DCPP VS. S.P. AND Y.M.IN THE MATTER OF P.P., S.P., O.P., R.P. AND A.K.B.(FN-01-0172-10, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2017 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4397-15T3
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD
PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
S.P.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
Y.M.,
Defendant.
______________________________________
IN THE MATTER OF P.P., S.P., O.P.,
R.P. and A.K.B.,
Minors.
_____________________________________________________
Submitted October 11, 2017 – Decided October 18, 2017
Before Judges Fisher and Sumners.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part,
Atlantic County, Docket No. FN-01-0172-10.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Anthony J. Vecchio, Designated
Counsel, on the brief).
Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
attorney for respondent (Melissa Dutton
Schaffer, Assistant Attorney General, of
counsel; Kimberly S. Dinenberg, Deputy
Attorney General, on the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law
Guardian, attorney for minors (Todd Wilson,
Designated Counsel, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
This action, commenced by the Division of Child Protection
and Permanency, asserted that defendants Y.M. and S.P. abused or
neglected their infant child R.P., who was born in January 2010
and who sustained skull and rib injuries at three different times
within a two-week period in or around April 2010. This is now the
third time the matter has come before us.
On the first occasion, we granted leave to appeal and
summarily reversed an order entered in favor of defendants because
the trial judge's findings "d[id] not account for" N.J.S.A. 9:6-
8.46(a)(2), which, as we then said, specifies that when the
Division submits "'proof of injuries sustained by a child or of
the condition of a child of such a nature as would ordinarily not
be sustained or exist except by reason of the acts or omissions
of the parent,' such proofs 'shall be prima facie evidence that a
child . . . is an abused or neglected child.'" Following that
remand, the judge concluded the shifting of the burden of
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persuasion to defendants compelled a finding that defendants
abused or neglected the child. Also, after providing defendants
with the opportunity to present expert testimony, the judge
reversed herself and precluded that testimony.
That determination prompted the second appeal. For reasons
set forth in an unpublished opinion, we agreed that the burden of
persuasion was properly shifted to defendants but concluded that
the trial judge erred in refusing defendants the opportunity to
provide expert testimony to contest the cause of the child's
injuries. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. Y.M. and S.P.,
Nos. A-3450/3507-11 (App. Div. Jan. 15, 2014).
Following that remand, another judge conducted a three-day
hearing that included expert testimony from both defendants and
the Division. By way of his written opinion, Judge Jeffrey J.
Waldman explained how the defense expert had failed to persuade
him that defendants had not abused or neglected the child.
Defendant S.P. appeals,1 arguing only:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT [S.P.]
ABUSED AND NEGLECTED HIS CHILDREN BECAUSE
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE PRESENTED THAT HE CAUSED
THE INJURIES TO [R.P.] AND WHERE [S.P.]
PRESENTED EXPERT TESTIMONY EXPLAINING
POTENTIAL CAUSES OF THE INJURY OTHER THAN
ABUSE.
1
Only S.P., the child's father, appeals. The child's mother, Y.M.,
had appealed past rulings but does not now appeal.
3 A-4397-15T3
We find insufficient merit in this argument to warrant further
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Judge Waldman's findings were based on substantial evidence
he found credible and, for that reason, we must defer to those
findings. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1974); N.J. Div.
of Youth & Family Servs. v. H.B., 375 N.J. Super. 148, 172 (App.
Div. 2005). Finding no principled reason for second-guessing the
judge's findings or the conclusions drawn from those findings, we
reject defendant S.P.'s arguments.
Affirmed.
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