Â ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is only binding on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3278-14T1
JARROD KAUFMAN, RACHEL KAUFMAN,
WILLIAM QUICK and NANCY QUICK,
on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
LUMBER LIQUIDATORS, INC. and
ROBERT M. LYNCH,
Defendants-Respondents.
_________________________________
Argued September 21, 2016 – Decided August 22, 2017
Before Judges Fuentes, Simonelli and Carroll.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Docket
No. L-5358-14.
Andrew R. Wolf argued the cause for appellants
(The Wolf Law Firm, LLC, attorneys; Mr. Wolf,
Matthew S. Oorbeek, Henry P. Wolfe, Andrew W.
Li and Daniel I. Rubin, on the briefs).
Brian E. O'Donnell argued the cause for
respondents (Riker Danzig Scherer Hyland &
Perretti, LLP, attorneys; Mr. O'Donnell,
Michael P. O'Mullan, Jeffrey M. Beyer and
Casey A. Boyle, of counsel and on the brief).
Gavin J. Rooney argued the cause for amicus
curiae The New Jersey Civil Justice Institute
and Chamber of Commerce of the United States
of America (Lowenstein Sandler, LLP,
attorneys; Mr. Rooney and Naomi D.
Barrowclough, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiffs Jarrod and Rachel Kaufman and William and Nancy
Quick are two sets of consumers who filed a putative class action
suit against defendant Lumber Liquidators, Inc. and its Chief
Executive Officer, Robert M. Lynch. In their complaint, plaintiffs
alleged they purchased "wood flooring and associated merchandise"
from Lumber Liquidators "several times from August 29, 2012 through
October 20, 2012." The sales invoices defendants provided did not
contain language promising plaintiffs that "the merchandise" they
ordered would be delivered by a specific date. (Emphasis added).
Plaintiffs claimed Lumber Liquidators' failure to include the
precise "delivery date" language on its sales invoices violated
the Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act (TCCWNA),
N.J.S.A. 56:12-14 to -18; the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), N.J.S.A.
56:8-1 to -20; and the Delivery of Household Furniture and
Furnishings Regulations, N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.1 to -5.4. Plaintiffs
do not allege defects or deficiencies in the products they
received. In fact, they suffered no actual damages. They seek
only statutory civil penalties in the amount of $100 for each
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alleged violation of the TCCWNA and reasonable attorney's fees
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 56:12-17.
The Law Division granted defendants' motion to dismiss
plaintiffs' complaint as a matter of law for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. See R. 4:6-2(e). The
dispositive issue is whether the hardwood flooring plaintiffs
purchased from Lumber Liquidators constitutes "household
furniture" under N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.1(d), which provides as
follows: "For purposes of this rule, 'household furniture'
includes, but is not limited to, furniture, major electrical
appliances, and such items as carpets and draperies."
Applying the well-settled standards established by the
Supreme Court in Printing-Mart Morristown v. Sharp Electronics
Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989), Judge Andrea G. Carter concluded
"a plain reading" of N.J.A.C. 13:45A-5.1(d) shows the term
"household furniture" does not include hardwood flooring. Judge
Carter found no reason to include non-moveable improvements to
real property, such as hardwood flooring or wall-to-wall
carpeting, in the regulatory definition of "household furniture."
Plaintiffs argue Judge Carter erred in adopting such a narrow
reading of the regulation. Defendants urge us to uphold Judge
Carter's analysis and ultimate conclusion. The New Jersey Civil
Justice Institute and the United States Chamber of Commerce filed
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a joint brief as amici curiae, urging us to use this case as an
opportunity to adopt "a rigorous standard" for defining what
constitutes a "clearly established legal right of a consumer"
under the TCCWNA. See N.J.S.A. 56:12-15.
We agree with Judge Carter's analysis and affirm. The long-
established canon of ejusdem generis provides that "'where general
words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general
words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to
those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.'" Wilson
ex rel. Manzano v. City of Jersey City, 209 N.J. 558, 584 (2012)
(quoting Massachi v. City of Newark Police Dep't, 415 N.J. Super.
518, 543–44 (App. Div. 2010)). The objects provided to illustrate
the limits of the regulation's reach clearly exclude items such
as hardwood floors, which, as Judge Carter noted, constitute
permanent improvements to property. When "the plain language
yields the meaning of the statute [or regulation], then our task
is complete." State v. Williams, 218 N.J. 576, 586 (2014) (citing
DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)).
We thus affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by
Judge Carter in her oral opinion delivered from the bench on
February 20, 2015. In this light, we decline Amici Curiae's
invitation to go beyond the four corners of plaintiffs' pleading
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to resolve the straightforward dispositive legal question
presented here.
Affirmed.
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