MILDALIA MADLINGER VS. NEW JERSEY TRANSIT CORPORATION (L-4844-14, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )


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  •                         NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-2310-15T4
    JAMMIE SKAZENSKI,
    Appellant,
    v.
    NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
    Respondent.
    Submitted April 25, 2017 – Decided May 5, 2017
    Before Judges Reisner and Mayer.
    On appeal from the New Jersey Department of
    Corrections.
    Jammie Skazenski, appellant pro se.
    Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
    attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi,
    Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Alex
    Zowin, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Appellant, Jammie Skazenski, presently an inmate at Northern
    State Prison, appeals from the January 19, 2016 disposition of
    disciplinary       appeal    issued    by   the   New   Jersey    Department       of
    Corrections (DOC). The DOC upheld a disciplinary hearing officer's
    decision,   dated   December    29,       2015,   finding   that    Skazenski
    committed prohibited act *.204 (use of prohibited substance). We
    affirm.
    Based upon information from a confidential informant, the
    prison learned inmates, including Skazenski, were using drugs in
    contravention of prison rules. To maintain the safety and security
    of   prisons,   there   must   be   assurance     that   drugs     or   illegal
    substances are not present. See Jackson v. Dep't of Corrections,
    
    335 N.J. Super. 227
    , 233-34 (App. Div. 2000), certif. denied, 
    167 N.J. 630
    (2001).    Consequently, prisons may require urine samples
    from inmates.   See Hamilton v. N.J. Dep't of Corrections, 366 N.J.
    Super. 284, 291 (App. Div. 2004).         Because Skazenski was suspected
    of illegal drug use, he was required to provide a urine sample.
    Appellant claims that on December 1, 2015, he provided an
    initial urine sample which tested negative.           He also alleges that
    on December 2, 2015, the prison required a second urine sample
    without a reasonable factual basis.           According to appellant, the
    prison improperly handled and improperly labeled his second urine
    sample.
    According to the DOC's evidence, only one sample was taken -
    on December 2 - and that sample tested positive for drug use.                   A
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    notice of violation for commission of prohibited act *.204 was
    issued based upon that positive urine test.
    Appellant alleged that the prison confused his December 2
    urine sample with that of another inmate.            He contended that the
    disciplinary report issued to him identified "Inmate Vazquez,
    Edwin" in the body of the report.           Appellant further argued that
    the time listed on the second sample indicated he voided eight
    minutes prior to the time he claims that he voided.
    Because of those issues, the DOC hearing officer postponed
    the hearing to address the discrepancies in the disciplinary report
    issued to plaintiff.     The hearing officer accepted the prison's
    explanation   that   insertion   of       another   inmate's    name   in   the
    disciplinary report was a clerical error, resulting from the use
    of a "template" for issuance of the report.                The corrections
    officer issuing the disciplinary report explained he failed to
    change the name in the body of the charge, which contained language
    taken from a charge issued to another inmate.          The hearing officer
    found Skazenski's name and SBI number were correctly identified
    in the top section of the disciplinary report.                 Concerning the
    timing of the alleged second sample, the "continuity of evidence"
    form signed by Skazenski indicated his sample was collected at
    "11:33 AM" and the disciplinary report indicated the sample was
    collected at "1133 hours."
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    Upon determining there was no mislabeling or other mistake
    concerning the second sample, the hearing officer found Skazenski
    committed prohibited act *.204.    The resulting sanctions included
    segregation, daily urine monitoring, loss of commutation credits,
    loss of recreation time, and loss of contact visits.        Skazenski
    filed an administrative appeal from the hearing officer's guilty
    finding.     In a written report dated January 19, 2016, the DOC
    denied the appeal and affirmed the hearing officer's findings and
    sanctions.
    Skazenski presents two arguments on this appeal.        First, he
    claims the purported second urine test violated N.J.A.C. 10A:3-
    5.10(b)(8) as no factual basis was provided to support a second
    sample.    Second, he argues a denial of due process and a fair
    hearing because he lacked access to evidence related to the
    disciplinary hearing.
    Prison disciplinary hearings are not criminal prosecutions,
    and "thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a
    proceeding does not apply."   Avant v. Clifford, 
    67 N.J. 496
    , 522
    (1975) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 
    408 U.S. 471
    , 480, 
    92 S. Ct. 2593
    , 2600, 
    33 L. Ed. 2d 484
    , 494 (1972)).          Prisoners receive
    limited due process protections.      
    Ibid. The protections extended
    to prisoners include written notice of the charges a minimum of
    twenty-four hours prior to the hearing, an impartial tribunal to
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    consider the charges, a limited right to call witnesses, assistance
    of counsel substitute, and a right to a written statement of
    evidence relied upon and the reasons for the sanctions imposed.
    
    Id. at 525-33.
    The scope of appellate review of an administrative agency's
    final decision is limited. In re Herrmann, 
    192 N.J. 19
    , 27 (2007).
    Decisions by an agency will be upheld, unless the decision is
    "arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or it is not supported by
    substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole." Henry v.
    Rahway State Prison, 
    81 N.J. 571
    , 579-80 (1980).          Our review is
    limited to whether the agency's findings could reasonably have
    been reached based on substantial evidence in the record.             In re
    Taylor, 
    158 N.J. 644
    , 656 (1999).        See also 
    Avant, supra
    , 67 N.J.
    at 530 (noting the substantial evidence standard applied to guilty
    findings in DOC appeals).
    During   the    disciplinary       hearing,   Skazenski    had     the
    opportunity to present evidence and witnesses in support of his
    allegations   and   to   cross-examine   adverse   witnesses.    Despite
    having identified potential witnesses, he declined to present any
    witnesses in his favor.     He also declined to cross-examine adverse
    witnesses. His evidence was limited to a written statement in
    support of his claims.
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    Appellant received the protections afforded to prisoners
    subjected to disciplinary proceedings, including assistance of
    counsel substitute, consistent with 
    Avant, supra
    .                 His counsel
    substitute requested a copy of the order to void, requested
    leniency on behalf of Skazenski, and relied on the statement
    previously provided by Skazenski.           Appellant offered no evidence
    contradicting the substantial evidence presented to the hearing
    officer.    "Substantial evidence" is "such evidence as a reasonable
    mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."                  In re
    Hackensack Water Co., 
    41 N.J. Super. 408
    , 418 (App. Div. 1956).
    As previously noted, the prison received an anonymous call
    that inmates in Skazenski's unit were using illegal substances.
    This created the factual basis for urine testing consistent with
    N.J.A.C. 10A:3-5.10(b).          Skazenski was required to void a urine
    specimen on December 2, 2015.          The sample was closed, sealed and
    labeled in his presence.          The ID number on the sample he voided
    was   the   same   ID   number   on   the   continuity   of   evidence   form.
    According to the prison's continuity of evidence log, he only
    voided for sampling once on December 2, 2015.                 No evidence was
    presented to the hearing officer, other than Skazenski's own
    written statement, substantiating the prison's collection of two
    urine samples.      He had an opportunity to call the prison officer
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    who allegedly took the first urine sample but declined to call any
    witnesses during the hearing.
    Based on our review of the record, there was substantial
    credible evidence to find Skazenski guilty of prohibited act *.204.
    The DOC's decision comported with procedural due process.               The
    DOC's   determination   of   guilt   and   the   sanctions   imposed   were
    supported by substantial credible evidence.
    Affirmed.
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